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Overview
This dissertation is subdivided into four parts, each consisting of several
chapters. Part I outlines the problem of human uniqueness. Chapter 1
contain mainly introductory material that provides background informa-
tion that is presupposed in the other chapters. In this way, all readers will
be on the same page with regard to the cognitive and evolutionary the-
ories on which this thesis draws. Chapter 2 considers the human mental
toolbox. It provides an overview of recent theories on how humans con-
ceptualize the world, and what their mental tool box looks like. Chapter
3 approaches the problem of human uniqueness through an examination
of language, indicating how a combination of modules can give rise to
a uniquely human cognitive specialization without invoking a monolithic
language faculty. Chapter 4 provides a detailed behavioral ecological anal-
ysis of the evolution of human social cognition during the late Pliocene
and early Pleistocene.
With this background on human cognition set up, the next parts will
examine products of human creativity. Part II discusses the evolutionary
and cognitive origins of human artistic behavior. Chapter 5 evaluates
recent cognitive neuropsychological and evolutionary psychological ap-
proaches to the appreciation and creation of art. Chapter 6 provides a
cultural group selectionist model of artistic behavior, as exemplified in
Magdalenian mobiliary art. Chapter 7 discusses how findings from devel-
opmental psychology, cognitive archeology, and ethnoarcheology, provide
insights into the earliest art production, focusing on Late Middle Stone
Age engraved objects from southern Africa and Aurignacian mobiliary
art from Germany. Chapter 8 argues that some forms of art, especially
incised bone and antler objects and rock art, were used to supplement
internal mechanisms of mental time travel, greatly enhancing our ability
to recognize cyclicity in the environment.
Part III focuses on the cognitive science of religion, especially on how
it can be applied to the reasoning of theologians and philosophers of
religion. Chapter 9 examines how the argument from design relies on
intuitions about the purpose and design of artifacts and natural objects.
Chapter 10 suggests that the cosmological argument relies on universal
human intuitions about causation.
Part IV considers the cognitive basis of scientific practice. Chapter 11
discusses the limitations that our evolved cognitive capacities impose on
scientific practice, focusing on paleoanthropology and comparative psy-
xv
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chology. Chapter 12 demonstrates how individual researchers can over-
come these cognitive biases by being part of a community of interacting
scientists that exchange different inferences and hypotheses. The conclu-
sion outlines implications of this evolutionary and cognitive approaches
to uniquely human creative behavior for philosophical anthropological
research, and indicates directions for future research.
Part I
Uniquely human behavior
1

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What is it like to be a human?
Echolocation in bats is a paradigmatic example of an adaptive cognitive
specialization. In What is it like to be a bat?, Thomas Nagel (1974) fa-
mously argued that echolocation, although clearly a form of perception,
is not similar in its operation to any human sensory experience, so we can
never know what it is like to be a bat. Three decades later, neuroscientist
and primatologist Todd Preuss (2004) wrote a paper entitled What is it
like to be a human? Remote as bat cognition may seem to us, we also
seem to have little understanding of what cognitive capacities are typical
for humans. What enables us to have complex and cumulative cultural
traditions, fluent speech, symbolic storage of information, elaborate social
and moral norms, and an inquisitiveness about the world that underlies
our philosophical inquiry and scientific practice? Since the mid 1970s,
molecular biologists (e.g., King & Wilson, 1975) have accumulated em-
pirical evidence that humans share the bulk of their genetic material with
their closest living relatives, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). Compar-
ing the draft of the complete chimpanzee genome with that of the human
genome leads to an estimate of about 98 % genes common to both species
(Mikkelsen et al., 2005). By taking into account insertions and deletions
of genetic material, this figure drops to 95% (Gojobori, Tang, Akey, &
Wu, 2007). Still, even with this more conservative estimate, we are left
with a surprisingly small fraction of the genome to carry the burden of
all behavioral and morphological differences between both species.
To get a sense of the behavioral differences between humans and other
primates, let us compare the daily lives of humans with that of other great
apes. First, there is a striking difference in geographical spread: whereas
extant nonhuman great apes live preferentially in tropical rainforests (e.g.,
chimpanzees in West- and Central-Africa, orangutans in Southeast-Asia),
humans occupy more ecological niches than any other species. No other
species can maintain itself so successfully in the diverging conditions
of tropical rain-forests, high-altitude plateaus, arid deserts, small coral
atolls, or the desolate arctic tundra. Each of these environments requires
different subsistence styles and technologies. The human capacity for cul-
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tural transmission enables us to find and transmit solutions to extreme
ecological challenges. The main reason that Inuit can survive so well un-
der the severe ecological conditions of the North Pole is not that they
have physiological adaptations to the cold climate (which are quite mod-
est compared to other large mammalian species that inhabit the same
region, like polar bears), but that their technology and subsistence is well
suited to these conditions.
Until well into the second half of the 20th century, humans were so
impressed with their own cultural achievements, that they did not rec-
ognize the sophistication of socially transmitted skills in nonhuman an-
imals. This has changed. Observations of chimpanzee behavior in the
wild indicate at least 39 distinct cultural traditions (Whiten et al., 1999);
orangutans have at least 24 culturally transmitted behaviors (Van Schaik
et al., 2003). Nevertheless, there still seems to be a substantial differ-
ence between human culture and nonhuman cultural traditions. Since
Jane Goodall started publishing her observations on chimpanzee groups
in the 1960s, very little if anything has changed in chimpanzee material
culture or social structures. There has been no Pan version of the Kyoto
and Copenhagen climate summits, there have been no debates concerning
simian gay marriages, nor did we witness anything analogous to the com-
puter revolution in chimpanzee material culture. Whereas humans today
are faced with challenges and technologies that would have been incon-
ceivable in the 1960s, chimpanzees live basically the same lives as when
Jane Goodall first observed them. Like 50 years ago, chimpanzee moth-
ers today bring up their offspring alone, chimpanzee males form alliances
and vie for power, and they have still have their traditional diet that
consists mostly of picked fruit and young leaves (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster,
& Hurtado, 2000). By contrast, human culture is cumulative: we depend
on socially transmitted behaviors that we further refine, mostly leading
to a cumulative retention of innovations and improvements over the gen-
erations—exceptions like Tasmania, where there was a loss of cultural
information, notwithstanding (see e.g., Henrich, 2004b, for an account of
the steady loss of technology over the past millennia). Tomasello (1999a,
5) captures this with the metaphor of the ratchett effect: “faithful social
transmission that can work as a ratchet to prevent slippage backward
—so that the newly invented artifact or practice preserves its new and
improved form at least somewhat faithfully until a further modication or
improvement comes along.”
1.1. What is it like to be a human? 5
Some may argue that this comparison is unfair—what if there is in-
deed some form of cumulative cultural evolution in chimpanzees that has
simply not been observed yet, since observations of chimpanzee behavior
are only reliably recorded since the 1960s? The fast pace of human cul-
tural evolution is not a recent phenomenon: we can see a marked increase
in stone tool types in Europe since about 45,000 BP1, and in Africa and
the Middle East, evidence for this dates back even further, to the end
of the Middle Pleistocene, ca. 130,000–125,000 BP (Conard, 2007, 2004–
2008). By contrast, analyses of wear patterns on stone tools from Coˆte
d’Ivoire (Mercader et al., 2007) that were used by chimpanzees about
4,300 years ago indicate that chimpanzees used unmodified stone tools
as a form of percussive technology: these stones had traces of starch,
indicating that they were used to crack open nuts. Present-day chim-
panzees (Pan troglodytes verus) in the Ta¨ı forest do exactly the same:
they crack nuts by hammering them with unmodified stones, as can be
seen in Fig. 1.1. Even scholars who have argued in favor of the attribu-
tion of culture to chimpanzees (and other nonhuman animals) admit that
evidence for anything like cumulative culture in chimpanzees is scant:
To date, it appears that there is indeed little such evidence
[for cumulative culture]. Given what we know of the learning
powers of chimpanzees, most of the cultural behaviors identi-
fied to date appear to be ones that have not advanced beyond
the achievement of their original inventors, rather than be-
ing the products of generations of complexification (Whiten,
Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, 2003, 95).
Systematic attempts to replicate cumulative culture with chimpanzees
have been largely unsuccessful. For example, Marshall-Pescini andWhiten
(2008) first showed juvenile chimpanzees how to extract honey from a de-
vice using a simple dipping technique, where a stick could be placed in
a rectangular box to obtain honey. The chimpanzees mastered this tech-
nique with ease. In a second stage, the human model demonstrated a
more complex probing technique that incorporated the dipping technique
to lever the lid off the box, which was a more effective way to get to the
honey. None of the subjects was able to master this latter technique, even
though they could perform the separate steps. It seemed as if the animals
were ‘stuck’ on the simpler, suboptimal dipping technique that brought
them some immediate reward.
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Figure 1.1: Human cultural evolution and chimpanzee cultural sta-
sis. 4,300 years ago, humans used adzes to work the land (bot-
tom left) which exhibited a gradual evolution in shape (e.g., at first
without hilt) and material (first stone, then copper, then bronze)
only in the course of about one millennium. Current successors to
these adzes are tractors and other agricultural vehicles (top left).
Meanwhile, chimpanzee stone tools (top right) look the same as
they did 4,300 years ago (bottom right). Images (counterclock-
wise) retrieved from http://www.freefoto.com/images/, http://www
.dot-domesday.me.uk/bronze.htm, Mercader et al. (2007), Fig. 2,
p. 3046., http://news.softpedia.com/news/Humans-and-Chimpanzees
-Learned-to-Use-Tools-From-a-Common-Ancestor-46941.shtml
The most convincing example of cumulative culture in a nonhuman
species is tool use in the New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides).
New Caledonian crows fashion two types of tools to catch invertebrates:
one from twigs and similar material, and the other from barbed edges of
pandanus leaves. These tool types each have a limited number of subtypes
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that differ in their modes of manufacture, and that can be found in dis-
tinct, largely non-overlapping geographical locations (so these probably
represent local cultural traditions). Each of these locally distinct man-
ufacturing styles consist of several steps, indicating to Hunt and Gray
(2003) that cumulative cultural evolution may have been at work. The
social transmission of song patterns in songbirds may also provide com-
pelling examples of cumulative cultural evolution in nonhuman animals
(Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). Although such examples suggest that cumu-
lative culture is not uniquely human (in contrast to what authors like
Galef (1992) have proposed), they do indicate that it is specific to hu-
mans within the primate lineage. Indeed, as Laland and Hoppitt (2003,
152) observe, there is more compelling evidence for cumulative cultural
transmission in birds than in nonhuman primates, despite the dispropor-
tionate attention comparative psychologists accord to the latter. Thus,
we are still left with the question how and why cumulative culture evolved
in humans (for a discussion of this, see chapter 4).
Another striking feature of human culture is, as Margolis and Lau-
rence (2007a, ix) put it, that we “live in a world that is, to an unprece-
dented extent, populated by our own creations.” This is not only the
case in urbanized areas. In almost all areas where humans live the land-
scape is altered to a significant extent to meet human needs (e.g., pad-
dies, dykes and fences). Of course, constructing one’s own environment
is not uniquely human. In fact, nest building is far more pervasive across
species than tool use. As Hansell and Ruxton (2008) observe, tool use
and manufacture may have been studied so intensively because of their
rarity in nonhuman traditions and their suggested importance in human
evolution—after all, stone tools and the cut-marks they leave on bones
are often the only tangible traces of Paleolithic human cultures. Animal
constructive behavior, such as nest building in birds or insects often ex-
hibits remarkable flexibility and complexity (e.g., birds have to take into
account local topography and materials when deciding where and how
to construct their nest). It is mainly the sheer extent to which humans
construct their own environment that is remarkable. Although artifacts
and buildings have utilitarian functions, they often also have substantial
cultural and emotional value: our built environment and everyday man-
made objects help to structure our social relationships and identities. For
example, in her detailed anthropological study of artifacts as inalienable
possessions, Annette Weiner (1992) has documented how valuable arti-
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facts, such as the New-Zealand Maori woven cloaks that are transmitted
through generations help to consolidate and justify the political power of
Maori chieftains. In such cases, it is the uniqueness and irreplaceability of
the objects that constitute their value. Even in functional objects, such
as arrowheads, basketry or agricultural tools, the shape of the object is
usually not solely dictated by its intended function. For example, Polly
Wiessner (1983) has shown that Kalahari San (southern African hunter-
gatherers) arrowheads have stylistic variations that are imbued with social
information. Some variations reveal something about the owner’s affili-
ation or group identity, not unlike the use of particular dress codes in
western subcultures. Others are meant to assert the individual identity
of their owner. As we shall see in more detail, this social import of ar-
tifacts can also be inferred from the archeological record, for example,
in beads and figurines from the European Upper Paleolithic (see chap-
ter 6), and perhaps even in older material culture dating to the Middle
Stone Age in Africa (see chapter 7). There is no parallel for this social
dimension of material culture in nonhuman animals.
Finally, humans, unlike other primates, devote considerable time and
energy to activities that do not seem crucially related to survival and re-
production, but that involve creating, maintaining and enjoying objects
and worldviews that are quite remote from mundane tasks like gathering
food and caring for offspring. The arts, religions and scientific knowledge
acquisition are perhaps the most striking examples of this. As Daniel
Dennett (2006, 5) put it: “Hardly anybody would say that the most im-
portant thing in life is having more grandchildren than one’s rivals do, but
this is the default summum bonum of every wild animal.” This is not to
say that these forms of human behavior have no bearing on reproductive
fitness. Geoffrey Miller (2000), for example, has attempted to explain cul-
tural displays in terms of sexual selection, where they serve as an honest
signal of fitness. We shall return to this hypothesis in chapter 5, which
discusses adaptationist accounts of artistic behavior. To take another ex-
ample, scientific knowledge (especially in the medical and technological
spheres) has allowed for an increase in human longevity and a worldwide
population expansion. However, even though they have a clear impact
on human fitness, many scientific innovations start out without any clear
practical purpose in mind. To give but one example, Einstein’s general
theory of relativity allows for the implementation of the GPS satellite
system (Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010, 102)—obviously, Einstein did not
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have GPS in mind when he came up with this theory. A considerable part
of scientific practice is concerned with learning for its own sake. Next to
this, religious people do have a higher reproductive success compared to
atheists and agnostics (Kaufmann, 2010), but it is still a matter of intense
debate whether religion can be seen as an evolutionary adaptation or a
byproduct of other adaptations (more on this in the introduction to part
III).
1.2 The puzzle of human uniqueness
These observations of the peculiarities of human culture provide a starting
point to set up the basic question of this dissertation: the problem of
uniquely human cognition, especially in the domain of creativity. The
question of the place of humans in the world, and especially of the role
of human cognition in shaping that place has ancient roots in philosophy,
going back at least to Aristotle, who saw humans as rational animals. This
view remained popular into the Middle Ages, where all Christian writers
up to Aquinas saw humankind’s power of reasoning as the imago Dei,
i.e., the view that humans are made in the image of God (Van Huyssteen,
2003, 167).
However, developments in philosophy, and later in evolutionary the-
ory, as well as an increasing knowledge about the behavior and cogni-
tive capacities of nonhuman animals have dramatically overturned this
view. In the 18th century it became clear that nonhuman primates, es-
pecially great apes, have a striking resemblance to humans. Anecdotal
observations of apes with humanlike behaviors (including tool-use) and
similarities in their skeletal anatomy were too obvious to be overlooked.
Carl Linnaeus was already compelled to fit humans and apes together in
the order Anthropomorpha, or primates. Linnaeus’ motivation was that
naturalists should classify by physical resemblance alone. Georges-Louis
Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, like Linnaeus, granted a physical resemblance
between humans and apes in his Histoire naturelle ge´ne´rale et partic-
ulie`re (1766), but argued that humans were still set apart by their mental
powers. These classifications, which effectively seemed to undermine the
claim for human uniqueness, were not widely accepted. For example,
the German biologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and the French nat-
uralist George Cuvier divided humans from apes by placing them into
two separate orders: bimana (two-handed creatures) and quadrumana
10 Chapter 1. Introduction
(four-handed creatures) (Bowler, 2003, 50–57). The first to propose an
evolutionary link between humans and apes was Jean-Baptiste Lamarck,
who proposed chimpanzees as the ancestors of the human species in his
Philosophie zoologique (1809). However, Lamarck’s ideas on human evo-
lution were less influential than those proposed by Darwin in the Descent
of Man (1871), which fuel the debate on human uniqueness up to the
present.
Figure 1.2: Cladistic relationships between humans and other apes. (a)
shows the outdated view, with humans set apart from the other apes,
which form a paraphyletic clade, the Pongidae; (b) shows the current
view, with humans, chimpanzees and gorillas forming the Homininae.
Discussions on the relatedness between humans and other apes con-
tinued well into the 20th century. George Gaylord Simpson (1963), for
example, classified hominids apart from the other apes: the nonhuman
apes constituted the Pongidae, a separate lineage comprising all the non-
human great apes which was believed to have diverged from the hominid
lineage as early as 15 million years ago (see Fig. 1.2a). However, sub-
sequent morphological and molecular biological analysis (e.g., Sarich &
Wilson, 1967) indicated that humans and chimpanzees are in fact more
closely related to each other than chimpanzees are to other great apes.
Thus, the Pongidae became a paraphyletic (invalid) clade, because the
clade is not based on evolutionary relationships, but only on the shared
characteristic that its members are nonhuman apes. For the past 30 years,
humans, chimpanzees and gorillas have been grouped into the Homini-
nae, and orangutans have been placed into the Ponginae, as can be seen
in Fig. 1.2b. The split between humans and chimpanzees is now believed
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to have occurred at a more recent period. Although Sarich and Wilson
(1967) did not have the sophisticated molecular clock techniques that are
used today, they came to a date of about 5 million years BP for the most
recent common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees, a date that is still
maintained today. The best current estimate is 5.4 million years BP, ±
1.1 million years (e.g., Stauffer, Walker, Ryder, Lyons-Weiler, & Hedges,
2001).
When the 19th-century British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli was
asked whether humans were apes or angels, he answered without hesita-
tion that he was on the side of the angels. Apes and angels can still be
used as metaphors for two positions that paleoanthropologists, compara-
tive psychologists and other scholars have held since the publication of the
Descent of man, namely an emphasis on human uniqueness (angels) or a
search for continuity between humans and other animals (apes). Robert
Foley (1995, 32–34), for example, rightly indicates that paleoanthropol-
ogists like Glynn Isaac (e.g., 1978) have emphasized uniquely human as-
pects of social organization, such as sharing and division of labor, whereas
others, like Lewis Binford (e.g., 1981), looked for animal characteristics,
such as the prominence of scavenging in a large part of human prehistory.
In paleoanthropology, this polarization is gradually giving way to a more
balanced position, where humans are seen as just Another unique species
(Foley, 1987). However, as we shall see in the next sections, this debate
still continues in comparative psychology.
1.2.1 The mental continuity assumption
In the philosophical and psychological literature, there are four main types
of strategies to deal with the puzzle of human uniqueness. Some authors,
following Darwin (1871), propose that the difference between humans
and other animals is a matter of degree, rather than kind. This posi-
tion can be termed the mental continuity assumption; it is especially a
popular position in contemporary comparative psychology, in particular
with researchers who study nonhuman primates (e.g., Povinelli & Bering,
2002). Darwin’s (1871) original statement captures the mental continuity
assumption very well:
Nevertheless the difference in mind between man and the
higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not
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of kind. We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the var-
ious emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention,
curiosity, imitation, reason, &c., of which man boasts, may be
found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed
condition, in the lower animals. [. . . ] If it be maintained
that certain powers, such as self-consciousness, abstraction,
&c., are peculiar to man, it may well be that these are the
incidental results of other highly-advanced intellectual facul-
ties; and these again are mainly the result of the continued
use of a highly developed language. [. . . ] The half-art, half-
instinct of language still bears the stamp of its gradual evolu-
tion (Darwin, 1871, 105–106).
Many proponents of the mental continuity assumption are comparative
psychologists, i.e., scholars who study cognition in nonhuman animals.
For example, Susan Savage-Rumbaugh, ‘mentor’ of the bonobo Kanzi, has
declared that her bonobo is “the ape at the brink of the human mind”
(quoted in Povinelli & Bering, 2002, 115). The idea is that cognitive
and behavioral differences between humans and other animals have been
overstated. With appropriate experimental techniques, or sufficient hours
of observations in the wild, any discontinuities between humans and other
animals will disappear. Induction from past experience makes this idea
less far-fetched than it might seem at first. For example, tool use was
once thought to be uniquely human, but has since been observed in a
variety of species, including most prominently nonhuman primates—at
first, only great apes but more recently also monkeys, (e.g., Visalberghi et
al., 2007)—next to, amongst others, birds and cetaceans (e.g., Kru¨tzen et
al., 2005). Nonhuman animals are also selective in the tools they procure
(e.g., Visalberghi et al., 2009). The ability for meta-tool use, i.e., the use
of a tool to fashion another tool, a hallmark of human stone technology
since the Late Pliocene, is also present in New Caledonian crows (A. H.
Taylor, Hunt, Holzhaider, & Gray, 2007). Thus, there seems to be little
in human tool-use of which there are no parallels in other species.
The mental continuity assumption implies that every human cogni-
tive capacity can be found to a lesser degree in other animals—cognition
distributed along an intellectual scala naturae with humans comfortably
at the top, and other animals holding continuously lower positions. Dar-
win’s (1871) legacy is reflected in current investigations of chimpanzee
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cognition which take human cognition as the point of reference: do chim-
panzees seek causal explanations (e.g., Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii, 2001),
do they have cultures (e.g., Whiten et al., 1999), do they possess a theory
of mind (e.g., Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001)? Leading neuroscientists
(e.g., Finlay, Darlington, & Nicastro, 2001) likewise assume that the only
difference between primate brains is their size. However, although the
mental continuity assumption is a progressive research programme in the
Lakatosian sense that it generates a wealth of empirical findings, it suffers
from a major flaw, viz., it takes the human mind as the standard against
which all other minds are measured. This attitude methodologically ex-
cludes the possibility of discovering cognitive specializations in nonhuman
animals that would be less developed or nonexisting in humans. As men-
tioned earlier, echolocation in bats is a paradigmatic example of a cog-
nitive specialization. Nagel (1974) famously argued that echolocation,
although clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to
any human sensory experience, so we can never know what it is like to be
a bat. Experimental studies (reviewed in Schwitzgebel & Gordon, 2000),
however, indicate that humans possess a rudimentary capacity to use the
sound-reflective properties of objects in the environment they navigate.
Yet few would take these observations to mean that humans effectively
possess the same cognitive capacity as bats, albeit to a lesser extent.
In contrast, within mainstream comparative psychology, any cognitive
similarity between humans and other apes is readily taken as evidence
for a fundamental continuity between the structure and function of their
brains.
The theory of natural selection compels us to see the history of life
as a branching tree rather than a scale. Thus, it may be misleading
to conceptualize human cognition as the pinnacle of intelligence, and to
gauge animal cognition in terms of its resemblance with human cognition.
We can expect that diverging selective pressures adapt animal minds
to their unique ecological niches. It may therefore be more fruitful to
approach cognitive evolution with Darwin (1859) in mind, rather than
Darwin (1871). Take, for example, the case of language. As will be ar-
gued in more detail in chapter 3, it is fundamentally misleading to treat
vocal imitation in dolphins and songbirds as ‘precursors’ to the human
capacity for vocal imitation, which is an important part of our capacity
for language acquisition. Since our closest living relatives, the nonhuman
apes, do not have this capacity, vocal imitation in humans is a cogni-
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tive specialization that arose independently in the human lineage. Some
similarities in the way young passerines acquire songs and humans ac-
quire speech (for example, in the babbling stage (Doupe & Kuhl, 1999),
where young birds and human infants produce song- and speechlike vo-
calizations) do not imply that language would not be uniquely human.
In contrast to the mental continuity assumption, several scholars (see
Shettleworth, 1998, for an overview) have taken an ecological approach.
Rather than ask whether a given human cognitive capacity is present in
particular species of animals, they take the following point of view: given
the selective pressures in a species’ environment, what kinds of cogni-
tive capacities can we expect? Over the past decades, this behavioral
ecological approach has led to a rethinking of claims that were initially
anthropocentric (Shettleworth, 2009). For example, social cognition—
including theory of mind, keeping track of third-party relationships, and
self-awareness—was initially extensively studied in primates because of
their close relatedness to humans. However, recently, researchers have
also begun to probe social cognition in more distantly related clades such
as hyenas (e.g., Engh, Siebert, Greenberg, & Holekamp, 2005) and corvids
(e.g., Paz-y-Min˜o, Bond, Kamil, & Balda, 2004), non-primate species that
have complex forms of social organization. These studies indicate that a
good predictor of complex social cognition is whether animals live in sta-
ble, social groups with complex hierarchies and alliance-formation—and
that this is a better predictor of complex social cognition than relatedness
to humans.
We can distinguish three styles of research in comparative cognition:
the anthropocentric approach (informed by the mental continuity assump-
tion), the ecological approach (informed by behavioral ecology), and a
more recent third approach, advocated by Lea, Goto, Osthaus, and Ryan
(2006), that takes the ecological perspective, but also recognizes that hu-
mans are at present the best studied animal, which means that most ex-
perimental paradigms have been developed with human subjects in mind.
It remains challenging to design tasks that are ecologically relevant to non-
human animals, but doing so often gives surprising results. For example,
as shall be unpacked in chapter 4, traditional tasks that investigated the-
ory of mind in nonhuman animals relied extensively on the ability of
the animals to guess cooperative intentional actions (something humans
are very good at, such as following pointing gestures by human exper-
imenters)—and, unsurprisingly, chimpanzees invariably perform poorly
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on such tasks (e.g., Bra¨uer, Kaminski, Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2006).
But when tasks had to be performed within a competitive setting (i.e.,
guessing what a competitor can and cannot see), the performance of the
apes improved markedly (Hare et al., 2001).
1.2.2 The genetic perspective
A second way to investigate the problem of human uniqueness is to fo-
cus on genetic differences between chimpanzees and humans. Why are
two species that share about 98% of their DNA so divergent in their
anatomy and behavior? One way to approach this problem has been to
identify which regions of the human genome show the largest number of
nucleotide substitutions compared to the chimpanzee genome. The re-
gion with the largest number of genetic mutations in humans is human
accelerated region 1 (HAR1), which changed very little during vertebrate
evolution (only two nucleotide substitutions between chicken and chim-
panzee) but underwent 18 further nucleotide substitutions after the split
between human and chimpanzee (K. Pollard, 2009). HAR1 is involved
in the development of the neocortex, indicating positive selection on this
gene during hominid evolution. The second most accelerated region in
the human genome is HAR2. Specific base differences in this DNA se-
quence are involved in the development of the wrist and thumb during
fetal development, indicating their importance in the evolution of the
human-specific hand morphology (K. Pollard, 2009).
An important factor in human-chimpanzee differences are not only
nucleotide substitutions, but differences in gene regulation. As early as
1975, King and Wilson already acknowledged that “the genetic distance
between humans and the chimpanzee is probably too small to account
for their substantial organismal differences” (King & Wilson, 1975, 107).
They went on to suggest that “evolutionary changes in anatomy and way
of life are more often based on changes in the mechanisms controlling the
expression of genes than on sequence changes in proteins” (King & Wil-
son, 1975, 107). Using refined techniques that were not available at that
time, more recent molecular biological studies have attempted to empiri-
cally test these predictions. Such studies typically study gene expression
using micro arrays, which allows for the comparisons of mRNA levels in
brain tissue of humans and other primates (see e.g., Preuss, Ca´ceres, Old-
ham, & Geschwind, 2004, for a review). Several of these studies indicate
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that gene expression has been upregulated in the human brain since the
human-chimpanzee split, whereas no marked upregulations have occurred
in other human tissues, such as the liver and the lungs (e.g., Gu & Gu,
2003; Uddin et al., 2004; Enard, Khaitovich, et al., 2002). A summary
of data from three studies on Fig. 1.3 shows the increased upregulation
of genes in the human brain compared to the chimpanzee brain. While
elevated gene expression intuitively looks like more of the same, it can
result in striking differences: it increases the probability that a particu-
lar protein will be built. Since many genes depend for their expression
on the presence or absence of particular proteins (i.e., on the expres-
sion of other genes), the upregulation of a single gene can dramatically
alter one or more cascades of developmental events, resulting in large
phenotypic effects (Marcus, 2004). Genes that regulate synaptogenesis
in the prefrontal and temporal cortices, two brain areas involved in so-
cial cognition, show more divergent expression patterns in humans and
chimpanzees compared to those that regulate synaptogenesis in the cere-
bellum, involved in locomotion (Ca´ceres, Suwyn, Maddox, Thomas, &
Preuss, 2007). Also, genes that are primarily expressed in the neocortex,
the part of the brain involved in domains such as social interaction and
conceptual thought, have been under stronger positive selection in both
humans and chimpanzees (Oldham, Horvath, & Geschwind, 2006).
A problem with this view (at least in its current form) is its limited
explanatory potential. Because there is no one-to-one correspondence
between genes and behavior, the relationship between genes, cognitive
function and environment remains largely unexplained. We know, for ex-
ample, that HAR1 is involved in the development of the neocortex, but
its exact function remains unknown (K. Pollard, 2009). Similarly, the
fact that many genes involved in the development of the human brain
have been upregulated should come as no surprise, but this does not give
us any more insight into human cognition than we already have. An ex-
ception to the limitations of the genetic perspective seems to be FoxP2, a
gene critically involved in language production (Enard, Przeworski, et al.,
2002). We know that a disruption in this gene causes language-specific im-
pairments, and the recent discovery of FoxP2 in the Neanderthal genome
(Krause et al., 2007) undoubtedly provides insights into the evolution of
articulate speech. However, as will be argued in chapter 3, it seems that
even this case has little explanatory power, as it remains unclear how
FoxP2 interacts with other genes to produce articulate speech.
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Figure 1.3: Patterns of gene expression changes in human and chimpanzee
brains, from Preuss et al. (2004), Fig. 3, p. 854.
1.2.3 Silver bullet theories
Another group of scholars (e.g., Mithen, 1996; Deacon, 1997; Tattersall,
1998) have argued that one or a few key changes in human cognitive evo-
lution can explain human-specific behavior and culture. Although they
do not agree on which cognitive capacities are responsible for uniquely hu-
man behavior, these authors’ views are similar in several respects. First,
they claim, pace Darwin (1871), that human cognitive capacities are not
only different in degree from those of other animals, but also in kind.
For example, Tattersall (1998, 32) argues that humans are “not simply
more intelligent [. . . ] but differently intelligent, in a manner that allows
us not only to view ourselves, but also to manipulate the environment,
in a qualitatively unique way” (emphasis in original). Second, these au-
thors claim that the purported cognitive change appeared relatively late
in human evolution, long after the split between the human and chim-
panzee lineages. For example, Steven Mithen (1996) situates the advent
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of ‘cognitive fluidity’ (the human capacity to draw on knowledge from dis-
tinct domains such as social cognition, natural history and technological
insight, see below) at 60,000–30,000 BP; Tattersall (1998) places the de-
velopment even later, during the Upper Paleolithic (between 45,000 and
10,000 BP). Third, many (but not all) of these models are committed
to a form of punctuated equilibrium, in contrast to the gradualism that
is characteristic of Darwin’s mental continuity assumption. Punctuated
equilibrium, as developed by Eldredge and Gould (1972, 1988; Gould
and Eldredge, 1993), proposes that evolution is punctuated by brief pe-
riods of rapid change, followed by longer periods of stasis. Dramatic
changes in climate or geography are regarded as the primary causes for
these brisk evolutionary changes. The paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall
(1998, 230–231), for example, has argued that the emergence of uniquely
human behavior, especially our ability to use symbols in language and
material culture, was achieved in one single punctuated event; he specu-
lates that this was a relatively minor event in genetic terms, a small neural
innovation that depended crucially on pre-existing adaptations that could
be exapted (i.e., co-opted for a new adaptive function) by the symbolic
mind.
Cognitive archeologist Steven Mithen (1996) has combined gradual-
ism and puncturated equilibrium to explain the emergence of cognitive
fluidity. Drawing extensively on a metaphor of the mind as a cathedral,
he argues that the human mind is built from several specialized cognitive
domains (in his terminology, intelligences), and that several phases of cog-
nitive evolution can be discerned. In the first phase, which corresponds
to the common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees, the mind is like a
central nave (as in the simple one-room churches in late classical and early
medieval times), without any specialized cognitive capacities. A second
phase witnessed the building of multiple ‘chapels’ of specialized cognitive
capacities around this nave, in close analogy to the building of chapels
in Romanesque churches. These include domain-specific capacities for
reasoning about social life, artifacts and natural history. Pursuing this
analogy, Mithen argues that these domains did not influence each other:
A critical design feature of these chapels is that their walls are
thick and almost impenetrable to sound from elsewhere in the
cathedral. There is no access between the chapels. In other
words, knowledge about different behavioral domains cannot
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be combined together (Mithen, 1996, 69).
Hominids from this phase, such as Homo ergaster, could not reason across
domains, which would explain why they did not make specialized tools,
but rather general-purpose tools such as handaxes. To put it in another
way, since the artifactual and biological domains could not communicate,
these hominids could not develop specialized hunting tools. The third
phase is marked by a partial demolition of the separating walls between
the distinct cognitive domains, so that information from one domain can
flow to others. Here, the metaphor draws on the transition from Ro-
manesque to Gothic architecture, where the thick, heavy walls between
the chapels were replaced by thinner columns. The differences between
the minds of the second and the third phase are analogous to those be-
tween Romanesque and the succeeding Gothic cathedrals. In Gothic ar-
chitecture sound and light emanating from different parts of the cathedral
can freely flow around the building unimpeded by the thick heavy walls
and low vaults one finds in Romanesque architecture. Similarly, in the
Phase 3 mental architecture, thoughts and knowledge generated by spe-
cialized intelligences can now flow freely around the mind: “[T]he result
is an almost limitless capacity for imagination. So we should refer to
these Phase 3 minds as having a ‘cognitive fluidity’ ” (Mithen, 1996, 71).
Cognitive fluidity is exemplified in animism (endowing inanimate objects
with a desire-belief psychology), totemism (merging social and biological
domains by making animals ancestors to current human groups) and an-
thropomorphism (endowing animals with human properties). According
to Mithen (1996), this third phase started about 60,000 years ago, when
we see the first material evidence for across-domain reasoning, includ-
ing specialized hunting tools which reveal a cross-fertilization of natural
history knowledge and technology (e.g., harpoons for specialized fish cap-
turing), and the emergence of therianthropes in art (half-human, half-
animal creatures such as the 32,000-year-old ‘lion man’ from Hohlenstein
Stadel, Germany, Fig. 7.5a, p. 192) which reveals a crosstalk between the
social and biological domains. The result is an almost limitless capacity
for imagination, which constitutes the roots of our ability to create art,
invent scientific theories and imagine religious beings. Although Mithen’s
view is more gradualist, there is still a punctuated event needed to ex-
plain the emergence of cognitive fluidity. Even though it is a metaphor,
the change from Romanesque to Gothic architecture is dramatic, and one
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may wonder what has prompted such a dramatic change in human cog-
nitive evolution. Moreover, since 1996, substantial archeological evidence
has come to light that questions this hypothesis, indicating an ability to
make specialized tools well before 60,000 years ago, e.g., hunting spears
from Scho¨ningen, Germany, dating to 400,000 BP (Thieme, 1997) and
bow and arrow hunting technology from Sibudu Cave, South Africa, dat-
ing to 64,000 BP (Lombard & Phillipson, 2010).
Several of the silver bullet theories propose language, or more broadly,
symbolic thought, as the capacity that sets humans apart from other an-
imals. Terrence Deacon (1997), for example, presents a picture of a co-
evolution between brains and language. At some point in our ancestral
past, some hominids developed the ability to communicate symbolically.
The great selective advantage associated with this learned ability favored
biological changes that facilitated linguistic skills, such as an enlarge-
ment of specific areas of the brain, especially within the frontal cortex.
According to Deacon, the evolution of human-specific cognition, in par-
ticular our ability to manipulate symbols, can be seen as the product of
a Baldwin effect, i.e., learning language changed the hominid selective
environment in such a way that linguistic competence was selected for.
Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli (2008, 110) argue for an even more profound
discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds, “which pervades al-
most every domain of cognition—from reasoning about spatial relations
to deceiving conspecifics.” They hypothesize that only humans are able
to reason about higher-order relations in a structurally systematic way,
which requires distinctive representational capacities that are not found
in nonhuman animals. Humans, like other animals, have representational
capacities, but unlike the latter, they can reinterpret their perceptually-
based representations in terms of higher-order explicitly structured rela-
tions. To give but one example: animals can recognize when two physical
stimuli are perceptually similar (e.g., two sounds of the same pitch, two
pieces of fruit). Human children as young as two years (Gelman & Co-
ley, 1990) tend to use causal-logical characteristics of relations, rather
than simple perceptual features of their environment, such as that the
relationship bird–nest is the same as dog–doghouse, despite the fact that
there is no surface similarity between those stimuli; according to Penn
et al. (2008) there is no evidence that animals can recognize structural
similarities like these.
Other models place more emphasis on social cognition. The philoso-
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pher Peter Carruthers (2002a), for example, has argued that while all the
capacities for human creativity were in place from the emergence of the
first anatomically modern Homo sapiens (ca. 195,000 BP), the ability to
engage in childhood pretend play only emerged about 40,000 BP. This
ability, according to Carruthers (2002a), provides us with crucial prac-
tice to generate suppositions, and novel, relevant, fruitful and interesting
ideas. Our habit to pretend as children is the basis of a consistent dispo-
sition to generate such ideas when we are adults. The comparative psy-
chologist Michael Tomasello (e.g., 1999a) thinks that cognitive capacities
involved in theory of mind and shared attention were the crucial element:
in The cultural origins of human cognition, he proposes that cumulative
culture requires a theory of mind (the ability to understand other peo-
ple’s mental states, including their goals and intentions). Social learning
situations, such as teaching and imitation, require an understanding of
the intentions and goals of the person who is being taught or whom one is
imitating. Tomasello argued that chimpanzees and other primates do not
take the intentions of others into account when they are learning any given
behavior socially, but rather, that they focus on changes in the observable
situation (e.g., the spatial configuration of objects) that are involved in
the action. This could explain why social learning in chimpanzees is a long
process. It takes for instance four to five years for young chimpanzees in
the Ta¨ı forest to learn how to crack nuts using hammerstones and anvil
(Tomasello, 1999b, 521). Moreover, experimental studies indicate that
human children—unlike chimpanzees—selectively imitate relevant, inten-
tional actions, but not accidental ones, even if the end result of both types
of actions is the same (Boesch & Tomasello, 1998, 611).
However, subsequent studies in comparative psychology indicate that
some nonhuman primates can discern the intentions of others. Chim-
panzees, for example, can imitate intentional goal-directed actions, al-
though they are more selective in what they imitate, i.e., they prefer to
use their own methods if they find these easier or more efficient than those
of the model, whereas human children almost always copy the model’s
method (Horner & Whiten, 2005). Other studies placed chimpanzees
in a competitive situation, where they had to vie for food. Hare et al.
(2001) showed that subdominant chimpanzees consistently chose a piece
of food that was only visible to themselves over a piece of food that was
also visible to a dominant conspecific. Similar experiments indicated that
rhesus monkeys (Flombaum & Santos, 2005) also have some inkling about
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the relationship between seeing and knowing. These experimental results
seemed to undermine Tomasello’s earlier position that only humans have
an understanding of goals and intentions, and that this was necessary and
sufficient for the evolution of human culture. Consequently, in later pub-
lications (e.g., Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003, 141), he has argued that while
chimpanzees might understand something about simple intentions, they
“seem not to understand communicative or cooperative intentions, and
so they do not attempt to direct the attention of conspecifics by point-
ing, showing, offering, or any other intentional communicative signal”.
His current position (e.g., Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007) is that humans
are unique in their ability for shared or joined attention. Shared atten-
tion is not only that two or more agents share information over the same
thing, but crucially, that they also realize that they are doing so. Be-
tween the ages of nine to fourteen months, human infants spontaneously
attempt to share attention, for example, by pointing and gesturing at
objects that catch their attention. Whereas nonhuman apes gesture pri-
marily to manipulate other agents’ behavior (e.g., begging), human chil-
dren also gesture to inform others, or to simply share experience with
them (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007, 122). Call and Tomasello (2008)
speculate that the chimpanzee’s theory of mind is primarily perception-
based, concerned with the inference of observable goals and intentions,
whereas human theory of mind is based on a belief-desire psychology that
allows them to pay attention to unobservable beliefs and desires of oth-
ers. There are many situations in which shared attention can make social
learning faster and more efficient. It allows for explicit teaching, like
when a teacher potter can see to what extent her student has mastered
the technique of using the potter’s wheel, whether she is paying atten-
tion, or whether she might have difficulties. Unsurprisingly, instances
of deliberate teaching are extremely rare in nonhuman animals, and are
limited to anecdotal, unsystematic observations (e.g., Boesch, 1991)—we
will return to human teaching and nonhuman learning by observation in
section 4.5.
These and other silver bullet theories point to interesting discontinu-
ities between human and nonhuman animal cognition. What remains to
be seen is whether one or a few key changes in human cognitive evolution
(such as the emergence of language or cognitive fluidity) could account for
the complete repertoire of uniquely human abilities we see today. As we
shall see in the next chapters, the current empirical evidence is more in
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agreement with the idea that several cognitive innovations occurred dur-
ing human evolution, including a fully developed language (see chapter
3), shared attention (see chapter 4), and symbol-mindedness (see chapter
7).
1.2.4 Dual inheritance models
This group of models emphasizes the interrelations between cognition
and culture. Briefly stated, they view both culture and genes as provid-
ing separate, but interconnected systems of inheritance, each with its own
forms of variation, selective retention and fitness effects (e.g., Henrich &
McElreath, 2007). Culture and genes interact in various ways. For ex-
ample, many cultural traits have been identified that clearly affect (i.e.,
increase of decrease) the fitness of those who possess them. Technology
is a clear example of this, allowing humans to survive under conditions
that they are not physiologically adapted to, including, for example, the
complex technology of kayak-making, weaponry, and snow-house building
that characterizes traditional Inuit societies. However, as Sterelny (2007)
aptly points out, the Inuit also have a host of costly beliefs that decrease
fitness, including belief in giant fish and birds that inhabit certain places
—traditional Inuit adapted their foraging patterns to avoid these sup-
posed dangers. Under extreme conditions, cultural practices are subject
to a form of runaway selection that are so detrimental to fitness that they
can cause the collapse of the entire cultural complex. Jared Diamond
(2006) has convincingly argued that the collapse of the culture on Rapa
Nui (Easter Island) was probably due to a depletion of the local resources,
fueled by large prestige projects such as the construction and erection of
mo’ai (giant stone anthropomorphic statues) by local competing political
factions. Cultural practices sometimes encourage the selection of initially
rare mutations. A well-known example is the spread of an initially rare al-
lele of the LCT gene that produces lactase (an enzyme that is necessary to
digest lactose, the sugar in milk). A majority of humans only express this
gene during infancy and early childhood, but most members of dairy cat-
tle keeping communities in Africa, Europe and northern America have an
allele with a mutation that allows the expression of LCT into adulthood
(Tishkoff et al., 2006). This mutation arose several times independently
in Africa and Europe; it is a remarkable example of convergent evolution.
Direct examples of gene-culture coevolution remain rare, however. To
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examine the interdependence of and relationships between cultural and
biological evolution, dual inheritance models often rely on mathematical
modeling, where individual characteristics (such as a given cultural trait)
are linked to population-level processes (e.g., fitness outcomes of specific
cultural traits). Examples of such models can be found in the compilation
The origin and evolution of culture (Boyd & Richerson, 2005).
Dual inheritance models often explicitly provide a counterbalance to
the recent emphasis on evolved, biological cognitive adaptations in evo-
lutionary approaches to human behavior2. For example, Richerson and
Boyd (2005) devote their entire second chapter to defend the claim that
culture actually exists, citing several examples of cultural variation be-
tween human groups that cannot be solely explained in terms of varying
environmental conditions or differing genetic backgrounds. However, un-
like standard social scientists (such as anthropologists for a large part of
the 20th century), who treated culture as a superorganic entity that was
totally disconnected from human biology, proponents of dual inheritance
models recognize the importance of evolutionary constraints, both in bio-
logical and in cultural evolutionary terms. Although these models provide
explanations of how culture can increase human fitness, dual inheritance
theory also allows for the possibility of maladaptive cultural traits. For
example, an evolved prestige bias can explain why people tend to copy
the behavior of more successful individuals (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001),
which may be adaptive (e.g., emulating the best hunter), but which may
also be maladaptive (e.g., taking up recreational drug use following fa-
mous actors and musicians). Some cultural traits evolve neutrally with
respect to human fitness. Their propagation can thus be entirely driven
by the fit they have with our evolved cognitive predispositions. Cultural
traits that have a close fit with evolved human preferences have a higher
chance of being remembered or transmitted. Sperber (1996) has termed
this form of cultural evolution the epidemiology of representations. In
section 5.4 we shall see how the evolution of abstract art toward more
bold lines and brighter colors was driven by evolved preferences of the
human visual system, and the evolution of toys like teddy bears and My
Little Pony, as well as the evolution of the depiction of children in histor-
ical paintings from the Low Countries in the direction of more baby-like
features was driven by a preference for neoteny. However, not all forms
of neutral cultural evolution fit in the model of the epidemiology of rep-
resentations. In some cases, the evolution of cultural traits is purely
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driven by a random and stochastic copying process, such as the shifts in
popularity of specific dog breeds in the second half of the 20th century
(Herzog, Bentley, & Hahn, 2004). Given that dogs today are kept mainly
as companions and no longer as working animals, the shifts in dog breed
popularity are no longer driven by practical concerns.
Dual inheritance models also recognize that cultural evolution can
be subject to distinct evolutionary forces that are rarely encountered in
biological evolution. For example, in order for group selection to occur,
very specific conditions need to be met, including a high between-group
variation and a low within-group variation. Such conditions are rare in
nature, as in the case of colonies of eusocial insects. But these groups have
a high measure of relatedness, making it difficult to distinguish the effects
of group selection from those of kin selection (Wilson & Ho¨lldobler, 2005).
By contrast, human cultures do exhibit high between-group variation, and
considerable within-culture homogeneity, even if there is some migration
between cultures (Henrich, 2004a). This opens the possibility of cultural
group selection, a topic that will be further explored in chapter 6.
Some authors working in the field of dual inheritance theory have ex-
amined human culture as a form of niche construction. Humans live in
their own artifactual, created environment, and are surrounded by their
own symbolically laden material culture. In this respect, humans are
similar to other species that modify their environment to improve their
climatic conditions and increase the viability of their offspring, such as
beavers, termites and ants. Niche construction theory is a recent branch
in theoretical evolutionary biology (see e.g., Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feld-
man, 2000; Sterelny, 2005, for reviews). It emphasizes the ability of or-
ganisms to modify the selective pressures in their environment (Laland
& O’Brien, 2010). Niche construction is characterized as “the activities,
choices, and metabolic processes of organisms, through which they define,
choose, modify and partly create their own niches” (Laland et al., 2000,
132–133). The main difference between niche construction and main-
stream evolutionary biology is that these modifications to the environ-
ment are seen as more than just a consequence of evolutionary change.
Richard Dawkins (1989a) regarded them as extended phenotypes, i.e.,
as nothing more than an expression of genes in the environment. By
contrast, according to niche construction theorists, these modifications
influence the selective pressures to which organisms are subject. In this
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pressure in its own right. Take the example of human clothes. Molec-
ular analysis of Pediculus humanus, the human body louse which lives
on clothes, indicates that Homo sapiens has been wearing clothes since
about 70,000 BP (Kittler, Kayser, & Stoneking, 2003). A clear conse-
quence of habitual wearing of clothes is a decrease of natural selection
on physiological adaptations to cold or heat. Although such adaptations
do exist, they are quite modest compared to these in nonhuman species
(compare, for instance, the physiological adaptations of a fennec (a desert
fox) to those of a desert-dwelling nomad). Indeed, it turns out that phys-
iological adaptations to cold or heat are much more extreme in human
societies where very little clothes are worn. Tierra del Fuegans, for ex-
ample, who traditionally wore almost no clothes, despite an annual mean
temperature of about 7 ◦C, have extreme adaptations to cold, including
the highest body mass index documented in nonwestern cultures, namely
25.7 kg\m2 (Steegmann Jr, Cerny, & Holliday, 2002). Sometimes our
modification of the external environment results in an increase in natural
selective pressures—the retention of the initially rare allele of LCT due
to dairy farming is a case in point.
According to its proponents, niche construction is a pervasive phe-
nomenon, not restricted to highly specialized constructions of termites
and other eusocial insects. Nest-building, burrowing, web-making, pupal
casings, and even fungi decomposing organic matter on the forest floor
are considered to be clear examples. Thus, niche construction blurs the
distinction between human culture and environment-altering behaviors
present in most organisms, including plants and fungi. Sterelny (2005),
however, is less convinced about this and rightly argues that niche con-
struction should distinguish between organisms’ ability to control the en-
vironment and the mere effects of their actions on the environment. While
it seems plausible to categorize nest building and tool use as instances
of niche construction, it is less clear why the ability of plants to change
the chemical composition of their environment should be placed in the
same category, as Laland et al. (2000) maintain. Also, cultural niche con-
struction by humans is not only altering the physical environment (e.g.,
by constructing buildings), it can also consist of making the environment
more cognitively congenial, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter
8.
A third strand of research that can be categorized under dual inher-
itance models is the work by authors who work on the extended mind
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thesis. These scholars are less mathematically inclined than those work-
ing on cultural group selection and niche construction theory, and usually
study more qualitative observations on the role of artifacts in human cog-
nition. Examples include Donald (1991), Mithen (2000) and Hutchins
(1995). These authors see our increased reliance on material culture and
our ability to make external symbolic representations not just as a result
of human cognitive evolution, but as one of the driving forces behind it3.
Cognitive neuroscientist Merlin Donald (1991), for example, distinguishes
three stages of human cognitive evolution: mimetic culture (correspond-
ing to the evolution of imitation, improvements in motor control, and
the ability to produce memorized motor patterns on command), mythic
culture (basically, the acquisition of speech), and the externalization of
memory (corresponding to the invention of symbolic storage in the Upper
Paleolithic, a process that continues up to this day). Mithen (2000) has
similarly argued that the shift to behavioral modernity in the Upper Pa-
leolithic, i.e., the shift to improved and specialized foraging techniques,
specialized tools, long-distance exchange, and social differentiation is due
to our ability to oﬄoad ideas that are difficult to conceptualize in the
environment:
The cultural and cognitive transformation that occurred be-
tween 60,000 and 30,000 years ago arose because humans
learnt a clever trick. They learnt how to exploit material cul-
ture to extend their minds beyond the limits of their brains
alone. By creating artifacts that represented ideas that could
only have transient existence within the mind, it became pos-
sible to regenerate those ideas, communicate those ideas, and
allow for cross-fertilization of ideas between individuals in
such a way that completely new constructs could be devel-
oped (Mithen, 2000, 216).
The unanswered question remains why humans (and not other animals)
have learnt “this clever trick”, and why they only did so in the past
60,000 years. This relationship between symbolically mediated culture
and cognition will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8. In these chapters, it
will become clear that material culture allows us to enhance our cognitive
capacities, but that the ability to use material culture symbolically does
depend on a suite of pre-existing cognitive adaptations, including the
design stance and symbol-mindedness.
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1.3 Approaching human uniqueness through multiple dis-
ciplines
This aim of this dissertation is to present a philosophical picture of the
cognitive roots of human creativity, as manifest in capacities that are
specific to our species. It focuses on the capacity to create and enjoy art,
the ability for religious reflection and scientific practice. The basic ques-
tion that motivated this research is: why is human creative behavior so
distinct from that of all other animals? Why do humans, including those
from small-scale societies with limited material culture living in harsh
environments, invest disproportionate amounts of time and energy in the
production and enjoyment of art, such as music, dance, body decoration,
painting and sculpture? Why do we, but not other animals, believe in
supernatural beings, and why do we go at such great lengths in repre-
senting such beings and worshipping them in religious rituals? Why are
we alone in our ability to make models of reality in the form of scientific
theories? At first blush, these questions seem to require widely diverging
answers. For one thing, even if one takes a long chronology of science,
where its emergence is situated in classical Greece, scientific practice is
only a few thousand years old, whereas archeological evidence for religious
practices stretches back to the late Pleistocene in the form of grave gifts
(about 25,000 BP) and religious imagery (from about 32,000 BP onward).
Evolutionary approaches to human cognition provide a potentially unify-
ing framework to conceptualize these cultural elements as products of a
universal human cognitive architecture.
The main title of this thesis Common minds, uncommon thoughts is
meant to capture the idea that remarkable products of human cognition
and culture (including art, theological reflection, and scientific theorizing)
arise as the products of mundane cognitive capacities that have evolved in
response to selective pressures in our ancestral past. To co-opt a beautiful
metaphor by the philosopher of art Stephen Davies (2009), human culture
is a passacaglia, and our universal human nature (specifically, universal
human cognitive capacities) can be regarded as the basso ostinato that
underlies it. In the next chapter, this basso ostinato will be characterized
in more detail; how we see traces of it in human creative behavior will
be considered in parts II (art), III (religion) and IV (science). However,
unlike some early evolutionary psychological claims, I think that it is a
mistake to regard variations in human culture as mere ‘evoked culture’
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(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). According to that view, variations in culture
can be regarded as different expressions of an evolved domain-specific
psychology in response to various conditions (e.g., war, drought, abun-
dance). In different environments, specific cognitive adaptations come
flexibly into play, e.g., a preference for a low body mass index emerges
in societies where food is plentiful and healthy food is a privilege for the
rich, whereas people living under harsh conditions close to starvation will
prefer more voluptuous body shapes. Although the concept of evoked
culture allows for rich inferences and novel predictions, it nevertheless
falls short of explaining the cultural achievements that will be discussed
in the next chapters. Common minds specifically refers to the social na-
ture of human cognition, i.e., the observation that human culture and
evolved cognitive dispositions interact with each other. Human culture is
more than a simple expression of evolved cognitive dispositions: rather,
arises as the product of interacting human minds and their material cul-
ture. This emphasis on the communal aspect of human cognition will
be explored in several chapters. In chapter 4, we will take a closer look
at selective pressures that operated in hominid evolution during the late
Pliocene–early Pleistocene and that gave rise to human social cognition,
including the specific features that underlie human social learning. In
chapter 6, I will discuss how material culture can serve as ethnic markers
in the context of cultural group selection. Through interaction with our
own material culture, we are able to surmount cognitive limitations, for
example in the domain of mental time travel (chapter 8). In chapter 12,
we will see how scientific progress critically depends on an interaction of
creative individuals.
This dissertation will make use of an eclectic combination of theo-
retical and empirical findings of disparate disciplines. I will not tackle
the question of whether human behavior can be best studied in terms of
innate, psychological adaptations, or an interaction between psychology
and culture, or ecological factors (see e.g., Smith, 2000, for such an en-
deavor), but will instead assume that all these approaches are valuable in
the study of human behavior and cognition. This approach fits within the
scope of a broad scientific naturalism (Quine, 1969a), which views philos-
ophy not as privileged and independent, but as fundamentally continuous
with science. My philosophical picture will draw on a variety of empiri-
cal sources, including developmental psychology, comparative psychology,
experimental psychology, cognitive archeology, ethnoarcheology4, cogni-
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tive anthropology and cognitive neuroscience. Why this reliance on so
many disparate strands of evidence, rather than concentrating, say, only
on developmental psychological studies? The most compelling reason for
using many different theoretical frameworks to approach a complex prob-
lem is what Whewell (1840, chapter 5, §11) has termed consilience of
inductions: when an induction obtained from one class of facts coincides
with that obtained from another class of facts, this provides an epistemic
justification of the induction, meaning it raises the probability that the
induction is correct. Writing 55 years before Whewell, the commonsense
philosopher Thomas Reid elegantly phrased this idea as follows:
The strength of probable reasoning, for the most part, de-
pends not upon any one argument, but upon many, which
unite their force, and lead to the same conclusion. Any one of
them by itself would be insufficient to convince; but the whole
taken together may have a force that is irresistible [. . . ] Such
evidence may be compared to a rope made up of many slender
filaments twisted together. The rope has strength more than
sufficient to bear the stress laid upon it, though no one of the
filaments of which it is composed would be sufficient for that
purpose (Reid, 1785, 690).
One philosophical motivation behind consilience of inductions is the
theory-ladenness of observation. Since Kuhn (1962), philosophers of sci-
ence accept that our observations are always theory-laden: scientists who
conduct experiments or rely on other forms of empirical observations start
from a set of assumptions. These assumptions are not only based on
pre-existing scientific models and hypotheses, but also on extra-scientific
hopes, wishes and aspirations of individual scientists, next to the broadly
shared cultural and cognitive biases. As Kuhn (1962) has argued exten-
sively, this makes it very hard to falsify any scientific model. Nonetheless,
proponents of a fallibilist version of falsification (e.g., Shadish, Cook, &
Campbell, 2002, 16) argue that empirical observations can still improve
our understanding of the world despite the theory-ladenness of observa-
tion, especially in those cases where the observations are repeated across
different methods and disciplines, and where observations from diverse
domains strengthen each other. Although in those cases empirical obser-
vations are still theory-laden, crucially, the background assumptions of
different disciplines are not identical, and can indeed widely differ. If, de-
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spite this, observations are yet repeated across domains, they can attain
a factlike status, even if they can never be fully justified as completely as
theory-neutral facts (if the latter were to exist at all).
It is with this in mind that this thesis should be read and evalu-
ated. Rather than a detailed comparison of naturalistic approaches to
uniquely human behavior, and extensive critiques of each method, this
work will draw on a consilience of inductions from different methodolog-
ical outlooks to argue that normal, evolved cognitive abilities, operat-
ing in specific cultural and ecological environments are constitutive of
what are traditionally regarded as exceptional cultural achievements, i.e.,
artistic expression, theological reflection and scientific practice. Some of
these capacities are shared with other species, whereas others seem to
have evolved somewhere after the split between humans and chimpanzees
about 5 million years ago.

Chapter 2
The human mental
toolbox: Evolutionary,
cognitive psychological
and developmental
perspectives on human
knowledge acquisition
To understand uniquely human cross-cultural traits it is important to ob-
tain an insight into the human mental toolbox. This chapter addresses
the following questions: What similarities and differences underlie human
and nonhuman cognition? What is the relationship between cognition and
language? What evolutionary forces can we discern behind the evolution
of uniquely human cognitive skills? How do humans naturally conceptu-
alize their world? These questions are quite wide, and answering each of
them in detail would require a separate in-depth discussion. This chapter
is structured as follows. In section 2.1, we will see to what extent con-
ceptual thought differs between humans and nonhuman animals. Section
2.2 will examine the human cognitive architecture, focusing on theories of
modularity. Section 2.3 introduces intuitive ontologies as cognitive mech-
anisms that underlie much of human intuitive reasoning and inference.
2.1 How humans see the world: Conditions for concep-
tual thought
2.1.1 Conceptual thought in humans and nonhuman animals
To examine continuities and differences between human and nonhuman
cognition, it is useful to consider what is required for thinking. What
does it take to think, or, to put it more precisely, what is required for
conceptual thought? According to a standard dictionary definition (Web-
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ster’s), concepts are abstract ideas, conceived in the mind. The concept
horse5 can be seen as an abstraction from individual horses. Through-
out this dissertation, the term ‘concept’ will be used in a strictly psy-
chological sense. Accordingly, concepts are mental representations; they
are the constituents of propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires
(Margolis & Laurence, 2007b, 563)6. Concepts are the constituents of
thought, or as Prinz (2002, 2) imaginatively put it “Without concepts,
there would be no thoughts. Concepts are the basic timber of our men-
tal lives.” Philosophers have held two distinct, and it seems, mutually
incompatible naturalistic positions on this front.
One philosophical tradition—going back to Rene´ Descartes—holds
that conceptual thought requires language. Since humans are the only
known species with a fully developed, articulate language, such a position
draws a categorical divide between human and nonhuman cognition. Ac-
cording to Descartes (1637 [1988], part V), animals have no reason, but
are mere complex organic machines, whose actions can be fully explained
without any reference to the operation of a thinking mind, just like a
watch can keep track of time without cognition:
de fac¸on que ce qu’ils font mieux que nous ne prouve pas qu’ils
ont de l’esprit, car a` ce compte ils en auraient plus qu’aucun
de nous et feraient mieux en toute autre chose; mais plutoˆt
qu’ils n’en ont point, et que c’est la nature qui agit en eux
selon la disposition de leurs organes: ainsi qu’on voit qu’un
horloge, qui n’est compose´e que de roues et de ressorts, peut
compter les heures et mesurer le temps plus justement que
nous avec toute notre prudence (Descartes, 1637 [1988], part
V).
Descartes realized that human cognition, too, could be explained in such
mechanistic terms, but insisted that two factors set us apart: humans
are more flexible in their behavior than animals, and they use language
in a creative and relevant manner. No machine or animal that would be
taught to use language would be able to engage in a decent conversation
(in this criterion, Descartes foreshadowed the Turing test):
jamais elles [the machines] ne pourroient user de paroles ni
d’autres signes en les composant, comme nous faisons pour
de´clarer aux autres nos pense´es: car on peut bien concevoir
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qu’une machine soit tellement faite qu’elle profe`re des paroles,
et meˆme qu’elle en profe`re quelques unes a` propos des actions
corporelles qui causeront quelque changement en ses organes,
comme, si on la touche en quelque endroit, qu’elle demande
ce qu’on lui veut dire; si en un autre, qu’elle crie qu’on lui fait
mal, et choses semblables; mais non pas qu’elle les arrange
diversement pour repondre au sens de tout ce qui se dira en
sa pre´sence, ainsi que les hommes les plus he´be´te´s peuvent
faire (Descartes, 1637 [1988], part V).
Both criteria—language and flexibility—still play an important role in
contemporary discussions on animal cognition (see e.g., the papers col-
lected in Hurley & Nudds, 2006).
A second tradition—going back to John Locke—draws a closer con-
nection between conceptual thought and experience. Locke (1689) argued
that all knowledge derives from experience through the senses, and that
this sets animals and humans apart from plants. He realized that animal
cognition is adapted to the ecological niche in which the animals live:
Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of animals;
though in some possibly the avenues provided by nature for
the reception of sensations are so few, and the perception they
are received with so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely
short of the quickness and variety of sensation which is in other
animals; but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the
state and condition of that sort of animals who are thus made
(Locke, 1689, book 2, § xix).
This is an interesting precursor to cognitive ethologists like Konrad Lorenz
and Niko Tinbergen, who likewise argued that animal perception is adapted
to their environment. For Locke, the only qualitative difference between
human and animal cognition is abstraction, the ability to make gener-
alizations between different kinds of stimuli, i.e., to derive universals.
white, for example, is abstracted from the appearance of milk yesterday
and the perception of snow or chalk today (Locke, 1689, book 2, § xi).
Locke defends this claim by arguing that animals do not have words or
other signs that denote abstract concepts.
For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use
of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason
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to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or
making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any
other general signs (Locke, 1689, book 2, § xi).
This Lockean position is also still present in contemporary philosophical
arguments based on empirical and theoretical studies in cognitive ethology
and psychology (e.g., Camp, 2009).
2.1.2 Intentionality
Theories of thought must explain how a cognitive system is able to repre-
sent aspects of the world. The absolute minimum for a cognizing system
is that it has intentionality, i.e., it refers to states of the world. Inten-
tionality by itself is not sufficient, of course; maps and abacuses represent
aspects of the world (spatial and numerical, respectively), but few people
would argue that these objects think. Therefore, most philosophical anal-
yses of cognition require that a thinker has a belief-desire psychology, in
other words, there needs to be a realistic distinction between perceptual
states (e.g., seeing an apple) and conceptual (belief, desire) states (e.g., I
wish I had an apple). Additionally, some authors (e.g., Carruthers, 2006)
require that perception and conceptual thought must possess distinctive
causal roles in guiding behavior. Carruthers’ requirements may be de-
manding, but can even be met by nonhuman animals, including those
with very small brains, like invertebrates. Bees, for example, can flexibly
use directional information to navigate from a food source to the hive, and
then use that information to produce an elaborate bee dance to inform
others about the location of this food source. The bee that discovered
the food has to move in an angle 90 ◦ away from the Sun to get back
to the hive, but once inside, it needs to convey that the source is at an
angle 90 ◦ toward the Sun. Foraging worker bees, on the other hand, will
simply take the nectar back to the nest when reaching the location. In
other words, the stimulus (a patch of flowers) does not always lead to the
same response, but to a variety of responses (dance, foraging).
How do bees and other animals achieve this intentionality? Recent
philosophical theories on mental content (teleosemantics) argue that in-
tentionality is a product of evolution. According to these authors (e.g.,
Millikan, 1984; Rowlands, 1997), the proper function of our cognitive
processes is to promote survival and reproduction. ‘Proper function’ is
a normative concept that is ultimately relative to fitness. The heart, for
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example, does many things: amongst many other things, it pumps blood
and produces lines on a electrocardiogram. From an evolutionary per-
spective, only the pumping of blood is relevant. Similarly, a brain does
many things but its proper function is the production of beliefs that are
fitness-enhancing. Intentionality is a property that mental states possess
by virtue of their evolutionary history. In other words, bee dances are
‘about’ the location of nectar, because the ancestors of current bees were
able to pass on the behavioral trait of dancing as a cue to the location of
a food source to subsequent generations because of the selective advan-
tage this conferred to them. If this evolutionary reasoning is correct, we
can expect that many animals, including indeed invertebrates, may have
intentional mental states.
2.1.3 Stimulus-independence
Additionally, genuine conceptual thought, as opposed to mere passive
reaction, should also require some sort of distance or separation between
the thinker and what it thinks about (Camp, 2009, 287). As Locke (1689)
already noted, we not only recognize whiteness when we actually see it,
but we can also reflect on whiteness in the absence of direct perceptual
stimuli. Elisabeth Camp (2009, 288) formulates this criterion as follows:
“Genuine thought involves a clear distinction between representation and
represented, so that the former can occur even in the latter’s absence.”
Although this condition seems demanding, there is good reason to suppose
that many instances of nonhuman animal cognition would meet it. A
hungry predator must have a concept of prey when it goes hunting;
many instances of operant conditioning, likewise, depend on an animal’s
ability to anticipate a food reward following the completion of a specific
action, such as pressing a lever. Indeed, Gallistel (1990) has shown that
mere temporal association is not sufficient for operant conditioning.
Next to this, many animals can represent states of affairs independent
of the state they are currently in. Western scrub jays, for example, are
caching birds that store food for future use. In one experiment (Raby,
Alexis, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007), the animals were placed in a three-
compartment room, which they could freely explore by day. The next
days, they were alternatingly placed in two compartments, one in which
food was served in the morning, and one in which no food was given.
Once the birds had learned in which of the rooms they received breakfast,
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they started caching food in the compartment where they had previously
not received anything, thus anticipating a future state (hunger) by storing
food in advance. The scrub jays saved food even when they were currently
hungry, indicating that they can discount current feelings of hunger to
take future needs into account. In this respect, scrub jays are better than
humans in discounting present feelings: the latter (Morewedge, Gilbert,
& Wilson, 2005) are influenced by current feelings of satiation or hunger
when they are shopping for food, buying more high-calorie snacks to eat in
the future because they are hungry now. Tool-use in nonhuman animals
is a further example of stimulus-independent reasoning. Animals like
New Caledonian crows and chimpanzees can select and modify objects
to retrieve food. For example, in the lab, New Caledonian crows can
shape bits of wire into hooks to retrieve food from a narrow tube (Hunt
& Gray, 2004). More impressively, these crows can use a short tool to
obtain another, longer tool in order to retrieve a food reward that is
out of reach, one of the few convincing examples of meta-tool use in
nonhuman animals (A. H. Taylor et al., 2007). Taken together, these
studies indicate that while stimulus-independence may be important for
genuine conceptual thought, it is not distinctly human.
2.1.4 Cognitive fluidity
A further hallmark of conceptual thought may be combinatorial flexibil-
ity, or as Mithen (1996) calls it, cognitive fluidity. Humans can put their
concepts to use in a variety of contexts, and draw connections between
mental representations in unexpected ways. Domains where this flexibil-
ity is particularly evident are art, religion and science. As will be spelled
out in more detail in chapter 5, art forms like music, visual art and dance
rely on the co-optation of a variety of cognitive processes, as in a dancer
who evokes a dying swan through bodily motions. Making visual art such
as paintings or sculptures involves the use of tools like brushes or chisels.
Whereas other animals mainly use tools to acquire food and for other
basic-need purposes, artists use tools to achieve social goals. Religious
concepts involve a combination of ideas from various domains. In many
cultures, people believe that their ancestors are nonhuman animals, such
as sharks or bears. Such totemic ideas involve a combination of knowledge
from the social domain (kinship) with information about the natural en-
vironment (knowledge about animals). In theological thought, the design
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argument draws a connection between design of artifacts and design in
the natural realm (see chapter 9). Scientific discovery often involves the
combination of evidence and modes of reasoning from different domains,
such as the use of mechanical metaphors by William Harvey and con-
temporaries in their description of the working of human bodily organs,
such as the heart. Prior to them, physicians never thought about combin-
ing their knowledge of hydraulic mechanisms, like sluice gates, with their
physiological knowledge about human anatomy. Medicine up to then did
not even concentrate on organs, but involved the study of humors, fluids
in the body, like blood and gall, that were believed to cause illnesses when
they were in imbalance. However, once physicians started combining both
domains, they began to think about human health and illness in terms
of solid, bodily organs that are subject to the same mechanical principles
as inanimate objects (De Cruz & De Smedt, 2010c).
Although no experimental paradigms have directly investigated cogni-
tive fluidity in nonhuman animals, there is substantial indirect evidence
to support Mithen’s (1996) view that cognitive fluidity is uniquely hu-
man. Take the example of transitive inference. Transitivity is the ability
to reason about properties of elements from a set by using relationships
between these elements. For example, if you know that Jenny is taller
than Ann, and Ann is taller than Beth, you know that Jenny is taller than
Beth, even if you do not know the individual heights of these girls. Some
experiments indicate that a small number of species can use transitive
inference. Pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) can figure out dom-
inance hierarchies between animals they did not directly interact with
by use of transitive infernece. In a series of experiments (Paz-y-Min˜o
et al., 2004), a test pinyon jay (A) was shown how an individual (B) it
was familiar with interacted with an unfamiliar bird (C), fighting over a
peanut. When A was subordinate to B, and witnessed B losing from C,
A showed submissive behavior when confronted with C. However, when
A was dominant to B, it would not show this submissive behavior when
put in the same cage as C. Also, in control conditions where A did not
know either B or C, it did not show submissive behavior toward whoever
won the outcome of the peanut contest. However, as Penn et al. (2008)
indicate, there is no evidence that nonhuman animals are able to transfer
their transitive inferences to other domains. According to them, tran-
sitive reasoning in other animals is qualitatively different from that of
humans, since the former cannot use this capacity in the systematic, logi-
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cal way that the latter do. Humans, according to this view, would be able
to abstract from any given situation and use deductive rules regardless of
the context in which problems are presented.
However, cognitive fluidity seems to have its limits. Take, for example,
the following implausible but logically valid argument:
(i) All things that are made of plants are good for one’s health.
(ii) Cigarettes are things that are made of plants.
∴(iii) Conclusion: Cigarettes are good for one’s health.
East Asian college students, such as Koreans and Chinese, are more likely
to reject this argument than European and North American college stu-
dents, even though the experimenters explicitly asked whether the con-
clusion follows logically from the premises (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, &
Nisbett, 2002). This ties in with a large body of experimental evidence
(see Nisbett, 2003, for an overview) that indicates that East Asians rea-
son more holistically and pay more attention to context than westerners.
Such cross-cultural evidence indicates that context-sensitivity in deduc-
tive reasoning might be present in both humans and nonhuman animals,
and that western college students may be atypical in their discounting
of contextual information when presented with logical problems. In the
contrived acronym of Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010), the lat-
ter may be WEIRD (from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and
Democratic societies).
Moreover, western subjects also have limits in their cognitive fluidity.
Noam Chomsky’s (1957, 15) famous example of a logically valid sentence
“Colorless green ideas sleep furiously” is nonsensical, even though it is a
combination of meaningful concepts. The cognitive anthropologist Pascal
Boyer (2002, 98–100) has proposed that the combination of ideas from
distinct ontological domains entails certain costs, such as in memory and
processing—thus a minimally counterintuitive idea such as a talking tree
is appealing, but a massively counterintuitive one, such as “a cat that can
never die, has wings, is made of steel, experiences time backwards, lives
underwater, and speaks Russian” (J. L. Barrett & Nyhof, 2001, 93) is sim-
ply unintelligible. In addition, an extensive literature on the boundedness
of human rationality indicates that human cognition in many domains is
context-specific, and that humans fail to generalize information from one
situation to another, for example in the domains of probability theory
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and risk assessment (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). This raises
an important point that Susan Hurley (2003) also brought up: we should
not overintellectualize the mind. She argued that nonhuman animals can
occupy “islands of practical rationality,” rather than a continuous space
of reasons (Hurley, 2003, 231). In the case of pinyon jays, deductive
reasoning is genuine, but it is limited to specific conditions, such as the
evaluation of social interactions. Although the birds are not able to jus-
tify or make explicit the inferences they are drawing, they can still use
them correctly to guide their behavior in taking a submissive or dominant
attitude toward an unfamiliar bird.
Transitive inferences in the social realm may have evolved in species
that live in stable, hierarchically organized social groups, without confer-
ring additional cognitive capacities that allow these animals to transfer
it to other domains, such as solving abstract tasks involving transitive
reasoning in the laboratory. Indeed, nonhuman primates require exten-
sive training, often comprising hundreds of trials, to solve transitive tasks
in the nonsocial realm, such as relationships between objects in terms of
size or other physical properties (Tomasello, 1999a, 18). To Hurley (2003,
251), such examples of context-sensitivity indicate that animal reasoning
is context-bound, and fails to have full conceptual generality—what she
terms “nonconceptual reasons in the practical sphere.” But perhaps this
picture should be resisted. It places high demands on conceptual abili-
ties, since it seems to imply that context-bound human reasoning may not
be fully conceptual either. Also, it seems to favor a linear scale or one-
dimensional cognitive spectrum with humans at the pinnacle by virtue
of their ability to integrate conceptual thoughts from distinct domains
(Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Yet, one need but think about cognitive special-
izations in other species that are lacking in humans to realize that this
scale-like view must be incorrect. Barn owls (Tyto alba), for example, can
use auditory cues to make a topographic map of their surroundings, and
use this auditory map to detect and capture prey—consequently, barn
owls can hunt in pitch darkness, avoiding to fly into trees and other ob-
stacles (Takahashi et al., 2003). There is no reason to prioritize cognitive
fluidity as the cognitive specialization that puts us humans at the top,
unless one can be persuaded to make many such scales, but what would
be the scientific or philosophical relevance of this?
While cognitive fluidity is probably uniquely human, it still makes
sense to term context-bound cognitive capacities of nonhuman species
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conceptual. Hurley (2003) and others have taken human cognitive capac-
ities as a starting point to guide their reasoning about how nonhuman
animals might think. As Sterelny (2003) remarks, they use their folk
psychology (i.e., the way we think about other human minds in our daily
interactions) to examine nonhuman animal cognition. Although folk psy-
chology clearly works well as an interpretive tool to deal with our human
social environment, using it to understand nonhuman animals like hon-
eybees and pinyon jays may be a far stretch (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Folk
psychology has a clear heuristic value: we ascribe intentions, desires and
beliefs to other agents, and motivate their actions based on these inferred
mental states. However, it does not mean that folk psychology is accu-
rate. Indeed, as we shall see in section 2.2, neuropsychological evidence
indicates that human and other animal minds are more fine grained than
folk psychology would have us believe.
2.1.5 Counterfactual and reflective reasoning
As we have seen, nonhuman species are able to think about states of
affairs without requiring their actual proximity. This capacity is dis-
tinct from what may be termed ‘counterfactual reasoning’, the ability to
reason about states of affairs that are manifestly untrue. Developmen-
tal psychologist Alan Leslie (e.g., 1987) argues that the ability of young
children to pretend play is an early manifestation of this. A child who
sees her mother talking to a banana (Fig. 2.1) is confronted with a puz-
zling sight: her mother talks to a banana, and the object obviously does
not talk back. By attributing a propositional attitude (pretend) to her
mother, even a two-year-old can understand her seemingly anomalous be-
havior. (This was especially the case in the late 1980s, when telephones
still vaguely looked like bananas—it would likely be more puzzling to
preschoolers today.) The propositional attitude pretend puts a given be-
havior or utterance (the proposition) as it were between scare quotes,
shielding it from the everyday beliefs the child has. This enables her to
understand that in the pretend situation, the banana is a phone, but that
under normal circumstances, the banana is not a phone, but an edible
piece of fruit. To Leslie (1994), this is an early manifestation of metarep-
resentation, the capacity that underlies our ability to pretend and to deal
with false beliefs and counterfactual reasoning.
This is related to Peter Carruthers’ (2002a) proposition (see section
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Figure 2.1: A pretend scenario that can be easily solved by a two-year-
old by attributing a propositional attitude to mother, from Leslie (1994),
Fig. 2, p. 213.
1.2.3) that argues that childhood pretense provides humans with the cru-
cial practice in supposition-making and counterfactual reasoning. This
makes pretense a critical contributing factor in the development of hu-
man creativity. Under specific circumstances, some nonhuman animals
can be seen engaging in pretense. A cat that is chasing a ball may take
this ball to be a real-life prey. Yet this capacity is typically limited to
highly specific play situations: no cat has been observed that pretended
that its empty plate really contained food, whereas young children reg-
ularly incorporate pretend food in their play. By contrast, humans use
counterfactual reasoning in many domains. We can understand proposi-
tions such as ‘If the present king of France were bald, he would not need a
comb,’ even though today France is a republic. Also, in logical reasoning,
people are able to make valid deductive inferences, and can understand
that an argument is valid even though it might be implausible.
Closely related to counterfactual reasoning is our ability to form re-
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flective beliefs. The cognitive anthropologist Dan Sperber (1996, 1997)
has compellingly argued that various credal attitudes do not constitute
a natural kind. Within folk psychology we term them ‘beliefs’, but ac-
tually there are at least two basic categories of beliefs, which he labels
‘intuitive beliefs’ and ‘reflective beliefs’. Consider the propositions ‘This
desk at which I sit is a solid object, made of wood’ and ‘This desk consists
mostly of empty space, dotted with tiny particles that are too small for
anyone to see with the naked eye, and that are held together by the strong
nuclear force.’ Like many western educated adults, I hold both beliefs, al-
though they are actually incompatible. In Sperber’s (1997) terminology,
the first belief is an intuitive belief, which spontaneously emerges from
my cognitive abilities and the way they interact with my environment.
The human visual system, together with conceptual capacities involved
in object representation, lead humans to hold an intuitive belief in solid
objects (intuitive physics, see section 2.3.1). It is an intuitive belief that
arises spontaneously, without reflection and deliberation, that guides my
actions in relevant ways (e.g., I trust to put my laptop on this desk).
Anything that were to violate this belief would be counterintuitive: if
the desk suddenly disappeared, or if my laptop fell through its surface,
I would be highly amazed. Not all beliefs that are intuitive are directly
drawn from perception. Sperber (1997, 79) also allows for intuitive beliefs
that are formed as a result of communication, as long as they are spon-
taneous, and according to intuitions that are furnished by our evolved
cognitive capacities. I have never met a free-ranging wild tiger, but I
have the intuitive belief (based on testimony) that tigers are dangerous.
This belief accords very well with my evolved intuitive biological knowl-
edge (see section 2.3.1) that includes a wariness for large, sharp-toothed
predators.
The belief that the desk consists mostly of empty space is a reflective
belief. According to Sperber (1996, 1997), humans have a specialized
metarepresentational ability that allows them to make representations of
representations. Thanks to this ability, one can assess the claim that
‘Mary believes that homeopathic medicine works’ as true, even though
one evaluates the proposition ‘homeopathic medicine works’ as false. As
we just saw, metarepresentation allows one to isolate propositions from
one’s own beliefs: one put them, as it were, between scare quotes. This
allows humans to represent propositions that they do not understand.
A person untrained in particle physics can accept the belief ‘This desk
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consists mostly of empty space, dotted with tiny particles that are too
small for anyone to see with the naked eye, and that are held together
by the strong nuclear force’ without really understanding it, based on his
reliance on testimony by physicists. By extension, we can put any be-
lief that is beyond the grasp of our evolved cognitive capacities between
scare quotes, which greatly extends human cognitive capacities. Sperber
(1997, 79) concedes that some people may have what he terms “reflective
mastery” over their reflective beliefs. A trained particle physicist under-
stands not just that a desk is mostly empty space, but also why this
would be so. Her reflective concepts are based on explicit theories that
specify these concepts, such as the standard model of particle physics.
Yet she will not incorporate her reflective beliefs about desks into her
intuitive beliefs—she will not, for example, have to deliberate whether it
is safe to put her laptop on her desk. By contrast, when faced with a
free-ranging tiger, she will attempt to run without having to deliberate.
Thus, pace Sperber (1997), it seems unlikely that reflective beliefs can
become intuitive beliefs.
If reflective beliefs keep on being put between scare quotes, how do
they become part of our mental lives? How is it that a trained par-
ticle physicist can assess novel theories in her domain of expertise, and
make qualitative predictions based on such theories, as De Regt and Dieks
(2005) have argued? Several authors (e.g., Carruthers, 2006; Camp, 2009)
argue that language lies at the basis of our ability to represent counterfac-
tual and reflective ideas. Language allows us to represent ideas that have
no bearing on the immediate present, allowing for stimulus-independent,
cognitively fluid and counterfactual reasoning. As we have seen (section
2.1.1), the idea that language helps us think is well-established in phi-
losophy. However, it may not be just language narrowly construed, but
rather the human ability to store information symbolically that is crucial
for maintaining reflective beliefs, both within individual minds and in a
cultural environment. Take mathematical symbols, which can be seen as
useful shorthands to denote difficult concepts (De Cruz & De Smedt, in
press b). A consistent feature of western mathematics is that concepts
that are difficult to grasp like
√−1 were represented with symbols (in
this case i). Taking an even root from a negative number is cognitively
intractable: the result cannot be negative, since multiplying two numbers
with the same sign is always positive; nor can it be positive, since mul-
tiplying two positives cannot yield a negative. Sixteenth-century math-
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ematicians like Cardano and Bombelli allowed for calculations involving
square roots of negative numbers in order to solve particular equations,
especially cubic equations. In one problem, Cardano attempted to find a
solution to the problem of dividing 10 into two parts, the product of which
is 40. His solution was ingenious: first, divide 10 into two equal parts, we
have five on each part. 5 × 5 = 25, which is still 15 short of 40. Divid-
ing this remainder of −15 equally between the two parts, we have √−15.
Thus the solution becomes (5+
√−15)(5−√−15). He remarked that this
solution ‘adeo est subtile, ut sit inutile’ (it is as refined as it is useless)
and considered the operation to be a ‘mental torture’. Nevertheless, the
formal correctness of the operations led Cardano to accept square roots
of negative numbers (Ekert, 2008). However, real progress with even
roots of negative numbers was only booked when Euler (18th century)
introduced the symbol i. This symbol shielded a difficult concept from
the corrosive effects of intuitive mathematical reasoning, namely that it
is impossible to extract an even root from a negative number. Once in-
troduced, mathematicians no longer needed to worry about square roots
of negative numbers, because the symbolism effectively masks this cogni-
tively intractable operation, for example
√−15, which bothered Cardano,
can be elegantly rewritten in Euler’s notation as i
√
15, hence Cardano’s
equation would be written as (5 − i√15)(5 + i√15) = 40. Once Euler
introduced the symbol i, where i2 = −1, mathematicians had a con-
venient shorthand to incorporate even roots of negative numbers. This
allowed such numbers to be incorporated in number theory, allowing for
the representation of complex numbers of the form x+ yi, with x as the
real component and yi as the imaginary one which vastly extended both
number theory and algebra. It allowed, for example, for a proof of the
fundamental theorem of algebra, for which real numbers do not suffice
(De Cruz & De Smedt, in press b). Additionally, reflective beliefs have
more chance of being transmitted and remembered unscathed if they are
stored externally, by using material objects such as written documents (it
is difficult to imagine particle physics without the storage of the informa-
tion underlying it in textbooks and scientific papers), or visual imagery
(think of the manifold depictions of the Trinity as a way to externally
convey the difficult to grasp relationship of the Christian triune God to a
lay audience). We will return to the role of external media in transmitting
and remembering difficult beliefs in chapter 8.
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2.2 Modularity in cognition
Until well into the 18th century, philosophy and psychology were not sep-
arate disciplines, but were both part of natural philosophy, the branch
of philosophy dedicated to the study of nature and the physical universe
prior to modern science. Within this broad domain, questions on the hu-
man mind and its structure held a prominent place. Natural philosophers
interested in the human mind, like their intellectual contemporaries the
philosophers of mind and philosophical anthropologists, relied primarily
on conceptual analysis, induction from first principles, and thought exper-
iments to examine human cognition. They attempted to answer questions
like ‘Of what parts is the mind composed?’ As is well known, natural phi-
losophy gradually transformed into diverse branches of modern science,
with its emphasis on empirical testability and experiment. Nevertheless,
current sciences still maintain an important aspect of natural philoso-
phy: they are still aimed at a better understanding of the world (Dear,
2006). As we will see, current theories about human cognition are still
informed and influenced by philosophical ideas, and conceptual analysis
still plays a crucial role in them. This is especially the case for theories
about modularity in cognition. As will be argued below, contemporary
cognitive scientists, computer scientists, developmental psychologists and
others often tacitly use a particular philosophical model of modularity to
guide their research and interpret research findings.
At the outset of this discussion, it is important to note that mod-
ularity is a general concept, not restricted to mental phenomena, but
often used in this context (Schlosser & Wagner, 2004). The concept of
modularity is used in such widely diverging domains as education (e.g.,
a modular training program), engineering and design (e.g., modularity in
architecture), and in many scientific domains outside of cognitive science
(e.g., modularity in genetics, computer programming). In these disparate
domains, we can characterize a modular system as follows:
• A system is modular if it is composed of separate units or modules.
For example, in a modular training program, it is possible to follow
individual courses within the program.
• Modules have a degree of autonomy from each other. For example,
the individual units of a modular robot can function independently
of what the others do.
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• Each module has its own functional and structural integrity. For
example, in modular architecture, each unit has a specific function
and layout (e.g., bathroom, bedroom, office).
Scholars who study modularity in cognition add more characteristics (e.g.,
domain-specificity, informational encapsulation), often resulting in more
restrictive definitions. Modularity as a hypothesis of how the mind works
has been put forward in several disciplines, including neuroscience, phi-
losophy, artificial intelligence, developmental psychology and evolutionary
psychology. Across and even within these disciplines, there is no unified
or generally agreed upon definition or set of criteria about what a modu-
lar cognitive system should look like. One reason for this is that there are
actually at least four different modularity theses, each with its own spe-
cific methodology and assumptions. Anatomical modularity is the view
that modules are cognitive faculties that correspond to specific anatom-
ical locations in the brain. Historically, this was the earliest concept of
cognitive modularity. It is mainly used in cognitive neuroscience. Fodor
modularity is the concept of modules as proposed by the philosopher Jerry
Fodor. To Fodor, modules are restricted to peripheral input systems
(dealing with the processing of perceptual information) and language.
This view of modularity has few actual supporters today, but remains
very influential in debates on mental modularity. Functional modularity
conceptualizes mental modules in terms of their functions. Evolutionary
psychologists and behavioral biologists are the main proponents of this
view. This position is often termed massive modularity. Developmental
modularity conceptualizes modules in terms of their domains. This view,
mainly endorsed by developmental psychologists, conceptualizes broad
domains of ‘core knowledge’ that emerge early in cognitive development,
and that gradually get enriched over time as children acquire more knowl-
edge about the world.
2.2.1 Anatomical modularity
The idea that the human brain is composed of specialized processing
units (modules) is not recent, but can be traced back to the 18th-century
discipline phrenology (see Greenblatt, 1995, for a discussion). Well into
the 18th century, human cognitive processes were regarded as distinct
from the other functions of the human body. The Cartesian received
view was that the mind was a unified entity (the soul) which could not
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be divided. The brain was not considered to be the seat of thought:
physicians believed that the nerves were hollow, containing some kind
of fluid which was the substance of the soul; the main function of the
brain was its filtration and purification. This view accorded well with
a Galenic medical paradigm, according to which illness and health were
correlated to the balance between specific bodily fluids (the humors).
However, in the course of the 18th century, a more ‘solidist’ view, in
which the solid organs of the body became more important for diagnosis,
was gaining currency, following the Harveyan view on the function of
organs. In this intellectual climate, physicians and anatomists began
to look for an organic centre in which all perceptual input would be
processed. The Viennese anatomist Franz Joseph Gall and his German
collaborator Johann Spurzheim argued that the brain is the seat of human
cognitive processes, and that we can study individual cognitive faculties
by the palpitation of bumps on the human skull. For Gall and Spurzheim,
cognitive faculties were much akin to the propensities and mental faculties
proposed by Scottish commonsense philosophers like Thomas Reid (1764);
they included love of one’s offspring, memory of facts, and the gift of
music (Greenblatt, 1995, 790–793). The important legacy of phrenology
is that it offered a monist (as opposed to the earlier dualist) view of
the human mind—the quest for organic correlates for mental faculties
still guides current cognitive neuroscience. The metaphysical assumption
that all human cognitive processes have a material, organic origin, and the
disappearance of all reference to an immaterial soul, is to a considerable
extent due to phrenology. Phrenology’s fatal mistake was to correlate the
shape of the brain with the shape of the skull, and to use this as a proxy
for mental faculties.
Ironically, phrenology’s demise was caused by other theories of cogni-
tive localization. The 19th-century French physician Paul Broca observed
patients with serious language impairments, and noted damage to a spe-
cific area in the brain (what is now known as Broca’s area, located in the
inferior frontal gyrus) during autopsy. Likewise, the German neurologist
Carl Wernicke found a different type of aphasia that corresponded with
damage to another area of the brain, the posterior section of the supe-
rior temporal sulcus (now known as Wernicke’s area). Neither of these
locations was in agreement with the phrenological theory of where human
speech was located. The studies by Broca and Wernicke were among the
first lesion studies. Brain lesions are usually caused by external injury
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or a stroke (a blood-clot that momentarily deprives part of the brain of
oxygen and nutrients), leading to specific patterns of cognitive impair-
ment. Indirectly, one can infer from the correlation between damage to a
given brain area X and loss of a certain cognitive function a that X and
a are functionally correlated. Because lesions in humans are fortunately
not the result of controlled experiments, they have some limitations. Le-
sions often damage multiple areas, and some areas are more likely to
be damaged than others due to their proximity to major arteries. The
fundamental idea that underlies all lesion studies, namely that discrete
anatomical areas of the brain deal with specific cognitive functions, is
to some extent an idealization. For example, neurons in the prefrontal
cortex of rhesus monkeys have a response that is task-dependent, i.e.,
a given neuron might fire in response to a specific stimulus during one
type of task (such as matching to sample), but show no activation when
presented with an identical stimulus in a different task (e.g., visuo-spatial
association), so the same neuron does not always respond to the same
task (E. Miller, 2000).
Since the 1980s, advances in neuroimaging techniques have made it
possible to examine the human brain in action. Functional neuroimaging
techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
positron emission tomography (PET), measure the consumption of oxy-
gen or glucose by the brain using indirect signals. They typically have a
very good spatial resolution: they can make maps of human brain activ-
ity that have an accuracy within a few millimeters. However, they have
a relatively poor temporal resolution, which places limitations on exper-
imental designs. Electrophysiological tools such as event related poten-
tial (ERP) measurement and magnetoencephalography (MEG) gauge the
brain’s electric activity. These tools have an excellent temporal resolution
(within milliseconds), but poor spatial precision and limited depth. Neu-
roimaging studies can show that a given brain region is involved in a spe-
cific task, for example, that the bilateral intraparietal sulci are involved
when a participant performs a subtraction or addition task (Dehaene,
Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999). What is less clear, however,
is whether the given brain areas are also necessary for those tasks. Some
areas show increased activation during a task because they are connected
to other areas that are involved in it. For example, it is possible that
only one hemisphere is involved in exact numerical processing (as is sug-
gested by e.g., Lemer, Dehaene, Spelke, & Cohen, 2003), but that the
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strong connections through the corpus callosum between the superior
and inferior frontal gyri in both hemispheres yield a bilateral activation
(O. Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2002). Rorden and
Karnath (2004) point out that lesion studies are still the only reliable
method to find out whether a given brain area is truly involved in a given
task. Even reversible induced lesion techniques like TMS (transcranial
magnetic stimulation), where an area’s functionality is briefly disrupted,
cannot reliably say whether a particular brain area is necessary for a task,
because the technique is as yet not fully understood. In some cases, re-
peatedly magnetically stimulating a brain area leads to a reduction of
function in that area, but it sometimes also increases it.
fMRI is the most popular neuroimaging technique; most of the neu-
roimaging experiments cited in this dissertation make use of it. Therefore,
it will be useful to look at this technique in more detail. fMRI captures
the BOLD (blood oxygen level dependence) signal of bloodflow within the
brain of a participant who is lying in a scanner. The basic assumption
is that areas of the brain that are involved in a task need more oxygen,
and that oxygenated blood has different magnetic properties compared
to non-oxygenated blood. To gauge whether a brain area is involved in a
task, its BOLD signal is compared to that of the brain at rest. The as-
sumption here is that a statistically significant increase in blood oxygena-
tion means that the area in question is functionally involved in the test.
The brain during (wakeful) rest is taken as a baseline. Unfortunately,
this assumption is highly idealized, for it turns out that the human brain
during wakeful rest has a distinct pattern of activation termed the de-
fault network (see e.g., Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008, for
a review). Another problem with fMRI is that the technique requires the
participant to lie as still as possible, since even minor head movements
can disrupt the signal. Thus, the technique is ill equipped to examine
the neural correlates of dance, playing a musical instrument, sports, and
a variety of other tasks that require that the body be in motion.
As will be pointed out later (chapter 5), neuroscientists typically pro-
pose functionally specialized areas at a very fine grain, so-called ‘psycho-
logical primitives’ (Bechtel & Mundale, 1999). These are usually small
and well-localized areas in the brain that have a narrow specific function,
and that are often part of larger networks with a broader functional spe-
cialization. To give but example, our ability to infer mental states is de-
scribed as a network of anatomically defined regions (C. D. Frith & Frith,
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1999), each specialized in a specific subtask such as intentionality detec-
tion (superior temporal sulcus), explicit representation of states of the
self (medial prefrontal cortex), and inferring emotions from facial expres-
sions (anterior region of the superior temporal gyrus). The relationship
between psychological primitives and the larger networks of which they
are part often provide genuine insights into human cognition. Buckner
and Carroll (2007), for example, note a large overlap between brain areas
involved in remembering personal experiences, imagining future events,
some forms of navigation and putting oneself into the perspective of some-
one else. In traditional psychology, these tasks were considered as dis-
tinct, but thanks to fMRI and other brain imaging techniques, one can
plausibly argue that they rely on a common set of processes, in par-
ticular, they all rely on our ability to use past experiences to imagine
perspectives and events beyond those that emerge from the immediate
environment, including mental time-travel, navigating the environment
and perspective-taking. It is hard to imagine how psychologists could
have come up with this insight without functional neuroimaging.
2.2.2 Fodor modularity
Jerry Fodor (1983) introduced the concept of modularity in an attempt
to unite two seemingly incompatible viewpoints of human cognition that
were popular during that time. Behaviorism—a paradigm that was mainly
motivated by studies of animal learning during the earlier decades of the
20th century—contended that cognitive processes are reflex-like, auto-
matic, and primarily driven by the external environment, whereas cogni-
tivism—an idea that arose during the cognitive revolution in the 1950s
—maintained that cognitive processes are sophisticated, while underscor-
ing the importance of internal, mental processes. Fodor (1983) argued
that these concepts of human cognition could be united by making a dis-
tinction between two kinds of cognitive processes: input processes, such
as perception and language, are modular, whereas central processes, such
as memory, attention or conceptual thought, are nonmodular.
Fodor borrowed the concept of modularity from computer science.
Since the 1950s, theorists from diverse disciplines became interested in
cognitive processes, mainly driven by their attempts to implement artifi-
cial intelligence. Theorists like the economist Herbert Simon, the linguist
Noam Chomsky and the computer scientist Alan Turing attempted to an-
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swer the question of how the brain, a material entity, is able to carry out
cognitive processes and generate mental representations. They saw cogni-
tion as a set of computational processes. According to the computational
theory of mind human cognitive processes are algorithmically specifiable
processes defined over syntactically structured mental representations. In
other words, when the appropriate input is there, the brain, or a part of
it, performs a set of mindless computational processes, and then yields
an appropriate output. Such a cognitive process is Turing computable,
i.e., at some level, it is composed of mindless, algorithmic computational
operations. If this were not the case, we would be faced with a problem
of homunculi in the brain, a potentially infinite regress of minds within
minds.
This cognitive perspective stood in sharp contrast to behaviorism,
which was the dominant paradigm in psychology from the early 20th cen-
tury until about 1960. Behaviorists assumed that the brain was a general
processor that took stimuli from the outside world and converted them
into appropriate outputs (behaviors). According to behaviorists, there
was no way of knowing what went on inside, and since the brain was
entirely dependent on the external environment, they treated cognition
as a black box. Instead, they focused only on stimuli of the external en-
vironment and their effects on behavior, primarily in nonhuman animals
—in fact, they overwhelmingly studies animals belonging to the white
variant of the Norwegian rat—although they presumed this could be eas-
ily extended to human cognition as well (Lockard, 1971). Cognitivists
doubted the view that cognitive processes were inherently reflex-like and
completely dependent on the environment. Chomsky (1959), for example,
argued that stimuli are often too poor and underspecified to explain the
richness of some behaviors, such as language. Fodor (1983) proposed a
way to unite these frameworks: although perception is reflex-like (auto-
matic, involuntary), it is sophisticated (i.e., makes inferences). He dubbed
such cognitive tools ‘modules’.
Fodor drew up a list of nine features he thought were typical of mod-
ular systems:
• Domain specificity, modules only operate on certain kinds of input
—they are highly specialized in a particular domain.
• Informational encapsulation, information from other modules can-
not influence the processing within a particular module.
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• Mandatory operation, modules work automatically upon the right
external stimulus, akin to a reflex. For example, you cannot choose
to hear speech as senseless noise.
• Speed, modules are fast, because their function is mandatory.
• Shallow outputs, the output of a module is typically simple and
limited to its own domain. For example, a module in the linguistic
domain that is concerned with syntax will not process the semantics
of utterances.
• Characteristic ontogeny, there is a regularity of development in
a module, both in its pace and the sequencing of developmental
stages.
• Inaccessible to consciousness, a module’s working is not influenced
by conscious processes; knowing that something is a visual illusion
does not stop it from fooling us successfully
• Associated with a fixed neural architecture.
• Subject to characteristic patterns of breakdown.
As mentioned earlier, Fodor believed that central (also termed higher)
cognitive processes, such as memory, attention, reasoning, or conceptual
thought are nonmodular, they are subserved by a general cognitive pro-
cessor. Fodor cites two reasons for this. First, there is his infamous
“First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science” (Fodor, 1983, 107):
central cognitive processes are too complex to be understood with our
current empirical knowledge of how the brain works. He was indeed very
pessimistic on cognitive science’s ability to understand central cognitive
processes: “the more global a cognitive process is, the less anybody under-
stands it” (Fodor, 1983, 107). Second, Fodor thought that encapsulation
is the most central feature of modularity, i.e., modules need to be iso-
lated from each other. Indeed, in his follow up book The mind doesn’t
work that way (Fodor, 2000), he characterized modularity primarily in
terms of informational encapsulation and domain-specificity. To Fodor,
higher-order beliefs are typically holistic and isotropic, i.e., the degree
of confirmation of any belief depends on its relation to any other belief;
anything a person knows is relevant to determine whether to believe a
given proposition.
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Fodor’s substantial influence on modularity theories can be explained
by his careful listing of properties that mental modules should have. His
nine characteristic features have thus become something of a diagnostic
checklist against which empirical claims of modularity have to be pitted.
The advantage of this approach is that it makes modularity a testable
hypothesis, not a blanket term that can be adapted to fit almost any
cognitive architecture. As Fodor (2000, 56) remarks, without the notion
of informational encapsulation, “Probably everybody who thinks that
mental states have any sort of structure that’s specifiable in functional
terms qualifies as a modularity theorist in this diluted sense.” A potential
problem, as Sperber (1996) and H. C. Barrett and Kurzban (2006) have
pointed out, is that if modularity is indeed a natural property of cogni-
tion, it may not always reveal itself as conveniently and clear-cut as Fodor
proposed it. In that case, its characteristics may be something to be dis-
covered empirically instead of just ticked off. An analogy with physics
might be useful here. Suppose that physicists who studied properties of
the atom were guided by a particular model of the atom, for example,
Dalton’s model of atoms as hard, indivisible balls, which was very popu-
lar in the early 19th century. Suppose then that physicists subsequently
discovered that the physical world did not in fact contain atoms as hard
balls, but rather that atoms were composed of smaller particles such as
electrons and neutrons. A possible response could have been: ‘See, the
theory of atomism is fundamentally flawed, since the stuff we find is not
actually composed of hard, indivisible balls, so atoms do not exist!’ This
response is clearly less sensible than what actually happened, namely
that physicists refined their concept of atomism to fit their experimental
findings. It is thus conceivable that the modules that neuroscientists, evo-
lutionary psychologists and developmental psychologists discover are not
at all like Fodor’s, but this does not imply that the thesis of modularity is
fundamentally flawed. Indeed, even Fodor (1983, 37) himself has argued
that the notion of modularity “ought to admit of degrees.”
With this in mind, let us examine some of Fodor’s central claims. Al-
though Fodor outlined nine features, he thought that informational en-
capsulation was the most central feature: other cognitive domains (e.g.,
our beliefs) cannot influence a module’s output. As an example of the
of the cognitive impenetrability of modules, Fodor frequently (e.g., 1983,
66) mentions the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion. However, McCauley and Henrich
(2006) showed that people from some cultures are more susceptible to
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the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion. In particular, it turns out that people from
environments that have many straight lines (such as western cultures,
with their angular buildings) are more susceptible to the Mu¨ller-Lyer il-
lusion than people who inhabit circular dwellings, such as the San (hunter-
gatherers that inhabit the Kalahari desert). This stands in sharp contrast
to Fodor’s claim that modules are impenetrable. To give but one more
example, lower-level visual processes that are highly domain-specific, such
as color perception and motion perception, can be influenced by higher-
level thought processes. A good example is the influence of higher-level
conceptual processes on motion detection. The medial temporal/medial
superior temporal cortex is activated by the visual observation of motion.
Interestingly, this module is also recruited when people watch still pho-
tographs of objects in which motion is implied, such as a running athlete
or a crashing wave, compared to photographs of objects at rest, such as
a resting athlete or a still lake (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000). This effect
is also shown when people look at drawings in which motion is implied,
such as those in Hokusai’s Manga (1814), which shows human figures in
dynamical postures (Osaka, Matsuyoshi, Ikeda, & Osaka, 2010), see also
sections 5.2 and 5.5. Since none of these objects are in actual motion, the
best explanation of the differential activation of this brain region is that
background information about the images (i.e., that they depict motion)
can provide input to this module. In other words, in this case a high level
belief influences the operation of a low-level module.
Most importantly, Fodor’s idea that only perceptual and other periph-
eral input processes could be modularly organized is abandoned by most
evolutionary psychologists and neuroscientists (H. C. Barrett & Kurzban,
2006). His claim that memory, for example, is not modular, has come un-
der attack by cognitive psychological research that indicates that humans
are equipped with at least three dissociable types of memory: seman-
tic, episodic and procedural memory (Tulving, 1985). Semantic memory
handles our factual memory of the world. It stores propositions like “The
Parthenon is in Athens.” Episodic memory contains the recollections of
one’s own, personal experienced past. It provides an autobiographical
record of events like ‘In 2007 I visited the Parthenon in Athens.” Pro-
cedural memory stores how to do things, such as baking a cake, riding a
bicycle or eating with chopsticks. Several studies indicate that these dif-
ferent types of memory can be selectively impaired, and that they operate
independently from each other. For example, a study of three children
2.2. Modularity in cognition 57
who suffered brain damage shortly after birth shows that it is possible
to store a wide variety of semantic facts and learn a range of skills with-
out any episodic memories (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). These children
were unable to remember anything about their personal lives, including
what they had done the previous day, what movies they watched, or what
classes they attended. Nonetheless, all attended mainstream schools, had
normal levels of language competence, and a factual understanding of the
world.
As we will see in the next section (2.2.3), many types of modular-
ity are logically possible next to Fodor’s. As it is, Fodor modularity is
very influential—perhaps too influential, because debates on modularity
too often center on whether particular modular systems correspond to all
of Fodor’s criteria. As we have seen, some of Fodor’s claims are dubi-
ous on evidential grounds. Others are dubious on epistemic grounds: per
definition Fodor modularity cannot provide an explanation for higher cog-
nitive processes, so it has a limited explanatory scope compared to other
functional modular approaches. Still, for modularity to be an interesting
notion, it is crucial for modular theories to outline non-trivial properties
that would be characteristic of modular cognitive architectures. We will
now look at two such theoretical frameworks, massive modularity and
developmental modularity.
2.2.3 Massive modularity
In the midst of debates on the applicability of Fodor’s modularity concept,
evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1994b) began to de-
velop a very different notion of modularity, which has been often dubbed
‘massive modularity’ (e.g., Carruthers, 2006; Sperber, 1994). The key dif-
ference with Fodor modularity is that a massively modular mind not only
contains peripheral, perceptual modules, but also modules involved in do-
mains of central cognitive processing, including memory, decision-making
and social cognition. Over the past decades, evolutionary psychologists
have gathered considerable evidence to support cognitive specializations
involved in social exchange, including the detection of kin and the avoid-
ance of incest (e.g., Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2003), the presence of
cross-culturally stable mating strategies that differ markedly between men
and women (e.g., Buss & Schmitt, 1993), and a heightened sensitivity to
animal-like stimuli (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). Massive modular-
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ity has attracted widespread criticism (e.g., Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000;
Bechtel, 2003). Unfortunately, many of these criticisms take Fodor mod-
ularity as the standard against which evolutionary psychological claims
are to be gauged. Evolutionary psychologists do not necessarily subscribe
to Fodor’s nine criteria. For instance, they do not consider informational
encapsulation to be a central or even an important feature of modularity
(e.g., H. C. Barrett, 2005; Pinker, 1997). Instead, as we shall see, accord-
ing to them the crucial property appears to be functional specialization.
The next sections will examine the case for evolutionary psychological
views of modularity. They will outline the main arguments in support
for massive modularity, and look at some criticisms that have been raised
against it.
2.2.3.1 Functional specialization
The basic starting point of massive modularity is the notion of func-
tional specialization (H. C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006). Human minds
(and those of other animals) exhibit a considerable degree of functional
specialization. Evolutionary psychologists assume that natural selection
has resulted in the evolution of several cognitive structures that are tuned
to solving specific adaptive problems (e.g., acquiring food, finding mates,
raising offspring), and that a better insight into these problems can help
us unravel the architecture of the human mind (Frankenhuis & Ploeger,
2007). Although chance events, such as drift or founder effects, may have
played a role in the evolution of the human brain, evolutionary psychol-
ogists argue that its complex functional design can best be explained
through natural selection. Therefore, we can expect that “the design or
functional organization of the mechanisms present in our cognitive archi-
tecture reflects the principles and logic of natural selection” (Cosmides
& Tooby, 1994b, 86). To explain functional cognitive specialization, evo-
lutionary psychologists can look at two levels (roughly corresponding to
two of Tinbergen’s (1963) four questions). First, there are proximate
explanations pertaining to the immediate function of a given trait. For
example, most diurnal primates have brain areas that process information
about the color of objects in the environment (in humans these are parts
of areas V1, V2 and V4). Second, there are ultimate explanations that
have to do with the adaptive value of that trait. Trichromatic color vision
in diurnal primates enables a better detection of ripe fruit (the main diet
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of these animals), and was naturally selected.
In their early writings, evolutionary psychologists frequently appealed
to machine analogies to capture the functional specialization of mental
modules. The Swiss army knife analogy is probably the best known ex-
ample of this:
The mind is probably more like a Swiss army knife than an
all-purpose blade: competent in so many situations because it
has a large number of components—bottle opener, cork-screw,
knife, toothpick, scissors—each of which is well designed for
solving a different problem (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994a, 60).
There are sound evolutionary reasons to expect the human mind to be
made up of several dedicated domain-specific cognitive systems, as spe-
cialized systems are better at solving distinct problems than a single pro-
cessor: “We have both cork-screws and cups because each solves a par-
ticular problem better than the other. It would be extremely difficult to
open a bottle of wine with a cup or to drink from a cork-screw” (Cosmides
& Tooby, 1994a, 58). Some authors (e.g., Nesse, 2000) have objected to
this use of machine metaphors, because machines are products of intelli-
gent (human) design, whereas minds are a product of natural selection.
Indeed, it may be argued that machine metaphors should be avoided
altogether when we talk about evolved structures (Pigliucci & Boudry,
in press). However, the use of machine metaphors in early evolutionary
psychological writings can also be seen in a more positive epistemic con-
text. In De Cruz and De Smedt (2010c), my co-author and I have argued
that scientists often use distant analogies (i.e., analogies where source
and target domain diverge widely) in areas of research that possess an
as yet underexplored conceptual structure. Despite important advances
in our understanding of how the human brain evolved, its evolutionary
origins remain as yet poorly understood. Distant analogies play a role in
the scientific creative process, especially in periods of intense conceptual
change. However, once this initial creative phase is past, distant analo-
gies are often abandoned. One can think of the use of the solar system
as a model for the atom by Niels Bohr and Ernest Rutherford in early
20th-century theories on the structure of the atom; although it was useful
at the time, physicists today no longer think about atoms in these terms.
We can thus expect that as evolutionary psychology matures, its ideas
about modularity should be less informed by machine metaphors and
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more by real-life examples of neural specialization in humans and other
animals, that is if massive modularity is to become a successful research
program. But why should we expect that natural selection would favor
a massively modular cognitive architecture? The main arguments in de-
fense of functional specialization are engineering constraints, functional
incompatibility and computational tractability.
2.2.3.2 Engineering constraints
Engineering constraints for massive modularity were already proposed by
Herbert Simon (1962), who drew an analogy of two watchmakers. Tempus
makes watches in a holistic way, so that if he is interrupted because the
phone rings in his workshop, he is forced to start anew each time. Hora
makes smaller subassemblies that he then puts together; thus he does
not need to start from scratch each time he has to put down his work.
The modular watchmaker, although initially slower, ends up making more
watches, even if the number of interrupting phone calls is quite low. The
neuroscientist David Marr (1982), in his seminal work on visual cognition,
invoked a similar engineering argument to explain why human vision has
modular properties.
[I]f a process is not designed in this [modular] way, a small
change in one place has consequences in many other places. As
a result, the process as a whole is extremely difficult to debug
or to improve, whether by a human designer or in the course of
natural evolution, because a small change to improve one part
has to be accomplished by many simultaneous, compensatory
changes elsewhere (Marr, 1982, 102).
Marr argued that vision has evolved in a modular way, hypothesizing that
biological subsystems evolve in such a way that adding extra components
does not change the performance of the overall system. Evolutionary
psychologists (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1994b) developed this engineering
argument for human cognition:
Speed, reliability and efficiency can be engineered into spe-
cialized mechanisms because there is no need to engineer a
compromise between different task demands. [. . . ] [A] jack of
all trades is necessarily a master of none because generality
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can be achieved only by sacrificing effectiveness (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1994b, 89).
The engineering argument relies on the notion of adaptive problem:
when distinct adaptive problems arise, a modular architecture is the
most efficient solution. This notion of adaptive problem is not specific to
evolutionary psychology, but is a central part of the adaptationist pro-
gram in biology in general (Frankenhuis & Ploeger, 2007, 694). However,
evolutionary psychologists do not have an articulate notion of what an
adaptive problem might be. Cosmides and Tooby (1994b, 90), for exam-
ple, simply define it by providing specific examples, including foraging
for food, navigating, selecting a mate, parenting, engaging in social ex-
change, dealing with aggressive threats, and avoiding predators. They
argue that the statistical occurrence of such adaptive problems in our
(Pleistocene) ancestors was sufficient to promote a modular cognitive ar-
chitecture through natural selection. A more recent theoretical paper
(H. C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006) does not define ‘adaptive problem’ at all,
but only suggests that the wide scope of adaptive problems that animals
face has resulted in the evolution of multimodular cognitive architectures.
Although the notion is intuitively appealing, it remains conceptually un-
derdeveloped. Is mate selection an adaptive problem that is out there in
the world, or do we impose it upon the world? Women use different cri-
teria when they select short-term or extra-pair mates (good genes) than
when they select long-term mates (providers) (Scheib, 2001). Does this
mean that mate selection for women actually consists of two adaptive
problems—i.e., father-selection and provider-selection? This example il-
lustrates that adaptive problems may be more fine-grained than would
be intuitively assumed.
Some authors have made more fundamental criticisms of adaptive
problems. Sterelny and Griffiths (1999), for example, have argued that
there are in fact no stable, pre-existing problems that natural selection
can provide a solution to, since adaptive problems arise as an interaction
between an organism’s environment, its needs and its cognitive resources.
The evolution of language, of tool use, and of indirect reci-
procity are not solutions to pre-existing problems posed to the
organism. There are no stable problems in these domains to
which natural selection can grind out a solution. The “adap-
tive problem” is always being transformed in an arms race
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(Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, 331).
This objection, however, fails to take into account that evolution al-
ways entails an interaction between an organism and its environment.
Frankenhuis and Ploeger (2007) provide the following illustration: de-
tecting emotions in human faces is not an adaptive problem for octo-
puses, since it is not a stable feature from their environment, and even if
it were, they would not gain anything by developing a cognitive mecha-
nism for this. For humans, detecting emotions in human faces is relevant.
Indeed, they are confronted with facial expressions that show some stabil-
ity across cultures (Ekman et al., 1987). A fly or mosquito might benefit
from learning how to detect anger or irritation in humans, and thus avoid
being killed. However, insects do not have the cognitive resources to de-
tect facial expressions, so for them detecting emotions in human faces is
not an adaptive problem. To return to the example of mate selection, it
turns out that people are not only driven by what they want in a partner,
but also by how they perceive their own quality as mates (Regan, 1998).
It would seem that adaptive problems do exist, and that, as many other
useful theoretical biological concepts (e.g., fitness), they critically depend
on an interaction between organisms and environment. Incidentally, it
is interesting to note that empirical evolutionary psychological research
seems to favor quite fine-grained adaptive problems, more fine-grained
than their theoretical work seems to suggest. For example, prima facie
the detection of dangerous animals seems to constitute an adaptive prob-
lem. Yet, empirical research (e.g., O¨hman & Mineka, 2003) supports the
existence of a fine-grained highly specialized system for the detection of
snakes.
Whether this myriad of adaptive problems also gives rise to a densely
modular mind is another matter. Evolutionary psychologists seem to
appeal to some notion of adaptationism to argue that it does. Tooby and
Cosmides assert that
Detailed theories of adaptive function can tell what modules
are likely to exist, what adaptive information-processing prob-
lems they must be capable of solving, and—since form follows
function—what kind of design features they can therefore be
expected to have (Tooby & Cosmides, 1995, xv).
However, this reasoning relies on the adaptationist assumption that the
most efficient cognitive architecture is effectively realized (Samuels, 2000).
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Also, as Samir Okasha (2003) has argued, even if adaptationism is true,
modularity does not automatically follow. At best, we can conclude that
the mind is probably equipped with a lot of innate mental content. It
is theoretically possible to have a nonmodular mind that is stocked with
innate mental content. Therefore, we would need stronger engineering
constraints than efficiency to infer that a mind furnished with modular
innate mental content is more plausible than a mind that has a large
holistic processor stocked with innate ideas (e.g., “go for good genes when
in short term relationships”).
2.2.3.3 Functional incompatibility
Cosmides and Tooby have argued that
different adaptive problems often require different solutions,
and different solutions can, in most cases, only be imple-
mented by different, functionally distinct mechanisms [. . . ]
As a rule, when two adaptive problems have solutions that
are incompatible or simply different, a single general solution
will be inferior to two specialized solutions. This is the ar-
gument from functional incompatibility (Cosmides & Tooby,
1994b, 89).
Sherry and Schacter (1987) provided a persuasive case of how func-
tional incompatibility would work in practice by examining two kinds
of memory systems in birds. Some species of bird, such as marsh tits
(Parus palustris), sing songs and retrieve previously cached food items.
Both abilities draw critically on memory, but the type of memory that
is required is quite different in each case. Song learning takes place in a
critical learning period, usually when the male bird is a fledgling, with
the songs of adult males of the same species as models. Once the bird has
acquired a song, it will keep this throughout life, as it is a way to signal its
presence to (potential) mates and competitors. By contrast, food caching
requires that a bird updates its memory each year with the new locations
of caching sites. Sometimes cached food needs to be relocated to prevent
pilferage by other birds. Remembering caching sites does not rely on a
critical learning period, and requires continuous updating. The functional
requirements of song learning and food caching are thus not compatible,
so we can infer that bird species that have both behaviors evolved two
separate memory systems to deal with these mutually incompatible tasks.
64 Chapter 2. The human mental toolbox
Note that the functional incompatibility argument is in some respects
stronger than the engineering argument, because it does not presuppose
adaptationism, and it can provide a solution to Okasha’s (2003) ques-
tion of why we should expect modular rather than nonmodular innate
knowledge. It is thus not that natural selection favors modular cognitive
architectures because it would be the best solution, but because it would
be the only solution. If correct, the functional incompatibility argument
has considerable power and would provide a serious challenge to nonmod-
ularists. Unfortunately, functional incompatibility of cognitive tasks has
not been actively researched. An exception is the domain of artificial in-
telligence, where neural networks are trained to solve a highly specialized
problem. This sometimes prevents the network from solving tasks that
require distinct computational operations. There are two possible ways to
deal with this: either continuously retrain the previously learned exam-
ples (a very cumbersome and time-consuming way), or design a modular
learning system. It turns out that modular learning systems are more ro-
bust, and better at generalizing than nonmodular ones (Jacobs, Jordan,
& Barto, 1991).
How can this be translated to natural cognitive systems? A possible
example of two functional incompatible systems could be the prediction
of motion performed by animate and inanimate objects. The task de-
mands are probably functionally incompatible: predicting the motion of
an agent requires attribution of goals and intentions, whereas predicting
the movement of an inanimate object requires only the ability to un-
derstand its velocity, trajectory and momentum. Humans do this quite
successfully, and it turns out that even infants have widely differing ex-
pectations about how an animate or an inanimate object should behave
(e.g., Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn, 2004; Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward,
1995). Indeed, it turns out that the detection of animate versus inani-
mate motion activates quite different areas in the human brain (Martin
& Weisberg, 2003). Given that functional incompatibility has not been
explicitly researched as a property of natural cognitive systems, it re-
mains as yet unclear to what extent our cognitive architecture is filled
with functionally incompatible structures.
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2.2.3.4 Computational tractability
Computational tractability is an important concept in artificial intelli-
gence, and in cognitive science in general. When presented with an ap-
propriate input a cognitive system must be able to provide an appropriate
output (behavior) through mindless and algorithmic processes. How does
the cognitive system do this? According to evolutionary psychology, we
can expect the brain to be modular because what counts as fit (appro-
priate) behavior differs markedly from domain to domain. Cosmides and
Tooby (1994b) provide the following example: sex with close kin should
be avoided because the resulting offspring has a higher probability of con-
genital disorders. Yet, helping close kin (e.g., sharing food) increases in-
clusive fitness. To make interactions with kin computationally tractable,
we need modules (e.g., incest avoidance, nepotism). However, this argu-
ment may be conflating cognitive processes with their tasks. As Shapiro
and Epstein (1998, 175) observe: tightening screws requires a turn to the
right and loosening them requires a turn to the left—we do not need two
different types of screwdrivers to perform these different tasks. It is not
that a cognitive system needs a new module each time it is confronted
with a new cognitive task. Indeed, it is quite possible that extant cog-
nitive capacities are co-opted for solving novel tasks. This point will be
developed in more detail in chapter 3 where we examine how language
depends on a host of older auditory and conceptual cognitive modules.
Cosmides and Tooby (1994b) point out another problem for compu-
tation: some problems are too difficult to learn through trial-and-error
learning within the lifetime of the individual organism. Sometimes this
is because individual learning is too costly (e.g., learning to avoid preda-
tors); sometimes an organism can simply not foresee the long-term fitness
consequences of its actions. Consider some male member of a species of
bird which has the option to either help its mate build the nest and feed
the offspring, or do nothing of the sort. Because of the mechanics of
internal insemination, it does not know whether it is the father of the
nestlings. If it helps, and it is the father, it increases its fitness (since
it increases the probability that the offspring survives), but if it has not
fathered the brood, it decreases its inclusive fitness since it wastes time
and energy that could have been invested in other mating opportunities.
For an individual bird with a life expectancy of only a few mating sea-
sons, there is no way to find out which is the most adaptive strategy. By
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contrast, natural selection can detect statistical regularities in behavior—
do female members of this particular species of bird frequently engage in
extra-pair copulations? How successful are these females in rearing their
offspring all by themselves?—and this can shape the nurturing behavior
of the males accordingly. The computational tractability argument is a
strong argument in favor of innate knowledge. But again, the argument
does not necessarily favor a cognitive architecture that is composed of
massively many modules.
2.2.4 Developmental modularity
While evolutionary psychologists developed computational and function-
alist models of modularity, developmental psychologists (e.g., Spelke et
al., 1995; Carey & Spelke, 1996; Gelman, 2004) put forward a very dif-
ferent notion of modularity: that of core knowledge. Core knowledge
domains arise early in ontogeny; most are phylogenetically old, as many
are shared with other animals. They deal with distinctive ontological
categories such as inanimate objects, numerosities and spatial properties
of the environment. During development, these core knowledge systems
are not fundamentally altered; rather, they become enriched over time
(see also chapter 10 for a discussion of core knowledge and an illustra-
tion of how it develops in specific cultural environments). Because of
core knowledge emphasizes links between humans and other animals, it
shares an evolutionary perspective with massive modularity. An impor-
tant difference with the latter is that core knowledge is a hypothesis on
innate mental content, i.e., innate knowledge, rather than innately speci-
fied information-processing units.
It is useful at this point to distinguish between two conceptions of
modularity, namely intentional and computational modularity (Segal,
1996). Intentional modules (‘intentional’ used in the philosophical sense
of ‘aboutness’) are primarily characterized in terms of their content, i.e.,
what they represent, rather than how they function. Chomsky’s universal
grammar, for example, is a hypothesis about what the human mind rep-
resents about grammatical structure. Computational modularity, on the
other hand, is mainly characterized in terms of what it does, i.e., how it
functions. Examples include the massive modularity hypothesis and the
fine-grained model of psychological primitives in cognitive neuroscience.
Core knowledge clearly falls in the first category, as the theory proposes
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that human conceptual thought falls into a limited number of conceptual
systems, including knowledge about inanimate objects, conspecifics, ani-
mals, plants, geometry and number (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). These core
systems arise early in development and remain stable throughout a per-
son’s life. In other words, they continue to contribute to our conceptual
reasoning as adults: “some of the cognitive achievements of children and
adults do not result from processes of theory change [. . . ]: they depend
on core cognitive systems that emerge early in development and remain
constant thereafter” (Carey & Spelke, 1996, 516). Core knowledge do-
mains have a theory-like structure. Spelke et al. (1995) argue that the
core knowledge domain of intuitive physics allows infants as well as lay
adults to predict the behavior of inanimate objects. Infants as young as
three months look longer, taken as an indication of surprise and violation
of expectation, when they see a solid object spontaneously disintegrate,
hover unsupported above the ground, or disappear. They propose that
three principles regulate infants’ cognition about objects: continuity (i.e.,
objects that are out of sight continue to exist), contact (i.e., inanimate
objects must be in direct contact to influence each other’s behavior; there
is no action at a distance), and cohesion (i.e., inanimate objects do not
fall apart without external cause).
A second difference between massive modularity and core knowledge is
the number of proposed modules. Developmental psychologists typically
posit fewer of them. Spelke and Kinzler (2007, 89), for example, explicitly
say “both these views are false: humans are endowed neither with a
single, general-purpose learning system nor with myriad special purpose
systems [. . . ] Instead, we believe that humans are endowed with a small
number of separable systems of core knowledge.” However, there is no
universal agreement in this research program as to which systems count
as core knowledge. For example, Carey (1995) includes number, intuitive
psychology and intuitive physics as innate domains of knowledge, but is
skeptical about intuitive biology. Spelke and Kinzler (2007) allow for
intuitive geometry, number, the representation of agents, physics and
perhaps reasoning about social partners.
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2.3 Intuitive ontologies
2.3.1 What are intuitive ontologies?
The previous sections discussed several models of modularity. In most
of this dissertation, I will use an eclectic notion of modularity termed
intuitive ontologies. Helen De Cruz and I (De Cruz & De Smedt, 2007)
derived this term from Pascal Boyer’s (2000) ‘intuitive ontology’. How-
ever, whereas Boyer used this term only in the singular, we put it in the
plural to indicate that different inference systems are at work. Intuitive
ontologies describe categories of objects in the world, such as person, ar-
tifact, plant, or animal. According to this view, the way humans parse
the world is not arbitrary or even solely governed by external reality.
Rather, our inductive inferences rely on intuitive ontologies—a limited
set of category-based evolved expectations that emerge early in devel-
opment and that guide our reasoning about physical, psychological and
biological phenomena. Ontology is the philosophical study of what is, i.e.,
what kinds of entities there are in the world, and how different categories
of entities are related to each other. The question of how particular
objects relate to universal properties is an ontological question (e.g., a
particular cat and cats as a species). Human category-based inference
mechanisms are ontologies in the sense that they provide a set of expec-
tations of how specific kinds of objects will behave. They are termed
intuitive because they are not the product of deliberate reflection or sci-
entific investigation (see also Sperber’s (1996, 1997) distinction between
intuitive and reflective beliefs, discussed in section 2.1.5). Examples of
intuitive ontologies include folk psychology (how do agents behave), folk
physics (how do inanimate objects move) and intuitive biology (how do
livings things develop and behave).
The concept of intuitive ontologies combines elements of modularity
from cognitive neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and developmental
psychology. It draws on neuroscience in the view that intuitive ontolo-
gies are subserved by a stable neural architecture, thus diverging from
evolutionary psychology, which does not equate functional specialization
with anatomical localizability (e.g., H. C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006).
It borrows the idea of functional specialization from evolutionary psy-
chology in that intuitive ontologies are associated with computationally
complex survival problems, including finding food, avoiding predators
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and handling tools. Rapid and efficient identification of and reasoning
about these have significant survival and reproductive advantages. For
example, humans make an early intuitive distinction between animate
and inanimate objects: animate objects can be self-propelled and are
driven by goals, desires and intentions, whereas inanimate objects need
to be set in motion externally, and do not have internal mental states.
This animate/inanimate distinction has been shown in five-month-olds,
(Kuhlmeier et al., 2004), as will be expounded in the introduction to part
III; it guides explicit reasoning in preschoolers, who believe, for example,
that an unfamiliar animal (such as an echidna) can move itself uphill,
whereas an animal-shaped statuette cannot (Massey & Gelman, 1988).
As a result of this, we can quickly and without deliberation infer that a
person running toward us does so out of his own accord and for a spe-
cific reason, but that a ball approaching at great speed is propelled by
something other than itself. In both cases, we can react appropriately.
The concept of intuitive ontologies also incorporates the notion of core
knowledge, in that they emerge early in development without instruction,
and remain stable throughout life. Intuitive ontologies continue to play
a role in folk knowledge and in scientific understanding (see chapter 11).
Based on the existing literature, to date the best candidates for intuitive
ontologies include animal, plant, artifact, person and body parts (e.g.,
Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003; Caramazza & Mahon,
2003). Each of these domains contains a distinct set of assumptions,
which means that inductive inferences made in one domain cannot be
transferred to another. Here are some examples of intuitive ontologies:
Intuitive physics Humans rely on folk physics to predict and under-
stand the behavior of inanimate objects. It is based on principles
like contact (objects need to be in direct contact to set each other in
motion), cohesion (bounded objects normally do not fall apart) and
continuity (an object continues to exist when out of sight). Looking
time experiments (e.g., Spelke et al., 1995) indicate that infants as
young as four months reason about inanimate objects in this way.
They are surprised when a solid-looking object suddenly falls into
pieces without any apparent external cause, or when an inanimate
object apparently causes the motion of another one without direct
contact (no action at a distance). Some principles of folk physics
are shared with other animals. For example, Povinelli (2000a) found
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that chimpanzees, like humans, understand the principles of contact
and continuity. However, humans may be unique in their ability
to understand physical phenomena in terms of invisible generative
causes, such as gravity or momentum (Vonk & Povinelli, 2006) (see
also section 10.2).
Intuitive psychology Humans have an intuitive psychological theory
(also termed theory of mind) by which they explain actions by at-
tributing internal (unobservable) mental states, such as beliefs, de-
sires and intentions. It develops already during the first year of life,
culminating in the ability to verbally solve false belief tasks between
four and five years of age. By this age, children seem to realize that
the mental representation of a situation may be different from the
situation itself (C. D. Frith & Frith, 1999). Their understanding of
false beliefs is gauged by tasks that involve deception, such as the
so-called Sally–Anne task, during which child has to predict where
an agent will look for a previously hidden object based on her false
beliefs. It is a cross-culturally robust phenomenon (Callaghan et
al., 2005) that children routinely fail such verbal false belief tasks
at age three, but can solve them by about five years of age. How-
ever, some experiments suggest that an implicit understanding of
false beliefs appears earlier in life. Fifteen-month-old infants look
longer when an agent looks for an object in a container where the
object was moved to when the agent did not see this, and expect
her to look for the object where she originally hid it (Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005). Surian, Caldi, and Sperber (2007) found a sim-
ilar result with 13-month-olds. A recently published looking-time
experiment (Kova´cs, Te´gla´s, & Endress, 2010) pushes this further
back to seven month of age. The latter experiment indicates that
infants are influenced by the inferred beliefs of other agents, even
if this conflicts with the infants’ own beliefs. It seems likely that
the ability to infer beliefs, especially false ones, is a uniquely hu-
man capacity, as nonhuman apes to date have failed all nonverbal
false belief tasks (Call & Tomasello, 1999). It is important to note,
however, that intuitive psychology (like all intuitive ontologies) con-
sists of several, more fine-grained capacities; it cannot be reduced
to an ability to infer beliefs. Cognitive scientists also include the
detection of eye gaze and the inference of goals as parts of our in-
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tuitive psychology. In many cases of day-to-day interactions these
less computationally demanding actions likely play an important
role. For instance, the detection of eye gaze enables us to infer
someone’s intentional state without having to attribute explicit be-
liefs to this person. Infants are able to detect from birth whether
someone makes eye contact with them (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, &
Johnson, 2002). The widespread occurrence of eye spots in animal
mimicry indicates that the ability to infer eye contact is phyloge-
netically ancient. Next to eye contact, the direction of the gaze
can be used to infer the attention of an agent to things other than
itself. Experimental studies indicate that not only apes, but also a
variety of domesticated animals (e.g., horses, goats, dogs) are pro-
ficient in this (see Itakura, 2004, for an overview). The ability to
infer goals is present in nine-month-olds, who can predict, for ex-
ample, which path an agent (in this experiment, represented by an
animated circle, see Fig. 2.2) will take if it wants to reach a specific
location (Gergely, Na´dasdy, Csibra, & B´ıro´, 1995). A growing num-
ber of empirical studies also indicates that chimpanzees can infer
goals (e.g., Hare et al., 2001; Uller, 2004), even if they fall short of
representing full belief states. Focquaert, Braeckman, and Platek
(2008), for example, argue that a crucial difference between human
and chimpanzee intuitive psychology is that only the former have
an ability to engage in introspection, which they see as a necessary
component of human mindreading abilities.
Intuitive biology At around four years of age (Ahn et al., 2001), chil-
dren develop an intuitive biology, containing rich inferences on in-
heritance (offspring resembles its parents) and patterns of growth
and development (members of the same species typically go through
the same irreversible patterns of growth). Neuroscientific evidence
(e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) indicates that intuitive biological
knowledge is dissociable into knowledge about animals and knowl-
edge about plants. Nevertheless, inferences about heredity and de-
velopment are common for both categories. One of the core intu-
itions underlying these rich inferences is psychological essentialism,
the belief that living kinds possess an unchangeable hidden essence,
which causes their final form and behavior (Medin & Ortony, 1989).
Young children believe that surgically altering a dog to look like a
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Figure 2.2: Looking-time experiment on the ability to infer goals. Nine-
month-olds are shown a little white ball that jumps over a wall (observed
behavior). During the test, they see either the ball jump over a wall that
is no longer there (incompatible outcome), or go straight to the red ball
(compatible outcome). Infants look longer when they see the ball jump,
indicating that they expect the ball to take the shortest route to its goal.
From Gergely and Csibra (2003, p. 288, Fig. 1).
raccoon does not actually transform this dog into a raccoon (Keil,
1989): it is the inside essence that matters, not the outside superfi-
cial appearance. Four-year-olds predict that an apple seed, planted
in an orchard with pear trees will still grow to be an apple tree, or
that a young kangaroo raised by goat foster parents, will hop rather
than climb even if it never saw another kangaroo in its life (Gelman
& Wellman, 1991). One recent study (Phillips, Shankar, & Santos,
2010) suggests that essentialism may not be uniquely human. In
this study, rhesus monkeys were shown how an exterior of one type
of fruit (e.g., shell of a coconut) was placed around a different type
of fruit (e.g., an apple). Then, a piece of the inside of the composite
object was placed inside a box. The monkeys searched longer in the
box when the piece of fruit they found was inconsistent with the in-
side of the original fruit—so in this example, if they found a piece of
coconut instead of a piece of apple, they would continue searching
longer in the box as if they were expecting to find a piece of apple.
This study indicates that monkeys, like humans, expect the inside
of a living thing to remain unchanged when its exterior undergoes a
change. Another important element of intuitive biology is teleology,
the tendency to think about the parts of living things (and even
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about living things in their entirety) in terms of purposes. The de-
velopmental psychologist Jean Piaget (1929 [2007]) was the first to
propose that children tend to view objects, including natural ones,
as designed for a purpose:
[T]he child conceives every object, including the natural
bodies, as, to use his own terms, “made for” a purpose.
Now for a natural object, such as the sun, the lake or
the mountain, to be considered as “made for” warmth,
for boating, or for climbing implies that it is conceived as
made “for man” and consequently closely allied to him
(Piaget, 1929 [2007], 356).
People intuitively assume that animals and plants have parts that
serve purposes that are beneficial for their owners, such as claws
in cats for climbing or defense, or thorns in plants so that they do
not get eaten. This kind of reasoning is termed teleology—it is an
explanatory strategy that sees the purpose of a given structure as a
necessary and sufficient explanation for why that structure exists.
Teleology enables children to learn useful facts about organisms.
Even three-year-olds can infer the diet of an unfamiliar animal based
on the shape of its beak, and they can predict that an unfamiliar
mammal with webbed feet lives in the water (Kelemen, Widdowson,
Posner, Brown, & Casler, 2003), as illustrated on Fig. 2.3. Prelim-
inary crosscultural studies indicate that this intuition is not only
deeply engrained in people from western cultures, but also appears
in other cultures such as the Shuar, Native Americans from the
Andes. The Shuar, like westerners, classify animals and plants ac-
cording to their functional parts, and think about these in terms of
goal-directedness (H. C. Barrett, 2004).
Intuitive engineering A growing number of developmental psycholo-
gists (e.g., Kelemen & Carey, 2007) are convinced that artifacts
constitute a distinct domain of intuitive knowledge, with its own
set of inductive inferences and assumptions. As we shall see in
more detail (see e.g., sections 7.2.1 and 9.2.1), humans have an in-
tuitive design stance, by which they infer the function and identity
of artifacts by the (inferred) intention of the designer. In other
words, when considering an artifact, we tend to keep the intended
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Figure 2.3: Young children can infer that the unfamiliar mammal (c)
spends most of its time in the water due to its webbed feet, despite its
greater superficial resemblance to a mammal that lives on land (a). From
Kelemen (1999, Fig. 2, p. 464).
identity or use of the object in mind. Humans find the original
function of an artifact more important than its current function.
For example, adults judge that an object designed for exercising
back muscles is still a training instrument, even if it is currently
exclusively used for stretching clothes (German & Johnson, 2002).
Children also have the intuition that the intention of the maker
of an artifact is crucial for its identity: a spoon-shaped object is
a key if the maker intended it to be a key—even if it looks more
like a spoon (Jaswal, 2006). The design stance develops gradu-
ally between the ages of about nine months to six years (Casler
& Kelemen, 2007). Two-year-olds who are exposed to a novel ar-
tifact that is used for a specific purpose will continue to use that
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artifact for that purpose, even if they only saw it demonstrated
once, a phenomenon known as fast mapping. Moreover, they will
avoid using the artifact for other, equally feasible purposes (Casler
& Kelemen, 2005). In this respect, young children treat artifacts in
a manner that is very distinct from other tool-using species. The
key signature of a fully developed design stance is functional fixed-
ness: subjects become fixed upon the intended design and function
of an object, and are thus hindered to use objects flexibly in an
atypical way to solve problems. A classic example is the following
task designed by Duncker (1945): participants were given a book
of matches, a candle, and a box of thumbtacks, and were asked to
attach the candle to the wall in such a way that it would not drip
onto the floor when being lighted. Many participants attempted to
solve this problem by trying to glue the candle to the wall with hot
candlewax, or even tried to attach the candle with the thumbtacks
directly. Very few actually thought of emptying the box, putting a
tack through one of its sides, attaching it to the wall, and finally
putting the candle in the box. Adamson (1952, 289) argued that
the prior use of the box as a container for the thumbtacks inhibited
participants from using it as a candle stand. German and Barrett
(2005) found that the Shuar, who have little material culture, are
also hindered by functional fixedness. This is especially intriguing
given that the Shuar often recycle their artifacts for other purposes.
Yet, Shuar participants will insist that an object that was originally
made for catching fish is a net, even if it is currently exclusively used
as a hammock (H. C. Barrett, Laurence, & Margolis, 2008). Our
intuitive ontological assumptions about artifacts may constitute a
human-specific cognitive adaptation, possible evolved as a result of
hominids’ extensive reliance on tools for at least 2.6 million years
(Semaw et al., 1997). Indeed, chimpanzees are more efficient than
children at finding solutions to artifact-related problems because
they disregard the suboptimal solution shown by an experimenter
(Horner & Whiten, 2005).
2.3.2 Neural underpinnings of intuitive ontologies
Neuroimaging studies suggest that intuitive ontologies structure and guide
perception, rather than the other way around: very scanty sensory input
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usually suffices to start a cascade of inference-mechanisms and expecta-
tions belonging to a specific intuitive ontological domain. In an elegant
fMRI study (Martin & Weisberg, 2003), subjects passively viewed simple
geometric figures such as triangles moving about on a computer screen.
In some conditions, movements suggested social interaction (e.g. play-
ing, chasing), whereas others evoked mechanical actions (e.g. conveyor
belt, pinball). The human brain apparently differentiates between these
stimuli: social action activates the lateral fusiform gyrus and the superior
temporal sulcus (both usually activated in theory of mind tasks, both un-
derlying intuitive psychology); mechanical action preferentially activates
the medial aspect of the fusiform gyrus and the left middle temporal gyrus
(usually activated in artifact recognition and physics, parts of intuitive
physics). Thus, the brain does not just passively construct abstract infor-
mation from sensory cues, but actively constructs conceptual frameworks
to interpret the sensory information.
A useful theoretical framework in cognitive neuroscience is the domain-
specific hypothesis, developed by Alfonso Caramazza and coworkers (e.g.,
Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Caramazza & Mahon, 2003). According to
this hypothesis, evolutionary pressures have resulted in specialized and
dissociable neural circuits dedicated to different categories of objects. The
categories of objects predicted by this hypothesis are those whose iden-
tification and reasoning would have conferred significant fitness advan-
tages. Plausible categories include conspecifics (subserved by intuitive
psychology), animals, fruits and vegetables (forming intuitive biology),
tools (intuitive engineering), and body parts. To test the domain-specific
hypothesis, neuroscientists (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) have re-
lied extensively on lesion studies. Brain lesions can selectively impair
knowledge about a specific ontological domain, while leaving other do-
mains intact, leading to the interpretation that evolutionary pressures
have resulted in specialized and dissociable neural circuits dedicated to
processing knowledge about different ontological categories. A review of
79 case-studies of patients with category-specific forms of semantic im-
pairment revealed that animal, plant, conspecific (human), artifact and
body parts are categories that can be selectively impaired (Capitani et al.,
2003). Consider the following striking example: EW, an elderly woman
who suffered brain-damage, has extreme diffculties when reasoning about
animals. She cannot tell real from imaginary animals, performs poorly
on tasks involving recognition of animal sounds, and is at chance level
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on questions seemingly simple as “do eagles lay eggs?” By contrast, her
understanding of artifacts and plants has remained intact (Caramazza &
Shelton, 1998).
Neuroimaging studies (e.g., Caramazza & Mahon, 2003) suggest that
some parts of the temporal and occipital cortex are exclusively dedicated
to perceiving and thinking about animals. Interestingly, the neural corre-
lates that correspond to the perception of animals are similar in sighted
people as in congenitally blind subjects (Mahon, Anzellotti, Schwarzbach,
Zampini, & Caramazza, 2009), indicating that this neural organization
is not the result of perceptual features of animals, but rather of selective
pressures that have formed specialized areas within the human brain that
deal with semantic knowledge about animals. If we assume that each of
the evolved neural structures that subserves intuitive ontologies is spe-
cialized to deal with one specific domain, we may expect that damage to
one such system cannot be recovered by others. This is exemplified by
Adam who has a disproportionate impairment in the category of living
things compared to artifacts. He suffered a cerebral artery infarction at
one day of age, resulting in bilateral occipital and occipitotemporal le-
sions. Sixteen years later, he still performs poorly on visual recognition
tasks and questions on animals and plants, e.g., confusing cherries with
a Chinese yo-yo. In contrast, his knowledge of artifacts is comparable
to that of control subjects (Farah & Rabinowitz, 2003). This implies
that prior to any experience with living or nonliving things, genes specify
distinct neural systems for storing knowledge about them.
2.4 Conclusion
We know a lot more about the human mental toolbox than we did a gen-
eration ago, thanks to advances in developmental and evolutionary psy-
chology and cognitive neuroscience. Taken together, results from these
disciplines strongly indicate that the human brain is not a holistic, un-
differentiated processor, but rather, that human minds consist of several
specialized domains of knowledge. At present, it remains unclear whether
a limited number of cognitive specializations (as in core knowledge) or
rather a multitude of modules (as in massive modularity) can account for
the human cognitive architecture. This is partly because the current em-
pirical evidence is consistent with both massive and more modest forms of
modularity, although it is in principle possible to design empirical studies
78 Chapter 2. The human mental toolbox
that would differentiate between the two (e.g., the extent to which dif-
ferent cognitive functions are functionally incompatible with each other
has not been investigated). I have defended a hybrid position, which does
not regard massive modularity and core knowledge as opposing positions,
but as concepts that can be integrated. Neuroscientific and developmental
psychological evidence is consistent with the view that intuitive ontologies
are subserved by more elementary modules, each specialized in a narrow
domain of inference. As we shall see in the next chapter, the language
faculty likewise is composed of a number of elementary conceptual and
perceptual modules, each with its own evolutionary and developmental
trajectory.
As we have seen in this and the preceding chapter, the human brain
does not present a radical new type of cognitive architecture that is unlike
that of other animal species. And, as we shall see in the next chapter,
this is even not the case for a uniquely human capacity such as language.
However, this does not imply that all human cognitive faculties can be
found to some extent in other species. The mental continuity assumption
thus construed is misguided, since humans (like other animals) possess
a mixture of plesiomorphic7 and apomorphic8 cognitive capacities. For
example, as we have seen, human intuitive psychology relies amongst
others on the abilities to detect eye gaze and goals which are phylogenet-
ically widespread, but also on the ability to infer internal mental states,
a capacity hitherto unattested in nonhuman animals.
Chapter 3
The case of language
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Smedt, J. (2009).
Cognitive modularity in the light of the language faculty, Logique & Anal-
yse, 208, 373–387.
In this chapter, we shall examine what is perhaps the most salient ex-
ample of an evolved, specialized, human capacity: the language faculty.
Ever since Noam Chomsky, language has become the paradigmatic exam-
ple of an innate capacity. Infants of only a few months old are aware of
the phonetic structure of their mother tongue, such as stress-patterns and
phonemes. They can already discriminate words from non-words and ac-
quire a feel for the grammatical structure months before they voice their
first word (Hespos, 2007). Language reliably develops not only in the
face of poor linguistic input, but even without it. For instance, within a
community of Israeli Bedouins, a group of people with hereditary deaf-
ness have developed their own sign language which has a grammatical
structure that does not resemble that of the surrounding speaking com-
munity (Sandler, Meir, Padden, & Aronoff, 2005). Over the past few
decades, several scholars (e.g., Pinker & Bloom, 1990) have extended this
uncontroversial view on language into the stronger claim that natural lan-
guage is a human-specific cognitive adaptation. As will be pointed out,
this position is more problematic because of a lack of conceptual clarity
over what human-specific cognitive adaptations are, and how they re-
late to modularity, the notion that mental phenomena arise from several
domain-specific cognitive structures (see section 2.2). The main aim of
this chapter is not to discuss whether or not language is an adaptation, an
issue which has already been amply discussed, notably by Steven Pinker
(1994), but rather, to examine the concept of modularity with respect
to the evolution and development of natural language. This chapter will
develop a parsimonious account of language: according to the model de-
veloped here, the human language faculty does not depend on a silver
bullet theory, but rather on the co-optation of several modules, many of
which (although not necessarily all) are shared with nonhuman animals.
This is a recurrent theme throughout this dissertation, as later the same
approach will be adopted for artistic expression, religious reflection and
scientific practice.
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3.1 Which cognitive capacities are specific to language?
The scientific study of cognitive modularity and of natural language as
a specialized human capacity share common roots. As we saw in sec-
tion 2.2.1, during the later decades of the 19th century, the physicians
Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke noticed that a selective impairment of a
cortical area in the left hemisphere could lead to a specific kind of lan-
guage impairment. Patients with damage to the inferior frontal gyrus
—Broca’s area—suffered from an inability to understand and formulate
grammatical sentences, whereas those with damage to the posterior part
of the superior temporal gyrus—Wernicke’s area—suffered from an inabil-
ity to understand the meaning of words. It seemed a perfect dissociation:
grammar processed by one area of the brain, vocabulary by another (Fig.
3.1a).
However, a growing body of evidence from neuroimaging studies, de-
velopmental psychology and neuropsychology indicates that this classical
model of the neural correlates of language is fundamentally wrong (see
Poeppel & Hickok, 2004, for a review). Most neuroscientists today agree
that Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas are involved in a larger and as yet
poorly understood neural network that also involves other temporopari-
etal prefrontal areas, as well as subcortical areas, such as striatum, basal
ganglia, thalamus and cerebellum (Fig. 3.1b). Moreover, Broca’s area is
not uniquely involved in grammar, but also plays a role in nonvocal imita-
tion (Heiser, Iacoboni, Maeda, Marcus, & Mazziotta, 2003) and the com-
prehension of musical structure (Maess, Koelsch, Gunter, & Friederici,
2001). Indeed, as we shall see in more detail in section 5.2, understand-
ing grammar and musical harmony and rhythm are subserved by the same
brain areas—violations in musical structure give the same neural signal in
Broca’s area as violations in grammatical structure (Maess et al., 2001).
The functional specialization of Broca’s area has precursors in nonhuman
animals: a recent neuroimaging study (Taglialatela, Russell, Schaeffer, &
Hopkins, 2008) indicates that a homolog of Broca’s area is active when
chimpanzees produce communicative gestures and vocal signals. Simi-
larly, anatomical observations (Gannon, Holloway, Broadfield, & Braun,
1998) and an MRI study (Hopkins, Marino, Rilling, & MacGregor, 1998)
indicate that the left planum temporale, a portion of Wernicke’s area that
serves linguistic functions in humans, is also enlarged in nonhuman great
apes.
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Figure 3.1: (a) Location of Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas in the human
brain; (b) brain areas currently known to be involved in language pro-
cessing.
To add to the confusion, language relies on cognitive capacities that
are not specialized for language and that are not uniquely human either.
Consider word learning. A necessary condition for word learning is the
capacity to isolate words within a stream of continuous speech. Saffran,
Aslin, and Newport (1996) demonstrated that eight-month-old infants
rely on probabilistic information to detect words: they discern strings of
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syllables that occur with greater statistical frequency (e.g., ‘bida’ in the
string bidakupagodibidaku. . . ) as words. Since many animals can detect
statistical regularities in their environment, it is perhaps unsurprising that
this capacity is also found in nonhuman animals, including rats (Toro &
Trobalo´n, 2005)9. Fast mapping, the ability of children to learn a word
after just hearing it once, was first proposed as a capacity specific to
word learning, but it turns out to be a more domain-general cognitive
capacity. Markson and Bloom (1997) found that three-year-olds can also
fast map facts (e.g., this object is called ‘feb’ versus this object was given
to the experimenter by her uncle). Moreover, domestic dogs are also
able to learn words through fast mapping. In a series of experiments
(Kaminski, Call, & Fischer, 2004), a border collie was presented with
an array of objects, all of which he knew by name except one. When
requested to fetch x (with x the name of the unknown object), Rico
correctly learned this word by exclusion, and still remembered it four
weeks later. The arbitrary linking of vocal calls with concepts has been
found in several nonhuman species, such as vervet monkeys, which have
three distinct alarm calls for three kinds of predators, leopard, eagle and
snake (Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler, 1980), or dolphins (Janik, Sayigh,
& Wells, 2006), that rely on signature whistles to discriminate between
conspecifics. Even the fine discrimination of speech sounds (such as /b/
and /p/ or /d/ and /t/), once thought to be a hallmark of the human
language faculty, is present in a variety of species, including chinchillas
(Kuhl & Miller, 1975).
It turns out that many features of human cognition are necessary for
the production and comprehension of grammatical language. Language
exhibits intentionality—linguistic expressions are ‘about something’. In
order to have its semantic content, language relies on a pre-linguistic
conceptual capacity, i.e., the capacity to make mental representations of
objects such as dog or water, and more abstract objects like solitude
and hunger. As we have seen in section 2.3.2, selective impairment of
brain areas involved in specific domains of semantic knowledge leads to
impairments in the ability to learn the meanings of the corresponding
words, e.g., some patients cannot answer simple questions about animals
or plants, like ‘Does a whale fly?’, but do fine in other domains of knowl-
edge, such as artifacts (Caramazza & Mahon, 2003). Some features of
language, although stable across human cultures, may not even be innate
at all. Because languages are limited by extrinsic factors like intelligibil-
3.2. Language and modularity 83
ity, these features probably come about through the dynamics of group
interactions rather than innate tendencies. Linguistic categories usually
have a small number of members—for instance, although humans can dis-
criminate about 10 million different colors, all known natural languages
have fewer than 15 basic color terms.
3.2 Language and modularity
The past years have witnessed a lively debate on the question of whether
language is a byproduct (e.g., Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002) or an
adaptation (e.g., Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005). One way to approach this
question is to examine language from the perspective of cognitive modu-
larity. Although not all cognitive modules are evolutionary adaptations
(e.g., reading), there is a growing tendency to see modularity as a neces-
sary condition for evolvability, i.e., the ability of a system (biological or
artificial) to evolve. The evolvability argument (e.g., Sterelny, 2004) holds
that unless cognition is to some important extent modular, it is incapable
of evolving away from its current organization: a change in one compo-
nent will be connected to many other changes, and even the slightest
modication can have disastrous effects on the organism. The importance
of modularity for evolvability has been demonstrated in disparate disci-
plines, including evolutionary artificial life (Nilsson & Pelger, 1994) and
evolutionary biology (Lewontin, 1978). In evolutionary computer science,
too, modular systems prove to be far more robust and flexible, and can
be taught to learn something with more efficiency and ease than holistic
systems (Jacobs et al., 1991; Wagner & Altenberg, 1996).
As we saw in section 2.2.3, the view that there are good evolutionary
reasons to expect some degree of modularity in human and other animal
brains has been taken up by evolutionary psychologists. Indeed, they
argue that brains must be modular because they perform a variety of
tasks that are better achieved by separate systems than by one holistic
processor (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1994b). Mind, since natural selection
is a tinkerer, not an engineer (Jacob, 1977), it is not inconceivable that it
would shape suboptimal non-modular brains. Nevertheless, even without
invoking optimality, modularity remains plausible because any reasonably
complex nervous system is faced with multiple tasks that are function-
ally incompatible. For instance, marsh tits and chickadees sing and cache
food, activities that require distinct memory systems (Sherry & Schacter,
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1987). Food-caching requires a memory that is flexible and can be up-
dated regularly as the birds cache food at different locations each year,
and must sometimes relocate food from caches that have been pilfered,
whereas song-learning relies on a critical learning period in which the
birds learn a particular repertoire that will not change during their life-
time. Since both types of memory are functionally incompatible, marsh
tits and chickadees should have at least two distinct memory systems.
If we take a relatively broad, neurologically informed definition of
modularity which specifies that modules are domain-specific computa-
tional devices, dedicated to solving specific tasks, and associated with
specific brain structures, then language is non-modular. Given that most
aspects of human cognition are involved in language, and given that brain
structures most commonly associated with language do not appear to be
uniquely specialized for language, it is difficult to term language mod-
ular without eroding the very concept of modularity. As we have seen
(section 2.2.3.1), there are also good reasons to argue that modularity
should be grounded in functional specialization, i.e., modules should be
defined by their function, both from a proximate and an ultimate point of
view. Whereas the proximate function of language is uncontroversial (it
is used for communication), there is much disagreement over the question
why ultimately language evolved. Explanations range widely: amongst
others kin selection, communication during hunting, facilitating cultural
transmission, enhancing social bonds through gossip (see Sza´mado´ & Sza-
thma´ry, 2006, for an overview). In sum, evolutionary accounts of lan-
guage face several problems: there is no well-defined language module,
many disparate domains of cognition are important to it, and its ultimate
function remains unclear.
3.3 How did language evolve?
3.3.1 The FLB/FLN distinction
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) argue that language is modular, but
that it is not an adaptation. They differentiate between two aspects of
language. The faculty of language in the broad sense (FLB) consists of
capacities that are necessary for language, but that are not restricted to
it. The faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN) comprises capac-
ities that are unique to language. If FLN is sufficiently small, it is not
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inconceivable that language evolved through non-selective processes, such
as genetic drift. In this scenario, human language depends on a host of
cognitive capacities that are present in nonhuman animals and one very
specific silver bullet, that emerged through a nonselective evolutionary
process. Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) identify recursion as the
only thing that is specific to language and that is uniquely human—two
properties that are logically independent, but that they systematically
conflate. A recursion specifies a class of objects by defining a few simple
base cases or methods, and defining rules to break down complex cases
into simpler ones, e.g., my parents are my ancestors, my parents’ parents
are also my ancestors and so on. In language, recursion allows one to
generate an infinite number of expressions from a finite vocabulary and a
limited set of rules. Thus, expressions like ‘to thine own self be true’ can
be embedded into larger frames like ‘Shakespeare first coined “to thine
own self be true” and many other expressions’. According to Hauser et
al. (2002), if recursion were indeed the only evolutionary novel aspect
of natural language, its emergence through nonselective processes seems
parsimonious.
However, recursion is not unique to language, as exemplified by three
agrammatic patients who were able to solve mathematical tasks that re-
quire recursion (Varley, Klessinger, Romanowski, & Siegal, 2005). All
three had suffered severe damage in the left hemisphere and were in-
capable of producing and understanding grammatical speech. Still, they
were able to work out complex bracket operations that can only be solved
if recursive rules are adopted, and they could even come up with numbers
bigger than 1 but smaller than 2, using a simple recursive rule (1.9, 1.99,
1.999, . . . ). Moreover, recursion does not occur in all natural languages.
Based on more than 20 years of fieldwork, the linguist Dan Everett (2005)
has argued that the language of the Piraha˜, a Native American culture
from Brazil, is not recursive: it does not have self-embedded structures
that can be expanded at will. Recursion is not a uniquely human capacity
either. T. Q. Gentner, Fenn, Margoliash, and Nusbaum (2006) success-
fully taught starlings to recognize recursive strings of sounds. So FLN
does not do the conceptual work it is supposed to do: it is not unique to
language, and it is not even necessary for it.
A more fundamental problem with the FLB/FLN distinction is that
it is not biologically relevant. Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) take
all traits that can be found in at least one nonhuman species as FLB,
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i.e., as not uniquely human traits. This confuses the notion of uniquely
human and derived traits. A plesiomorphic or ancestral trait is present
in an ancestral species (or clade) and its descendants. For example, the
spinal chord is plesiomorphic with respect to goldfish and cats, because
both species have inherited this trait from a common ancestral vertebrate
species. A derived trait is a specialization found in one species (or clade),
but not in closely related others. For example, the elephant trunk is a
derived trait for elephants compared to other mammals, since no other
extant species of mammal has this trait. For the same reason, wings
of bats are derived with respect to other mammal clades, even though
wings are not unique to bats. Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002), how-
ever, mistakenly claim that all capacities that are not uniquely human are
plesiomorphic. For example, they argue that the ability for vocal imita-
tion is not a uniquely human trait because cetaceans and some species of
bird also possess this capacity—this view is mistaken because our closest
living relatives (the great apes) are not able to imitate vocalizations, as
is aptly illustrated by decades of experiments in which chimpanzees were
in vain taught to speak. Hence, human speech and a parrot’s ability to
imitate a wide range of sounds are similar, but not because they share
a recent common ancestor. Humans only imitate human language and a
limited array of other sounds, finches only imitate conspecifics, and my-
nahs and parrots imitate a wide range of sounds, including all sorts of
natural (streaming water, barking dogs) and artificial (telephone ringing,
creaking doors) sounds. In everyday loose parlance all these phenom-
ena are deceptively referred to as vocal imitation, but actually they are
three distinct biological phenomena. The fact that humans are relatively
poor at imitating nonvocal sounds such as whinnying horses or flying he-
licopters, whereas mynahs and parrots are good at it, bears testimony to
this fact.
3.3.2 The evolution of traits specific to language
Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) rightly remark that traits that are special
to language need not be uniquely human, and conversely, that not all
uniquely human traits are specific to language. Nevertheless, they do ac-
cept the FLB/FLN distinction as a useful way to look at language. Using
inference to the best explanation, they claim that some anatomical and
cognitive adaptations have arisen to meet the demands of vocal commu-
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nication. Enhanced human hearing due to upregulations (mutations that
indicate positive selection) in auditory genes can be plausibly explained
as a result of selective pressures brought about by the elaborate vocal
communication in humans; the lowering of the human larynx can like-
wise be interpreted as an adaptation that facilitates the production of
speech sounds—although both also serve other adaptive functions (e.g.,
voice timbre in males as a sexually selected trait). If a distinction be-
tween traits ‘specific to language’ and those ‘not special to language’ can
be made, then it is not difficult to envisage that natural selection honed
human anatomical and cognitive traits in such a way as to facilitate vocal
communication. However, the inference from current function to adap-
tive origin cannot be made thus: it is not because the human auditory
system, larynx and other traits have adapted to language, that language
itself started as an adaptation in the past.
The distinction between what is special to language and what is not
sometimes looks arbitrary. Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) argue that some
capacities for conceptual thought are uniquely human, but not specific to
language. For example, they write that humans are able to represent false
beliefs, whereas chimpanzees and other great apes are not. It remains
equivocal, however, whether the capacity for reasoning about false beliefs
is language-specific or not. Newton and de Villiers (2007) asked adults
to solve a simple false belief task while concurrently either shadowing
(repeat with some delay) a pre-recorded dialogue or tapping along with
a rhythmic soundtrack. The dialogue, but not the tapping, resulted in a
serious disruption in the false belief reasoning. Might one not be tempted
to conclude that false belief reasoning is language-dependent, and hence
specific to language, especially since the ability is seriously compromised
in those who cannot speak, and delayed in deaf children raised by hearing
parents (these children also experience a delay in language development).
A similar argument could be made for natural numbers, which can only
be accurately represented by humans. Whereas infants and nonhuman
animals can only distinguish very small numbers up to three precisely,
and larger numerosities only when the difference between them is large
enough (e.g., 6 and 12, but not 10 and 12), more educated children and
adults can discriminate large numbers accurately (see De Cruz, 2006;
De Cruz & De Smedt, 2010a, for an overview). Speakers of languages with
very few number words represent numerosities as imprecisely as infants.
Although it needs much more support to claim that this difference is
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caused by language, maybe in its use as a cognitive tool to guide exact
representations (M. C. Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008), such
uniquely human concepts might turn out to be language-specific.
Proponents of language as a modular adaptation argue that our lin-
guistic capacities can be selectively impaired or spared. Williams syn-
drome (WS), a rare genetic disorder due to a deletion of about 25 genes
in the 7q11.23 region (on the long arm of chromosome 7), affects many
domains of cognition, especially social abilities and visuospatial skills.
People affected by WS find it difficult to infer other people’s mental
states; they also have difficulties finding their way and performing mun-
dane motor-tasks such as tying their shoes. In comparison to this, their
linguistic skills seem to remain relatively spared. Some authors (e.g.,
Pinker, 1995, 274) even suggest that WS patients are “hyperlinguistic”:
in their spontaneous speech, they choose markedly more unusual and so-
phisticated words, like ‘mince’, ‘saute´’ and ‘alleviate’. When asked to
name a number of animals, a normal eight-year-old will come up with
prototypical barnyard and pet animals like ‘cat’, ‘dog’, and ‘sheep’; WS
children typically respond with more exotic examples like ‘unicorn’, ‘yak’
and ‘chihuahua’. This has led several researchers (e.g., Pinker, 1994, 44–
46) to claim that the language faculty can be considered as a modular
computational system, which can be selectively impaired or spared. Yet,
the atypical word choice reveals that at the semantic level, the language
capacity of WS patients is disrupted. Their word-learning relies more
on the phonological properties of words than on their meanings (Bellugi,
Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai, & St. George, 2000). This may explain why
vocabulary learning is severely delayed in young children with WS: only
at about 28 months they reach the lexicon of a typical one-year-old. Older
children and adults with WS have difficulties with placing words into dif-
ferent categories, e.g., both Spiderman and Mozart are ‘not alive’, but
WS subjects fail to see that in this case ‘not alive’ belongs to two dif-
ferent categories, i.e., fictional character and dead person (Bellugi et al.,
2000). They also perform worse when they have to sort a homonym with
its more common associate, e.g., to pair ‘bank’ with either ‘money’ or
‘river’, normal subjects spontaneously choose ‘money’, but WS subjects
show no preference (Brock, 2007). Semantics is indisputably one of the
core features of language—language has intentionality, it refers to con-
cepts or things in the world. The disrupted semantics of WS patients
speaks against the claim that their language faculty as a whole would
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be selectively spared. Of course, this does not provide definite evidence
against the modularity of language, but it does show that a phenomenon
that is often cited as a very strong case of selectively spared linguistic skills
is not in fact as clear-cut. Double dissociation requires that a faculty can
be selectively impaired or spared. While there are well-documented cases
of language-specific impairment (see below), to my knowledge, there are
no convincing cases for the selective retention of language.
3.3.3 Deep homologies and FoxP2
Over the past decade, the discovery of FoxP2, a gene critically involved
in the development of language, has given an exciting new perspective on
the evolution and modularity of language. People with mutations in this
gene have serious impairments in many areas of speech, including effort-
ful, slow speech, problems with phonology, and difficulties in grammar
comprehension. This was first observed in members of a single family,
and has since been extended for a large sample of patients with language
specific impairments (Feuk et al., 2006). FoxP2 expression is not specific
to the human brain; it is also expressed in the lungs, gut and heart. It
is also not unique to humans, as it occurs in clades as divergent as mice,
nematodes, and yeast (Marcus & Fisher, 2003). Enard, Przeworski, et
al. (2002) noted that there were only three amino-acid substitutions sep-
arating human and mouse FoxP2, two of which were evolutionary very
recent, occurring after the human-chimpanzee divergence, and therefore
human-specific, as shown in Fig. 3.2a. Interestingly, the derived FoxP2
variant of modern humans has also been found in fossil neanderthal DNA
(Krause et al., 2007).
Remarkably, FoxP2 also plays a key role in vocal communication in
nonhuman species. Inhibiting FoxP2 expression in the basal ganglia (a
brain area critical to the development of song repertoire) in young song-
birds hampers their capacity to learn songs (Haesler et al., 2007). A dis-
ruption in one copy of the FoxP2 gene in mice pups yields a substantial
reduction in ultrasonic vocalizations that are normally elicited when they
are separated from their mothers (Shu et al., 2005). Given the extreme
specialization of the auditory system in bats as a means of echolocation,
it is perhaps not surprising that bats species have very diverse versions of
the FoxP2 gene. The diversity of FoxP2 is larger within bats than in any
other mammalian lineage (Li, Wang, Rossiter, Jones, & Zhang, 2007), as
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can be seen on Fig. 3.2b.
Figure 3.2: Two views on the evolution of the FoxP2 gene in mammals (a)
nucleotide substitutions indicated by grey boxes, from Enard, Przeworski,
et al. (2002), Fig. 2, p. 871; (b) the branch lengths on this figure indicate
the number of non-synonymous nucleotide substitutions that occurred in
each species; species of bats are indicated in italics. Note that the bats
(colored lines) show the widest variation in FoxP2, from Li et al. (2007),
Fig. 1, p. 3.
.
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Language, birdsong and mouse vocalizations may be examples of deep
homologies, traits that look like examples of convergent evolution, but
that nevertheless share a deep genetic ancestry. A homology, classically
defined, refers to a historical continuity: morphological features in dif-
ferent clades look similar, because they are inherited from a common
ancestor. Deep homology also points to a historical continuity, but one
that is less anatomically obvious: the similarity in function is due to
commonly inherited regulatory genes (Shubin, Tabin, & Carroll, 2009).
The paradigmatic example of this is Pax-6, a gene that stands at the
top of a developmental cascade involved in eye-development (it can even
generate an eye on the antenna of a fruit fly if it is artificially expressed
there). Eyes in different organisms exhibit such divergent anatomical
structures that biologists used to think that eyes had evolved indepen-
dently dozens of times. However, studies of gene expression in a variety
of species, including fruit flies and mice, indicate that Pax-6 is involved
in the building of light-sensitive cells. In all sighted animals, the develop-
ment of eyes depends on a cascade that involves the production of opsin
proteins, which is triggered by the Pax-6 gene. The best explanation for
this is that all animals that have eyes inherited Pax-6 from a common
ancestor, but that each lineage developed different cell types for the de-
tection of light (Shubin et al., 2009). Thus, the cellular circuitry that
underlies eye development is a deep homology that predates the evolu-
tion of eyes in vertebrates and invertrebrates. Apparently, Pax-6 can be
easily modified to produce light-sensitive cells, and natural selection has
hit upon this solution several times independently. If FoxP2 acts as a
‘master control gene’ for language development, one can see how slight
evolutionary changes in this gene might have shaped the evolution of hu-
man language (and bat echolocation, bird song and mouse vocalizations).
As Marcus and Fisher (2003) argue
The genetic mechanisms involved in speech and language de-
velopment are likely to involve recruitment and modification
of pre-existing genetic cascades, much in the way that the
development of the wing began with the development of the
basic design of a vertebrate forelimb (Marcus & Fisher, 2003,
261).
Deep homologies show that natural selection often recycles ancient struc-
tures. Although birdsong and human speech evolved independently due
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to different kinds of evolutionary pressures, FoxP2 is critically involved in
the development of both kinds of communication, because across species
the gene seems to be co-opted for tasks involving complex facial muscular
motions and vocal communication. Unfortunately, the causal role of genes
in shaping cognition is still poorly understood. As a mutation in FoxP2
does not altogether abolish the ability to speak, but merely compromises
it, more genes must be at work in the development of language. Similarly,
inhibiting the expression of the gene in songbirds does not eliminate their
capacity for song learning entirely (Haesler et al., 2007).
3.4 Toward a more fundamental solution
The view of natural selection as a tinkerer is not just useful for looking
at language evolution at the molecular level, it can also be applied to the
anatomical level. An advantage of this is that we have a much better
(albeit still fragmentary) understanding of language from the anatomi-
cal than from the genetic-developmental point of view. To understand
how something as highly specialized as the language faculty emerged,
evolutionary thinkers might have to reconsider their notion of modular-
ity. Evolutionary psychologists have a relatively coarse-grained view of
modularity: to them, modules are domain-specific units, dealing with
evolutionarily salient tasks like inferring mental states or vocal commu-
nication. On the other hand, cognitive neuroscientists have a more fine-
grained idea of modularity: they take modules to be specified units with a
narrow function that are connected in larger, distributed networks. Par-
ticular modules can be co-opted for several tasks. For example, cognitive
neuroscientists have demonstrated that theory of mind (inferring men-
tal states) is not subserved by a single module, but by several neural
structures involved with narrow domains like eye-direction detection and
detection of biological motion (Castelli, Happe´, Frith, & Frith, 2000). The
module that detects biological motion is not only used for inferring men-
tal states, it also functions in a network involved in semantic knowledge
about animals (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999)—arguably, an important
part of our semantic knowledge about animals is how they move.
There are no theoretical reasons why modules should correspond to
domains humans find intuitively appealing, such as language, theory of
mind or number. Rather, the grain of modularity is something to be em-
pirically discovered. For example, traditionally, theory of mind was seen
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as a single module that could be selectively impaired, and that was en-
gaged in inferring the mental states of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995). But
recent studies with nonhuman primates have challenged this monolithic
view: in a recent review paper, Call and Tomasello (2008) argue that
chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, that they understand
the goals and intentions of others, but that they cannot understand false
beliefs. Hence the seemingly straightforward question ‘does the chim-
panzee have a theory of mind?’ cannot be answered by a simple yes
or no. Nine-month-old human infants (Csibra, Gergely, B´ıro´, Koo´s, &
Brockbank, 1999) and even seven-month-olds (Kova´cs et al., 2010) are
already able to understand other agents’ goals and intentions. Yet, a
fully-developed theory of mind that involves the ability to understand
second- and even third-order intentionality (e.g., she knows that I know
that he knows) is demonstrated to only mature by the age of four or five
(e.g., Callaghan et al., 2005). It may therefore be useful to abandon in-
vestigating theory of mind as a whole, but rather to concentrate on more
basic, finer-grained capacities (like detecting goal-directed behavior) that
together constitute the ability to understand the minds of others.
As we have just seen, current neuroanatomical and neuroimaging stud-
ies point toward a fine-grained modularity, where elementary modules are
recruited in diverse larger, distributed networks. A useful metaphor to
capture how this might work is a large set of hundreds of lego blocks,
which can be recombined to make larger, meaningful objects. In isola-
tion, each of these blocks may not be evolutionary significant, but the role
each of them fulfills in the larger wholes (the distributed networks) allows
that natural selection can fine-tune them to better fulfill their role. For
example, the module involved in edge detection alone cannot do much,
but the role it fulfills in the visual system as a whole makes that nat-
ural selection can improve the detection of edges. Similarly, phoneme
detection by itself does not do much, but its role in communication and
other auditory tasks can fine-tune its ability. The view outlined here
has some affinities with Carruthers’ (2006) concept of massive modular-
ity that proposes that most of our cognitive processes are subserved by
dedicated modules, the input of which can be flexibly combined by the
language module to produce creative thought. An important difference is
that I do not conceptualize language as a module in itself, but rather as
an interplay of several fine-grained modules that can be combined with
others in a variety of linguistic and nonlinguistic tasks.
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As an aside, we may ask whether natural selection can also detect
the networks, i.e., enhance or facilitate the connections between modules.
Perhaps this could be meaningfully answered in a 100,000 years or so, if by
that time Homo sapiens has developed a distributed network specialized
in reading and writing. Currently, learning how to read and write is a
tedious and difficult task, because we have to co-opt a variety of modules
that normally fulfill other functions. Young children struggle to connect
sounds with arbitrary signs, whereas they have no problems to learn how
to speak, i.e., connecting arbitrary sounds to concepts, such as objects
and mental states.
Returning to Broca’s area, the fact that it is a relatively large neu-
ral structure that seems to serve several not always compatible functions
probably means that it contains several fine-grained modules (building
blocks), involved in amongst others nonvocal imitation, analyzing au-
ditory structures (musical and grammatical) and social communication
(larger distributed networks). Each of these modules can be subject
to selective pressures resulting from the role they play in these diverse
distributed networks. For example, it is conceivable that the structure-
analyzing neurons located within Broca’s area can be fine-tuned to meet
the demands of comprehending complex grammatical language. Similarly,
the ability to link concepts with arbitrary signs, although not uniquely
human, could have been selectively enhanced because doing so facilitates
cognition and communication. As mentioned earlier, several studies (e.g.,
M. C. Frank et al., 2008) indicate that language is a cognitive technol-
ogy, enabling us to denote cardinal numbers or keep track of the beliefs
of others. According to Jackendoff (1996), the reason for this is that
language allows us to hold thoughts longer in attention, enabling us to
pay attention to relational and abstract aspects of thought. The human
brain, when compared to other primate brains, shows indications that
Wernicke’s area has been under strong selective pressure during human
evolution (Rilling & Insel, 1999). Interestingly, neurons within this area
facilitate the forging of such arbitrary links.
This chapter has provided several lines of research from comparative
psychology, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience that
give reasons to doubt that the language faculty is subserved by a domain-
specific cognitive module. This perspective has an important advantage
for evolutionary accounts of language: if language is composed of numer-
ous modules, many of which also figure in other distributed networks, no
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single evolutionary reason for why or how language evolved is needed.
Rather, research can focus on more contained, more modest hypotheses
about the evolution of the specific neural structures that underlie the lan-
guage faculty and other cognitive capacities (like creating and enjoying
music). For instance, comparing Broca’s area and its homologs in dif-
ferent primate species may indicate which evolutionary pressures shaped
this brain structure. Whereas the inferior frontal cortex (area F5, a ho-
molog of Broca’s area) in rhesus monkeys is a seat of mirror neurons,
concerned with understanding actions (e.g., Umilta` et al., 2001), it is in-
volved in social communication in chimpanzees (Taglialatela et al., 2008),
and in language comprehension, nonvocal imitation and grammar in hu-
mans. Asking why this homolog evolved differently in rhesus monkeys,
chimpanzees and humans presents a more constrained and perhaps more
interesting question than the question of why language evolved in humans,
but not in other species.

Chapter 4
Challenging the mental
continuity assumption:
Why the human brain is
not an enlarged
chimpanzee brain
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Smedt, J., De Cruz,
H., & Braeckman, J.(2009). Why the human brain is not an enlarged
chimpanzee brain. In: H. Høgh-Olesen, J. Tønnesvang, & P. Bertelsen
(Eds.), Human characteristics. Evolutionary perspectives on human mind
and kind (pp. 168–181). Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars.
4.1 Introduction
As argued in section 1.2.1, much of current comparative psychology and
neuroscience is conducted with the implicit assumption that the human
mind is a kind of ape mind, differing only in degree from that of the extant
apes—this is the mental continuity assumption. However, the continuity
principle in evolutionary theory does not posit continuity between extant
closely related species, but between extant species and their extinct an-
cestors. It is not unlikely that some human cognitive capacities have no
parallel in extant apes, but that they emerged in extinct hominid ances-
tors, after the human-chimpanzee divergence. Taking social cognition as
a test-case for the mental continuity assumption, this chapter will argue
that human and chimpanzee social cognition not only differ in degree,
but also in kind: they represent two peaks in an adaptive landscape. To
explain how these cognitive specializations emerged, we examine arche-
ological data to reconstruct the ecological and social contexts of early
hominid and chimpanzee evolution.
This chapter challenges the mental continuity assumption by tracing
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diverging ecological and social contexts in hominid and chimpanzee evo-
lution after their split 5.4 million years ago (Stauffer et al., 2001). First,
we consider evidence from comparative neuroanatomy that suggests that
human brains are not simply enlarged chimpanzee brains. We then formu-
late predictions on how differing ecological conditions could affect social
cognition, and pit these predictions against the comparative psycholog-
ical literature. This chapter concludes by examining some implications
for comparative psychology: rather than asking to what extent nonhu-
man apes possess human cognitive capacities, it might be more sensible
to examine what cognitive capacities nonhuman apes could have, bearing
in mind their ecological and social evolutionary contexts.
4.2 Cognitive specializations in humans and other apes
Primate brains exhibit a considerable variation in internal organization
and structure (Rilling & Insel, 1999). Which selective forces are respon-
sible for this diversity? Some authors argue that diet and ecology are
the primary forces that drive adaptive cognitive evolution. Comparative
neuro-anatomical studies (e.g., Barton, Purvis, & Harvey, 1995) indicate
that primate brain structure is influenced by species-typical ecological
properties. Because color and smell are important cues to assess fruit,
frugivorous primates have a relatively larger primary visual cortex and
olfactory bulb compared to foliovores. But because olfaction is more im-
portant at night, when colors are more difficult to distinguish, nocturnal
fruit-eating primates possess a relatively larger olfactory bulb than diur-
nal frugivores. Interestingly, De Winter and Oxnard (2001) found that
ecology is more predictive of brain organization than cladistic relatedness:
woolly monkeys (Lagothrix poeppigii), a species of New World monkeys,
have an energy-rich diet consisting mainly of fruits and insects, and a
locomotion comparable to that of chimpanzees. The internal organiza-
tion of their brain looks similar to that of chimpanzees and bonobos, and
differs considerably from that of other New World monkeys, implying
convergent evolution.
A second view, the social brain hypothesis (e.g., R. I. M. Dunbar,
1998), proposes that brain evolution is primarily driven by the complex-
ities of social life. It predicts that species with a more complex social
life will have larger brains. This hypothesis has been confirmed in birds:
species that live in complex social groups have a relatively larger telen-
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cephalon (involved in social cognition) compared to less social species
(Burish, Kueh, & Wang, 2000)—although type and quality of the social
bonding also seems to be an important factor, as the largest brain size is
found among monogamous species (Emery, Seed, von Bayern, & Clayton,
2007). Given that both diet and social life are important selective pres-
sures, these two hypotheses need not be mutually exclusive. Indeed, S.
Shultz and Dunbar (2006) found that both ecological and social factors
are good predictors of brain size in ungulates. Since primate species dif-
fer significantly in diet and social organization, we can expect that both
ecological and social pressures are important in primate brain evolution.
Rilling and Insel (1999) compared brains of 44 primate species, using
magnetic resonance imaging. They show that the human brain is not sim-
ply an enlarged chimpanzee brain: some areas have grown allometrically
in humans, while others are reduced. The most intense selective pressures
were exerted on the prefrontal cortex and on the posterior section of the
temporal cortex, which are not only allometrically larger, but also more
gyrified than the rest of the human brain. Gyrification is the degree to
which the outermost layer of cell bodies of the brain (the neocortex) is
folded: the more folded, the more neural tissue fits within the skull. Both
brain areas have been consistently implicated in theory of mind tasks (U.
Frith & Frith, 2001); the posterior temporal cortex (which includes Wer-
nicke’s area) is also involved in linking words to concepts. The increased
gyrification of these parts can therefore be taken to indicate increased
selective pressures on uniquely human skills like theory of mind and word
learning. As can be seen on Fig. 4.1, the cerebellum is relatively larger
in gibbons and orangutans than in humans and Old World monkeys. It
plays an important role in coordinating locomotion. The kinematics of
tree-swinging in gibbons and orangutans may thus have exerted increased
selective pressure on the evolution of their cerebellum. The corpus callo-
sum, which connects areas of similar function between the hemispheres, is
reduced in humans compared to other apes (Rilling & Insel, 1999). This is
an interesting finding because once the connection between corresponding
brain areas has been weakened, their functions can evolve independently
from each other, thus allowing for more cognitive modules in the human
brain. Taken together, these studies do not support the mental continuity
assumption: the human brain is not an enlarged ape brain, but, like the
brains of other primate species, it has undergone evolution under eco-
logical and social selective pressures. This hypothesis is strengthened by
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the fact that genetic expression in the human brain has been upregulated
since the human-chimpanzee divergence (see section 1.2.2).
Figure 4.1: Size of cerebellum relative to total brain size in primates.
Image based on Rilling and Insel (1998), Fig. 2b, p. 311.
4.3 Differential selective pressures after the split between
humans and chimpanzees
The continuity principle in evolutionary biology does not apply to extant
related species, but to species and their extinct ancestors. It is a matter
of coincidence that we are the only surviving member of the genus Homo.
Barely 40,000 years ago, Homo sapiens shared the planet with Homo
neanderthalensis in Europe (Finlayson et al., 2008), Homo floresiensis
(Morwood et al., 2005) and late Homo erectus in Indonesia (Swisher III et
al., 1996), and with an as yet unnamed hominid in Siberia and probably
East Asia (Krause et al., 2010). If these species were still around, we
would probably not bother studying chimpanzee cognition. Since some
human cognitive capacities have no parallels in extant apes, they must
have emerged in extinct hominid species, after the human-chimpanzee
divergence. Conversely, it is equally plausible that chimpanzees have
cognitive adaptations that are absent in humans. Here, we focus on the
period of the late Miocene to the early Pleistocene (between 6 and 1.8
million years BP) to examine some selective pressures that have been
important in our evolutionary history, using paleoclimatological and fossil
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evidence.
4.3.1 Great ape dietary specializations
As a result of intense selective pressures, the extant great apes exhibit
diverging dietary adaptations (Milton, 1999). During the early Miocene,
the apes reached their greatest level of diversity, filling a wide range of
sympatric niches. Fossil hominoid dentition indicates that their diet con-
sisted exclusively of vegetable foods (Teaford & Ungar, 2000). By the
late Miocene, however, they came under pressure from climate change
and growing competition from the Old World monkeys. The few ape
species that survived this competitive sweep did so by adopting unusual
ecological niches, as we can see in their descendants today. Gorillas and
orang-utans developed larger body sizes and turned to lower quality plant
foods, such as mature leaves and bark, thus avoiding intense competition
with monkeys. Chimpanzees became dietary specialists of ripe fruits,
nuts, young leaves, insects and small vertebrates, which all contain high
levels of calories. To obtain proteins, they rely extensively on socially
transmitted tool-use. For example, if chimpanzees in Gombe (Tanza-
nia) did not know how to probe long stalks in termite mounds or ant
hills, they would only consume 1/8 of the invertebrates in their diet. In
the Ta¨ı forest (Coˆte d’Ivoire), chimpanzees spend about 15% of their
total feeding time on cracking nuts, which constitute the bulk of their
caloric and protein intake (Yamakoshi, 2001). Bonobos live in the more
food-rich central African rain forests. They rely on fruits, leaves and
terrestrial herbaceous vegetation (leaves, flowers and pith), which is a
stable and widely available source of protein. They also consume inverte-
brates, and even occasionally small vertebrates, but to a far lesser extent
than chimpanzees (Hohmann & Fruth, 2003). However, in contrast to
chimpanzees, in the wild bonobos do not use tools for dietary purposes
(Hohmann & Fruth, 2003), despite their ability to use tools in laboratory
contexts (Schick et al., 1999). Humans are unique in their obligatory
reliance on tools to extract food. An analysis of diets in contemporary
hunter-gatherers (Kaplan et al., 2000) reveals that humans are dietary
specialists in food that is difficult to obtain, but that is high in energy
and nutritive value. Less than 10% of all food types exploited by humans
are relatively calorie-low vegetable foods that are easy to gather (fruits,
leafy vegetables). In contrast, 95% of chimpanzee diets consist of easy to
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pick food, as is shown in Fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.2: (a) percentage of caloric intake from diverse dietary sources in
traditional hunter-gatherer societies (averaged); (b) in free-ranging chim-
panzees (averaged), graph compiled from data in Kaplan et al. (2000).
This wide diversity of ecological niches has a profound influence on ex-
tant hominoid social structures. Due to their intake of low calorie foods,
gorillas and orang-utans are unable to sustain the complex social life char-
acterized by extensive grooming of other apes (Milton, 1999). Because
high-quality food is scarce, competition for food among chimpanzees is
intense. As a result, female chimpanzees with dependent offspring are
forced to live and forage solitarily, because their slowness puts them at a
competitive disadvantage (Hrdy, 2005). Exceptions to this general rule
are communities from the Ta¨ı forest and Bossou which exploit locally
abundant species of nuts with hammers and anvils. Yet, even these fe-
males compete for food and form linear dominance hierarchies (Wittig &
Boesch, 2003). Male chimpanzees cooperate to defend communal ranges.
They groom, and engage in coalition formation against dominant indi-
viduals. However, competition between them is also fierce; even among
maternal brothers, food-sharing is rare (Langergraber, Mitani, & Vigi-
lant, 2007). Tolerated theft is a more adequate term for their occasional
sharing, which does not resemble human intentional acts of altruism—by
allowing a harassing conspecific a share of the food, the donor escapes
the costs of the continued harassment of the beggar (Stevens & Stephens,
2002). The stable presence of high-protein terrestrial herbaceous vegeta-
tion seems to have favored increased sociality in female bonobos, which
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form cooperative alliances. However, cooperation among bonobo males
is restricted to periods of relative fruit abundance (F. J. White, 1998).
Humans exhibit the highest degree of sociality among the primates, with
both sexes engaging in enduring social bonds. Hunter-gatherers exten-
sively share food, in particular meat, with kin as well as nonkin (Gurven,
2004). From this brief survey, it is clear that the great apes occupy a
wide diversity of ecological niches. As we shall see, these divergent niches
exerted a profound influence on hominid and chimpanzee cognitive evo-
lution.
4.3.2 Hominid and chimpanzee diet and sociality in the Pliocene
Although cognition itself does not fossilize, we can infer changes in cog-
nition through changes in behavior which leave their marks in the fos-
sil and archeological records. Marine sediment sequences off the North
African shore provide compelling evidence for stepwise increases in East-
African aridity during the last 8 million years. This was caused both
by a global cooling trend and by the formation of the Rift valley, which
blocked East-Africa from the moist winds and precipitation from the At-
lantic Ocean (DeMenocal, 2004). The increasing aridity forced early ho-
minids to extend their daily foraging range, favoring bipedal locomotion,
which is more energy-efficient than all known forms of primate terrestrial
locomotion (Leonard & Robertson, 1997). Fossil evidence suggests that
bipedalism evolved in Ardipithecus about 5.2 million years ago, almost
immediately after the divergence between the chimpanzee and hominid
lineages (Haile-Selassie, 2001), although by 4.4 million years ago this
bipedalism was still facultative rather than obligatory (Lovejoy, Suwa,
Spurlock, Asfaw, & White, 2009). The patchy distribution of food re-
sulted in an increasing specialization in high-quality foods: analyses of
australopithecine bone collagen and patterns of tooth-wear show that the
australopithecines specialized in a high quality diet of fruits and young
leaves, not unlike that of chimpanzees today (Sponheimer & Lee-Thorp,
1999). Bipedalism had unexpected consequences for the early hominids’
social interaction, because it made female cooperation almost inevitable.
A bipedal ape cannot look at her own offspring while giving birth, and
thus cannot assist her young, such as removing mucus from its face or
loosening a suffocating umbilical cord. Nonhuman apes habitually help
their own offspring in this way (Fig. 4.3), but bipedalism requires assis-
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tance in birthing (Rosenberg & Trevathan, 2002). In all human cultures,
women in labor receive help. Whereas female chimpanzees do not form
alliances, female hominids as early as 5.2 million years ago required help
during birth.
Figure 4.3: Various stages in the delivery process of an OldWorld monkey.
The neonate is facing in the same direction as its mother; she is able
to reach down and assist it as it emerges from her birth canal, from
Rosenberg and Trevathan (2002), Fig. 3, p. 1202.
Female alliances were further promoted by the demands of alloparent-
ing. Recent studies (e.g., DeSilva, 2011) suggest that the human tendency
to give birth to relatively large infants (partly a consequence of their en-
larged brain, which requires a considerable reserve of fat to sustain it-
self) in proportion to body size of the mother occurred relatively early
in hominid evolution. Whereas Ardipithecus infants were small at birth,
as chimpanzee infants are, Australopithecus afarensis (and A. africanus)
infants had already an increased body size. As a consequence, Australo-
pithecus mothers as early as 3 million years ago were compromised in
their ability to climb trees. Once hominids developed a brain size that
was markedly larger than that of chimpanzees, which occurred about 2
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million years ago, they were forced to wean their infants earlier to meet
the nutritional demands of the rapidly growing brain. Humans in tra-
ditional societies have the shortest lactation period of all apes, weaning
infants at about 30 months, whereas chimpanzees are breastfed for about
62.8 months on average, and orangutan infants are lactated about seven
to nine years (Kennedy, 2005). Shorter lactation times result in shorter
interbirth-intervals: traditional human foragers have interbirth-intervals
of about three to four years, compared to five to nine years in other apes.
However, human children need intensive care until they are six or seven.
This places heavy demands on human mothers, who must take care of
several dependent children at the same time. In most pre-industrial so-
cieties, women solve this problem by developing extensive networks of
alloparents. In some cases, such as the Aka pygmies, childcare networks
comprise over 10 individuals including several nonkin members (Ivey,
2000). Therefore, it seems plausible that early hominids from about 2
million years BP on showed greater cooperation between females than
chimpanzees, perhaps on a par with what we observe in bonobos today.
A second step toward increasing aridity in East Africa took place
around 2.8 to 2.5 million years ago. Interactions between cyclic changes
in orbital obliquity (the eccentricity of the Earth’s axis) and oceanic cur-
rents caused profound climatic shifts, most notably the alternation of ice
ages and interglacials (DeMenocal, 2004). These global climate shifts
were locally intensified in East Africa because of the further formation
of the Rift Valley. Paleo-ecological analysis (Bonnefille, 2000) shows that
these climatic changes set in motion a cascade of speciation, migration
and extinction events in plants and animals. The equatorial rainforest
disappeared; forests became restricted to banks of rivers and lakes. Be-
cause fruit and young leaves became scarce and seasonally unavailable,
hominids were forced to exploit alternative ecological niches which led
to an adaptive radiation in the hominid lineage. One clade, Paranthro-
pus, specialized in hard vegetable food such as seeds, especially during
the annual periods when normal plant foods were not available (Ungar,
Grine, & Teaford, 2008). Early Homo relied more extensively on meat
to compensate for the seasonal unavailability of rich plant food sources.
Examinations of fossil cut marked bones and of wear patterns on stone
tools (e.g., Capaldo, 1997) indicate that early Homo obtained most or all
of the meat in its diet through scavenging: they cut meat from partly
defleshed carcasses with sharp flakes, and crushed bones with blunt ham-
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mer stones to obtain the marrow. At least three saber-tooth genera in-
habited Pliocene eastern Africa. These were relatively small felids with
powerful front paws and long dagger-like teeth, which enabled them to
kill prey far too large to satisfy their own needs (Lewis, 1997). These
partly-eaten large to medium-sized carcasses provided the hominids with
a stable and reliable food source. Analyses of tooth indentations and cut
marks on bones show that early Homo got to the carcasses before the
hyenas (Domı´nguez-Rodrigo & Barba, 2006). Because hyenas, their only
terrestrial competitors in the scavenger niche, were dangerous gregari-
ous animals, it seems plausible that hominid males cooperated to defend
the carcasses (Bunn & Ezzo, 1993). This suggests that male hominid
coalitions were at least on a par with those of male chimpanzees today.
The evolution of the Pan lineages is less well-documented than that
of the hominids. They probably evolved in wooded West- and Central-
Africa, where fossil preservation, due to the acidity and humidity of the
environment, is worse than in dry East-Africa. To date only teeth, dated
to about 500,000 BP, belonging to one fossil species of the genus Pan have
been recovered (McBrearty & Jablonski, 2005). However, it is interesting
to note that according to Y-chromosome sequencing the split between Pan
troglodytes and Pan paniscus (bonobo) occurred about 1.8 million years
ago (Stone, Griffiths, Zegura, & Hammer, 2002), which coincides with an
extreme cooling and drying event that also gave rise to the emergence
of Homo ergaster in East Africa. Given that West and Central Africa
experienced far less climatological instability than East-Africa, we can
assume that chimpanzees and bonobos occupy their current niches for
about 1.8 million years.
4.4 Differing social cognition as the outcome of unique
selective pressures: Are humans simply more social?
Over the past few years, comparative psychologists (e.g., Tomasello &
Rakoczy, 2003; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003) have asserted that chimpanzees
possess less sophisticated social skills than humans. They have argued
that in clear contrast to humans, chimpanzees do not understand inten-
tions or beliefs, i.e., they lack a theory of mind (e.g., Call & Tomasello,
1999), and they may not even fully understand visual perspective taking
(Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 2000). The scala naturae of general
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intelligence is being replaced by a scale of social cognition, in which hu-
mans exceed all other apes in social intelligence. Human social cognition
is chimpanzee social cognition plus some additional human faculties, al-
ternatively described as ‘unique’ or ‘enhanced’, depending on the research
group. Although we do not doubt the experimental results that lie on the
basis of these conclusions, we nevertheless question their interpretation
as evidence that chimpanzee cognition can simply be equated with the
ancestral state of human cognition.
Given the radically differing ecological and social contexts of human
and chimpanzee cognitive evolution, one can expect both species to pos-
sess specialized social skills. Hominids could afford to be more social
because they enjoyed a stable and abundant source of protein in the form
of scavenged meat (Blumenschine, 1987) which lowered competition for
resources within the group. Moreover, ecological and social pressures
that were unique to the hominid lineage such as alloparenting and con-
frontational scavenging (cooperative defense of large carcasses) promoted
increased sociality in hominids. Considering the ecological conditions un-
der which chimpanzees evolved, namely their exploitation of high-quality
patchy resources, one could expect that chimpanzee social cognition will
be tuned to competition. In what follows, we will examine comparative
psychological studies to test these predictions.
4.4.1 Perspective taking
Humans seem to engage in specialized forms of social cognition: we under-
stand others as intentional agents, and we attribute unobservable mental
states such as beliefs, desires and intentions to ourselves and to oth-
ers. This capacity develops before language since even 15-month-olds
can predict an agent’s actions on the basis of its prior beliefs (Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005). It remains an open question whether chimpanzees
also possess a theory of mind: do they represent underlying intentions
and beliefs, or are they behaviorists in the sense that they only repre-
sent what others do, rather than what they think? Povinelli et al. (2000)
found support for the latter hypothesis by simple visual perspective tasks.
Chimpanzees were trained to find a hidden food-item by following point-
ing gestures or gaze direction. The apes were curiously insensitive to the
attentional state of the experimenter: they were as likely to follow the
cue of an experimenter with a bag over her head as of one who could look
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inside the containers with food rewards. Later experiments (e.g., Bra¨uer
et al., 2006) found that chimpanzees even have difficulties to learn to
follow a simple pointing gesture to retrieve hidden food, a task in which
dogs and even horses succeed (McKinley & Sambrook, 2000).
Chimpanzees do better in social tasks when they are placed in a com-
petitive situation: they can effortlessly find a reward if the experimenter
pretends to reach for it in vain—this gesture looks quite similar to point-
ing, but here the experimenter can be seen as a competitor rather than a
helper. When placed in competition over food with a human, chimpanzees
take food when the human cannot see it, and quickly discover routes that
allow them to remain undetected by the human while they approach
the food (Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2006). This is quite a sophisticated
feat in visual perspective taking that is more cognitively demanding than
the Povinelli et al. (2000) tasks—that the animals succeed in this task
hints at its ecological salience (see also section 1.2.1 on the importance of
ecological salience in designing comparative psychological experiments).
While chimpanzees seem inept at solving cooperative perspective tasks,
they can easily solve them when placed in a competitive situation. As
mentioned before, Hare et al. (2001) gave subdominant chimpanzees the
choice between two food-items, one that a dominant conspecific could see,
and one that he could not see because his vision was blocked by an obsta-
cle. Subdominant animals consistently chose the item that the dominant
one could not see, again indicating an understanding of visual perspec-
tive taking. Ironically, most experimental setups use food rewards, and
it is precisely food that elicits competitive behavior in chimpanzees. This
interpretation of the experimental results finds support in recent studies
with bonobos. Bonobos, which evolved in environments that contain sta-
ble and abundant sources of protein in the form of terrestrial herbaceous
vegetation, are less competitive over food. As follows our prediction that
ancestral stability in food sources gives rise to augmented sociality, they
outperform chimpanzees in cooperative tasks, such as pulling together
at a rope to draw in a board that contains a food reward (Hare, Melis,
Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007).
4.4.2 Uniquely human social learning
Human social learning is characterized by a set of distinctive features,
such as imitation, teaching and joint attention. Imitation, the ability to
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reconstruct a sequence of actions through direct observation of a model,
has received the most attention. Early behavioral biologists often mistak-
enly assumed that animal traditions were transmitted through imitation,
such as Japanese macaques that washed sweet potatoes, or blue tits that
pried open the lids of milk bottles to obtain the floating cream (see Galef,
1992, for review). However, more controlled observations pointed to ways
of social learning that do not involve imitation, such as local or stimulus
enhancement. In these cases, an animal’s attention is drawn to a specific
situation by the presence or action of a conspecific, or by the end-result of
such an action, and this enables the learner to re-invent the behavior for
itself (Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). Many cultural variations in chimpanzees
can be adequately explained by such non-imitative forms of social learning
which require a significant degree of individual trial-and-error discovery.
For example, the length of twigs with which members of chimpanzee com-
munities fish for ants correlates with the aggressiveness of the ant species
that are present in the home ranges of these communities: it makes sense
to use longer twigs when ants are more aggressive (Humle & Matsuzawa,
2002). Cultural behaviors that exhibit cumulative complexity over time,
and thus cannot be rediscovered by a single individual, are notably ab-
sent in nonhuman apes. This can be seen from experimental approaches
(e.g., Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008) as well as from the archeological
context (Mercader et al., 2007). This means that, despite our improved
knowledge of chimpanzee cultures (e.g., Whiten et al., 1999), there seems
to be no instance of chimpanzee social learning that cannot be adequately
explained by non-imitative social learning mechanisms.
To understand why only human cultural evolution is cumulative, it
is interesting to compare the development of social skills in humans and
chimpanzees. In the first few months of life, the development is similar:
both human and chimpanzee infants prefer their mother’s face and engage
in dyadic interactions with her, such as smiling and mutual gazing. At
around four to six months, members of both species become proficient at
following the gaze of their mothers and other individuals. However, at
about nine months, only human infants develop the ability to share their
attention for a specific object with another person (Tomasello & Rakoczy,
2003). This results in a referential triangle of infant, adult and the object
upon which they share attention. Crucial for this shared attention is that
the infant knows that it shares its attention for the object with someone
else—it is thus aware of the mental state of the other (Fig. 4.4). Some
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experiments (Striano & Stahl, 2005) indicate that a sensitivity to triadic
interactions emerges even earlier, at about three months, but that only at
nine months human infants begin to overtly engage in triadic interactions.
This ‘nine-month revolution’ does not occur in chimpanzees. In stark
contrast to humans who from then on are engaged in triadic interactions
—mother, infant and object—chimpanzees learn from dyadic interactions
only: they observe their mothers’ behavior carefully, and this helps them
to reconstruct object-oriented actions for themselves. Tomonaga et al.
(2004) not only observed many hours of exclusively dyadic interactions
between chimpanzee infants and mothers, but also repeatedly attempted
to engage in triadic interactions with infant chimpanzees; still, they failed
to replicate the results obtained with human infants.
Figure 4.4: Schematic rendition of a triadic interaction: two agents share
attention over an object, and are aware that they do so.
Presumably, shared attention is the most important mechanism that
facilitates cumulative cultural evolution. Because humans can engage
in triadic interactions that involve objects, they can quickly copy the
behavior of others. This reduces the cost and time spent at individual
learning, and it enables learners to build upon and improve inventions of
previous generations. Indeed, Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003) speculate
that cumulative cultural evolution may be absent in other species as only
humans share attention.
If shared attention is indeed a uniquely human capacity, it must have
emerged after the split between the human and chimpanzee lineages, and
we should be able to infer its emergence from the archeological record.
The Oldowan stone technology (about 2.6 to 1.5 million years BP), which
is ubiquitous in Pliocene and early Pleistocene hominid sites, required
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extensive cultural learning on a level beyond that observed in chimpanzee
cultural traditions. To obtain sharp flakes, one strikes a stone (the core)
with another stone (the hammer stone) on a striking platform (a flat
surface of the core). Only an oblique angled strike results in a razor-
sharp flake with a typical conchoidal fracture pattern. Refitting10 of 2.4
million-year-old Oldowan artifacts from Lokalalei, Kenya (Roche et al.,
1999; Delagnes & Roche, 2005) shows that the hominids turned the core
around while flaking, indicated by the multiple striking platforms, and
that they chose the most efficient angles to strike the core, exploiting
its natural morphology, as can be seen in Fig. 4.5. In contrast, both a
chimpanzee (Kitahara-Frisch, 1993) and a bonobo (Schick et al., 1999)
have been extensively tutored in how to make Oldowan-type stone tools,
but neither succeeded in striking the cores at correct angles. The flakes
they were able to produce (e.g., by hurling the stones against the floor) did
not exhibit the typical conchoidal fracture pattern of Oldowan; if found
in an archeological context, such tools would probably not be recognized
as intentional flakings.
Hominids were very selective in their choice of raw material. Good
flakes are only obtained from cores which have a dense, fine and isotropic
(even) structure. They do not crumble; fracture dynamics are easy to con-
trol, producing razor-sharp conchoidal fractures upon impact. The earli-
est stone tools from Gona, Ethiopia, dated at 2.6 million years BP, were
made from the locally scarce vitreous volcanic clasts, not from the locally
abundant basalt, which is of lower quality, and is less easy to work (Stout,
Quade, Semaw, Rogers, & Levin, 2005). When the quality of local cob-
bles was poor, the hominids transported raw material from other sources
to the butchery sites that were often several kilometres away (Plummer,
Bishop, Ditchfield, & Hicks, 1999). This anticipatory behavior in raw
material selection has not been observed in extant nonhuman primates.
Chimpanzees, for example, use a wide range of materials that they find
in their immediate surroundings. Their hammer stones are unprocessed
and weigh between 1 and 24 kg, indicating the opportunistic nature of
their raw material choice (Mercader et al., 2007)—indeed, sometimes the
chosen stone is so heavy that it just crushes the nut. By contrast, ho-
minid hammers typically weigh less than 400 g, and are all lighter than 1
kg (Mercader et al., 2007, 3046). Taken together, the striking differences
between Oldowan technology and chimpanzee technological skills indicate
that the Oldowan is beyond the social learning skills of chimpanzees. It is
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Figure 4.5: This is a refitted, i.e., pieced together cobble from which
ten flakes were struck using the Oldowan technique, from Lokalalei 2C,
ca. 2.34 million years old. The core is a phonolite cobble with a length of
9.4 cm, which is a typical size of source material at that site. It is quite
impressive that late Pliocene knappers were able to get so many useful
sharp-edged flakes from relatively small cobbles. Face B was less smooth
than face A and therefore has fewer flakings. Roman numerals denote the
sequence of flaking before turning the stone. From Delagnes and Roche
(2005), Fig. 6, p. 443.
the first archeological evidence of cumulative cultural learning, indicating
that hominids at 2.6 million year ago were able to share attention and to
engage in triadic interactions.
To facilitate sharing attention and cooperation, humans have devel-
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oped unique anatomical and neuropsychological adaptations. For exam-
ple, the human eye shows a huge white sclera on both sides of the iris
(Fig. 4.6). This makes it easy for conspecifics to follow our gaze direction.
In contrast, all other primates have pigmented sclera, which makes it diffi-
cult to follow their gaze (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001). All primates are
good at following gaze direction. Yet, in their highly competitive world
it is not always good to have others know what one is up to, especially
not during competition for food. In those cases, it is more advantageous
to have a dark sclera which camouflages gaze direction. Human white
sclera might actually have evolved in response to selective pressures that
encouraged not only reading eye direction, but also having one’s eye di-
rection followed. Given that the transmission of tool use in primates is
vertical (i.e., from mother to offspring), this may have increased inclusive
fitness. Through triadic interactions, we still make objects part of our
social world. Humans across cultures reason about artifacts in terms of
the (inferred) intentions the maker had when creating that artifact (see
also sections 2.3.1, 7.2.1 and 9.2.1). As we have seen, this design stance
is universal in humans, and it emerges in children as early as two years
(German & Barrett, 2005; Casler & Kelemen, 2007). It seems reasonable
to suppose that the design stance is a direct consequence of our ability
to incorporate objects in triadic interactions. The design stance seems
hardly conceivable if humans, like chimpanzees, were only able to engage
in dyadic interactions. In the light of this, the absence of a design stance
in nonhuman primates is not surprising.
4.5 Uniquely chimpanzee social learning
Chimpanzees exhibit complex cultural behaviors, which is all the more
remarkable given that many of these are transmitted from mother to de-
pendent infant—this, as we have seen, is a consequence of the fact that
female chimpanzees are forced to forage away from the group because of
the intense competition for food. Laboratory and field studies have re-
vealed a unique kind of social learning in chimpanzees. The primatologist
Tetsuro Matsuzawa (2007) terms this kind of social learning ‘education
by master-apprenticeship’, alluding to the learning practice in medieval
guilds. For a period of about five years, the infant spends most of its time
alone with its mother. It is highly motivated to acquire her behavior. She,
however, does not teach, nor does she provide any feedback. How then,
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Figure 4.6: Width-height ratio (WHR) and exposed sclera size (SSI) in
diverse primate taxa. As can be seen, humans have the widest eyes and
the largest relative area of exposed sclera; also they are the only primates
with a white sclera. From Kobayashi and Kohshima (1997), Fig. 1, p. 768.
do chimpanzee infants acquire difficult skills? Looking-time experiments
(e.g., Gergely et al., 1995) indicate that human 12-month-olds can predict
the actions of agents based on an inferred goal before they have acquired
a fully-developed theory of mind. The comparative psychologist Clau-
dia Uller (2004) replicated these experiments with infant chimpanzees,
and found that their performance matches those of human infants. Thus,
a baby chimpanzee from the Ta¨ı forest who observers its mother using
a hammer (and sometimes anvil) to crack nuts, infers that the goal of
her action is to eat nuts. Although chimpanzee mothers do not teach or
provide feedback, they allow their young to learn by observation, even
permitting them to steal the yield.
As chimpanzees rely more on individual learning than humans, they
have developed behavioral adaptations to facilitate this. Young chim-
panzees seem to be more intrinsically motivated to explore novel objects,
which increases the chance that they discover salutary properties of these
objects. A study in which both chimpanzee and human infants were
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familiarized with novel toys (Murai et al., 2005) shows that chimpanzee
infants do not exhibit any significant habituation despite repeated presen-
tation of the items. In contrast, human infants quickly habituate and lose
interest. Moreover, chimpanzee infants possess a strong intrinsic motiva-
tion to copy their mothers’ behavior which persists in the absence of food
rewards. A longitudinal study (Sousa, Okamoto, & Matsuzawa, 2003),
which investigated the behavioral and cognitive development of a male in-
fant chimpanzee born in captivity revealed extensive explorative behavior.
Since one week after birth, Ayumu was present when his mother retrieved
rewards from a vending machine. He intently observed her actions, and
unsuccessfully experimented with the apparatus for several months on a
weekly basis. Although he was never rewarded or encouraged to explore
the machine, he mastered its use after 17 months of intensive exploration
and manipulation, proving his prowess by successfully repeating the full
sequence of the task 20 times consecutively. These strong intrinsic mo-
tivations to explore novel objects and to copy their mothers’ behavior
allow young chimpanzees to successfully acquire their cultural traditions
without shared attention or imitation.
4.6 Chimpanzee and human social cognition as two peaks
in an adaptive landscape
Since tool-use plays a crucial role in chimpanzee food acquisition, it seems
surprising that they did not develop shared attention. We believe that
the absence of shared attention can be best explained by differing costs
and benefits of individual learning and copying. All social learning can be
decomposed into two elements: individual learning on a trial-and-error
basis, and copying, a broad notion of learning which encompasses local
and stimulus enhancement and imitation. In his simple but robust math-
ematical model, the anthropologist Alan Rogers (1988) already showed
that pure copying does not constitute an evolutionary stable strategy.
Imagine a population that consists only of individuals who acquire new
skills exclusively through individual trial-and-error learning (individual
learners, I.L. on Fig. 4.7). In this population, a mutant who acquires
new skills by copying individual learners (social learner, S.L. on Fig. 4.7)
will enjoy a higher fitness, because it avoids the costs associated with
trial-and-error learning. However, as more and more individuals with a
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copying strategy enter the population, their mean fitness will eventually
drop, either due to an accumulation of error-rates or to changes in the
environment which make the strategy no longer adaptive (indicated by
the dotted line on Fig. 4.7). In either case, individual learners will gain
the upper hand, and cumulative cultural evolution is impossible. Rogers’
Figure 4.7: Mean fitness of individual and social learners as a function of
the relative frequency of social learners in a mixed population. Based on
A. R. Rogers (1988), Fig. 1, p. 822.
quandary can be circumvented if copiers in a relatively stable environment
have a reliable model to copy from, or alternatively, if they have many
models from whom they can learn and select the best when they live in a
changing environment. Next to this, social learners also have to be capa-
ble of individual learning to improve existing designs (Boyd & Richerson,
1995, 1996). This model fits in nicely with the archeological record that
shows that Late Pliocene East Africa was subject to climatic fluctuations.
One can thus infer that horizontal transmission (i.e., learning from sev-
eral members of the group other than one’s parents) would have been
an efficient strategy for the earliest stone tool wielding hominids, putting
extra selective pressure on cognitive and anatomical adaptations, such as
shared attention and an increasingly white and visible sclera. Given that
social and individual learning are both important in cultural transmis-
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sion, the ratio between these strategies can vary across species, and this
seems to correlate with the ecological and social contexts in which they
evolve.
Applying this general framework of social learning to humans and
chimpanzees, we see that both species present two different peaks in an
adaptive landscape. Whereas humans place a premium on copying from
many models, natural selection has favored enhanced individual learn-
ing in chimpanzees. Systematic comparisons between humans and chim-
panzees (e.g., Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello,
2007) show that human 2.5-year-olds outperform chimpanzees in imitat-
ing an experimenter who solves a problem that has a rather simple but
non-obvious solution, e.g., retrieving a reward from a transparent tube
by violently hitting it against the floor. On the other hand, when human
children and chimpanzees are confronted with a cumbersome solution to a
problem (e.g., raking an object with an ill-suited tool), young chimpanzees
are able to come up with their own, better solution, while children imitate
the suboptimal solution of the human model (Horner & Whiten, 2005).
Social learning, especially in an unstable environment, improves when
a learner can rely on several models to choose the best solution from.
Consequently, Oldowan technology could only emerge in a context where
young hominids were able to observe several tool makers and users. As our
survey of hominid Pliocene ecology shows, early Homo relied primarily on
scavenged medium-sized to large carcasses, which could be shared by sev-
eral individuals. This facilitated and promoted social learning of tool-use:
hominid infants learned to manufacture and use stone tools from several
models which made their social learning more reliable and efficient. In
such ecological and social contexts, natural selection can favor increased
social learning skills, and cumulative cultural evolution can take off. On
the other hand, chimpanzees evolved in relatively stable environments
with patchier and less concentrated resources. To avoid competition over
food, chimpanzee mothers with a dependent infant forage away from the
group, which means that their young learn most of their cultural tradi-
tions from one model only, their mother. As the experimental literature
shows, socially enhanced individual learning can provide a more robust
performance than imitation if technology is relatively simple. In this case,
natural selection seems to have favored cognitive adaptations that pro-
mote individual discovery, such as a high intrinsic motivation to explore
objects.
118 Chapter 4. Challenging the mental continuity assumption
4.7 Concluding remarks
Although the mental continuity assumption has generated an interesting
body of empirical literature, which casts light on the evolutionary origins
of our cognitive capacities, the assumption itself is fundamentally flawed.
The case of social cognition illustrates that the minds of humans and
other apes differ not only in degree, but also in kind. The availability
and distribution of food sources play an important role in the evolution
of sociality. Stone-wielding hominids exploiting large to medium-sized
carcasses have evolved a dietary niche which enabled and required them
to be highly cooperative. Chimpanzees, on the other hand, specialized
in patchy high-quality food items, and use social cues mainly in compet-
itive contexts. As a result, the cognitive mechanisms underlying cultural
transmission are widely different between these species, with an emphasis
on imitation in hominids, and a focus on individual discovery in chim-
panzees.
Comparative psychologists, primatologists and neuroscientists should
not solely take human cognition as the starting point of their investiga-
tions of nonhuman primate cognition, but rather the ecological and social
contexts in which these species have evolved. This more ecological ap-
proach is already gaining currency in comparative psychological studies
outside of primatology. For example, early studies on deductive reasoning
(such as transitive inference) focused on chimpanzees, due to their prox-
imity to humans (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977). These studies relied
on operant conditioning, where subjects were taught arbitrary transitive
relationships between stimuli such as colored chips. Later experimental
procedures found that the ability to infer transitive relationships is not a
matter of brain size or relatedness to humans, but can be better predicted
by the ecological pressures to which species are subject. For example,
despite their small brain size, territorial fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can
predict the outcome of future encounters with unfamiliar fish based on
their observation of pairwise contests between them (Grosenick, Clement,
& Fernald, 2007). Species that are closely related can show striking cog-
nitive differences based on these divergent ecological pressures. For exam-
ple, pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) live in large, stable groups
with linear dominance hierarchies, whereas the closely related Western
scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica) live in couples. Bond, Kamil, and
Balda (2003) found that pinyon jays could learn transitive relationships
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between arbitrary stimuli within less than 70 trials, whereas scrub jays
needed more than 200 trials merely to get above chance level. The case
of social cognition in humans and chimpanzees shows that this ecologi-
cal approach could also turn out to be fruitful for comparative studies
of primate cognition as well. Tackling such questions may help us gain
insight not only in how the human mind works, but also promises a better
understanding of other primate minds.

Part II
Artistic ability
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One morning, when writer Elizabeth Gibson was on her way for coffee
as usual, she spotted a conspicuous and colorful canvas in a pile of rubbish.
Although she knew nothing about modern art, she felt compelled to take
the painting to her crammed Manhattan apartment because, as she put
it, “even though I didn’t understand it, I knew it had power.” The canvas
hung for several years in her flat until she discovered that it was actually
the famed work Tres Personajes (Fig. 4.8) by the Mexican painter Rufino
Tamayo, stolen some twenty years before. After realizing its value, Gibson
returned the picture to its rightful owners11. This anecdote illustrates
that we have an intuitive concept of art—even without any formal training
in aesthetics or art history, we recognize art when we see it.
Figure 4.8: Tres Personajes, by Rufino Tamayo, 1970, retrieved from
http://www.daylife.com/photo/0gyH5gph2K3o4
What is it in this particular canvas that made Elisabeth Gibson decide
that the object she saw was a work of art? Or, to put it differently, what
is it that we see and intuit in works that we denote as ‘art’? Most
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indigenous cultures lack a term equivalent to the western notion of art
for art’s sake (Dutton, 1993), which only emerged in late 18th-century
Europe. This conventional western notion came into being with amongst
others Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790 [1987]). In chapter 16, Kant
famously distinguished between free beauty and beauty that is merely
dependent. Free beauty is independent of concerns of functionality and
even of conceptualization or categorization. Objects of free beauty per
definition do not serve any function. Because of this, they appeal to
our cognitive predispositions of imagination and aesthetic judgment in a
disinterested fashion. By excluding functionality from his aesthetics, a
large part of what is currently exhibited in museums and galleries (e.g.,
medieval art, nonwestern art12 ) are put outside the purview of aesthetic
analysis. Actually, in the course of the 18th century, the concept of art
had already been narrowed by the abbe´ Batteux’ dichotomy between fine
art (e.g., painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry and music) and the
applied arts (e.g., garden architecture, design, crafts, and fashion) in his
Les beaux-arts re´duits a` un meˆme principe (Kristeller, 1997, 90–91).
The demarcation of art is one of the most outstanding problems in con-
temporary philosophy of art; attempting a solution to this problem falls
outside the scope of this dissertation. Objects and performances that we
routinely classify as art share features like skill, strikingness and beauty,
but it is easy to come up with counterexamples for each of these features;
for example, ready-mades (objects originally not used as art, such as com-
mon household items) do not clearly exhibit artistic skill, whereas a chess
game requires lots of skill. The diversity in recent art production allows
one to easily defeat attempts to capture features that are necessary (let
alone sufficient) for art objects. For example, although the craftsmanship
and expertise of artists are cross-culturally valued (Anderson, 1989; Gell,
1998), ready-mades seem to preclude any definition of art in terms of
expertise. The late Dennis Dutton (2006) therefore convincingly argued
that it is a mistake to let our theories of art be guided by borderline cases
or problematic examples, such as Marcel Duchamp’s fountain or John
Cage’s 4’33”. Such examples are very hard to accommodate in any the-
ory of art. Drawing on an analogy with law practice, Dutton (2006, 368)
argued that “hard cases make bad law”: in an attempt to understand the
nature of murder, it is unwise to start out de novo from borderline cases
like abortion or assisted suicide; rather, we must start from paradigmatic
examples, from which we later move on into unchartered territory. To
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take a similar case from another philosophical discipline, epistemology:
the definition of knowledge as justified true belief seemed, on the face of
it, very intuitive. However, special and unusual cases of belief-formation
challenged this assumption (Gettier, 1963). This gave rise to a cottage
industry of ever more baroque examples of beliefs that seemed justified
and true, but that do not qualify as knowledge13. The view that theories
of art should conform to the extremes is perhaps a case of what Gutting
(2009, 89) has dubbed “the philosopher’s fallacy.” Philosophical theories
can capture important and interesting features of art, but this does not
mean that philosophical knowledge is infallible. Indeed, if it were, philoso-
phy would be an exceptional discipline, as knowledge in all other domains
of human knowledge is fallible. Extreme cases are likely to challenge any
definition or characterization of art that is sufficiently detailed to be in-
teresting, or to provide novel philosophical insights. Therefore, when in
chapter 7 I have my own attempt at providing a concept of art, I will not
let myself be guided by borderline cases, problematic exceptions and the
like. As we shall see, my cognitive approach to art is informed by em-
pirical findings from developmental psychology and cognitive archeology,
combined with philosophy of mind.
Most approaches in philosophy of art have in common that they fo-
cus on art objects, rather than on what caused these objects to come
into being, namely human behavior. Instead of taking the art objects as
a starting point, it makes sense to examine the human cognitive facul-
ties and behaviors that are responsible for the creation and enjoyment of
these objects. This shift in focus allows one to include objects and per-
formances from distant places and cultures, and ancient artifacts, such
as cave paintings and prehistoric sculptures. The following chapters will
examine art as a form of human behavior. Chapter 5 provides a review
of the cognitive neuroscientific and evolutionary psychological literature
on art. Chapter 6 looks at art as a product of cultural group selection.
Chapter 7 proposes a cognitive approach to art, where three distinct cog-
nitive abilities are considered that lie at the basis of artistic creation and
appreciation. Chapter 8 looks at the interaction between minds and ma-
terial culture in the use of rock art and notched artifacts as calendrical
notation systems.

Chapter 5
Toward an integrative
approach of cognitive
neuroscientific and
evolutionary
psychological studies of
art
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of the following paper:
De Smedt, J., & De Cruz, H. (2010). Toward an integrative approach
of cognitive neuroscientific and evolutionary psychological studies of art.
Evolutionary Psychology, 8, 695–719.
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, cognitive neuroscientists and evolutionary psychologists
have provided reductionist accounts of human behavior in terms of the
lower-level theories and concepts of biology. Reductionism in scientific
practice is primarily an explanatory strategy: reductionist scientific ex-
planations are not necessarily committed to the view that higher levels
of explanation can always be reduced to more fundamental ones; rather,
they attempt to gain a better understanding of a given phenomenon by
focusing on a basic level of explanation. Unification, the ability to explain
a wide range of phenomena using a relatively restricted set of premises,
is arguably the most important of the explanatory goals of reductionist
research programs (Steel, 2004). Evaluations of these programs should
therefore assess to what extent they are successful in unifying a diversity
of observations through a restricted set of principles. This chapter ex-
amines to what extent two flourishing reductionist approaches to human
behavior—cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology—provide
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unifying explanatory frameworks to understand art and its aesthetic ap-
preciation, and whether they obviate the need for higher-level accounts.
Additionally, it explores to what extent theoretical evolutionary consider-
ations can outline new directions for empirical research on art production
and appreciation.
Art presents an ideal case study to evaluate reductionist programs,
because it is a paradigmatic domain of investigation of the special sci-
ences (the humanities and the social sciences), such as aesthetics, art
history and art sociology which typically take a more holistic approach
to the phenomena under investigation. Within and across these disci-
plines, there is little agreement on how art should be studied or defined.
Although visual art (in the form of body decoration, artifact decoration,
and often sculpture and painting), dance and music appear in all known
human cultures past and present (D. E. Brown, 1991, 140), most indige-
nous languages lack a term equivalent to the western notion of art for art’s
sake, which only emerged in the late 18th century. A radical solution to
this definitional problem is to qualify only fine art, as it developed in post-
Enlightenment Europe. But this merely shifts the problem of continuity:
the functions, styles and social contexts of 19th-century art clearly differ
from that of, say, the 1950s, which again radically differ from that of art
today. On the other hand, Hellenistic sculptors, Gothic architects, and
Melanesian wood carvers did not possess the modern western concept of
art, yet we readily appreciate and appropriate their work. And just as
sculptures from sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania adorn western homes,
artists from these cultures have eagerly adopted western styles and me-
dia, as for example in historical ledger art, narrative drawings in pencil
in used ledger books by Native Americans of the Great Plains (Fig. 5.1)
or contemporary Australian aboriginal painting, which mixes indigenous
themes with western media such as oil or acryl painting (see also Fig. 7.2).
Thus, even though people from those cultures do not have terms that are
equivalent to our notion of art, they seem to recognize similarities be-
tween their and our artistic expressions. Moreover, many cultures have
indigenous terms that capture aspects of the western concept of art, such
as skill or beauty (Van Damme, 1997). Experimental studies (e.g., Seifert,
1992) show that western subjects without any formal training in art or
aesthetics display and freely express aesthetic judgments on works of vi-
sual art, even if they are unfamiliar with them, like African sculpture.
What is it that we intuit when we judge something to be a work of art?
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Figure 5.1: Kiowa drawing, possibly by Koba or Etahdleuh, of a group of
men, presumably representing a warrior society meeting, 1875–1877, Na-
tional Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Museum Support Center,
Suitland, Maryland, NAA INV 08547626.
We seem to have an intuitive, pretheoretical notion of what art may
be (see also Osborne, 1981). Humans may possess a folk concept of art
akin to folk biology and folk psychology, a tacit, inarticulate concept of
what a work of art is like, which guides their identification of some objects
and performances across cultures as art. This folk concept includes ob-
jects and performances that are typically manmade, that elicit aesthetic
experiences14, and that are embedded in social contexts. It is this broad
folk concept of art that scholars across disciplines attempt to capture.
Some (e.g., Davies, 2006) emphasize the aesthetic properties of artworks,
attempting to discriminate from other phenomenological experiences an
aesthetic sensation, i.e., a subjective sensation of pleasure derived from
sensory (usually visual or auditory) perception. Others, following the art
anthropologist Alfred Gell (1998), deliberately exclude aesthetics from
their analysis and focus on the social role of art. Next to these, some
philosophers of art (e.g., Levinson, 1993) prefer to examine artworks in
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terms of the intentions of their makers. None of these attempts have
provided an adequate concept of art that captures all forms of human
production that we intuit as art. For this reason, some philosophers of
art (e.g., Mag Uidhir & Magnus, in press) propose to abandon the search
for a unifying concept of art. In the light of this methodological and
conceptual fragmentation, reductionist approaches with their promise of
a unified explanation seem highly desirable.
Whereas traditional philosophy of art takes artworks as a starting
point, recent naturalistic approaches (e.g., Carroll, 2004) concentrate on
the human cognitive faculties and behaviors that are responsible for the
creation and enjoyment of these objects. After all, there is no experi-
ence of art except through our cognitive and perceptual systems. Thus,
to understand why people create and enjoy art, it is important to un-
derstand its neurological underpinnings. Its universality across cultures
also seems to warrant an explanation in biological terms. It is therefore
not surprising that the first attempts to provide a unified explanation
for art in biological terms date back to the 19th century. Experimental
aesthetics (see Aiken, 1998, for an overview) was in fact among the ear-
liest domains of experimental psychological investigation, with founders
of the field like Wilhelm Wundt and Gustav Fechner probing their sub-
jects’ aesthetic responses to the golden ratio15. Later, behaviorism was
reflected in the experimental study of aesthetics. For example, Berlyne
(1974) investigated the psychological basis of aesthetics as arising from
the fundamental needs for arousal and excitement that are closely related
to a drive for exploration and curiosity. Colin Martindale’s experimental
analysis of patterns of stylistic change in European music (e.g., Martin-
dale & Uemura, 1983) suggested that rapid stylistic changes do not stem
from a universal drive to innovate, but rather from the human desire
to avoid repetition and boredom. Martindale held the well-understood
mechanism of habituation responsible for the craving for novelty in art
in modern European and American culture.
Theoretical and conceptual developments in psychology, in particu-
lar the decline of behaviorism and the growing influence of evolutionary
theory in studies of human behavior are reflected in current scientific in-
vestigations of art. Evolutionary theory offers the possibility of a unified
approach to human artistic behavior. Tinbergen’s four questions (1963)
form a useful starting point. Niko Tinbergen (1963) proposed that any
evolved trait or behavior can be explained through four complementary
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explanatory strategies: its proximate causal mechanisms (what physical
structures, such as hormones or brain structures, are causally responsi-
ble for the trait), its ultimate function (how does the trait contribute to
an organism’s fitness, why did it evolve), its development (how does the
trait arise in individual ontogeny) and its phylogeny (its evolutionary his-
tory). This chapter will focus on two of these questions: proximate and
ultimate causes. As we shall see, cognitive neuroscience primarily inves-
tigates proximate causal mechanisms (brain structures) responsible for
artistic behavior, whereas evolutionary psychology mainly concentrates
on ultimate causes (e.g., what are the consequences of artistic behavior
for an individual’s fitness). This chapter will argue that the byproduct
account of art, which conceptualizes artistic behavior as a byproduct of
normal cognitive processes, rather than as an adaptation, is most success-
ful in integrating these approaches. Given the current methodological and
conceptual fragmentation in the field of art studies, such an integrative
approach would be welcome.
5.2 Cognitive neuroscience and art
Current cognitive neuroscience draws on two types of methods to exam-
ine modularity in cognition: studies of functional brain imaging and brain
lesions (see also section 2.2.1). Cognitive neuroscience is a successful re-
search program that provides causal accounts for cognitive states by ref-
erence to brain states. Subdisciplines like neuro-economics, neuro-ethics,
or neuro-aesthetics attempt to provide neurally grounded explanations
for phenomena typically investigated by the special sciences, such as eco-
nomic decision-making, moral judgments or aesthetic appreciation. By
looking at patterns of brain activation (neuroimaging studies) and cog-
nitive impairments following brain damage (lesion studies), it examines
how the functional architecture of the brain produces cognitive processes.
Since the brain is the only organ responsible for cognition, every cog-
nitive task must yield a specific pattern of brain activation. Why then
is it interesting to localize cognitive functions if all are localizable? If we
put people who contemplate the Mona Lisa under a scanner, this will ac-
tivate neural circuits dealing with face-recognition, emotion and perhaps
theory of mind (our intuitive psychology that allows us to infer mental
states, such as the reason why she might smile). It does not follow that
the brain contains a “Mona Lisa module”, even if these patterns of activa-
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tion are stable across subjects. To constrain their research, neuroscientists
look for psychological primitives, capacities that are not further reducible
to other, more basic abilities. Due to these methodological constraints,
they typically propose cognitive specializations at a relatively fine grain
(Bechtel & Mundale, 1999). However, psychological primitives do not
necessarily equate with single brain regions—rather, what is important is
that the same areas are robustly activated across a wide variety of tasks.
Theory of mind, for instance, activates a distributed network of neural
circuits, including the medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus,
and temporal poles. What makes it a psychological primitive is that the
same network is activated across a wide diversity of tasks that involve the
attribution of mental states to others, such as beliefs and desires, includ-
ing interpreting cartoons and stories, or even watching simple geometric
shapes ‘chasing’ each other (Gallagher & Frith, 2003).
Does art constitute a psychological primitive? Neuroimaging studies
of subjects looking at visual art indicate that propensities and biases of
the visual system can account for many recurring features of art. Indeed,
several authors (e.g., Latto, 1995) have argued that works of art capture
our attention precisely because the artists that created them have uncon-
sciously homed in on propensities of the human nervous system. For ex-
ample, the search of artists like Piet Mondriaan and Kazimir Malevich for
pure forms accords with the presence of orientation-selective cells in the
primary visual cortex (V1) that respond selectively to dots and straight
lines, especially to horizontal and vertical ones (Zeki, 1998). This is part
of the earliest stages of processing by our visual system. Mondriaan’s
Composition with Red and Blue (ca. 1936) is a typical example of visual
art that stirs the orientation-selective neurons in V1 (Fig. 5.2, top left).
Since the Late Pleistocene, combinations of straight lines are commonly
found, for instance in the engraved ochre plaquettes from Blombos cave,
South Africa (about 77,000 years old), as are dots on Franco-Cantabrian
cave walls (e.g., the spotted horses from Pech Merle, France, 16,000 years
old, see Fig. 5.2, top right). Such designs are also observed on artifacts
from diverse periods (e.g., decorative lines and dots on earthenware from
the Linear Pottery culture from the European Neolithic, 5500–4500 BC)
and in the artistic production of many nonwestern cultures (e.g., geo-
metric patterns on basketry or cloth, see Fig. 5.2, bottom left). The
pervasiveness of geometric designs across widely divergent cultures and
periods may be explained by the fact that they are appealing to the early
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human visual system (Hodgson, 2006). Although the popularity of ge-
ometric designs could also be due to the fact that they are simple to
render, and that they can be used as building blocks of more complex
designs, as in Yuan and Ming dynasty Chinese painting, where bamboo
is rendered with a few simple brush strokes (see Fig. 5.2, bottom right),
the fact that they are consistently used alongside more complex designs
(e.g., dot and stripe patterns alongside animals depicted in Paleolithic
imagery) provides evidence for their intrinsic appeal.
Some forms of art key in on trichromatic color processing, a visual sys-
tem humans have in common with most diurnal primates. Color-sensitive
cells in the visual areas V1 and V2 are mainly concerned with registering
the intensity and presence of color fields (Zeki, 1999, 189). Artists like
Mark Rothko or Yves Klein produced paintings with large iridescent color
fields that key in on this stage of color processing. By contrast, fauvist
and expressionist canvases evoke responses in V4 and in the inferior tem-
poral and frontal cortices (Zeki & Marini, 1998), which are involved in
matching colors to objects. People process images with correct colors in
a different way from images that have colors that are not commonly asso-
ciated with the objects they depict, such as blue strawberries. The latter
elicit a strong activation of the dorsolateral frontal cortex (Zeki & Marini,
1998). The unusual neural pathways associated with our perception of
mismatching colors may provide an explanation for why such images are
attention grabbing. Fauvist and expressionist painters unknowingly hit
upon this when they began to paint objects in mismatching colors, like
Henri Matisse’s portraits of his wife, with green and blue patches across
her face, or the blue horses by Franz Marc, as can be seen in Fig. 5.3.
Yet other forms of art are experimentally associated with an increased
activation in the motion-sensitive visual areas, such as the medial tem-
poral and medial superior temporal cortices (Zeki, 1998). This is not
only the case for dance, but also for contemporary art forms like mo-
biles by Jean Tinguely and Alexander Calder. A PET study (S. Brown,
Martinez, & Parsons, 2006) of subjects who tango revealed that dance in-
volves a network of neural circuits normally engaged in ordinary bipedal
locomotion and in the organization of complex sequences of movements.
Somewhat surprisingly, the activation of the medial temporal and supe-
rior temporal cortex is also observed in subjects who look at classical
and renaissance sculptures in contrapposto stance16 (Di Dio, Macaluso, &
Rizzolatti, 2007). Apparently, brain areas that visually analyze motion
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Figure 5.2: The appeal of straight lines and dots. Clockwise: Piet Mon-
driaan, Composition with Red and Blue (ca. 1936), retrieved from http://
www.abcgallery.com/M/mondrian/mondrian57.html; spotted horses,
Pech Merle, 16,000 BP, retrieved from http://france.cherylfortier
.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/PechMerleHorses.jpg; basketry
from the Akimel O’odham Native Americans (living across the border of
Arizona and Mexico), retrieved from http://thetextileblog.blogspot
.com/2010/01/pima-basketry.html; painting of bamboo by Ming dy-
nasty painter Zheng Banqiao (1693–1765), retrieved from http://
china4200.com/.
are not just active when seeing actual motion, but also when it is implied
(see also sections 2.2.2 and 5.5).
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Figure 5.3: Henri Matisse, Madame Matisse (a.k.a. The green line)
(1905), retrieved from http://sharonlaffertyart.blogspot.com/2010
03 01 archive.html; Franz Marc, The large blue horses (1912),
retrieved from http://www.artinthepicture.com/paintings/Franz
Marc/The-Large-Blue-Horses/.
Music, too, recruits brain mechanisms that are associated with a va-
riety of normal, everyday cognitive activities. Listening to music recruits
Broca’s area and the orbitalis region of the left inferior frontal cortex, neu-
ral regions specialized in the processing of grammatical structure (Levitin
& Menon, 2003). Music that violates expectations in rhythms or har-
monic structures activates brain areas that were previously implicated
in violations of syntax in language (Maess et al., 2001), see also section
3.1. At the same time, experimental evidence (e.g. Huron, 2004) indi-
cates that people who listen to music have a clear preference for expected
over unexpected sounds, and find the former more pleasant. Many mu-
sical devices, such as the appoggiatura (an embellishment along the main
note) or harmonic cadences (the use of at least two chords to conclude
a section or phrase of music) promote prediction by the listener (Huron,
2004). Classical period compositions, for instance by Joseph Haydn or
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, often balance on a cognitive optimum be-
tween predictability and violation of expectation: they are predictable
enough to evoke pleasurable responses, but occasionally violate these pre-
dictions so that the audience remains interested and focused, for example
by inserting changes in modulation and rhythm, introducing elements
from folk music, or by incorporating unusual instruments (e.g., Leopold
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Mozart’s Cassation in G for toys, two oboes, two horns, strings and con-
tinuo, that introduces toy instruments into an otherwise normal orchestral
piece). Because neuroimaging studies rely on stimuli of limited duration,
at present no such studies have probed what neural mechanisms under-
lie the perception and appreciation of literature. It seems, however, that
short stories and jokes invoke neural circuits involved with theory of mind
(Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Mano, Harada, Sugiura, Saito, & Sadato, 2009)
—presumably, the same would be true for someone reading Leo Tolstoy’s
Anna Karenina (1878).
An interesting pattern emerges from these studies on different types
of art: in all cases, the aesthetic responses are elicited by tapping into
the normal functions of perceptual systems in unconventional ways. Why
should the perception of blue horses which yields an enhanced response
in the inferior temporal cortex, or of atypical musical structures, lead-
ing to an increased activity in Broca’s area, elicit aesthetic responses?
Given the limited attentional resources of the brain, perceptual inputs
compete for neural space. It thus seems likely that because of their im-
portance to the survival and reproduction of an organism, some cues are
given priority by the early perceptual systems—for example, as we shall
see further on (section 5.4), the human auditory system is especially well
attuned to the acoustic properties of the human voice, and the human
visual system is apt at recognizing face-like stimuli. The brain could be
regarded as a set of world-interpreting mechanisms that lead us to ig-
nore some aspects of the world, while others are accorded disproportion-
ate attention (see also section 12.2). Aesthetic responses may find their
origin in the brain’s reward system, which guides attention to relevant
perceptual input (Barry, 2006). Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) pro-
pose that successful art exploits these tendencies, thereby eliciting strong
emotional responses. Some cognitive neuroscientific studies provide sup-
port for these views. Looking at paintings one deems beautiful activates
reward-based emotional circuits compared to duller paintings (Vartanian
& Goel, 2004). Similarly, participants looking at canonical classical and
renaissance sculptures show higher activation in the anterior right insula
compared to a control condition in which the proportions of these sculp-
tures have been digitally altered so as to look less harmonious (Di Dio
et al., 2007). The anterior right insula is a part of the limbic system
that is consistently involved in mediating cravings for food and so-called
recreational drugs and in providing an emotionally relevant context for
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perceptual experience (Garavan, 2010). Likewise, people listening to their
favorite music show stronger activation in reward and motivation-related
brain areas compared to control compositions (Blood & Zatorre, 2001).
This intimate connection between the function of art and the func-
tion of the brain led Zeki (1999, 10) to quip that artists are in a sense
neuroscientists, since art, in order to be successful, must appeal to hu-
man perceptual, conceptual and motivational systems. In other words,
art appeals to us because it exaggerates or appropriates features that
human perception is tuned to (e.g., faces, color contrasts) while ignoring
or underplaying other features that are less important to human per-
ception. Indeed, many works of visual art contain revealing systematic
mistakes in rendering perspective, shadows, and reflections accurately.
Take shadows as an illustration. Painters typically do not depict shad-
ows realistically. Outside of western art, most traditions omit shadows
altogether (Gombrich, 1995). When artists do attempt to paint shadows,
they often fail to do so consistently: an examination of a corpus of west-
ern historical paintings (Casati, 2007) revealed that painters tended to
produce a replica of the visible profile of the caster when depicting shad-
ows, which yields impossible shadows, as is illustrated by Witz’ depiction
of the shadows cast by Mary and Jesus (Fig. 5.4, left). Most observers
are also not bothered by inconsistencies in lighting—indeed, without be-
ing told about them, they do not even notice them (Cavanagh, 2005).
For example, Fra Carnevale’s Birth of the virgin (Fig. 5.4, right) is full
of inconsistent shadows, but to a casual observer these inconsistencies
do not stand out. In accordance with this, developmental psychological
studies indicate that an understanding of the behavior of shadows only
emerges in late childhood. Infants, for example, show no surprise when a
shadow behaves anomalously with respect to the object by which it is cast
(Van de Walle, Rubenstein, & Spelke, 1998). Even adults have difficulties
predicting what shadows will look like given the distance and angle of a
light source and the shape of an object (Ostrovsky, Cavanagh, & Sinhaoˆ,
2005). Shadows have been put to dramatic use in film noir and expres-
sionist movies such as Murnau’s Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens
(1922), yet even there the actual shape of the shadows has been distorted
beyond what would normally be cast by the actors, something that does
not seem to bother the audience.
The intimate fit between artistic production and human cognition can
explain why artists are unconsciously drawn to some art forms over others,
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Figure 5.4: Impossible shadows. Adoration of the Magi by Konrad Witz,
1446, from http://allart.biz/photos/image-2522.html; detail of The
birth of the virgin by Fra Carnevale, 1467, from Cavanagh (2005, fig. 1,
p. 301).
or when, if a new artistic style is developed, it tends to evolve in specific
ways. Take the example of abstract art: since the 18th century, artists
have attempted to break free of aesthetic conventions in order to capture
the essence of their subject matter, culminating in abstract art. Yet, as we
have seen, abstract art often appeals strongly to early perceptual systems,
by using vivid colors, straight lines or sharp contrasts, exploiting amongst
others areas V1, V2 and V4. The perceptual tendencies of the human
brain can be seen as cognitive attractors that have channeled abstract art
in preordained directions, in particular, a tendency toward more clear-
cut, simplified and geometric shapes, brighter colors and higher color
contrasts, arguably because these features elicit stronger responses in the
artists’ and viewers’ early perceptual systems. In the work of well-known
artists like Paul Klee, Piet Mondriaan and Henri Matisse, one can indeed
observe an evolution toward the progressive influence of these cognitive
attractors, in the increasing use of strong lines, vivid colors and bold
contrasts. As can be seen in the series of images on Fig. 5.5, Mondriaan,
who started out painting naturalistic fruit trees, progressively abstracted
them into horizontal and vertical lines in the course of a few decades.
Ironically, by striving to escape from artistic conventions, abstract artists
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were lured into the conventions of the human perceptual systems. Or, to
put it more positively, as ‘to abstract’ means ‘going back to the essentials,’
abstract art has indeed succeeded in stripping away cultural conventions
by reverting to elementary responses of the human perceptual systems.
Figure 5.5: Mondriaan: from orchards to straight lines. From left to right,
and top to bottom, Piet Mondriaan, Red tree (1909); Grey tree (1912);
Blooming trees (1912); Composition No. 6 (1914); Composition: Light
color planes with grey contours (1919); Composition with red, yellow,
blue and black (1921), retrieved from http://www.abcgallery.com/M/
mondrian/mondrian.html.
Taken together, neuroimaging studies suggest that art is not a psycho-
logical primitive. Rather, it hijacks the preferences of normal perceptual
and motivational neural circuits. Lesion studies provide an equally com-
pelling case: art production seems to continue irrespective of the location
or extent of the lesions in the brain of the artist. Not even at the very
rough level of hemispheric specialization do we see any modularity in
artistic behavior—the loss of function in either hemisphere does not au-
tomatically lead to an inability to create art (Zaidel, 2005). In a case
study of an Asian-American artist, Mell, Howard, and Miller (2003) doc-
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ument the gradual shift over 12 years from conventional Chinese themes
to a bolder, expressionist style throughout her cognitive decline due to
fronto-temporal dementia (FTD), as shown on Fig. 5.6. Remarkably,
some patterns of brain damage, resulting from FTD, are correlated with
an emergence of artistic skills in previously non-artistic individuals (e.g.,
B. L. Miller et al., 1998), Fig. 5.7. The five patients (all in their 50s or
60s) described by B. L. Miller et al. (1998) all spontaneously began to
take up art classes, painted, sculpted or photographed obsessively without
any previous interest in art, and were later diagnosed with FTD. Their
interest in art is thus not a result of therapy. FTD patients typically
have impairments in language, executive control and social skills, but re-
main relatively unaffected in the domains of visual perception and motor
skills. According to B. L. Miller et al. (1998), the decline in inhibitory
control that is typical for FTD might facilitate the already present ca-
pacities for visual art production in these subjects. Alternatively, the
patients may have chosen to focus on visual art because of the difficulties
they experienced in other domains, such as social interaction, and the
relative preservation of their motor and visual skills. Either way, this
research suggests that the capacity to make art is not restricted to the
select few, but is present in the population at large. This may also be
true for music. A study that investigated musical memory (Racette &
Peretz, 2007) suggests that professional musicians are not significantly
better than laypeople in recalling the melody, rhythm and lyrics of unfa-
miliar folk songs, despite their extensive training in and familiarity with
music.
If art is not a psychological primitive but an epiphenomenon, cognitive
neuroscience cannot study art as such—indeed, what the neuroscience
studies seem to tell us is that when subjects view a work of art, they do
not see, say, a canvas or a statue, rather, they react to what it represents
(e.g., a seascape, a nude woman). However, cognitive neuroscientists
who examine artistic behavior (e.g., Zeki, 1998; Vartanian & Goel, 2004)
do not claim that art does not correspond to anything in the real world.
Quite on the contrary, many of them (e.g., Cavanagh, 2005) argue that the
history of art can inform theories of the human mind, because successful
art provides a window onto invariant properties of the human perceptual
systems.
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Figure 5.6: Changes in style in an accomplished American-Asian artist
with FTD. From left to right: Quan Yin, prior to the artist’s illness; Male
nudes, 9 years into her illness (at this time she was affected by aphasia);
Four Masks, 13 years into the artist’s illness and her last painting. Images
from Mell et al. (2003), Figs. 1, 2 and 3, pp. 1708–1709.
Figure 5.7: Paintings by two amateur painters who made their first art-
works in their 50s: by an FTD patient in his late 50s, depicting a church
he remembered from early childhood (left); by a 64-year-old FTD pa-
tient, depicting a rural scene from her childhood (right). Images from
B. L. Miller et al. (1998), Figs. 1 and 3, p. 979.
5.3 Art as adaptation
Evolutionary psychology aims to explain features of human behavior as
a product of an interaction between evolved psychological mechanisms
and the environment, making use of methods from evolutionary biology,
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such as kin selection or parental investment theory. It does not regard
culture as completely autonomous but as at least in part reducible to
the human evolved cognitive architecture. Evolutionary psychologists
disagree about the extent to which this reduction of culture to evolved
cognitive tendencies is possible. Some (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992)
argue that most of culture consists of ‘evoked’ cognitive predispositions,
while others (e.g., R. I. M. Dunbar & Barrett, 2007) allow for a larger
influence of culturally transmitted norms and rules in governing human
behavior. Nonetheless, much of the evolutionary psychological literature
is clearly unificationist, as it attempts to “integrate the social sciences into
a seamless system of interconnected knowledge that runs from astronomy
to biology” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, 19).
Although evolutionary psychologists are interested in both proximate
and ultimate explanations in a variety of domains of human behavior,
their examinations of art have so far concentrated on ultimate explana-
tions of why people spend considerable time and energy in their produc-
tion and enjoyment of art. Two types of approaches to explaining artistic
behavior have been proposed: either that it is an adaptation, which has
evolved in direct response to one or more selective pressures in our an-
cestral past, or that it is a byproduct of other adaptations that does not
serve an adaptive function in itself. Its complexity makes it implausible
that art would have evolved through random genetic drift.
Those who favor the view that art is an adaptation invoke its univer-
sality across cultures, its costliness in terms of time and energy, and its
early and spontaneous development in children. We will briefly discuss
a selection of recent adaptationist models for art. Geoffrey Miller (2000)
argues that art and other forms of human creative behavior evolved as
a result of sexual selection: their costliness in terms of time and energy
provided ancestral hominids with an honest signal of the fitness of the
art-producing person (in Miller’s view, primarily the art-producing male).
Just like a lush but burdensome tail in peacocks or birds of paradise is a
good signal of its owner’s qualities to live with such a handicap (Zahavi,
1975), the artworks honestly signal the artist’s qualities as a mate. In
support of his hypothesis, Miller (1999) shows that the artistic produc-
tion of western male writers, jazz musicians, and painters peaks during
prime reproductive age, with a higher productivity in quantitative terms
compared to their female peers. The latter have a more even distribution
of artistic output across their lifespan, and do not experience the sharp
5.3. Art as adaptation 143
decline in artistic production during middle age that is typical of their
male fellows.
A potential problem with this evidence is that it is solely based on
an analysis of western artists. The quantitatively higher male output
may be due to socio-cultural factors, such as gender-based prejudices in
perception of male versus female artistic qualities. A way to control for
this possible western bias would be to replicate Miller’s study in non-
western cultures, especially in those where women are responsible for a
substantial part of the art production. For example, in Tonga (a Polyne-
sian kingdom), woven ceremonial mats that are exclusively the work of
women have high aesthetic and cultural value—a collection of such mats
constitutes the Tongan crown jewels (St. Cartmail, 1997). These ceremo-
nial mats are not primarily functional objects (although they resemble
functional, non-decorated mats in some respects) and are thus a good
analogy to the (primarily non-functional) art production in western cul-
ture. Tongan men, on the other hand, carve functional wooden objects
like decorated bowls and neck supports. A cross-cultural test of Miller’s
hypothesis evaluating art production in cultures where both men and
women are active artists (such as Tonga, or Navajo native Americans)
could examine whether men still have a higher quantitative production
in these cultures, and whether there is a correlation in men (but not in
women) between a peak in artistic production and the prime reproductive
years. Even if this were the case, there is yet another possible confound to
Miller’s hypothesis, namely more general sexual differences in motivation
and drive: men might be more prone to have a high quantitative output
of art for the same reason that they seek higher income jobs. Indeed,
Kanazawa (2000) found that male but not female scientists tend to write
the lion’s share of their papers in their prime reproductive age. Thus,
sexual differences in art production could be the result of sexual selec-
tion, but this does not entail that sexual selection specifically targeted
art and other cultural displays.
Tooby and Cosmides (2001) point out that pretend play emerges uni-
versally in toddlers. This ability provides us with the imagined worlds of
(oral and written) literature and visual art, risk-free environments where
learning can take place through vicarious experience: fairy tales like Snow
White tell of the competition that may arise between fading mothers and
nubile daughters, whereas novels like Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility
(1811) provide an insight into human mate selection dogged by financial
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worries. Although this hypothesis sounds intuitively plausible, it has not
been empirically investigated. A possible test for Tooby and Cosmides’
(2001) claim might be to investigate correlations between early exposure
to fiction and performance in theory of mind tasks. Some studies (e.g.,
M. Taylor & Carlson, 1997) indicate that children who engage more in
imaginative play, i.e., creating fictional environments or inventing imag-
inary friends, are advanced in theory of mind comprehension compared
to their less imaginative peers. Future work may indicate to what extent
being engaged in fiction (such as children’s books, read aloud by parents)
has an effect on the developing theory of mind.
Ellen Dissanayake (2000) proposes that art is the intentional act of
making everyday behavior special through exaggeration, formalization, or
manipulation of expectations: dance exaggerates and formalizes normal
bodily movements; songs distort normal speech and prosody. Performing
such actions together relieves tension and anxiety, thus improving social
bonds within the community: such rituals “build and reinforce feelings
of unity among adults, all of which ultimately serve to hold the group
together” (Dissanayake, 2000, 64). She traces the evolutionary precursor
of these behaviors to mother-infant dyadic interactions, where mothers
and infants spontaneously engage in intentionally modifying their vocal-
izations, gestures and facial expressions. One potential source of tension
in this account is that it has conflicting notions on the level at which
selection operates. On the one hand, Dissanayake seems to favor a group
selectionist account of art, as she identifies fitness benefits of art at the
group level, such as an increased cohesion between group members (e.g.,
Dissanayake, 2000, 64, 168). On the other hand, she has emphasized that
art is a result of individual selection, since “art is a behavior potentially
available to everyone because all humans have the disposition to do it”
(Dissanayake, 1995, 34–35). To Dissanayake, this indicates that art is the
result of selection at the individual level: “art-inclined individuals, those
who possessed this behavior of art, survived better than those who did
not. That is to say, a behavior of art had ‘selective’ or ‘survival’ value”
(Dissanayake, 1995, 35). Unfortunately, the claim that art improves sur-
vival chances has not been experimentally tested. Furthermore, insist-
ing that a selectionist account needs to operate at the individual level
requires more backing up: cross-cultural research (Anderson, 1989) indi-
cates that the production of art by adults is usually the work of specialists.
As Davies (2005, 295) pointed out, Dissanayake could have opted for a
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weaker position, where only a few talented persons make art, but where
art is still a pan-cultural phenomenon. As long as a sufficient number of
individuals make art, the adaptive benefits of art could be available at
the group level. Indeed, mathematical models of cultural group selection
can be applied to the evolution of particular artistic traditions, such as
the development of portable art (so-called Venus figurines) in Ice Age
Europe, as we shall see in chapter 6.
For art to be an adaptation, it does not suffice to come up with the
observation that art serves adaptive functions in some context. Adap-
tationist explanations for art need to specify what it is an adaptation
for. Clearly, it is not difficult to come up with adaptive functions for
art, but that is exactly the problem of such adaptationist accounts. It
remains as yet unclear what selective pressures may have promoted the
emergence of art in the Late Pleistocene, therefore theorizing about it
remains fairly unconstrained. The current selective benefits of art (for
example, in terms of sexual selection) are not necessarily the same as
those in the past. It is interesting to note that most adaptationist ap-
proaches to art are concerned mainly with literature (see e.g., the papers
collected in Gottschall & Wilson, 2005), where the function of vicarious
learning is quite plausibly explained. However, it remains unclear to what
extent such an approach can be generalized to other arts, especially ab-
stract art, music and dance. Those approaches that sketch a theory that
encompasses most arts have the problem that the category of objects that
is being explained is wider than what we normally regard as art. Miller
(2000) explains not only art, but also humor and even conspicuous con-
sumption, the wasteful advertising of one’s resources by spending them
on luxury items or giving them away, as described Veblen (1899). Tooby
and Cosmides (2001) themselves point out that their adaptive account is
about fiction, the broad human ability to imagine counterfactual worlds
and situations. Dissanayake (1995, 2000) provides not only an explana-
tion for art but also for ritual and ritualized behavior, which is not even
restricted to humans, but can be observed in many animals living in cap-
tivity and perhaps also in the wild (see Bekoff, 2009, for a tantalizing
report about grieving magpies). To date, no adaptationist explanation
makes a plausible case that targets artistic behavior in its entirety.
146 Chapter 5. An integrative approach to art
5.4 Art as byproduct
Some evolutionary psychologists explain art as a byproduct of the evolved
human mind, without the further claim that it is an adaptation. For in-
stance, to Pinker (1997, 524–525), art’s primary function is not to increase
our biological fitness, but to “press our pleasure buttons.” To Pinker, art
exploits aesthetic preferences that were (or are) adaptive in other con-
texts, just like cheesecake gratifies our craving for sugar and fat. Dutton
(2009, 95–96) has criticized this cheesecake analogy, aptly pointing out
that there is an important sense in which our craving for sugar- and fat-
rich food is not a byproduct, but decidedly an adaptation—it is just that
it is maladaptive under current conditions to consume large amounts of
such foodstuffs when they are plentiful available. Dutton (2009) makes
the case that art, like cheesecake, directly appeals to our evolved dispo-
sitions.
A potentially fruitful domain of investigation for byproduct explana-
tions of art is the study of cross-culturally stable properties of artistic
production. The cross-cultural prevalence of some forms of art can be ex-
plained by their efficiency to exploit our evolved cognitive predispositions.
Although human creativity can in principle create a wide diversity of artis-
tic expressions, some of these will enjoy more success and have a higher
chance to be incorporated in artistic traditions because of their fit with
our cognitive biases. In the domain of music, scales provide an interesting
example. Scales are collections of tones that divide octaves into specific
intervals. Since humans can discriminate between about 240 pitches over
an octave in the mid-range of hearing (Fastl & Zwicker, 2007), in princi-
ple a very large number of scales are possible. Yet, in practice, musical
traditions only explore a modest subset of these possibilities: most scales
across time and cultures are only between five and seven tones, often
with well-defined intervals between them. Gill and Purves (2009) argue
that this conformity can be explained by the fact that pentatonic and
heptatonic scales—natural scales, not well-tempered scales as in modern
western music—are close to harmonic series, which find their origin in
the way humans perceive speech. Human vocal fold vibrations charac-
teristic of voiced speech are mathematically best described by harmonic
series. These function as cognitive attractors: the cross-cultural prefer-
ence of a very limited number of scales may be explained by their fit with
the evolved human auditory system, which is tuned to harmonic series.
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Gill and Purves (2009) demonstrated that scales that are widely used
cross-culturally, like the minor pentatonic scale (as in Mary had a little
lamb) and the Phrygian heptatonic mode (e.g., Ralph Vaughan Williams’
Fantasia on a Theme of Thomas Tallis), indeed correspond closely to
harmonic series, whereas scales that are only rarely used across cultures,
such as the Locrian mode (for instance, Metallica’s Sad but true), bear the
least resemblance to them. An external confirmation of this hypothesis is
the sound produced by a replica of a 36,000-year-old flute made of swan
bone from Geißenklo¨sterle, southwestern Germany, by the experimental
archeologist Friedrich Seeberger. The flute produces four tones and three
overtones that fall neatly into a minor pentatonic scale. Seeberger (2003)
can be heard playing the flute on a CD. The minor pentatonic scale is the
most widely used musical scale cross-culturally, and it is also the scale
that is closest to harmonic series.
Next to this, most music, even purely instrumental music, is com-
posed within the human vocal range, indicating that music may be based
to some extent on auditory adaptations involved in human speech percep-
tion. A recent study with cotton-top tamarins (Snowdon & Teie, 2010)
provides indirect support for this hypothesis. The monkeys did not ex-
hibit any noticeable behavioral reactions to human music, compared to
a baseline control condition in which no music was played, which the
experimenters interpreted as indifference. By contrast, the animals re-
sponded strongly to cello compositions that were modeled on tamarin
vocalizations, showing arousal when they heard music based on aggres-
sive vocalizations, and decreased activity and calm behavior when they
listened to melodies based on affiliative calls. Human subjects found nei-
ther of the tamarin-vocalization based compositions pleasant. Although
music is more than a rendition of vocalizations, these studies indicate its
species-specificity.
Conversely, some authors (e.g., Hauser & McDermott, 2003) argue
that music depends on ancient auditory properties that predate the evo-
lution of language. The salience of some tonal intervals in musical scales
may be based on auditory sensitivities that humans share with other pri-
mates. There is some experimental support for this. Rhesus monkeys,
manifestly a species that does not produce music, can correctly identify
two versions of the same short tonal melody as the same, for example,
when one version is played an octave higher. Interestingly, like with hu-
mans, their performance drops sharply when they have to identify atonal
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melodies (Wright, Rivera, Hulse, Shyan, & Neiworth, 2000). However, in
other respects, human musical ability is more akin to that of distantly re-
lated clades, such as songbirds and cetaceans, than to that of our closest
living relatives, the nonhuman apes. Whereas songbirds and cetaceans
learn songs through social transmission (e.g., Foote et al., 2006), apes,
with the exception of gibbons, do not produce anything akin to song
(Geissmann, 2000)—and gibbon song does not depend on transmission
through learning but is stereotypical and species-specific: a hybrid of two
species of gibbon will combine songs of both parents, even if it was only
exposed to the song type of one of its parents (Geissmann, 2000, 108–
110). Despite many efforts, no nonhuman ape has mastered the ability
to learn complex, novel vocalizations through social transmission (Fitch,
2005). Taken together, the limited evidence for musical ability and recog-
nition in primates indicates that music may be specific to humans within
the primates, and that it draws to an important extent on adaptations
that are involved in the production of voiced speech, including vocal fold
vibrations and grammar, which evolved after hominids split from other
ape lineages.
In the domain of visual art, we can also expect that visual stimuli that
are significant from an evolutionary perspective will feature prominently
in art production. The canvases by Vitaly Komar and Alex Melamid
indicate that the taste of naive art observers may be guided by more
than cultural influences. These paintings, based on polls that probed
aesthetic preferences in different countries, are remarkably stable across
cultures: they invariably feature tranquil landscapes around a lake with
relaxing humans in the foreground and some large animals in the distance.
(Readers can visit http://www.diacenter.org/km/ for a flavor of this
work.) This is in line with studies (e.g., Orians & Heerwagen, 1992) that
reveal a universal preference for semi-open savannah-like landscapes with
trees and water, reminiscent of the environment in which a large part of
hominid evolution took place.
Another example is face perception. Newborns can already discrimi-
nate faces from other objects by detecting the shadowy patches created
by eyes and mouth (Farroni et al., 2005). Face-recognition is a highly
specialized capacity in humans and other primates. Its neural basis is the
fusiform face area, a part of the cerebral cortex that is specialized in the
processing of face-like stimuli, and that has characteristic features, such
as a diminished ability to recognize inverted faces (Pascalis & Bachevalier,
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1998). Face recognition probably evolved as a means to visually recognize
conspecifics, as diurnal primates have less developed olfactory capacities
compared to other mammals, and therefore cannot easily recognize each
other by smell. A considerable part of the world’s art production (e.g.,
portraits, busts, and masks) keys in on this evolved face-recognition sys-
tem. Interestingly, some studies tentatively suggest that cultural face-
like stimuli emphasize those parts of the face that humans find especially
salient. Infants pay most attention to the eyes and mouth, and less to
features like eyelashes or cheeks (Farroni et al., 2005). Still, face-like
stimuli that are very schematic (such as smileys) elicit less neural re-
sponse in the fusiform face area than realistic faces (Tong, Nakayama,
Moscovitch, Weinrib, & Kanwisher, 2000). One could predict on the ba-
sis of this that successful cultural face-like stimuli will have some degree
of realism, but that they nevertheless emphasize the eyes and mouth,
and pay considerable less attention to eyebrows, eyelashes, cheeks or nose
(think, for example, of Aztec mosaic masks, or Dan masks from Coˆte
d’Ivoire). In support of this, Costa and Corazza (2006) found that re-
alistic self-portraits and likenesses drawn from memory by art students
show significant increases in the size of the eyes and the lips. The effect
is also discernible in historical portrait art, such as in the striking Fayum
mortuary portraits (Fig. 5.8).
Future research can elucidate how cognition and culture interact, for
example, in the cultural evolution of face-like stimuli such as portraits or
masks within particular traditions. An fMRI study of one novice and one
expert portrait artist, who were asked to draw a series of faces (Solso,
2000), revealed an increased activity in the fusiform face area in both
participants (albeit somewhat less in the expert) compared to a control
condition (drawing geometric figures), indicating the importance of this
area for the production and perception of face-like stimuli. The lower
activation in the expert’s brain might be a consequence of more efficient
processing of faces, a result of extensive training and practice. However,
since both subjects were allowed to look at the faces and their own draw-
ings during the production task, it is unclear whether this activation is
merely due to visual perception, production or both. Miall, Gowen, and
Tchalenko (2009) asked untrained participants to draw cartoon faces from
memory, preventing them from looking at their own hand or drawings dur-
ing the task, thereby controlling for visual perception versus production of
face-like stimuli. Their fMRI study indicated that drawing cartoon faces
150 Chapter 5. An integrative approach to art
Figure 5.8: Self-portrait (middle) by an art student (left), made by use of
a mirror. Notice the larger eyes and fuller lips in the drawing compared
to the photograph, from Costa and Corazza (2006), Fig. 3, p. 237. Fayum
mortuary portrait (right), 2nd century AD, from the Oxford Ashmolean
Museum (author’s photograph).
without direct visual perceptual input indeed also activates the fusiform
face area.
Equally striking is the prevalence of animal imagery in visual art
across the world, from the early Upper Paleolithic on. Indeed, the ear-
liest representational art depicts almost exclusively animals. Large dan-
gerous carnivores, large and medium game, and birds figure prominently
among the mammoth ivory figurines (see Fig. 7.3.1) of between 40,000–
32,000 years old, excavated in southwestern Germany (Conard, 2003)
and among the slightly younger cave paintings of the Grotte Chauvet
in southern France (Feruglio, 2006). Even in industrialized countries,
where contact with animals is relatively sparse, depictions of animals
have not diminished in popularity—unsystematic observations by par-
ents and teachers indicate that the drawings by young western children
teem with quadrupeds, birds and fish. The salience of such imagery may
be explained by the priority our perceptual systems give to animal shapes.
New et al. (2007) demonstrated that subjects are substantially faster and
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more accurate at detecting changes in complex scenery when animals
(even small ones, like pigeons) were introduced or omitted compared to
inanimate objects, even vehicles, which they have been trained for years
to monitor for sudden life-or-death situations in traffic. As this efficiency
could not be accounted for by differences in lower-level visual charac-
teristics or expertise, the authors assumed that people might have an
advantage in animal categorization by virtue of the ancestral importance
of this ability, regardless of its current utility. After all, hominids have
been active hunters for at least one million years (Rabinovich, Gaudzinski-
Windheuser, & Goren-Inbar, 2008) and had to be aware of predators and
venomous animals for a much longer period. Interestingly, the visual de-
tection of predators can persist long after the danger of predators has dis-
appeared: tammar wallabies (Macropus eugenii), an Australian marsupial
found on offshore islands on the southern and western Australian coasts,
have lived in isolation from mammalian predators since the last Ice Age.
Yet, the animals exhibit fear and increased vigilance when confronted
with stuffed foxes and cats and models of thylacines (extinct marsupial
carnivores) (Blumstein, Daniel, Griffin, & Evans, 2000). Section 2.3.2
already mentioned neuroimaging studies that suggest that some parts
of the temporal and occipital cortex are exclusively dedicated to perceiv-
ing and thinking about animals (e.g., Mahon et al., 2009), indicating that
this neural organization is not the result of perceptual features of animals,
but rather of selective pressures that have formed specialized areas within
the human brain that deal with semantic knowledge about animals. More
systematic empirical research could examine to what extent art that has
animal imagery or themes is influenced by evolved cognitive predisposi-
tions. For example, given their evolutionary salience, one can expect that
art will tend to represent those kinds of animals that humans interacted
with (prey animals, predators), regardless of their current effect on hu-
man fitness—it will rather show large carnivores than malaria-carrying
mosquitoes, even though the latter have currently more impact on human
fitness. Some artistic traditions, like Upper Paleolithic animal imagery in
sculptures and cave paintings, indeed seem to conform to this, showing
high frequencies of predator and prey animals in prototypical postures.
More systematic work is needed to examine to what extent this is also
the case for more recent animal imagery in figurative art in western and
nonwestern cultures.
If we take consilience of inductions, the convergence of two or more in-
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dependent scientific disciplines (see also section 1.3), as a useful scientific
heuristic, the byproduct account of art is preferable to the adaptation-
ist view, because the former is more in line with cognitive neuroscience.
The cognitive neuroscientific evidence reviewed here provides strong em-
pirical support for the claim that various forms of art, including visual
art and music, are attention-grabbing because of their correspondence
with evolved propensities of the human neural system. The most likely
proximate explanation for why masks, for example, elicit attention is that
they activate the fusiform face area. The functional specialization of face-
detection is such that perceiving faces is ineluctable: we cannot look at a
depiction of a face and choose to regard it as a meaningless configuration
of colors. A visual stimulus that has the main features of a face, such
as a portrait or mask, thus compels the brain to pay close attention to
it. The ultimate reason for the cultural success of masks and portraits
around the world can be found in the evolutionary salience of face detec-
tion for humans—highly social animals that put a premium on individual
recognition.
It is important to note that artists need not be consciously aware of
this effect. Artists generally do not know the effects their work has on
the neural activity of their audience. Random variations in artistic style
can be cumulatively retained to the effect that specific artistic traditions
come to correspond more closely to evolved cognitive predispositions as a
form of cultural selection. We already looked into the tendency of early
20th-century abstract art to emphasize bright color contrasts and lines,
and the cross-cultural prevalence of musical scales that correspond to
harmonic series.
A short historical example can further clarify how this unconscious
selection of artistic variations may be one of the driving forces in the cul-
tural evolution of artistic traditions, next to culture-specific norms and
preferences. The developmental psychologist Willem Koops (1996) exam-
ined the physical appearance of children depicted in Dutch and Flemish
paintings from the 15th to the 20th century. He drew on Lorenz’ (1943)
theory of the ‘child schema’ (Kindchenschema), which proposes that spe-
cific anatomical proportions of the face and body (in particular, a rela-
tively large head, high forehead, large eyes, and short, thick limbs) elicit
nurturing behavior and affective responses. In the Middle Ages, babies
and children were depicted as miniature versions of adults. From the 17th
century onward, infants, children and even adolescents look progressively
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more neotenous (Koops, 1996). In other words, more recent paintings
turn out to correlate more closely with the child schema, perhaps because
Dutch and Flemish painters and their patrons found neotenous children
more attractive. It is not that visual preferences changed; the preference
for neoteny is probably a stable feature of adult cognition. Rather, this
feature may have played a role as a cultural selective pressure to retain
small variations in the depiction of infants and children. Paintings with
infants and children that had slightly larger eyes and slightly higher fore-
heads were more successful than those with smaller eyes and lower fore-
heads, pushing the design of these portraits in the direction of babylike
faces. (By comparison, Shaun Nichols’ (2002) study of disgust and table
manners indicates that a stable human aversion for bodily fluids drove
the cultural evolution of more and more refined table manners. It is not
that people’s innate disgust mechanisms changed within the past few cen-
turies.) The increasing chubbiness cannot be solely explained as a result
of a better diet, since this long period (15th to 20th century) was punctu-
ated by famines. It is also unlikely that the increased neoteny in depicted
infants and children was solely driven by concerns for realistic depiction,
as late medieval painters like Rogier Van Der Weyden or Hugo Van Der
Goes could paint very realistic-looking adults, animals and plants, while
the infants they painted looked like tiny adults. Moreover, exaggerated
neoteny is observed in other cultural stimuli, such as the increasing child-
like appearance of teddy bears in the course of the 20th century which
display increasingly higher foreheads and shorter snouts (Hinde & Bar-
den, 1985). More recent examples of neoteny include toys like Littlest
Pet Shop and My Little Pony, where there is a similar increasing size
of eyes and head, accompanied with a progressive shortening of snouts
and limbs, as is illustrated in Fig. 5.9. Interestingly, Morris, Reddy, and
Bunting (1995) found that this cultural evolution in toys was not driven
by the consumers (the children) but by their parents, who buy the toys,
and are thus the selecting agents. The ultimate explanation for why hu-
mans prefer cuteness in cultural stimuli is the fitness benefit it conferred
to ancestral parents who were compelled to nurturing and caring for in-
dividuals whose features corresponded to the child schema. It remains a
topic of future research, however, to identify the primary selective agent
in the evolution of art: the preferences of the artists, or of the patrons
and purchasers, or of both?
The evolutionary psychological byproduct account of art provides a
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Figure 5.9: The evolution of My Little Pony from a somewhat neotenous
horse (1982, left), with increasing neoteny throughout the 1990s and early
2000s (second, third) to an almost unrecognizable baby-shaped zoomor-
phic toy (2010, right), author’s collection. Without cultural context, one
would hardly be able to guess that the toy on the right is a pony.
satisfying explanation for the cross-cultural human drive to create and en-
joy art, and for the recurrence of some forms of art (e.g., musical scales,
faces, animals) across time and cultures. The evolutionary byproduct
explanation and cognitive neuroscientific account strengthen each other.
However, a few questions remain unanswered. The byproduct account
does not explain why we do not invariably prefer art that maximally
conforms to evolved cognitive mechanisms. Academic art17 by painters
like William-Adolphe Bouguereau or Jean-Honore´ Fragonard generally
responds to our evolved tastes in depicting attractive men and women in
lush landscapes. Yet some influential art critics (e.g., Greenberg, 2003,
32) derisively refer to this type of art as overpolished and cliche´d. Many
highly acclaimed works of visual art are hardly eye candy, such as Fran-
cisco Goya’s gloomy political canvases or Francis Bacon’s haunting papal
portraits (Fig 5.10). Unsurprisingly, and in accordance with the folk
concept of art, untrained art observers do prefer academic painters like
Lawrence Alma Tadema or Bouguereau (Martindale, 1998), probably be-
cause their works are more in agreement with our evolved cognitive ten-
dencies. Nevertheless, the fact that this preference for such artistic forms
is not universal remains unexplained.
Another future challenge for the empirical study of art consists of in-
dividual differences in art perception and production. What makes some
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Figure 5.10: Bouguereau or Bacon? Why is Bouguereau’s The
earring, 1891 (left) less well regarded than Bacon’s Study af-
ter Velazquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X, 1953 (right)? Re-
trieved from http://kevinalfredstrom.com/art/v/paintings/
William+Bouguereau+-+The+Earrings+ 1891 .jpg.html and
http://www.artquotes.net/masters/bacon/paint study.htm.
people more prone to create art? What distinguishes art critics from the
general public? Cross-culturally some people are more drawn to art pro-
duction than others. Even relatively egalitarian societies have artists, i.e.,
individuals that are regarded as especially competent in sculpting, story-
telling, or dancing by members of their community (Anderson, 1989). An
adaptationist perspective, such as the one advocated by Miller (2000),
can explain such individual differences as a result of frequency-dependent
selection. Indeed, empirical tests that examine the relationship between
artistic creativity, schizotypy and reproductive success indicate that an
increased reproductive success associated with artistic capacity may be
offset by the prevalence of traits indicative of schizotypy (which reduces
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fitness) in British poets and visual artists (Nettle & Clegg, 2006). This
does not exclude an explanation of individual differences in artistic capac-
ities under a byproduct account. If art is a byproduct of evolved cognitive
capacities, we may expect that a combination of individual differences in
these capacities, and personal interest and circumstance may explain why
some become artists, whereas others do not. Indeed, such models have
been developed for other capacities that are seen as byproducts of evolved
abilities, such as mathematical reasoning skills (e.g., Geary, 1995). Like
art, these skills are the result of a co-optation of abilities that have an
unrelated evolutionary function, and they are sensitive to cultural con-
text.
5.5 Do reductionist approaches obviate the need for higher-
level accounts of art?
Cognitive neuroscientific and evolutionary psychological approaches can
help us understand the cognitive processes that underlie art. From this
examination of both approaches, a coherent picture emerges of art as
a byproduct of normal perceptual, motivational and emotional brain cir-
cuits that have evolved in response to problems originally unrelated to art.
However, from neither discipline does it become clear that art should be a
meaningful subject of investigation within their explanatory frameworks.
As discussed earlier, several cognitive neuroscientists (e.g., Ramachan-
dran & Hirstein, 1999; Barry, 2006) argue that art draws on perceptual
and motivational neural structures involved in everyday experience. As
we have seen, evolutionary psychologists who propose adaptationist ac-
counts for art (e.g., G. Miller, 2000; Dissanayake, 1995) typically target
a category of behaviors that is broader than art (e.g., cultural display).
Byproduct explanations too, do not consider art as a natural category:
they make no distinction between an artwork and perfume, cheesecake or
pornography, since all these exploit our evolved perceptual biases.
The special sciences, such as aesthetics and art theory, can investi-
gate aspects of art that are not reducible to universal features of human
psychology, but that are variable across time and cultures. Arguably,
the striking dissimilarities in the way human figures are rendered in Uta-
maro’s or Hokusai’s woodcuts (Japan, Edo period) and Rembrandt’s etch-
ings are better explained through art historical accounts than through
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differences in internal brain organization. The possible ways in which a
human figure can be drawn are constrained by the human visual system.
Our perceptual preference for clear-cut shapes (Cavanagh, 2005) may
account for the strong delineated shapes and the absence of shadow in
many artistic traditions, for instance in the Japanese Edo period wood-
cuts that portray human figures. These strong lines also allow for the
depiction of implied motion and imbalance in the human figures (e.g.,
sword-fighting or standing on one leg) in Katsushika Hokusai’s Manga
(1814), see Fig. 5.11, right. Indeed, a recent fMRI study (Osaka et al.,
2010) indicates that motion-sensitive areas of the extrastriate visual cor-
tex are recruited when participants look at these images. By contrast,
Rembrandt van Rijn’s use of shadows and diffuse shapes provides more
static, almost rigid figures, but allows for a more dynamic expression of
emotions on their faces (see Fig. 5.11, left)—by making facial expres-
sions diffuse, there is room for the observer’s interpretation, heightening
emotional response (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003). Thus,
there seems to be a trade-off between clarity of shape and expression of
emotions—both are in tune with human perceptual predispositions, but
cannot be realized simultaneously. In order to explain the choices that
have led to these divergent artistic styles, one needs to consider the cul-
tural and historical contexts in which they evolved. In the case of the Edo
period woodcuts, limitations inherent to the medium of woodcuts and a
preference for clear shapes and striking compositions in Japanese visual
art may be contributing factors. In the case of Rembrandt’s etchings, an
increased emphasis on expressing emotions in Baroque art may provide
an explanation. In this way, empirical findings from cognitive neuro-
science provide building blocks for testable hypotheses on the cultural
evolution of stylistic traditions, a topic that is currently underexplored in
evolutionary studies of art.
The evolved preference for savannah-like landscapes might explain
some recurring features of garden and park design, such as a relatively
sparse implantation of trees and the frequent use of water-sources like
ponds or fountains, but it does no exhaust the types of landscape we
find attractive. Japanese rock gardens, which consist of large stones sur-
rounded by white raked sand or gravel, are a case in point. In contrast
to many other types of gardens, Japanese rock gardens do not contain
water; rather, the sand or gravel symbolizes seas, rivers or lakes. The
aesthetic appreciation of landscapes seems to be subject to considerable
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Figure 5.11: Rembrandt, Self-portrait as beggar, etching, 1630
(left), retrieved from http://www.mystudios.com/rembrandt/
rembrandt-etchings-beggar.html; Hokusai, page with danc-
ing human figure from Manga, 1814 (right), retrieved from
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hokusai Manga 03.jpg.
cultural influence. For instance, the enjoyment of the sea and mountains
is a relatively recent phenomenon in western culture—these places were
thought of as threatening and hostile until well into the 19th century. As
Corbin (1988) notes, it was only in the course of the late 18th century
that people started to visit the beach for recreational purposes.
This ineluctability of the special sciences may be true for many do-
mains of human culture. Consider jet-lag: suppose scientists were able to
explain all its effects through neural and genetic processes, i.e., they un-
covered the relevant neural structures responsible for generating 24-hour
wake and sleep rhythms, and identified the genes that encode circadian
rhythms in humans and other animals (indeed, most of these have been
5.5. Reductionism and higher-level accounts 159
identified, see e.g., Antle & Silver, 2005, for an overview). Still, this would
not explain jets or the recent phenomenon of people habitually making air
voyages that span half the globe—for this, we need to resort to historical
accounts of jet propulsion and sociological explanations of the rise of mass
tourism and inexpensive charter flights to exotic destinations (which in
turn is linked to the colonial history of these places). Similarly, a host of
factors influence the appreciation and production of art, including the so-
cial status, education and economic background of the observer or artist,
and the context in which one is exposed to the artwork. Consider listen-
ing to a piece of music in a concert hall to hearing it while waiting on the
phone: the exact same piece of music can elicit feelings of emotion and
exultation in the concert hall, while provoking boredom and irritation at
the phone.
Accepting the validity of higher-level accounts of art does not auto-
matically lead to a rejection of reductionism. Weaker forms of pluralism
(the position that the study of human behavior, including art, requires
multiple autonomous perspectives) pragmatically imply that a given phe-
nomenon can be studied by a variety of perspectives (see also section 1.3)
—there is no objective reason why lower-level or higher-level accounts
should be the only ones worth pursuing. Since scholars are also interested
in various properties of art that are not part of human biology, they can
legitimately study these through the humanities. For instance, prevail-
ing Buddhist and Taoist influences among Chinese scholars adequately
explain the emergence of landscape painting in the Southern Song period
and its persistence throughout the Ming dynasty (Cheng, 1991). We can
therefore maintain that evolved neural circuits in the human brain can
account for the production and appreciation of art. But there must be
more to the study of art than simply stating that it can be reduced to
the physical structure of the brain. A promising line of research is to
investigate how evolved aesthetic preferences causally relate to existing
styles, formats and themes in artistic production across cultures. Such
an account could help us gain insight into why some art forms are more
salient than others. For example, it seems puzzling that figurative visual
art is more prevalent and more appealing to naive observers than ab-
stract art, although the latter taps more directly into very early stages of
evolved perceptual preferences. Indeed, to some authors (e.g., Hodgson,
2006), abstract art is most successful in tapping into primary visual areas,
because of the prevalence of bold lines and colors. Maybe art observers
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not only use aesthetic value to gauge artworks, but also other evaluative
criteria, such as the perceived difficulty in making the artworks. For ab-
stract art, the expertise of the maker is often less easy to judge than it
is for naturalistic representations. The search for causal mechanisms in
the human brain may well be the most powerful strategy to account for
cross-cultural universal patterns in artistic production and appreciation,
with the potential of unifying sciences dedicated to the study of art.
Chapter 6
Cultural group selection
and Magdalenian
mobiliary art
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Smedt J., & De
Cruz, H. (in press b). Human artistic behavior: Adaptation, byproduct,
or cultural group selection? In K.S. Plaisance & T.A. Reydon (Eds),
Philosophy of behavioral biology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Dordrecht: Springer.
6.1 What is cultural group selection?
As we saw in the previous chapter, while the byproduct account of art
is more in accordance with the data, neither the adaptationist nor the
byproduct account can adequately explain the time and energy people
invest in art. While this by itself is not a reason to reject such expla-
nations out of hand, it does provide room for an alternative explanation
that will be explored here. As will be argued, this explanation accords
well with empirical observations of the function of art in contemporary
small-scale societies and with the archeological record of Paleolithic art.
We will explore how some forms of art could be maintained through cul-
tural group selection, in particular as a means to emphasize within-group
identity. This chapter will examine the proliferation of some forms of
art in the Late Pleistocene, in particular, the mobiliary art from the
Magdalenian (a Homo sapiens Ice Age culture), by an appeal to cultural
group selection. Group selection was originally proposed as a mechanism
to explain altruism (e.g., Wynne-Edwards, 1962). In this view, groups
composed of altruists do better as a whole than groups composed of self-
ish individuals, favoring the retention of altruistic behavior. In the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, prominent evolutionary theorists like John
Maynard Smith (1964) and George Williams (1966) argued that the as-
sumptions on which group selection relies are very implausible. For one
thing, altruistic groups are vulnerable to subversion from within—given
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that a single cheater within a group of altruists has higher fitness, this
individual’s genetic success will far outstrip the success of the altruists,
as the latter have costs as well as benefits. Moreover, the replicators in
biological evolution are genes, and it turns out that most instances of
altruism can be explained in terms of the propagation of these genes (kin
selection). As a result, group selectionist ideas fell on hard times in main-
stream evolutionary theory. While no one claimed that group selection
was inherently impossible, it was argued that special conditions need to
be fulfilled before it could work. Group selectionist ideas are making a
comeback, both in theories of altruism in the natural world (e.g., Wilson
& Ho¨lldobler, 2005) and in models of the cultural evolution of human al-
truistic behavior (e.g., Henrich, 2004a). Cumulative culture, which gives
humans the capacity to transmit complex behavioral traits at a fast rate,
indeed creates a set of special circumstances that might allow for group
selection to occur.
A sensible way to interpret group selection is to see it as claiming that
groups can fulfill the same role as organisms do. In evolutionary theory,
a distinction is made between replicators (genes) and vehicles (i.e., enti-
ties that interact with the environment). Genes can interact as cohesive
wholes with their environment through their vehicles, typically organ-
isms. Thus the behavior of a given vehicle has direct consequences for
its replicators: the vehicles’ differential reproductive success ultimately
causes the reproductive success of their replicators, thereby making the
vehicles important units of selection (Sterelny, 1996). From this, it al-
ready becomes intuitively clear that groups must be distinct from each
other and form cohesive wholes for group selection to occur.
Group selection requires that the fitness benefits of altruistic groups
over selfish groups must outweigh the fitness benefits of selfish individuals
over altruistic individuals within mixed groups. This condition can be
mathematically described using the Price equation (Price, 1972), which
provides a formal way to study changes in the frequency of heritable
traits at two levels18. In this case, we are interested to find out whether
the benefits of art for the group (i.e., all members of the group together,
including nonproducers) is greater than the fitness costs of the production
of art by individual members of the group. The Price equation is a
statistical statement that relates the expected change in the frequency of
a gene or cultural trait ∆x per generation, the absolute fitness wj , and
the current frequency of the trait xj . We start with a population of N
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individuals subdivided into groups indexed by j, each with nj members.
There are no restrictions on how the groups are composed, except that
all groups must contain at least one individual.
w∆x =
between groups︷ ︸︸ ︷
Cov(wj , xj) +
within groups︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(Wj∆xj ) (6.1)
The first term on the right side of equation 6.1 represents the relationship
between the fitness of the groups and the initial frequency of the culturally
transmitted trait within them, i.e., what is the effect of having this trait
in the group as a whole as compared to other groups. The second part
represents the expected changes in this trait, based on its impact on
the fitness of individual members of the group. Given that covariance
expresses the product of a variance and a regression coefficient (β), we
can rewrite the Price equation as follows (simplifying by ignoring factors
like mutation and recombination):
w∆x = βwj ,xjV ar(xj) + E(βwij ,xijV ar(xij)) (6.2)
The two terms on the right side of the equations 6.1 and 6.2 oppose
each other, since altruism increases group fitness but decreases individual
fitness to a certain extent. If most of the variance in the population is
within the group, but all groups have nearly the same frequency of the
culturally transmitted traits, then the variation between groups V ar(xj)
will be very small, whereas the expectation of the variation within groups
V ar(xij) will be nearly the entire variance of the population. In this case,
cultural traits that favor altruism will not be maintained. If groups can be
isolated from each other, the variance between groups can become larger
than the variance within groups due to cultural drift, which provides
an ideal basis for the development of altruistic behavior. Cultural drift
is the emergence and spread of cultural elements that arise by chance
within a given group and that are copied randomly by members of that
group. This is a mechanism that results in between-group differences
when groups are sufficiently isolated. However, frequent contact between
groups and migration can quickly undermine this: behavioral traits from
one group can percolate into another, which increases variation within
groups V ar(xij) at the expense of variation between groups V ar(xj).
Cultural mechanisms that enable humans to mark group identity and to
maintain between-group differences can counter these effects, giving rise
164 Chapter 6. Cultural group selection and art
to within-group altruistic behavior. Subversion from within is routinely
countered by social rules such as altruistic punishment (Fehr & Ga¨chter,
2002) that discourages selfish behavior and nonconformism. Furthermore,
the presence of conformists dramatically increases the group size for which
cooperation can be sustained (Guzma´n, Rodr´ıguez-Sickert, & Rowthorne,
2007).
Henrich’s (2004a) derivation of the Price equation (see equation 6.3)
also shows that group selection only works if the benefits of being in an
altruistic group outweigh the costs of bestowing benefits to other members
of the group.
βwixi + βwixjβxjxi > 0 (6.3)
The first term of equation 6.3 is always positive, as it models the benefits
of being in an altruistic group. The second term is always negative, be-
cause it represents the costs of bestowing benefits to others. Obviously,
the sum of both terms needs to be larger than 0 for cultural group selec-
tion to occur. Cultural group selection is one type of group selection in
which the group is defined through cultural markers, such as a distinct
language or dialect, religious beliefs, dress code, food taboos, or other
cultural norms. Languages and dialects, for instance, serve as a hard to
fake signal of group membership, successfully constraining between-group
migration (Nettle & Dunbar, 1997). Cultural groups are also fairly stable
because people have a conformist bias: they tend to follow the norms
of the culture in which they were raised (Henrich & Boyd, 1998). This
conformist tendency is well attested ethnographically (Richerson & Boyd,
2005; Tehrani & Collard, 2002) and archeologically (Collard, Shennan, &
Tehrani, 2006), in the way material culture tends to evolve together with a
particular ethnic group. As groups are culturally, rather than genetically,
defined, and given that such culturally defined groups are fairly stable,
cultural group selection can be invoked to explain human prosociality, i.e.,
the exceptional degree of cooperation and altruism found within most hu-
man societies. Rather than explaining this through genetic changes, one
could argue that human culture, with its ability to differentiate groups
from each other, allowed for the formation of distinct groups that each
have their own norms and cultural practices (see also Henrich, 2004a).
As we have seen above, once stable groups have been formed, altruistic
behavior can be favored within such groups, and the individuals within
such groups will have higher reproductive success compared to members
of other (less altruistic) groups.
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During the Late Pleistocene (126,000–10,000 years ago), members of
Homo sapiens began to create various forms of material culture that, be-
cause of their aesthetic properties and putative symbolic value, are often
referred to as visual art. Unfortunately, the archeological record does not
provide reliable evidence for other forms of art such as music until much
later, namely the recovery of flutes made of bird bone and mammoth
ivory of Aurgnacian sites in southwest Germany, dated at about 36,000
BP (Conard, Malina, & Mu¨nzel, 2009). The evidence for dance can only
be indirectly inferred, from Magdalenian representations of dancers, such
as the dancing therianthropes in the Grotte des Trois-Fre`res, dating to
about 13,000 BP (Clottes, Menu, & Walter, 1990). Because of the poor
archeological preservation of music and dance, we will here concentrate
on visual material culture. The earliest convincing examples of body dec-
oration are in the form of beads made of seashells from Israel and Algeria,
dated to 135,000–100,000 BP (Vanhaeren et al., 2006), shell beads from
South Africa, Blombos cave, dated to 75,000 BP (Henshilwood, d’Errico,
Vanhaeren, van Niekerk, & Jacobs, 2004) and ostrich eggshell beads from
Kenya, dated to 50,000 BP (Ambrose, 1998). For reasons of space and
clarity, we leave aside the engraved ochre artifacts from Blombos and
other South African sites, as their status as art objects is still contested
within the archeological community. (In chapter 7 we will return to these
artifacts for a more thorough discussion on the earliest art.) Figurative
art, such as figurines, painting and engravings, appears somewhat later
still. Although it remains unclear whether cognitive or cultural changes
lie at the basis of this transition, theoretical models (e.g., Powell, Shen-
nan, & Thomas, 2009) indicate that cultural changes brought about by
different patterns of interaction and population density can explain the
emergence of art without the need to invoke new cognitive capacities due
to genetic mutations, moving away from so-called silver bullet explana-
tions. A cultural account of art is also supported by the fact that different
art forms (e.g., musical instruments, beads, rock paintings, engravings)
emerged independently at different time periods across the world, a pat-
tern that cannot be explained by gaps in the archeological record alone
(see section 7.1).
We here propose that some forms of Paleolithic art, in particular mo-
biliary art and body decoration, could have been invented and maintained
as a way to signal group identity which allows for a differentiation between
groups, an essential condition for cultural group selection to occur. We
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will now consider two theoretical models to explain in detail this signal-
ing function of art: green beards and ethnic markers. We will pit these
models against the archeological record to determine how useful they are
for explaining the emergence of some forms of art.
6.2 Green beards
Art may have been used as a conspicuous tag to signal altruism directly.
In theoretical models such tags are often referred to as green beards: if
green-bearded creatures bestow their altruism exclusively on fellow green-
beards, natural selection will promote the presence of the tag as well as the
altruism. This theoretical framework can be easily extended to cultural
evolution. Simulations (e.g., Riolo, Cohen, & Axelrod, 2001) indicate
that cooperation can evolve easily in a population of agents who follow
the simple rule ‘cooperate with others who bear the same tag as you.’
But as Dawkins (1989b) already recognized, green beard altruism can be
undermined by cheaters, who show the tag but are not altruistic. The
inherent instability of green beards has been demonstrated extensively in
models of biological forms of green beard, where the linkage between the
allele that signals the altruism (A) and the allele that codes for the display
of the altruistic trait (G, for green beard) gets disrupted (McElreath
& Boyd, 2007). The possible combinations of such genes in a haploid
organism are summarized in table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Different fitness outcomes of signalers and nonsignalers,
adapted from McElreath & Boyd 2007, p. 202.
Genotype Phenotype Fitness
NN nonaltruist, no green beard w0
NG nonaltruist, green beard pb+ w0
AN altruist, no green beard q(−c) + w0
AG altruist, green beard pb− qc+ w0
Here, fitness outcomes are calculated as follows: genotype NN repre-
sents baseline fitness w0, p is the frequency of altruists in the population,
b is the benefit one receives from an altruistic donor. Given that signaling
nonaltruists NG can always expect to get b, but that they do not incur
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costs c, their benefit is pb + w0. Altruists without signal AN are worst
of, because they never get b but suffer costs c whenever they encounter
a potential recipient who signals, the frequency of which is given by q.
Finally, altruistic signalers AG get benefit pb but also have to pay cost
qc. It is easy to see that genotype NG always has higher fitness than
any other type as long as c > 0 and b > 0. Therefore, any process that
breaks up the association between the tag G and the altruism A can re-
sult in an invasion of NGs, thus eroding the value of the signal. Selective
forces work against the linkage between A and G. This association can
be expressed as D (linkage disequilibrium). If A is associated with G,
D is positive; if A and G are assorted at random, D = 0; and if A is
paired with N , D will be negative. Because NG has the higher fitness, D
will decline, until selection no longer favors the A allele. (Note that the
selective force that breaks the linkage between the alleles coding for green
beards and altruism does not play when green beards are rare alleles that
are good proxies of relatedness. Due to the dynamics of kin selection,
if two organisms who are reasonably closely related have the same rare
marker, they can use this as a reliable indicator of relatedness.)
In cultural evolution, to counter this effect, one can change the tag
regularly. Once a tag becomes too common, the chance increases that
one encounters an organism with the tag but not the altruistic intentions.
This can be mathematically expressed in equation 6.4.
β(pj , qj) =
pq+D
q − p
1− q =
D
q(1− q) (6.4)
Here pj is the frequency of the altruism trait in the donor given the
frequency of the green beard characteristic in the recipient qj , p is the
frequency of altruists in the population, and q is the frequency of green
beards. As mentioned earlier, D expresses the association between green
beard and altruism. One can see that the strength of cultural group
selection through tags is proportional to the amount of D, but inversely
proportional to the variance of the green beard trait—in other words, rare
markers work best. Additionally, green beards can repel cheaters if the tag
is costlier to produce for cheaters than for cooperators. As simulations
(e.g., van Baalen & Jansen, 2003) show, a population of agents that
signal their altruism through green beards can withstand cheaters when
the temptation to cheat is very low, i.e., when the costs of adopting the
tag are very high.
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When we pit these criteria against the archeological record, it seems
unlikely that green beards can be a good model for the evolution of Pa-
leolithic art. As art is not a genetic characteristic, D will not be high
—there is no intrinsic reason why those who make and/or display art
would be more altruistic than those who do not. Therefore, populations
using art as a signal for altruism can be easily invaded by cheaters. Fur-
thermore, as rare markers work best, green beard models predict that the
signal for mutual altruism should be rare and subject to frequent stylistic
turnovers. However, taking taphonomic and other destructive processes
into consideration, Paleolithic art is found in abundance. Next to this, art
styles in the Upper Paleolithic are remarkable stable in space and time:
they are typically in use for several thousands of years with few stylistic
changes over large areas (see section 6.4 for an example). Although mo-
biliary art requires much effort to produce, it can be displayed by anyone.
Several Upper Paleolithic child burials have been found, where the indi-
viduals were covered with hundreds, or sometimes thousands of beads,
each of which took considerable skill, time and energy to make—it seems
unlikely that the children would have produced these beads themselves.
The positioning of the beads suggests that they were attached to cloth-
ing, such as shoes, trousers or parkas, indicating that the children did not
receive them as exceptional grave gifts, but that they were part of their
attire (Vanhaeren & d’Errico, 2005). Clearly, the person who made the
beads, and bore the costs of its production was not always the one who
displayed the tag, and this association is a necessary condition for green
beards to work. It is also not clear how mobiliary art could be less costly
to produce for people who behave altruistically than for those who do
not. In sum, green beard dynamics are an unlikely explanation for the
emergence of Paleolithic art.
6.3 Ethnic markers
Like green beards, ethnic markers are easily recognizable tags that mu-
tual altruists can use to exhibit or infer altruistic intentions. The crucial
difference is that ethnic markers do not signal altruism per se, but provide
information on an agents’ behavior during social interactions; they are a
proxy for social norms and conventions, such as marriage rules, religion,
or moral practices. As social norms and conventions are not readily ob-
servable, arbitrary characteristics, like hair style, dress code or dialects,
6.3. Ethnic markers 169
can provide good indications for them. Meeting an individual with similar
ethnic markers facilitates social interactions which can be conducive to
cooperation. An influential illustration of how ethnic markers can work is
Nettle and Dunbar’s (1997) model of languages and dialects. Their sim-
ulation indicates that individuals with similar languages or dialects can
cooperate better and as a result of this achieve higher fitness. Given a lim-
ited memory-span, artificial agents can withstand invasion from cheaters
who speak the same language, especially given that cheaters need to re-
learn another language each time they are found out and have to move
to another group where they are not known as cheaters.
We will now examine how art could have been used as an ethnic
marker. Cross-culturally, artistic ethnic markers are widely observed.
Examples include decorated functional artifacts, where the style gives in-
formation about the ethnic group the owner belongs to, such as decorated
household artifacts in mixed Phoenician Mediterranean settlements from
the 8th century BCE (Delgado & Ferrer, 2007), and arrow point style as
social information in Kalahari San (Wiessner, 1983). Artistic style en-
ables individuals to distinguish people who belong to the ingroup from
those who do not. Like dialects, artistic styles are difficult to imitate—it
typically takes years for an artist to master a particular style.
Anthropological studies show that hunter-gatherers typically live in
small bands of about 25 individuals (minimum bands); they are highly
mobile within a large territory, moving on when resources are depleted.
During parts of the year when resources are concentrated and abundant,
these small groups aggregate with other bands that share their language,
customs and beliefs. Group size is then between 200 and 800 individuals
(maximum bands), depending on the carrying capacity of the environ-
ment. During such seasonal aggregations, information, gifts and sexual
partners are exchanged (Mandryk, 1993). In the Upper Paleolithic, we see
the alternation between these group sizes in two types of sites: smaller res-
idential sites with relatively little material culture, and larger sites with
high concentrations of material culture. Theoretical models of hunter-
gatherer interactions (e.g., Wobst, 1974) stipulate that minimum bands
are hexagonally arranged across the landscape, thus minimum bands typ-
ically interact with six neighbors. A hexagonal structure is optimal, be-
cause it ensures a maximum level of interconnectedness between different
minimum bands. (In contrast, in a linear structure, any band would
only have about two neighbors to communicate with. Linear structures,
170 Chapter 6. Cultural group selection and art
although often used in mathematical modeling of group dynamics, are
not an ethnographic reality.) These theoretical concepts can be attested:
ethnographically, bands have on average between 5.4 and 5.9 neighbors
(Gamble, 1982, 100). The spatial distribution of minimum bands within
a maximum band is illustrated in Fig. 6.1.
Figure 6.1: A mathematical schematization of the structure of hunter-
gatherer minimum bands within a maximum band.
Altruism within minimum bands is widely attested in the ethno-
graphic record in the form of food-sharing (e.g., Hill, 2002) or alloparent-
ing (e.g., Ivey, 2000). It can be easily explained by two well-established
evolutionary mechanisms: kin selection (since most members of these
small bands are related) and reciprocal altruism (since all members have
social contact on a daily basis). There is also anthropological evidence
that members of maximum bands help each other in times of hardship
(Whallon, 2006). This type of altruism is much more difficult to explain
through biological evolutionary mechanisms, since most people within the
maximum band are not that closely related, and social contact between
them typically takes place sporadically. Thus, kin selection and reciprocal
altruism alone cannot explain why people from different minimum bands
would help members from other minimum bands within the maximum
band.
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From a behavioral ecological point of view, it is easy to understand
why hunter-gatherers who live under marginal or unpredictable clima-
tological circumstances, such as the historical Inuit or Kalahari !Kung,
help each other to lessen the risk of local scarcity. When resources are
unevenly spread in the landscape, small bands will sometimes starve be-
fore they find food. Under very difficult circumstances that are both
cold and dry (the environment typical for Late Pleistocene Europe) it
is not uncommon that 10% of the population dies of starvation each
year (Mandryk, 1993). This is a situation that is characteristic for Late
Pleistocene Europe (126,000–10,000 BP), where people mainly subsisted
on herds of large migrating animals, like reindeer, horse, mammoth and
bison. Under these circumstances, where the main sources of food are un-
predictable and patchy in distribution, inter-group contact and movement
will become increasingly advantageous and necessary. Fruitless (wrong)
moves across the landscape can be lethal, leading to starvation and pop-
ulation decline. Not only do groups need information on where to find
resources, they must also get access to them. These conditions set the
stage for alliance networks between minimum bands, who can through vis-
its, gift-giving and other regular contacts exchange valuable information
on resources, and help each other in times of need. This help can take the
form of passive tolerance, for instance, allowing another group to trespass
on their territory, or can consist of active food sharing (Whallon, 1989).
Social security networks come with a set of defined rights and obligations
that people can exercise when they are in need or that they must fulfill
when others are in distress (Gamble, 1982; Whallon, 1989). Such mu-
tualistic ties are widely attested in ethnographically documented hunter-
gatherers from tundra and arctic environments, such as the Tareumiut
and the Nunamiut Inuit in northwest Alaska (Minc, 1986), and desert and
arid environments, such as the well-known hxaro network of the Kalahari
hunter-gatherers (Wiessner, 2009).
How could such networks be maintained? Although face-to-face con-
tacts can play an important role, they are limited to adjacent local groups,
and cannot be used to establish relationships between individuals from
groups that have little or no previous face-to-face contacts. The use of a
tag turns out to be a stable strategy to signal social security network mem-
bership. The hxaro network of the Kalahari !Kung uses ostrich eggshell
beads as gifts to keep their social security network up to date. Ostrich
eggshell is difficult to obtain, because the eggs are jealously guarded by
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both parents who ferociously defend their brood. The shell is also no-
tably difficult to work: it has to be fresh but nevertheless fractures easily.
Interestingly, ostrich eggshell beads from the Kenyan Middle Stone Age
site of Enkapune Ya Muto are among the oldest examples of uncontested
body decoration, dated to about 50,000 BP. Many of the beads broke
prematurely and were discarded as waste, which shows how difficult it
is to produce them (Ambrose, 1998). Upper Paleolithic Europe saw a
prolific production of beads from mammoth ivory, tooth and shell. In-
terestingly, although some beads were found in burial contexts, most of
them were found in living sites (R. White, 1982). These findings suggest
that beads were part of the everyday attire of European Ice Age hunter-
gatherers. The production of the beads and the acquisition of the raw
materials required effort and time. Experimental archeological studies
(e.g., R. White, 1997) indicate that fashioning one mammoth ivory bead,
as is found in Aurignacian western European sites, takes one to two hours,
and we know from burial contexts that clothing could contain thousands
of such beads (Formicola & Buzhilova, 2004). Next to this, some shell
beads were excavated in sites that are found up to 600 kilometers from
the Atlantic or Mediterranean coasts (Whallon, 2006), indeed indicating
extensive exchange networks across Europe. Such high investments of
time and energy can be explained when one interprets these objects as
ethnic markers.
6.4 The case of the Magdalenian
We will now focus on the Magdalenian, a European cultural complex that
presents a pertinent illustration of how art may have played an important
role in maintaining social security networks. Although the Magdalenian
spanned Europe from the Pyrenees to Poland and Ukraine, its material
culture was remarkably invariant. During the Last Glacial Maximum,
which lasted from about 25,000 to 18,000 BP, temperatures had plunged
and ice sheets had expanded from Scandinavia and the Alps. Most of
Europe was depopulated, because conditions were too harsh for human
subsistence. Only southern France and northern Iberia were hospitable
enough to maintain relatively high population densities19. From these
regions, humans gradually recolonized Europe between 18,000 and 11,000
BP. The recolonization is supported by archeological data, which show
the spread of the Magdalenian, a markedly uniform material culture from
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south of the Loire to a large part of Europe (Jochim, Herhahn, & Starr,
1999). It is also confirmed by analysis of mtDNA sequence variations in
extant European populations which indicate that a population originating
from southern France and northern Iberia spread to central and eastern
Europe about 15,000 years ago (Torroni et al., 1998, 2001; Achilli et al.,
2004). Due to the severe population bottleneck that took place during
the Last Glacial Maximum, about 60 % of the European mitochondrial
DNA lineages (Richards, Macaulay, Torroni, & Bandelt, 2002) and even a
higher proportion of the Y chromosome lineages (Semino et al., 2000) can
be traced back to the Magdalenian recolonization. Figure 6.2 shows the
area of distribution of the Magdalenian, as well as the vegetation types
at the end of the Last Glacial Maximum.
Figure 6.2: Extent of vegetation types at the end of the Last Glacial
Maximum and range of distribution of the Magdalenian, adapted from
Jochim et al. (1999), Fig. 1, p. 131, and from Ray and Adams (2001),
Fig. 7.
Since the Magdalenian spans an enormous geographic area with a
174 Chapter 6. Cultural group selection and art
low population density, we would expect human groups to become iso-
lated, and their art and other forms of material culture to diverge. Local
climates, divergent geography of the areas and types of prey show consid-
erable variability across Europe which again would lead to the prediction
that these groups would diverge. For example, settlements closer to water
relied to an important extent on aquatic food resources, whereas groups
living inland subsisted mainly on reindeer and other large terrestrial mam-
mals, reflected in a larger size of the settlements as preying upon large
herds requires many hunters and can sustain higher population densities.
However, the striking uniformity of the Magdalenian material culture sug-
gests that groups maintained extensive contacts. Cultural innovations
such as harpoons and spearthrowers (the latter already invented during
the preceding Solutrean) were ubiquitous. Also, the frequent occurrence
of exotic shells, amber and nonlocal stones found hundreds of kilometers
away from their place of origin suggests the maintenance of long-distance
exchange networks (Dolukhanov, 1997). The Magdalenian expansion was
characterized by a significant increase in population density. During the
Last Glacial Maximum, the density of sites across the southwest Euro-
pean landscape remained low, suggesting a population size of about 4400
to 5900 individuals. The Magdalenian recolonization led to a marked
increase in site density across western and central Europe, suggesting a
population of up to 28,800 individuals (Bocquet-Appel, Demars, Noiret,
& Dobrowsky, 2005).
Colonizing marginal territory requires extensive social security net-
works, since environmental conditions are unpredictable. Similar mo-
biliary art and body decoration in the form of beads and pendants en-
abled these small bands to maintain contact and to signal membership of
large aggregation bands. Over thousands of kilometres, Magdalenian art
shows striking stylistic similarities, including perforated bone discs with
zoomorphic figures, antler spear-throwers with zoomorphic sculpture, and
hundreds of stylized female figures in profile. These figurines have been
found in a wide geographical area from the Dordogne to Ukraine, as can
be seen in Fig. 6.3. These objects were sculpted from a wide variety of
materials, including flint, bone, ivory and steatite, which all have spe-
cific properties in terms of workability, fracturing and density. Despite
this diversity in raw materials, they are stylistically markedly homoge-
neous, representing stylized women in profile with large buttocks, elon-
gated headless torsos, small or absent breasts, without arms or feet. None
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Figure 6.3: A selection of Magdalenian so-called Go¨nnersdorf-Lalinde
type Venus figurines and their locations.
of the figurines, including those made of flint, show traces of wear, so they
were not used as tools. On the contrary, they often exhibit traces of exten-
sive polishing, which firmly establishes that the artisans and owners were
concerned with their aesthetic properties. The statuettes fall within the
Late Magdalenian, between 16,000 and 14,000 BP (Fiedorczuk, Bratlund,
Kolstrup, & Schild, 2007), a period characterized by population expan-
sion and settlement of humans in large open-air and rock shelter sites.
Long-distance contacts are documented in the transfers of exotic materials
such as Mediterranean shells and Baltic amber found more than 600 kilo-
metres from their places of origin (Gamble, Davies, Pettitt, Hazelwood,
& Richards, 2005). We propose that the abundance of these figurines
within living sites (e.g., more than 20 in Wilczyce, Poland (Fiedorczuk et
al., 2007) alone), the continent-wide adherence to a canon, and the care
with which the objects were made and looked after suggests their use as
ethnic markers. Importantly, none were found in burial sites which indi-
cates they were not associated with particular individuals but rather with
groups. The fact that some of the objects (e.g., in Monruz, Switzerland,
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and Petersfels, soutern Germany) have holes for suspension (Braun, 2005)
strengthens this interpretation, as they were probably worn as necklaces
or other types of body decoration, signaling group identity. As the cli-
mate became milder around 10,000 BP due to the start of an interglacial
period, Magdalenian visual art in all its forms disappeared. Large an-
imals became extinct or rare, and were replaced by smaller game such
as deer, birds and hares, which are more evenly spread across the land-
scape. The risk of starvation became smaller and social security networks
were less essential for survival in this richer environment. There was a
marked decrease in the spread of exotic stone and ornamental materials in
Mesolithic assemblages compared to Magdalenian assemblages (Eriksen,
2002). The lack of material manifestations of social safety nets in the
archeological record during this period supports our hypothesis.
Based on converging lines of evidence, this chapter sketched a cultural
group selectionist model in which Paleolithic mobiliary art and body dec-
oration were used as a signal of membership of mutual altruistic groups.
Archeological and genetic evidence shows that anatomically modern hu-
mans migrated out of Africa during the Last Pleistocene. Around 50,000
years ago, they colonized Australia, including the arid inland with its
inhospitable and unpredictable climate (R. G. Roberts, Jones, & Smith,
1990; Turney et al., 2001). At around 45,000 years ago they expanded
into arctic Siberia (Goebel, 1999). As ethnographic parallels and our case
study of the Magdalenian show, risky and marginal environments can only
be colonized by hunter-gatherer groups if they form social security net-
works. These networks require recognizable ethnic markers in the form
of portable art and body decoration. It is no coincidence that mobiliary
art and pierced shell beads were first made during the last two Ice Ages,
as soon as population density allowed it (first in Africa and later in Eura-
sia), as at least some forms of art can be explained as an adaptive cultural
response to harsh and unpredictable environmental conditions. Mutual
altruism was necessary for Upper Paleolithic European hunter-gatherers,
since they lived in uncertain and marginal environments, where the risk
of starvation was always considerable.
It is important to note that this model was not designed to provide
an all encompassing explanation for artistic behavior, in the sense that
more traditional adaptationist approaches have attempted (see preceding
chapter). Indeed, the fact that art spontaneously arises as a byproduct
of normal perceptual and motivational processes leads us to suspect that
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no silver bullet theory will be able to successfully explain all forms of art
production. Art objects have a diversity of roles and meanings in present
and past human societies, and each of these roles and meanings might
require different explanatory frameworks. The purpose of this chapter
was to examine how some forms of art in a particular context (such as the
mobiliary art from the Magdalenian) could proliferate and be maintained
through cultural group selection.

Chapter 7
A cognitive approach to
the earliest art
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Smedt, J., & De
Cruz, H. (in press d). A cognitive approach to the earliest art. Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
7.1 The problem of first art
Paleolithic paintings, sculptures and engravings are unequivocally rec-
ognized as art: many historical overviews of art (e.g., the widely used
textbook Janson, 2004) start with prehistoric material, usually Franco-
Cantabrian cave paintings from Chauvet, Lascaux, and Altamira. The
recent archeological discovery of older symbolic artifacts may push back
the time when the earliest art appeared. These artifacts include objects in
bone, ochre and ostrich eggshell with geometric engravings from south-
ern Africa, dated to 77,000–55,000 BP, and figurative mammoth ivory
sculptures from Swabia, southwestern Germany (40,000–32,000 BP). The
BBC20, for example, hailed an engraved ochre piece from Blombos Cave
(Fig. 7.7) as “the world’s oldest example of abstract art.” What warrants
the intuition (not only voiced by journalists, but also by archeologists,
e.g., Conard, 2003) that these objects are artworks? After all, the cul-
tural and social contexts of these Ice Age artifacts differ from those of
the modern world, and there are no written records to reconstruct their
meanings and functions.
First art is a theoretical concept that denotes the earliest artworks
within a particular tradition (Davies, 1997). It is doubtful whether there
is a single first artwork. Arguably, multiple artworks qualify as first art:
archeological evidence indicates that some forms of art emerged inde-
pendently at different times across the world, a pattern that cannot be
explained by gaps in the archeological record alone. To give but one
example, figurative painting (Fig. 7.1) appeared significantly earlier in
Europe and (possibly) in Australia than in Africa or East Asia, suggest-
ing that figurative painting may have been invented independently in
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disparate cultures. The oldest figurative paintings in Europe (Chauvet
Cave, France) date to 32,600 BP (Valladas, 2003). Australian rock paint-
ings in the Kimberley region (northwestern Australia) probably predate
40,000 BP21. In Africa, the first figurative rock art, found in Apollo 11
Cave, Namibia dates from between 27,500 and 25,500 BP (Wendt, 1976),
whereas East Asian hand stencils have been dated between 27,300 and
9,900 BP22 (Plagnes et al., 2003).
Figure 7.1: Dates of the earliest rock art in various places across the
globe.
First art presents a puzzle to most recent concepts of art, because
these require cultural contextual information on the function, producers,
and the art critical context in which artworks are made—information
unavailable for Paleolithic art. Did the cave painters of Chauvet, Cos-
quer and Altamira depict large terrestrial mammals and birds mainly as
a source of aesthetic pleasure, a form of art for art’s sake (Halverson,
1987)? Were these paintings primarily meant to be accurate depictions
of animals, similar to instructive illustrations in field guides, used for ed-
ucational purposes (Mithen, 1988)? Or do the cave walls bear evidence of
encounters with the denizens of the spirit world during trancelike states
in shamanic rituals (Lewis-Williams, 2002)? Cluster concepts, as advo-
cated by amongst others Gaut (2005) and Dutton (2006), involve a list of
features that are typical for art objects, but it is unclear which of these
apply to Paleolithic art, e.g., are they expressive of emotion (Gaut), or
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was there anything akin to artistic criticism (Dutton)? Historical defini-
tions (e.g., Levinson, 1993) cannot easily accommodate first art either,
because they have a recursive structure: they define artworks by virtue
of their relationship to earlier artworks, and again, we know nothing of
these. The philosophical analysis of first art presents problems additional
to that of nonwestern art. In both cases, one cannot indiscriminately
apply criteria specific to western art; a focus on western art in aesthetic
theories has left other artistic traditions underanalyzed (Davies, 2000).
Although one can often rely on ethnographic information to get insights
into the function and aesthetic significance of nonwestern art objects, this
information is unavailable for first art.
Yet, as the philosopher of art Stephen Davies (1997, 27) observes,
“our acknowledgement of certain items as first art seems to rest on our
direct recognition of them as such, not on abstract reasoning.” In a
similar vein, the aesthetician Peter Lamarque (2005, 33) reflects that
“what is most striking about all Paleolithic cave painting is the sense
of affinity that modern viewers experience, despite the immense cultural
divide,” even though we have no idea about their cultural meaning. We
readily identify objects from remote cultures and periods as art, and
seem to possess a folk concept of art (see also section 5.1). Just like
humans have had folk concepts of biological species long before the rise of
modern biology, they may have a tacit and inarticulate concept of what
a work of art is like (Osborne, 1981), which guides their identification
of artworks independent of aesthetic theory. This does not imply that
folk concepts are immune to cultural influence. On the one hand, folk
concepts have universal features, like the supposition of internal mental
states that is common to folk psychology across the world. On the other
hand, western folk psychology is arguably influenced by Freudianism (e.g.,
the supposition of a subconscious state of mind), whereas that in China is
influenced by Confucianism (e.g., the importance of ancestry in a person’s
identity). Similarly, the western folk concept of art may be colored by
aesthetic theories, such as in its higher regard for painting and sculpture
compared to other art forms. Yet, although indigenous terms for ‘art’
may be lacking, people across cultures seem to be able to recognize and
appreciate what we would call artworks. Vanuatu tree-fern sculptures
and Ivory Coast masks have a place in western museums and interiors,
and Melanesian (Fig. 7.2) and West African artists incorporate western
media and styles in their work. Were it not for stable human cognitive
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capacities, we would have a hard time explaining the appeal of Lascaux
II, the replica of the Magdalenian cave that attracts thousands of visitors
every year, or indeed the adoption of western techniques and media in
artistic traditions from small-scale societies, like Native American ledger
art (Fig. 5.1)—and vice versa, like the influence of those traditions on
post-impressionists.
Figure 7.2: Eddie Daiding Bibimauri is a Melanesian artist who mixes
western media with traditional themes. The painting, part of a series
of murals called Custom images (1974), depicts a war canoe (note the
traditional imagery like the birds) and shark totem. Plastic housepaint
mural on copra shed, Point Cruz Wharf, Honiara, Solomon Islands. From
D’Alleva (1998), Fig. 118, p. 152.
This spontaneous recognition of artistic behavior across time and
space, back to the Paleolithic, motivates a cognitive approach to art. It
is likely that Paleolithic artists had a mind like ours. For one thing, they
were members of our species, Homo sapiens. Also, archeological evidence
for behavioral modernity, in the form of standardized tools, structured
living spaces, and economic exchange networks, dates back to at least
40,000 BP in Europe (Conard, 2007). In Africa, this transition was prob-
ably earlier and more gradual (McBrearty & Brooks, 2000). As Sterelny
(2008) has proposed, behavioral modernity is likely not a purely psycho-
logical property, but arose as an interaction between human cognition and
culture. (In the next chapter, we will see the importance of material cul-
ture in human cognitive evolution.) A recent computer simulation (Powell
et al., 2009) indicates that fluctuations in Pleistocene demography seem
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to go hand in hand with the archeological appearance or disappearance of
modern human behavior since the existence of anatomically modern hu-
mans. This indeed suggests the importance of social dynamics, including
population density, coalition formation and migration, for the emergence
of behavioral modernity (see also chapter 6). Stable features of human
cognition may explain what is common to art behavior in disparate cul-
tures.
This chapter proposes a cognitive approach to art. Rather than list-
ing features that are characteristic of art objects, we will consider what
cognitive processes are typically involved in the recognition of objects and
performances as artworks. The shift in focus from art objects to cogni-
tive agents is motivated by naturalistic theories that propose that art is
a product of normal human perceptual and motivational processes (see
sections 5.2 and 5.4 for a discussion of these theories). These theories
provide a fruitful framework to approach art production and apprecia-
tion with methods from cognitive psychology. From this point of view,
artworks do not form an exceptional category of objects, but rather, they
are products of cognitive capacities that are present in all neurologically
healthy humans. The ubiquity of art across cultures, the universal hu-
man ability to recognize and appreciate it, and the early and spontaneous
emergence of artistic behavior in child development—as is evident in an
early disposition to draw, sing, dance, play word games (Dissanayake,
2000)—suggest that producing and enjoying art may be a stable part of
the human cognitive repertoire. This cognitive approach allows us to in-
clude artworks from distant places and cultures, even from those we know
virtually nothing about, like material culture from the Paleolithic.
7.2 Cognitive requirements for art
In terms of conceptual analysis, a cognitive approach to art provides a
set of higher-order criteria that need to be satisfied so that artworks can
be created and recognized. In other words, it concentrates on abilities
that are necessary to create and understand art, not on any features
that define the objects themselves. This approach can be situated within
the abilities view of concepts, a philosophical theory that argues that
concepts are not definitions but abilities that are specific to cognitive
agents (see e.g., Millikan, 2000). According to a descriptivist theory of
concepts, having the concept cat requires one to list features typical
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of cats, like furriness, triangular ears, and a long tail. By contrast, the
abilities view argues that agents who possess the concept cat do not have
to provide a definition of what cats are, but rather, that they are able to
recognize cats from non-cats with fair reliability under a broad range of
conditions (Millikan, 1998). Likewise, having the concept art entails the
ability to recognize art in a wide variety of circumstances. Additionally,
it enables one to make meaningful inferences about artworks one has
not encountered previously, and to guide actions like art production or
art criticism. Regarding the concept art as an ability can provide a
solution to the problem of borderline cases, since the ability need not be
infallible. After all, a child who can identify specific cats, like a Siamese
behind a window, or Misty, the neighbor’s tabby, with fair reliability has
the concept cat even if she is puzzled by ocelots or wildcats. Similarly,
borderline cases like found art or chimpanzee paintings can challenge the
expertise of art critics, but it would be far-fetched to conclude from this
that said critics do not have the concept art. According to the abilities
view, having the concept art does not require that one is able to list
any properties of art, but rather that one is able to identify particular
instances (artworks) that fall under this concept’s extension. The abilities
view allows for concepts to be inarticulate and tacit, as seems to be the
case for the folk concept of art.
To identify which cognitive processes are required for art production
and appreciation, this chapter will draw on theories, experimental results
and empirical evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neu-
roscience. (The use of developmental studies does not mean to imply that
Paleolithic artists were like children. Rather, the results of developmental
psychology point to stable features of human cognition that robustly arise
early in development.) Although art production and recognition require
a wide range of cognitive skills (e.g., semantic memory, visual or audi-
tory perception), we focus on those skills that we believe typify behaviors
related to art. They include the design stance (the recognition of inten-
tionality), symbol-mindedness (the realization that something represents
something other than itself) and aesthetic sensitivity (the qualitative ap-
preciation of perceptual stimuli). We then examine to what extent these
processes played a role in the production of Paleolithic artifacts, in par-
ticular figurative sculptures from southwestern Germany and engraved
objects from southern Africa, using methods from cognitive archeology.
A cognitive approach to art can draw meaningful links between Pale-
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olithic and contemporary western and nonwestern art, despite the widely
diverging cultural and social contexts in which these objects were made.
7.2.1 The design stance
Artworks are almost invariably products of human intentional actions.
This forms the basis of Jerrold Levinson’s intentional-historical theory
of art (1993), which conceptualizes artworks as those entities that have
been successfully created with the intention that they be regarded in a
certain way, namely the way in which prior artworks have been correctly
regarded. The developmental psychologist Paul Bloom (1996) has ex-
tended this concept to artifacts in general. He argues that manufacturing
and understanding artifacts is governed by an intuitive design stance—
humans are guided by the inferred intentions of the designer when they
categorize and name artifacts. One can infer that a schooner in a bottle
belongs to the category of ships, even though the object is not seaworthy,
because one can infer from its shape that the maker intended it to repre-
sent a ship. Also, we still see a broken chair as a chair, even though it may
no longer fulfil its function (see also section 9.2.1). Levinson (2007) has
objected to this extension of his intentional-historical stance to artifacts
in general, because it places artworks on a par with other artifact kinds,
and does not seem to reserve a special place for artworks. However, if
we conceptualize art in terms of its constituent cognitive abilities, this
is not a serious objection, since there is no a priori reason why humans
would not draw on cognitive capacities that are used in other domains
when reasoning about or creating artworks. Consequently, to gain a bet-
ter understanding of how intentionality plays a role in art production
and evaluation, it is useful to examine how humans infer design, and how
creator and artifact are causally linked.
The design stance emerges early in ontogeny, and it is a characteristic
feature of children’s art. Although they are not skilled artists, toddlers
name their drawings using the same terms as the real-world objects that
capture their interest, such as ‘house’ or ‘daddy’. These early works are
similar to those of adult artists in that both skilled artists and young
children take an intentional perspective toward categorizing and naming
their artworks (see e.g., Fig. 7.3 for an example of this). When one asks
three-year-olds to draw a picture of a lollipop and a balloon, these two
drawings look virtually identical. Yet the subjects will consistently refer
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Figure 7.3: Mommy (left) and daddy (right). Although the drawings
do not resemble what the child depicted, the two-and-a-half-year-old who
drew this consistently referred to the drawings as what they were intended
to represent. Drawing by author’s daughter.
to the pictures according to what they intended to depict when they pro-
duced the drawings (Bloom & Markson, 1998). Also, like adults, children
as young as two years are guided by the intention of the maker when
they name pictures that hardly resemble what they depict. When they
witness an adult drawing a circle that could be either of two unfamiliar
disc-shaped objects, they take the gaze direction of the artist as a cue for
which of the items is drawn. The toddlers reliably point at the object the
adult was looking at when asked which object was depicted (Preissler &
Bloom, 2008).
These and other studies suggest that foreknowledge about the in-
tentions of the maker is a critical feature in our evaluation of artifacts.
Gelman and Bloom (2000) showed children and adults a variety of objects,
but subjects were divided into two groups, each of which got distinct ac-
counts of how the objects came into being. For example, in the case of an
irregular-looking stone object, the unintentional version said that some-
one smashed a piece of rock in a fit of rage. In the intentional account,
subjects heard how an agent carefully chipped pieces off the rock. Only
the children and adults who heard the latter version called the object
7.2. Cognitive requirements for art 187
a sculpture. This indicates that our appreciation that something is an
artwork is substantially driven by our beliefs about its genesis, not only
by its perceptual characteristics. This is also detectable at the neural
level: when subjects believe they are listening to a piece of music that
was written by a composer, activation patterns in their brain look very
different from those of subjects who listen to the same piece that they
believe is computer-generated. The first group of participants, but not
the latter, exhibit a high activation in brain areas that are involved in
the attribution of mental states and the inference of intentions of others
(Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2009). The experimental evidence indicates that
the design stance is an important element of art appreciation. Although
one can never claim with absolute certainty whether or not the Iliad was
intentionally created to be a work with literary qualities, we can reason-
ably infer this from formal properties of the work, such as its elaborate
language and extended imagery (Levinson, 1993).
7.2.2 Symbol-mindedness
Humans today are immersed in a world of visual markings, such as ara-
bic digits, letters, and pictures, in the form of advertisements, documents
and traffic signs. Our fluency with these representations makes it hard to
realize the complex cognitive processes involved in their interpretation.
In order to make and understand artworks, one must be able to decouple
the symbolic meaning of an artwork and the material it is made from.
Understanding this decoupling between the meaning of an object and its
medium constitutes a necessary condition for symbolic thought. For in-
stance, in order to interpret Rousseau’s Surprise (Fig. 7.4), one needs to
realize that the painting itself is made of canvas, covered with oil paint,
but that it represents a tiger in a stormy tropical landscape. Given that
in this case referent and symbol are so much alike, some might not even
consider the tiger to be a symbol at all. For the purpose of this chap-
ter, we will not draw fine-grained distinctions between symbol, token,
etc., but use Judy DeLoache’s (2004) psychologically motivated concept
of symbol, according to which a symbol is something that someone in-
tends to represent something other than itself—nothing is inherently a
symbol, but only becomes so by virtue of an intentional act. This rel-
atively simple working definition presupposes fairly complex skills: next
to an understanding of the dual nature of a symbol as both object and
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representation of something other than itself, it requires the recognition
of intentionality and design. The decoupling of the material nature of a
symbol and its referent emerges early in development. Controlled exper-
iments have shown that infants prior to 18 months treat pictures much
as if they were real objects, attempting to pick a photograph of a toy
off the page, or to put on pictures of shoes (DeLoache, Pierroutsakos,
Uttal, Rosengren, & Gottlieb, 1998). By the second year of life, however,
children can interpret pictures correctly, point to them and name them,
and pay more attention to their meaning than to their shape (Preissler
& Bloom, 2007). Two-year-olds were shown a picture of an unfamiliar
looking artifact which was called a ‘wug’. When asked to give the ex-
perimenter a ‘wug’, the children gave the experimenter an object that
resembled the depicted object. However, when asked ‘look at the pic-
ture, can you give me another one?’ the children gave the experimenter
another picture with a dissimilar looking object. Such studies indicate
that by the age of two, children can flexibly switch between the material
nature of a symbol and its referent.
Figure 7.4: Henri Rousseau, Surprise! (1891). Understanding this
painting requires the ability to decouple materiality (oil on can-
vas) and inferred intended meaning (representing a tiger in a land-
scape). From http://free1000s.blogspot.com/2008/06/rousseau
-henri-surprise-1891.html.
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Although representational visual art is not produced in all cultures,
several empirical studies have shown that people unfamiliar with figura-
tive representations can recognize and even produce them spontaneously.
An early study (Hochberg & Brooks, 1962) focused on a western child,
brought up without exposure to any pictorial representations, such as pic-
ture books, television or figurative wallpaper. At 19 months, the boy was
able to recognize and reliably name line drawings of his toys and common
household objects. Deregowski, Muldrow, and Muldrow (1972) showed
line drawings of complex scenes, such as a hunter stalking a goat, to mem-
bers of an Ethiopian culture without pictures or drawings. Again, these
subjects recognized and named the depicted objects correctly. Martlew
and Connolly (1996) asked children from a Papua New Guinean culture
without figurative art or access to photography to draw a man. Although
the children had never produced drawings before, they drew recognizable
anthropomorphic figures. These studies indicate that people are proba-
bly naturally endowed with an ability to recognize iconic representations
for what they depict, and that cultural exposure is not necessary for its
development. Art critically depends on this pre-existing ability, as even
most nonplastic arts require the ability to make a distinction between
medium (e.g., sound waves or moving limbs) and what it represents, such
as the moods expressed in a piece of instrumental music, like the tra-
ditional Chinese guqin piece A drunken fisherman sings in the evening,
where the plucking on pentatonically tuned strings is meant to juxtapose
the tranquillity of rustic life with the rowdiness of the drunken fisherman.
We can safely infer that early representational artworks are about
something, i.e., that they are meant to symbolically convey something
other than themselves—it seems reasonable to suppose that a small Pale-
olithic sculpture that has the shape of an ibex actually represents an ibex.
Thus, among archeologists and cognitive psychologists, the presence of fig-
urative art is universally regarded as evidence for symbolically-mediated
behavior (e.g., Deacon, 1997, 374–375). As we will see, there is more con-
troversy about the symbolic meaning of nonfigurative designs. In order
to be of methodological interest, a concept of symbol should not be so
broad as to include all objects that have some ornamental or aesthetic
value (Currie, 2004, chapter 12), yet not so narrow that all forms of non-
iconic representation are a priori excluded. Deloache’s (2004) definition
of symbols is productive in this regard, since it also allows for non-iconic
symbols. Shell beads, for instance, can be symbolic, provided that they
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encode social meaning (e.g., when they are used as ethnic markers), but
not if they are merely used as body-decoration.
7.2.3 Aesthetic sensitivity
Many authors take aesthetic appreciation to involve the sensory and quali-
tative appreciation of artworks and other objects, yielding a distinct sense
of pleasure. Like in other animals, the human nervous system is wired
in such a way that some forms of sensory input appear to us as more
striking and pleasing than others. Artworks capture our attention pre-
cisely because artists that created them have unconsciously homed in on
propensities of the human nervous system (Zeki, 1998; Cavanagh, 2005).
Given that our senses are constantly bombarded by impressions, the ner-
vous system needs to prioritize some cues over others (Ramachandran &
Hirstein, 1999). Barry (2006) argues that aesthetic preferences find their
origin in the brain’s reward system, which guides attention to relevant
perceptual input, i.e., perceptual input that is likely to yield informa-
tion that is relevant to survival and reproduction. (For a more detailed
discussion of the cognitive neuroscience of art, see section 5.2.)
While this evolved function provides a plausible explanation for why
humans are capable of aesthetic experience, and which aesthetic criteria
are likely to be more culturally widespread than others (see section 5.4),
it does not imply that all pleasurable sensations are aesthetic responses.
Still, if correct, this theory could explain why at least some forms of art
are particularly salient across cultures, such as the representation of the
human face in masks, portraits, and busts, as argued in section 5.4.
7.3 Cognitive capacities and the earliest art
In the previous section, we outlined three types of cognitive processes
that play a role in the production and appreciation of art. By focusing
on human cognition, Paleolithic artworks can be understood as products
of the same kinds of cognitive processes that still give rise to art today.
In order to allow for an in-depth discussion, this chapter will examine
two case studies: mammoth ivory sculptures from Swabia, Germany and
engraved objects from southern Africa.
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7.3.1 Sculptures from southwestern Germany
As we have seen, archeologists universally accept the emergence of rep-
resentational art as proof of symbolically-mediated behavior. The earli-
est uncontested figurative representations found to date are small mam-
moth ivory figurines from Swabia, southwestern Germany, that represent
animals, therianthropes (half-human, half-feline creatures), and humans
(Fig. 7.5). They are dated to 40,000–32,000 BP, and belong to the Au-
rignacian cultural complex, the oldest Homo sapiens culture in Europe
(Conard, 2003). These objects are unequivocally the result of intentional
design. This can be inferred from the highly complex shapes, and the
resemblance to objects in the real world, mainly mammoths, horses, and
carnivores. Several of the objects are pierced, presumably to be sus-
pended as personal ornaments. The sculptures are made of mammoth
ivory, a material that is notably difficult to work due to its growth rings
(Fig. 7.6). Their production required considerable expertise with ivory
and its fracturing properties, and a great investment of time—using only
materials that were available at the time, it took an experimental arche-
ologist 27 hours (R. White, 2005) to copy the 5 cm-long horse figurine
from Vogelherd (Fig. 7.5d). The artifacts were finished with incisions and
polished with hematite, an effective metallic abrasive that is still used by
contemporary ivory carvers (R. White, 2005). Although mammoth tusks
are large, most figurines are tiny, no more than 5 cm across. We can infer
that the objects were made with much care and attention to detail.
The easily recognizable depictions, the attention with which they are
finished, and the consistent style (preference for ivory as material, small
size) indicate a fully developed design stance. Given that most objects
resemble entities in the world, we can be fairly certain that the makers
imbued them with symbolic meaning. At the very least, the mammoth-
shaped figurine (Fig. 7.5b) was intended to represent a mammoth. Next
to this, it may have had other symbolic meanings as well (e.g., endurance,
power), but we know none of these. The sculptures are rich in relevant
details, including the hump on the mammoth’s shoulder (Fig. 7.5b), the
horse’s arching neck (Fig. 7.5d), and the protruding breasts and buttocks
of the female figurine (Fig. 7.5f), while less telling details, like hands and
feet are underplayed. Interestingly, 15- to 18-month-olds gain most infor-
mation from pictures that are rich in relevant details. They can trans-
fer this knowledge to objects in the real world: detailed pictures, but
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Figure 7.5: Mammoth ivory figurines from Swabia, Germany. (a) theri-
anthropic figure from Hohlenstein-Stadel; (b) mammoth, (c) feline head
and (d) horse from Vogelherd; (e) waterfowl and (f) female figurine from
Hohle Fels, Figs. a–e are redrawn from http://www.ice-age-art.de/;
Fig. f is redrawn from (Conard, 2009).
not schematic depictions, enable them to learn the names and properties
of novel objects or animals they never encountered in the real (Ganea,
Pickard, & DeLoache, 2008). Moreover, three-year-olds find prototypical
images more useful as symbols than less prototypical ones (Allen, Bloom,
& Hodgson, 2010). This may explain why Paleolithic animal imagery
tends to represent animals in profile, the way they are most recogniz-
able, not unlike the widespread use of animal profiles in natural history
books. This strongly indicates that the Swabian figurines were intention-
ally made to symbolically represent the real-world objects they resemble.
Many of the objects have geometric engravings, including crosshatchings
(Fig. 7.5c), parallel lines (Fig. 7.5a) and chevrons (Fig. 7.5f). The stability
of these motifs across the figurines may suggest that they had an addi-
tional symbolic meaning, the code of which is lost. The therianthropes
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Figure 7.6: Mammoth ivory tusk. When sculpted injudiciously, there is
a realistic chance that the ivory crumbles off at any of the growth rings
(author’s photograph).
form a special case, since their referents are non-existing entities. The the-
rianthropes from Hohlenstein Stadel (Fig. 7.5a) and Hohle Fels probably
represent religious agents, as many cultures know supernatural entities
that are part human, part animal.
What about aesthetic value? Although the Swabian sculptures look
alluring and beautiful to us today, there is no guarantee that they had the
same effect on their Pleistocene makers. Even within western culture, the
aesthetic appreciation of Paleolithic art has been variable. As recently as
1972, the paleoanthropologist Gustav von Ko¨ningswald (cited in Nelson,
1990) proposed in earnest that the Gravettian Venus figurines, which
are now uniformly praised for their charismatic beauty, were grotesques
carved with the purpose to scare intruders away. Nevertheless, there
is some reason to believe that the Swabian figurines were made with
the intention to be aesthetically appealing. Our main motivation for
this is the choice of the material, mammoth ivory. Interestingly, the
Aurignacians did not use ivory to make tools, for which they preferred
stone, bone and antler, but exclusively reserved this material for beads
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and sculptures (R. White, 2004). Together with the technical difficulties
involved in the working of ivory, this suggests that it was a choice material,
maybe also because of its specific sensuous lustre. The fact that the
makers or the owners polished the sculptures carefully, and used special
material to do so, further supports this hypothesis.
7.3.2 Engraved artifacts from southern Africa
Let us now examine whether engraved ochre and ostrich eggshell objects
from the Middle Stone Age (MSA, a Homo sapiens African culture) might
qualify as the oldest forms of non-representational art. They date be-
tween 77,000–55,000 BP. As evidence for symbolic and artistic behavior
is markedly rare prior to 40,000 BP (R. White, 2005), claims for non-
representational art before this date need to be treated with caution. To
see whether these engraved objects might indeed qualify as art, we will
examine whether they were deliberately designed, had symbolic meaning
and appealed aesthetically to their contemporaries.
Figure 7.7: SAM-AA 8938, engraved ochre piece from Blombos cave,
ca. 77,000 BP, 5.4 cm long, from Henshilwood et al. (2002), Fig. 2, p. 1279.
The term ‘engraved’ already carries an inherent implication of de-
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sign, and indeed some of the markings look convincingly intentional. The
best-known exemplar is SAM-AA 8938, an engraved ochre piece from
Blombos Cave, dated to ca. 77,000 BP (Fig. 7.7). It appears to show
a crosshatched design, consisting of two series of parallel lines that are
intersecting, bounded top and bottom by long horizontal lines and di-
vided through the middle. However, most other engraved objects from
Blombos look far less spectacular, as shown in Fig. 7.8. In order to as-
sess whether the makers had an intentional design in mind, the shape of
the objects alone does not provide enough information. Blombos Cave
yielded 8224 pieces of ochre; among this plenitude only 15 bear incisions.
The majority of these incised ochres show signs of grinding (as can be
seen for example on Fig. 7.7), and most are intentionally knapped or bro-
ken (Henshilwood, d’Errico, & Watts, 2009). Experimental studies (e.g.,
Wadley, 2005) demonstrate that ochre is an effective binding agent for
adhesives, in particular, to haft stone or bone points onto wooden shafts.
Many MSA points have ochre and plant residues on their ends, indicating
that they were hafted by mastic that contained ochre, and bound with
twine (Lombard, 2007). This implies that at least some of the engravings
on ochre may have been byproducts of functional processes. On the other
hand, despite their rarity, engraved artifacts are found in several southern
African MSA sites, suggesting that they may be part of a regional tradi-
tion (Cain, 2006). These objects bear non-representational incisions, and
are of durable but soft materials. Microscopic analyses (e.g., Mackay &
Welz, 2008) suggest that some of the markings are deliberate, not merely
byproducts of functional activities. An ochre piece from Klein Kliphuis,
for example, has several crosshatched lines, almost perpendicular to each
other. Each of these lines is the result of multiple incisions by the same
tool—the best explanation for this is that the maker intended to draw
these particular lines. The engravings on SAM-AA 8938 were made using
the same procedure, as can be seen on Fig. 7.7.
The fact that the engravings were deliberate does not entail that they
were symbolic. As virtually anything can be a symbol, and as in principle
there are no limitations to what a symbol might refer to, it is difficult
to assess this archeologically. For example, small variations in functional
stone blades might have had symbolic meaning (e.g., provide information
about group membership), but this would be impossible to confirm with-
out cultural background information. The incision patterns on the these
MSA artifacts may well be the result of the scoring of ochre fragments for
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Figure 7.8: Engraved ochre pieces from Blombos cave, all dated ca. 77,000
BP, from Henshilwood et al. (2009), (a) Fig. 3 (p. 31), (b) Fig. 4 and (c)
Fig. 5 (p. 32), (d) Fig. 6 (p. 33), (e) Fig. 11 (p. 36).
testing their suitability as hafting agent. Of course, these explanations
(functional and symbolic) need not be mutually exclusive: a person may
have started scoring ochre to test how it crumbled, but gotten caught up
in this act and developed the strokes into an appealing design.
Even if the design is deliberate, this still does not mean it is symbolic,
as modern telephone-pad doodling aptly illustrates (Davis, 1986). Let us
assume for a moment that the engraved pieces are symbolic. The question
is then, why are they so rare? After all, symbolic cultures, even those
with sparse material culture teem with symbolic artifacts. The archeol-
ogist Chester Cain (2006) suggests that the marked artifacts might have
served to affirm personal identity. Hunter-gatherers like the Kalahari
!Kung typically live in egalitarian communities, where food and other
resources are shared equally among members. In order to differentiate
themselves from others, some members of these groups make personal
art objects (Wiessner, 1983). These objects are typically rare, vary in
quality (since the artists are not specialists), and are stylistically and ma-
terially diverse—properties that fit the engraved MSA artifacts. If Cain’s
hypothesis is correct, then the marked artifacts would indeed have had
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symbolic meaning. However, the !Kung are but one small-scale society,
and it would be mistaken to take them as a model for all African Stone
Age cultures. Consider the following ethnoarcheological parallel. The
archeologist Robert Gunn’s (2007) analysis of scratchings in Australian
aboriginal rock art reveals that these highly variable motifs are mainly
a result of spontaneous scribbling, with little or no symbolic meaning,
mainly serving as a creative outlet for the individual, not unlike doo-
dling. Thus, Henshilwood et al.’s (2009) characterization of the MSA
ochres as symbolic seems premature.
One potential line of evidence for symbolism is the existence of en-
during or repeated designs (conventions) that change or get replaced over
time. Using this criterion, a more convincing case for symbolism can
be made for engravings found on 270 ostrich eggshell fragments from
Diepkloof Rock Shelter, dated to 65–55,000 BP (Texier et al., 2010), a
selection of which is shown on Fig. 7.9. These fragments were likely parts
of flasks that were used for storing and transporting water—some of the
pieces exhibit evidence of a circular punctured opening on the apical side
of the eggs. Ostrich eggshell containers are still used by southern African
hunter-gatherers today (Wannenburgh, Johnson, & Bannister, 1999, 30).
Many small-scale societies use stylistic abstract elements on functional
objects like basketry, weaponry or pottery as a way to denote ownership,
group membership, gender or social status (David, Sterner, & Gavua,
1988; Hegmon, 1992). These elements encode social meaning, hence are
symbolic. The eggshell fragments bear a limited number of recurring
motifs, including hatched bands (Figs. 7.9a and 7.9c) and parallel lines
(Fig. 7.9b). These motifs suggest a degree of standardization: the hatched
band motif, for example, always began by the long parallel lines, followed
by engraving of the shorter, perpendicular lines. A diachronic change in
the designs can be observed: the hatched band pattern is only found in
the lower layers of Diepkloof, and is absent in its upper levels, where it is
replaced by the parallel line motif (Texier et al., 2010). Both the limited
number of designs and the cultural evolution manifest in this site stand
in stark contrast with the variable Blombos material, where no recurring
motifs can be discerned. Given the clear imposition of recurrent design
and the difficulties associated with engraving eggshell (which is prone to
fracture, Ambrose, 1998), it seems unlikely that these designs were spon-
taneous scribbles. The Diepkloof eggshells are therefore more plausible
(although not indubitable) candidates for symbolic material culture in
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the MSA than the Blombos ochres.
Figure 7.9: Ostrich eggshell fragments from Diepkloof Rock Shelter, dated
to 65–55,000 BP, from Texier et al. (2010), Fig. 1, p. 6181 (redrawn by
author).
As the extensive media coverage of the South African material shows23,
it has an obvious aesthetic appeal to us. How can we assess whether it
held the same appeal to MSA people? The fact that many of the Blom-
bos ochres are red implies to some archeologists (e.g., Henshilwood et al.,
2009, 43; Conard, 2005, 310) that they were intentionally picked out for
their color, which would have had not only aesthetic value but also sym-
bolic meaning. However, the redder ochre is, the higher its iron content,
and the higher the iron content, the better it makes bone or stone points
stick to wooden shafts, as it critically contributes to the homogeneity of
the adhesive (Wadley, 2005). Moreover, in extant small-scale societies
red ochre is also used for tanning hides, as an insect repellent, or for
medicinal purposes (see e.g., Wadley, Williamson, & Lombard, 2004, for
an overview), although it is unclear whether Pleistocene hunter-gatherers
used it as such. Therefore, the selection of red ochre could have been for
functional, rather than aesthetic or symbolic purposes, though one does
not exclude the other—there is no way to make it out.
The MSA engravings are geometric, mostly consisting of straight lines.
Geometric designs are a pervasive element of Paleolithic art. They fea-
ture on most of the Swabian figurines, and are found alongside many
animal paintings in Franco-Cantabrian cave art (Lewis-Williams, 2002).
Did straight lines appeal aesthetically to Paleolithic people, as they did to
more recent artists like Mondriaan or Malevich? As we have seen in sec-
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tion 5.2, according to the cognitive archeologist Derek Hodgson (2006),
the pervasiveness of geometric motifs across human cultures from the
earliest art onward can be explained by the fact that such designs evoke
strong responses in our early visual system. Orientation-selective cells in
the primary visual cortex (area V1) respond strongly to straight lines,
especially horizontal and vertical ones. Does the fact that geometric de-
signs appeal aesthetically to us imply that the MSA engraved objects
were intended to be aesthetically pleasing? After all, some of the regu-
lar geometric designs on younger African artifacts have been interpreted
as calendrical notation systems (e.g., Marshack, 1991a). But, as we will
see in chapter 8, in those cases, notches are grouped into sets that have
some numerical correspondence to lunar cycles or other seasonally re-
curring events. The older MSA material does not show this systematic
grouping, making a notational interpretation unlikely. It seems therefore
reasonable to infer an intended aesthetic value for the Diepkloof ostrich
eggshells, especially given that their geometric designs show a high degree
of standardization, being stably reproduced for long periods of time. The
Blombos material is more idiosyncratic: if it appealed aesthetically to its
engravers, this did not lead to a widespread adoption of designs in the
community.
7.4 Concluding remarks
What guides our spontaneous recognition of some Paleolithic artifacts
as artworks? Cognitive archeology, developmental psychology or eth-
noarcheology by themselves may not be enough to shed light on the
problem of Paleolithic art, but the consilience of inductions from these
disparate domains may lead to a coherent philosophical picture of first
art. This approach allows for a relatively fine-grained conceptual analysis
of artworks. Because it does not require culture-specific contextual infor-
mation, it can be extended to the study of first art. Underlying our ability
to recognize art are three cognitive abilities: the design stance, symbol-
mindedness and aesthetic sensitivity. By conceiving art as an ability that
is present in all neurologically healthy humans, it is possible to trace
continuities between early artworks and art today. In this context, it is
meaningful to say that the Swabian ivory sculptures and perhaps also the
more elaborate among the southern African engraved objects, especially
the decorated eggshell flasks from Diepkloof, are artworks.

Chapter 8
How material culture
extends the mind: The
case of time-keeping
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Smedt, J., & De
Cruz, H. (in press c). The role of material culture in human time represen-
tation: Calendrical systems as extensions of mental time travel. Adaptive
Behavior.
8.1 Introduction
Ever since Darwin, comparative psychologists have considered the prob-
lem of the apparent mental discontinuity between humans and other ani-
mals. Why are humans, more so than other animals, capable of advanced
cognition? Some authors (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; A. Clark & Chalmers,
1998) have suggested that a distinctive feature of human cognition is
its interaction with the external environment. Humans rely heavily on
environmental support such as books, electronically stored documents,
nautical slide rulers, or simply pen and paper to delegate computational
problems to the external world. How can we properly gauge the influence
of artifacts in reasoning processes? Empirical investigations of the role
of material culture in human cognition involve well-controlled conditions
in which cognitive performance aided by external tools is pitted against
purely internal mental operations. Kirsh and Maglio (1994), for example,
compared the performance of subjects playing Tetris who were allowed
to physically rotate blocks to fit them into the slots to players who were
forced to mentally rotate them. The former performed faster and made
less mistakes. However, participants in studies like these are typically
western college students, who are thoroughly enculturated into a world
filled with artifacts that serve epistemic purposes, including banknotes,
signposts, and nutritional information on packaging. It is no exaggeration
to say that we inhabit a world that is primarily made up of our own cre-
ations, and many of these play a role in our cognitive lives. This makes it
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difficult to experimentally assess how unaided cognition (the naked brain)
compares to externally aided cognition, or to examine the effects of mate-
rial culture on human cognitive evolution. Some authors have developed
computational models that examine how the use of the external environ-
ment can reduce cognitive load. Chandrasekharan and Stewart (2007),
for example, have constructed a simulation where agents can learn to
lower their cognitive load by generating task-specific external cues, such
as using their own tracks. This chapter will take a qualitative approach,
concentrating on material culture used in epistemic contexts from extant
small-scale societies with sparse material culture and prehistoric cultures,
where people had not amassed such a vast body of epistemic artifacts (i.e.,
artifacts that help us think).
The aim of this chapter is to develop an account of interactions be-
tween internal human cognitive abilities and external media based on
findings from developmental and cognitive psychology, anthropology and
cognitive archeology. It will argue that artifacts such as calendars extend
evolved cognitive abilities by allowing humans to accurately predict cycli-
cally occurring events. The term ‘calendar’ is here used in a broad sense,
as a shorthand for any artificial memory device that helps to recognize
and record temporal events, such as astronomical or environmental ob-
servations. Calendrical notation systems are an illuminating case study,
because they do not physically alter the environment, but render it more
cognitively congenial. They do not increase the number of potential prey
in a territory; however, they enhance foraging success, amongst others
by predicting animal migration events, and by allowing people to make
preparations and arrangements in advance, thereby saving time and re-
sources. As will be demonstrated, evolved human cognitive capacities
that deal with time are limited in their ability to recognize cyclical events
in the environment in a way that a coupled cognitive system, consisting
of a calendar and interpreting humans, is not.
The chapter begins with an examination of cognitive mechanisms for
keeping track of time that are naturally available to humans, focusing
on mental time travel. Cognitive psychological evidence indicates that
mental time travel is a highly constructive process that is liable to dis-
tortion. As a result, the naked human brain cannot accurately predict
cyclical occurrences such as animal migration events or the fruiting of
plants. Next, anthropological examples will illustrate how humans rou-
tinely supplement their evolved mechanisms for keeping track of time
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with material objects (both natural events and especially designed epis-
temic artifacts). We then argue that the extension of mental time travel
by material culture dates back to the late Middle Stone Age in Africa
and the Upper Paleolithic in Europe, and illustrate this with examples
of material culture interpreted by archeologists as calendars. It will be
shown that the emergence of the earliest unequivocal epistemic artifacts
in the archeological record coincides with marked improvements in forag-
ing efficiency. The chapter concludes by outlining possible ways in which
the claims put forward here could be tested using analytic and compu-
tational modeling, and by considering implications of the case study for
philosophical concepts of extended cognition.
8.2 Cognitive processes underlying the perception of time
8.2.1 Salient systems of time processing
The natural world is filled with temporal regularities, which organisms are
adapted to exploit. Timing enables animals to anticipate opportunities
and risks, which greatly improves their chances of survival. Multicellular
organisms are equipped with circadian rhythms, internally generated 24-
hour cycles (Antle & Silver, 2005). For shorter durations ranging from a
few seconds to a few hours, animals rely on interval timing, which enables
them to optimize their foraging behavior in terms of time and energy
costs (Bateson, 2003). Some species possess highly specialized abilities
to keep track of somewhat longer spans of time. Male house mice, for
instance, kill any neonate in their territory, except when they have mated
18 to 22 days before. During this period, when the possibility exists that
the neonate is their offspring, they switch to nurturing behavior. This
hormonal mechanism enables house mice to detect relationships between
events widely distributed in space and time (fertilization and birth) that
could never be perceived through associative learning alone (Kummer,
1995).
The Earth’s yearly orbit around the Sun produces seasons, cyclical
climatic changes that have a high impact on animal fitness. Seasonal fluc-
tuations in temperature, food availability and predation pressures pose
challenges to survival and reproduction. Consequently, many species have
acquired seasonal behavioral and physiological adaptations, such as mi-
gration, seasonal mating, hibernation and changes in pelage or plumage.
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In many cases, these adaptive responses are directly triggered by environ-
mental fluctuations. Nevertheless, as many shifts in behavior would occur
too late if they were a direct response to environmental factors, there is
intense selective pressure on the capacity to anticipate seasonal changes
—if squirrels waited to store nuts until the onset of winter, their caches
would be insufficient to help them through winter. As a result, several
vertebrate species use predictive cues—usually the duration of daylight
per day—as a proxy for seasonal changes (Paul, Zucker, & Schwartz,
2008).
Some animal species can anticipate future events that are highly vari-
able and hard to predict from external cues alone, using past experience
as a proxy for the future. Western scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica)
cache both perishable (e.g., larvae) and non-perishable (e.g., seeds) food-
stuffs. Under experimental conditions, their recovery of previously stored
items shows sensitivity not only to what type of food was cached but also
where and when it was stored, enabling them to prioritize perishable items
(Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). Moreover, these corvids also appear to be
able to anticipate the future: they flexibly adapt their caching behavior
to future needs, such as preferentially caching food in a room where they
foresee they will be hungry the next day (Raby et al., 2007). This ability
to take into account future events independent of current motivations is
rare in the animal world, and can plausibly be explained as the result
of selective pressures that are associated with food caching. A compar-
ative study (Stevens, Rosati, Ross, & Hauser, 2005) with two types of
New World monkeys indicates that feeding ecology indeed exerts con-
siderable selective pressures on an animal’s ability to take into account
future events. Marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), which feed on tree exu-
dates, require patience to wait for sap to exude from the trees, whereas
tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), whose diet is composed mainly of insects,
perform more quick, impulsive actions. As a consequence, marmosets are
willing to wait much longer than tamarins to obtain a larger food reward.
One can glean from these examples that ecological conditions and feeding
behavior are important factors in shaping cognitive processing of time.
8.2.2 Episodic thinking and mental time travel
Since current and historical human populations, including hunter-gatherers,
horticulturalists, fishers and farmers, rely on food that is seasonally vari-
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able, one can expect that Homo sapiens has cognitive adaptations that
allow for the recognition of temporal regularities of the environment. Hu-
mans are equipped with circadian rhythms and interval timing. Next to
this, they rely on past experience to simulate future events. This ability
is termed episodic thinking or mental time travel. Episodic memory (see
Tulving, 2002, for review) refers to our capacity to remember personally
experienced events and to mentally travel back in time to re-experience
those events; it is distinct from semantic memory, which stores factual
knowledge about the world. The ability to travel mentally into our ex-
perienced past is supplemented by episodic future thinking (Atance &
O’Neill, 2001), a capacity to project oneself into the future to simulate
possible scenarios, enabling one to foresee possible future consequences
of one’s current behavior, or to make preparations in anticipation of a
planned activity.
A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that episodic memory
and episodic future thinking are subserved by the same neural mecha-
nisms. Their onset during cognitive development is synchronous. Episodic
memory arises gradually between three to five years of age (Perner &
Ruffman, 1995). Although younger children’s rapidly expanding lexicon
indicates that they have an excellent semantic memory, they seem unable
to store long-term autobiographical memories. For example, when taught
a novel fact (e.g., a new color name) or skill, three-year-olds believe that
they have always possessed this knowledge; the realization that this is not
the case only emerges between four and five years of age. The ability to
travel mentally into the future follows a similar developmental trajectory
(Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 1997): given the choice between a small
immediate reward and a larger delayed reward, only children of four years
and older forgo immediate gratification and choose the delayed one.
More direct evidence that episodic memory and episodic future think-
ing are subserved by the same neural circuits comes from neuropsychol-
ogy. An fMRI study by Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2007) found that
imagining future experiences or recollecting vivid memories activates a
similar network of brain regions, including the left hippocampus and pos-
terior visuospatial regions like the right middle occipital gyrus. Hassabis,
Kumaran, Vann, and Maguire (2007) examined the ability of amnesic
patients with focal hippocampal damage to imagine fictitious autobio-
graphical experiences, such as visiting a museum or sunbathing on a
tropical beach. Their subjects showed a seriously compromised ability
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to make vivid, detailed and sensory descriptions of imagined experiences.
Presumably, episodic memory and episodic future thinking are subserved
by the same neural correlates because they share similarities in terms of
their underlying psychological mechanisms. Both are constructive pro-
cesses, which require a system that flexibly recombines bits and pieces
of information from various sources. Therefore, we shall refer to episodic
memory and episodic future thinking collectively as ‘mental time travel,’
following Suddendorf and Corballis (1997). The likely adaptive function
of mental time travel is not to recollect past events per se, but to enable
one to anticipate and predict future events on the basis of past expe-
riences. According to Suddendorf, Addis, and Corballis (2009, 1319),
episodic memories provide a vocabulary from which one can construct
possible scenarios, which can be compared in order to optimize future be-
havior. Its combinatorial flexibility allows one to predict the consequences
of events that one has never experienced, leading to the prediction that
pickled herring with chocolate is a challenging combination of tastes, or
that a naked dance in front of one’s superior will get one fired, unless one
is a professional pole dancer.
8.2.3 Mental time travel as a human cognitive specialization?
Since Suddendorf and Corballis (1997) suggested that the ability to travel
mentally in time is a uniquely human cognitive specialization, compara-
tive psychologists have developed experimental paradigms to investigate
this capacity in nonhuman animals. To date, the strongest candidate
is the Western scrub jay: as mentioned earlier, members of this species
appear to remember where and when they previously cached food-items.
However, their mental time travel seems to be highly domain-specific,
only concerned with the caching and retrieval of food, whereas human
mental time travel is domain-general: we are able to reminiscence or an-
ticipate upon virtually any aspect of our personal lives, be it food, social
encounters, or weather circumstances. While Clayton, Bussey, Emery,
and Dickinson (2003) argue that the ability of scrub jays to remember
the what, where and when of caching events is similar to human mental
time travel, Suddendorf et al. (2009) contend that it does not follow that
these animals actually mentally reconstruct the event of caching.
Nevertheless, the accuracy of some nonhuman animals is superior to
that of humans—whereas scrub jays can cache food based on future needs
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irrespective of current utility, humans exhibit systematic errors in predict-
ing the consequences of their actions. The latter are driven by current
feelings of hunger or satiation to predict future appetite: hungry sub-
jects are more likely than satiated participants to choose a high calorie
snack to eat at a distant point in the future, and hungry people mistak-
enly expect to like eating spaghetti for breakfast the next day (Gilbert,
Gill, & Wilson, 2002). If there is indeed a qualitative difference between
mental time travel in humans and memory in some nonhuman species,
it remains unclear what this difference might be. As will be argued, an
underexplored possible explanation is that humans, unlike other animals,
routinely supplement their episodic thinking with material culture.
Given that episodic memory and future thinking are constructive pro-
cesses, it is not surprising that they are liable to distortion. Mental time
travel involves the simulation of future experiences through past events,
leading to the omission of inessential features, the abbreviation of the
simulated event (which is, of course, less long than the true event), and
the absence of context. Indeed, episodic memory retains only informa-
tion that is likely to be needed for future reference—we rarely need to
remember all the exact details of our experiences. For example, people
typically remember their worst train-missing experience when simulat-
ing how painful and inconvenient a next train-missing experience will be
(Morewedge et al., 2005). These puzzling features of episodic recall can
be explained by the hypothesis that mental time travel does not serve
the adaptive function of a disinterested representation of true events, but
that it allows for simulations that guide action in adaptive ways. Over-
estimating the discomfort of an unpleasant experience may help us avoid
that situation in the future. Adaptive as this may be, it poses severe
limitations on the reliability of our long-term episodic memories. Numer-
ous experiments (e.g., Marsh & Tversky, 2004) show that even vivid and
confident episodic memories are vulnerable to distortion. Retelling per-
sonal recollections typically involves exaggerations, omissions, and sim-
plifications to entertain or help the audience better understand. Under
controlled experimental conditions, biased retellings of incidents alter the
memories one has of these events (Tversky & Marsh, 2000); they rou-
tinely become part of one’s own episodic recall, replacing more accurate
memories.
People can also be induced to remember personal experiences that
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abeth Loftus and co-workers gave participants descriptions of childhood
experiences provided by family members, and encouraged them to re-
member these (see Loftus, 2003, for an overview). One of these stories
was actually a pseudo-event that had never taken place (e.g., getting lost
in a shopping mall at age five and eventually being rescued by an elderly
person). About 25% of participants claimed to ‘remember’ this traumatic
childhood experience, often adding embellishing details to their accounts.
As Loftus (2003, 872) puts it “the story creates a memory rather than
the other way around.” Precisely because narratives require subjects to
generate their own details, they encourage false memories. Memory dis-
tortion can thus be seen as part of the adaptive operation of a healthy
memory system.
8.3 Material culture and internal time representation
Animals regularly modify their external environment in order to reduce
the number and cost of mental operations. For example, ants mark paths
from food-sources to the nest with pheromone trails (Jackson, Holcombe,
& Ratnieks, 2004), because it is easier to follow a pheromone trail than
to store and compare landmarks, which places high demands on visual
memory (Judd & Collett, 1998). Kirsh (1996) terms such actions epis-
temic actions, because they are not aimed at bringing about physical
goal-directed changes in the environment, but rather at making it more
cognitively congenial. Drawing a map, for instance, does not physically
alter the environment, but makes it easier to navigate—one does not
have to level the terrain or cut trees to get a comprehensive overview.
Humans rely on external cognitive resources to a considerable extent—
they fashion tools that are explicitly aimed at fulfilling epistemic needs.
One need but think of instruments, such as compasses or thermometers,
which allow for accurate measurements, external memory storage in texts
or diagrams, or objects that otherwise lighten cognitive load, like tallies
or calculators. Such epistemic artifacts—which are made to serve epis-
temic purposes—are a distinctive feature of human cognition. Nonhuman
animals sometimes use objects for epistemic purposes. An example is the
female gorilla observed by Breuer, Ndoundou-Hockembal, and Fishlock
(2005) that probed the depth of a pool with a stick before deciding to
cross it. (This is an especially intriguing example, since gorillas usually
do not use tools.) More recently, Wimpenny, Weir, and Kachelnik (in
8.3. Material culture and internal time representation 209
press) used a controlled experimental condition to elicit epistemic tool
use in New Caledonian crows, a species that often uses tools for prag-
matic purposes (see also section 1.1). The authors presented the birds
with unfamiliar objects, to wit rubber snakes and rubber spiders, stimuli
that elicit spontaneous fear reactions in many animals. Wimpenny et al.
(in press) observed eight occasions in which first contact with these novel
objects was mediated by a stick, suggesting that the stick was used for
the exploration of the unknown items. To our knowledge, however, no
animal has ever been observed to make tools (i.e., intentionally modify
objects) primarily for epistemic purposes.
The use of external media is not limited to contemporary societies,
but seems to be a pervasive element of human cognition at least since the
Late Pleistocene (ca. 120,000 BP). From this period onward, archeologists
find shell beads, notched pieces of ochre and bone, and—somewhat later
—representational art, demonstrating that humans conveyed ideas exter-
nally in symbolic media. Some authors have proposed to incorporate this
extended cognition as a key element in human cognitive evolution. The
cognitive neuroscientist Merlin Donald (1991) views the evolution of hu-
man cognition as stages in which new memory representations emerged;
the final stage is marked by the use of material culture as a way to ex-
ternally store symbolic information. The cognitive archeologist Steven
Mithen (2000) argues that the emergence of modern human behavior
during the past 100,000 years was not so much due to intrinsic changes in
brain organization as to the emergence of cultural practices that incorpo-
rate artifacts into reasoning processes, like the use of representational art
as memory storage devices. The cave paintings of Lascaux (Dordogne,
France, about 18,600 BP), for instance, can be seen as mnemonic devices
that display animals with their feet turned toward the spectator, which
allowed the artists to depict the shape of the hoof prints of particular
prey species, such as bison and horse (Mithen, 1988). In this way, future
hunters could learn the connection between spoor and prey. To Mithen
(2000, 214), artifacts are especially suitable to represent ideas that have
“no natural home within the mind,” such as religious beings. Since re-
ligious agents are not obviously physically present, thinking about them
is often structured by artifacts, like paintings, masks, or sculptures. The
next sections will examine how humans also rely on their external envi-
ronment to complement their evolved capacity for mental time travel.
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8.4 Extending the mind to increase memory capacity
As we have seen, future events are rarely replicas of past ones—a con-
structive episodic memory, which retains a gist of what has happened is
therefore more flexible than a hypothetical memory that would store rote
records of the past. But this means that mental time travel falls short
of accurately predicting long-term cyclical occurrences. Annual phases
in the life cycle of animals and plants, such as spawning migrations of
fish or the fruiting of trees occur reliably in the same seasons. Being
able to predict these events would have dramatically improved foraging
success in prehistoric hunter-gatherer communities. A clear example is
Late Pleistocene Europe, where humans primarily relied on animal pro-
tein for their diet. Fatty meat is much higher in caloric content than
lean meat, but wild mammals are lean most of the year and only store
fat during specific phases in their life cycle. Reindeer, an important pre-
historic food-source, store fat during the late summer and early autumn.
During the rutting season (in the late fall), they quickly lose this fat and
only regain it by next summer (R. D. Guthrie, 2005, 74). Cave paintings
in Lascaux, Niaux, and other Late Pleistocene Franco-Cantabrian sites
indicate that hunter-gatherers were sensitive to these seasonal changes,
as they frequently depict reindeer with exaggerated humps of fat (Delluc
& Delluc, 2006). Hunter-gatherers who tuned their migrations to coin-
cide with those of the reindeer during early autumn could maximize their
energy intake by hunting this prey species.
Moving away from high latitudes, the arid Australian inland, which
was colonized by humans as early as 50,000 years ago (R. G. Roberts et
al., 1990), provided dramatic challenges in terms of seasonal availability
in food, water, shelter and artifact-making materials. Rainfall is sparse
and seasonal, and the onset of seasons is highly variable. As a result, Aus-
tralian nonhuman vertebrates have developed a wide variety of adaptive
responses. For example, the freshwater turtle Chelodina rugosa lays eggs
in low-lying areas during the wet season. The embryo only begins to de-
velop once the egg is exposed to the air which permits a synchronization
of the organism with external conditions (Shine & Brown, 2008). Hu-
mans do not have such specialized physiological adaptations to variable
events; their internal memory likewise seems insufficient to allow storing
fine-grained details like co-occurrences of subtle seasonal changes with
phases in animal life cycles. Humans equipped with nothing but their
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naked brains are thus unable to reliably predict such cyclical occurrences.
Since distorted retellings corrode episodic memories, and narratives can
induce false memories, sharing reminiscences with a wider audience does
not increase their dependability. Caspari and Lee (2004) have explained
the Upper Paleolithic symbolic revolution mainly as a consequence of
increased human longevity. They argue that intensified oral intergenera-
tional transmission of complex cultural information may have contributed
to the innovations associated with behavioral modernity. Some compu-
tational models (e.g., Di Paolo, 1997) indeed indicate that increases in
communication improve the transmission of skills. However, as we have
seen, experimental psychological evidence strongly suggests that episodic
memories are susceptible to distortion through retelling, leading to the
prediction that distributing cognition through oral communication alone
may be insufficient to transmit some forms of complex cultural informa-
tion. Especially if information is transmitted over many generations, it
may get distorted through retelling, or may simply be lost through gaps
in the transmission process. Thus, one can expect that the use of epis-
temic artifacts markedly improved the conceptual stability of transmitted
representations.
Anthropological investigations of recall in non-literate societies pro-
vide evidence for this crucial role of externally stored information. Aus-
tralian aboriginals use multiple strategies to remember and transmit knowl-
edge of the local geography, such as the presence of water-sources, which
are crucial for their survival. They associate oral narratives with partic-
ular places in the landscape, the Dreaming24—their natural environment
thus becomes an epistemic aid. Crucially, several of these stories are
recorded as dot paintings on bark (Sharifian, 2003) or as rock paintings.
In this way, collective memory can stretch far back indeed. For exam-
ple, a relatively recent Australian engraving in the Weaber Range of the
Keep River (Northern Territory) features the track of Genyornis newtoni,
a large emu-like bird that went extinct by about 40,000 BP (Fig. 8.1a)
(Ouzman, Tac¸on, Mulvaney, & Fullager, 2002). Given that humans colo-
nized Australia at least 50,000 BP (R. G. Roberts et al., 1990), humans
and Genyornis co-existed for thousands of years. Australian aboriginals
may well have hunted these flightless birds to extinction, as they did
with many other large species like giant kangaroos and marsupial car-
nivores in the period between 46,000 and 40,000 BP (R. G. Roberts et
al., 2001). Other examples include an ochre rock painting of a marsupial
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lion (Thylacoleo carnifex), as shown on Fig. 8.1b (Akerman & Willing,
2009), and the depiction of a hitherto unknown species of extinct giant
stripe-faced flying fox in the Kimberley Region (northwestern Australia),
shown on Fig. 8.1c (Pettigrew, Koerner, McPhee, & Wallman, 2008).
The Dreaming teems with zoomorphic ancestors, many of which have the
shape of members of the Australian megafauna that went extinct during
the Late Pleistocene. Ouzman et al. (2002) speculate that interactions
with these animals have been passed down through oral history, with the
aid of imagery such as the engraved bird track. The continuity of Aus-
tralian megafauna in Dreaming stories today indicates that this tradition
emerged between 50,000 and 30,000 BP. It seems unlikely that such rec-
ollections would have been kept vivid without external memory storage
(in casu rock art), which helped to bring to mind the physical properties
of these beings. In stark contrast, the memory of Australian aboriginal
forebears is notably shallow: people tend to remember ancestors only as
far back as their grandparents. An important reason for this brief re-
call is that information about persons is not stored materially, but only
orally recounted. During retellings, this information is habitually edited
and reformulated to match the fluid social relationships between different
families within these small-scale communities, where coalitions are often
shifting (Sansom, 2006). By contrast, in nonliterate cultures where ge-
nealogical recall is vital for the local political and social order, material
culture serves to store genealogical knowledge. The Luba from Congo
use flat wooden boards studded with pins and beads to teach neophytes
about historical events, such as migrations and royal genealogies. The
shape, colors and spatial configurations of the pins and beads help them
to accurately remember and transmit these events. Interestingly, many
of the elements presented in their oral history are also found in the arche-
ological record of Luba kingdoms which stretches back to more than 1500
years (Nooter Roberts & Roberts, 1996).
8.4.1 Material anchors and epistemic artifacts
In disparate cultures, people keep track of cyclical events by extending
their evolved internal timing mechanisms into the world, i.e., they use
cyclical natural events as material anchors. Obvious candidates are the
phases of the Moon. They are easy to observe, but synodic (phase cy-
cle) lunar years are about 11 days shorter than solar years, which would
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Figure 8.1: Australian rock art depictions of extinct species that are still
part of the Dreaming today. (a) Track from an extinct bird, Genyor-
nis newtoni, undated engraving, Northern Territory, from Fig. 1, p. 104,
Ouzman et al. (2002); (b) extinct marsupial lion, Thylacoleo carnifex,
undated ochre painting, Kimberley region, from Fig. 1, Akerman and
Willing (2009); (c) extinct giant flying fox of unknown species, sub-order
Megachiroptera, undated ink painting, Kimberley region, from Fig. 2,
Pettigrew et al. (2008).
soon lead to an accumulation of errors rendering lunar calendars use-
less for the purpose of tracking seasons. The epistemic role of material
anchors is aptly illustrated by the Borana lunar calendar and its calibra-
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tion to prominent star clusters (Bassi, 1988). The Borana from northern
Kenya and southern Ethiopia use synodic lunar months to construct their
calendar. This calendar is of vital importance to their subsistence and
ceremonial activities, and is regulated by ayantu, experts on sky observa-
tion. To calibrate it, the ayantu add an intercalary month approximately
every three years. Their decision to add an extra month is solely based
on astronomical observations, namely when the Moon rises in conjunc-
tion with a particular succession of reference stars on successive nights.
Borana astronomers make multiple night sky observations, formulating
hypotheses about the future behavior of celestial bodies and testing them
on observations the following nights. The star clusters play an impor-
tant epistemic role, as they are the sole guides in the ayantu’s decision
to add the extra month. By using astronomical observations, the Bo-
rana can oversee a period spanning three years, which would otherwise
be impossible within this nonliterate society.
Horticulturalists from the Torres Islands of Vanuatu (Melanesia) tra-
ditionally calibrate their lunar calendar to seasonal events. The appear-
ance of a ubiquitous sea-worm, palolo, in October marks the planting of
yam and other garden crops. The metamorphosis of a local species of ant
into its winged phase, vu¨horo, in January serves as a marker for the end
of the planting cycle (Mondrago´n, 2004). Next to this, many aboriginal
groups associate the ripening of particular fruits or occurrences of spe-
cific animals with the arrival of particular constellations. For example,
in Arnhem Land, Australia, the harvesting of reeds to make fish-traps
commences when Arcturus is seen in the eastern sky at sunrise (Haynes,
1992). Material anchors need not be restricted to the visual modality.
Aboriginal inhabitants of Queensland, Australia, know that when the
black beans are ready to eat, it is time to hunt jungle fowls (Clarke,
2009). The Andaman Islanders knew a calendar of scents: the distinct
succession of odors in the densely covered jungles was used to mark differ-
ent periods of the year (Radcliffe-Brown, 1922). The Yanyuwa from the
southern Gulf of Carpentaria, northern Australia, use a wind calendar to
identify their five seasons: changes in intensity, humidity and direction of
local winds are used to optimally time fishing, and gathering eggs, buds
and nuts (Clarke, 2009). In all these cases, the timing of cyclic activities
(such as hunting, weeding and harvesting) is rendered more optimal and
reliable by tying it to cyclical occurrences in nature.
Next to natural material anchors, humans across the world draw on
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especially designed artifacts to keep track of cyclical events. Artifacts
have the advantage that they are less constrained by processes in nature,
thereby further enhancing the stability of the representation of cyclical
events. The Mandan (a Native American Great Plains culture) recorded
lunar phases as rows of crescents onto sheets of paper. Some of these are
accompanied by plant symbols, indicating a record of planting and har-
vesting (Thornton, 2003). The stick-calendars in the shape of hexagonal
prisms of the Yakut, a subarctic Siberian culture subsisting on hunting,
gathering and herding reindeer, show two months along each edge, incised
with day units (Marshack, 1991b). Several days on the Yakut calendar
bear signs to mark seasonal events (e.g., the flowering of certain plants),
astronomical observations (e.g., the appearance of the Pleiades, impor-
tant in their shamanic rituals), as well as Christian (Orthodox) holidays.
In Chankillo, Peru, a megalithic calendar of 2,300 years old, consisting of
13 aligned towers, was calibrated to the winter and summer solstices. The
towers and gaps in between enabled tracking the progress of the Sun to
within an accuracy of two or three days (Ghezzi & Ruggles, 2007), which
was vital for agriculture in this arid region that lies in the rain shadow of
the Andes.
8.5 Evidence for the extended mind in the archeological
record
Artifacts like shell beads, notched bones and ochre plaques represent the
earliest concrete evidence for storage of symbolic information outside of
the human brain. Here, we discuss direct and indirect evidence that
suggests that during the Late Pleistocene humans started to use mate-
rial culture to store cyclical events externally, and that this was one of
the factors that had a significant impact on human foraging success. As
reviewed above, the human brain is not naturally equipped to recall cycli-
cal events. Cross-cultural evidence from non-literate societies shows that
people rely on material anchors to remember such events accurately. On
the basis of this, one can expect the appearance of artifacts that were
used to keep track of time to coincide with improved foraging success.
The next sections will discuss several material devices that were used by
Pleistocene hunter-gatherers to keep track of time, focusing on incised
bone and antler objects, and rock art. Next, we indicate changes in hu-
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man behavior during the same period that suggest an improvement in
foraging efficiency.
8.5.1 Incised bone and antler objects
Upper Paleolithic bone and antler objects with regular incisions have been
recovered since the 1860s. The fact that they have ordered sets of notches
or incisions indicates that these artifacts were used to represent numeri-
cal information. Marshack (1972) proposed the influential hypothesis that
many of these objects were lunar calendars. His conclusion that notched
bones represent the first human notation systems has gained general ac-
ceptance in the cognitive archeological community. However, he assumed
that these notched artifacts always reflected a long term, cumulative,
sequential notation, a view that is now called into question. Based on
microscopic analysis, the cognitive archeologist Francesco d’Errico (1998)
developed a theoretical framework and an explicit methodology for eval-
uating the manufacturing process of incised bone objects. When mor-
phologically resembling tools were used and abandoned subsequently, the
accumulation of the engravings was probably gradual, similar to a tally-
stick. If, in contrast, morphologically distinct burins were used simulta-
neously (like on the antler plaque from Abri Blanchard, see below), one
can infer that the artifact was conceived as a whole, representing different
items with different symbols, as is the case in a calendar. The code for the
symbols is lost, as we do not have enough information about these prehis-
toric societies to find out what they meant. However, from ethnographic
parallels we can infer plausible functions of these objects.
One of the oldest probable lunar calendars is an antler plaque from
Abri Blanchard, France, dated to about 32,000 BP. This object was more
than a simple tally (counting a number of past nights); it was made with
the intention of being a time-keeping device: a recent detailed formal
analysis of the artifact (Je`gues-Wolkiewiez, 2005) reveals that its maker
prepared the surface carefully with a set of notches at the edges, form-
ing a rough coordinate system, to plot his or her inscriptions. One of
its sides is engraved with some 70 morphologically differentiated cavities
that resemble successive phases of the Moon, the serpentine trajectory of
the notches reflecting the actual position of the spring Moon in the sky
in the Dordogne region upon setting. In this way, the Abri Blanchard
plaque is a hybrid representation, depicting both the phases of the Moon
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and its position in the sky (Fig. 8.2): the differently shaped notches in-
dicate phases of the Moon, as well as its position. The dates on Fig. 8.2,
(based on current astronomical observations in the region) are those cor-
responding to the current position of the Moon. Four cavities to the left
and two cavities to the right of the serpentine are separated from the
other cavities by fine lines. Je`gues-Wolkiewiez (2005, 57–58) speculates
that these are probably mistakes that have been noticed by the engraver,
hence separated from the main drawing.
Figure 8.2: Antler plaque from Abri Blanchard. Note the notched edges,
which provide the coordinate system. Drawing based on Figs. 1 (p. 44),
3 (p. 46) and 13 (p. 54) from Je`gues-Wolkiewiez (2005).
Some Paleolithic notched artifacts show pictorial images, which may
hint at the meanings associated with the notations. The antler baton
from Cueto de la Mina (Fig. 8.3), Spain, dated to the Late Magdale-
nian (about 12,000 BP), presents several sets of notches, which are made
with different angles, pressures and directions, suggesting a code based
on morphological differentiation. Each of these sets is accompanied with
a different image: two schematic ibex or chamois heads and at least four
kinds of plants in different stages of growth (Marshack, 1972). Many
hunter-gatherer cultures use plants to predict seasonal changes in rainfall
and temperature (see e.g., Clarke, 2009, for a discussion of plant-based
calendars in Australian aboriginal societies). Pleistocene hunter-gatherers
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may also have used plants in this way, recording their different stages of
growth as a means of time keeping (see 1-4 and 7 on Fig. 8.3). Like in the
Mandan and Yakut calendars, these icons were probably used to mark
seasonal events. Interestingly, archeological analysis of the site (Baxter,
2001) suggests that Cueto de la Mina was an aggregation locale, a place
where hunter-gatherer groups annually came together to exchange food,
sexual partners and technological skills—the temporal animal and vege-
tative clues (when did these animals migrate, when were these plants in
these particular stages of growth) on this antler piece may have facilitated
this.
Figure 8.3: Antler baton from Cueto de la Mina. It has several sets of
notches that are associated with images of plants (1–4, 7) and two animal
heads, probably ibexes or chamois (5, 6). Redrawn from Marshack (1972,
p. 456, Fig. 15).
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8.5.2 Rock art
Next to incised bone and antler objects, Paleolithic rock art also served
as artificial memory system for storing ecologically relevant information
about seasons. Rock art often emphasizes information useful to hunters,
such as the exaggerated representation of fat deposits on horses and au-
rochs, or the depiction of footprints of prey species in lieu of hooves
(Mithen, 1988). As a detailed analysis by Delluc and Delluc (2006) shows,
rock art from well-known Franco-Cantabrian sites like Chauvet, Lascaux
and Niaux is rich in seasonal information. Lascaux and Niaux (French
Pyrenees, about 12,890 BP) have depictions of horses in different sea-
sons. Horses in summer dress are heavy, with short, light fur, whereas
those in winter pelage are typically leaner, with a longer tail and manes,
and darker, scruffier fur (Fig. 8.4). Most large herbivores are pictured
in their specific winter or summer appearances; for instance, reindeer are
shown in summer dress, with large antlers and fat deposits. Additionally,
some rock paintings in Lascaux show mating behavior that is restricted
to early spring, such as two bison bulls intimidating each other and a stal-
lion closely following a mare. We are not claiming that these paintings
were used as calendars; rather, we argue that one of their functions was
probably mnemonic, by visually representing what prey species look like
in specific seasons.
Next to large terrestrial herbivores, Upper Paleolithic artists also de-
picted birds. In historical times, the mating and migration behavior of
geese, ducks and sea mammals served as cues for seasonal changes to
Northwest Coast Native Americans and Inuit (Freeman, 1967). The use
of these animals as temporal cues by contemporary hunter-gatherers sug-
gests that their representation served as external storage of cues for sea-
sonal changes. d’Errico’s (1994) detailed analysis of a scene depicting
three birds identified as great auks (Pinguinus impennis) at the Cosquer
cave (Bouches-du-Rhoˆne, France) supports this interpretation (Fig. 8.5).
The pigments of this rock painting were directly dated to about 26,400 BP
(Clottes et al., 1992), but recent developments in C14 calibration methods
push this back to 32,000 BP (recalibrated using Fig. 2, p. 932 in Mellars,
2006). These large, flightless, now-extinct birds seasonally flocked to form
large breeding colonies on offshore islands. This behavior was restricted
to early summer, when mating occurred, eggs were hatched and chicks
raised.
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Figure 8.4: Horse in summer pelage from Lascaux (left): note
the light fur, thin mane, and heavy underbelly. Also note
the grass in full seed, which gives an additional indication
of summer, from http://www.elissa.weichbrodt.org/wp-content/
uploads/2007/12/lascaux horse.jpg; horse in winter pelage from Ni-
aux (right): this animal is leaner, has noticeable thick fur and scruffy
manes and tail, from http://www.theartsdesk.com/images/stories/
TV/ismene brown/Niaux horse.jpg.
The scene shows three individuals, two facing each other with wings
outspread, and a third, lying down with wings folded. As in all Alci-
dae, the great auk’s wings were useless for flight; they were only used
during swimming or in combat for mates, when they were vigorously
flapped. d’Errico (1994) interprets the opposing pair as males in combat,
the third bird as a female they are disputing. A less gladiatorial inter-
pretation (McDonald, 1994) is that the upper individuals are foraging
underwater (swimming is indicated by their outspread wings), and that
the lower individual represents their single chick (auks laid only one egg
per season and both parents raised the offspring). Whichever interpreta-
tion one favors, it is important to point out that the scene shows gregar-
ious behavior in auks which was seasonally restricted to early summer.
The conspicuousness of large breeding colonies on nearby islands may
have been useful for prehistoric hunter-gatherers as a material anchor for
seasonal events related to the beginning of summer. Rock paintings de-
picting this behavior may thus have served as artificial memory systems
to recall and communicate its significance as a temporal marker. A rock
engraving with a comparable function (Fig. 8.6) has been identified in the
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Figure 8.5: Scene depicting three auks at the Cosquer cave. This
scene shows gregarious behavior, which was seasonally restricted to early
summer. Figure from http://www.bradshawfoundation.com/cosquer/
cosquer2.php.
Elvina track engraving site at Ku-ring-gai Chase National Park, 20 km
north of Sydney. This engraving of a large bird represents the Emu in
the Sky, a common Australian aboriginal term for the cloud of interstellar
dust close to the Southern Cross. Interestingly, the engraved bird only
aligns with that constellation during early autumn, at just the time of
year when real-life emus are laying their eggs (Norris & Hamacher, 2009).
Great auks went extinct around 1844. Because they usually returned to
the same location to breed, they easily fell prey to sailors and fishermen
who captured them in large quantities during their breeding season for
meat, fat and feathers. Auk bones are also present in numerous Upper
Paleolithic Mediterranean sites, indicating that prehistoric hunters also
regularly included these birds in their diet.
Contemporary and historical small-scale societies often rely on star
clusters as an aid to keep track of time. The Iroquois and the Algo-
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Figure 8.6: Emu in the sky, rock engraving from Ku-ring-gai Chase Na-
tional Park, Australia, figures from http://www.atnf.csiro.au/
research/AboriginalAstronomy/Examples/emu.htm (left) and
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/2591889/posts (right).
nquians (both Native American peoples) used the Pleiades to time the
cultivation of their staple food, maize, which was grown at the northern
fringes of the range in which it is possible to cultivate it. The appearance
of the Pleiades coincides with the then limits of the frost-free periods
of sowing and reaping (Ceci, 1978). The pervasive role of the Pleiades
in folk astronomy (in places as widespread as East-Africa, Melanesia,
North America and Siberia) can be explained by their visibility: to the
naked eye they form the most visible cluster of stars in the night sky
with a marked cyclicity. The archeoastronomer Michael Rappenglu¨ck
(2001, 2004) has recognized the Pleiades on paintings of the caves of La-
Teˆte-du-Lion (Arde`che, France, 21,000 BP) and Lascaux, indicating that
Paleolithic people used this easily recognizable star cluster, probably also
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for calendrical reasons.
8.5.3 Improved foraging success
In what ways does the use of epistemic artifacts extend human cognition?
Although cognition itself does not fossilize, one can infer changes in cog-
nition through changes in behavior which leave their marks in the fossil
and archeological records. Many archeologists (e.g., Klein, 2001) observe
a discontinuity in subsistence patterns and other forms of behavior dur-
ing the Late Pleistocene. In the archeological record, there is evidence
for behavioral innovations in diverse domains during this period. Techno-
logical innovations included the invention of highly specialized weaponry,
such as harpoons and spear throwers, and improvements in lithic technol-
ogy, such as the invention of microliths, which had a much higher ratio
of cutting edge versus tool weight compared to earlier stone technology
(Leroi-Gourhan, 1993, 136). In the European archeological record, there
is also clear evidence that Middle Paleolithic (MP) hominids hunted and
gathered less efficiently than those of the Upper Paleolithic (UP). Im-
provements in technology can partly account for this increased efficiency.
However, there is also evidence that the increased effectiveness in forag-
ing was due to a better recognition of cyclical events. Take the transition
from MP to UP in the southern Russian plains. In marked contrast to the
earlier (MP) occupations, later (UP) sites show fewer species of prey and
less variability in the concentration of fossil bones across seasons. This
is taken as evidence for higher selectivity in the choice of prey and time
of occupation, indicating specialized hunting and seasonal occupation of
sites tuned to animal migrations (Soffer, 1989).
The Aurignacian site of Vogelherd (Lone Valley, Germany) dated to
33,000-30,000 BP, provides a good illustration of seasonal occupation.
The main sources of food for these Pleistocene hunters were reindeer
and horses. Both species were highly seasonal in birthing and mating,
and they migrated seasonally through the Lone Valley, using the nat-
ural routes that dissected it. As present-day wild horses and reindeer
are quite predictable in their migration patterns (not following exactly
the same route, but approximately so), it would have been advantageous
for the Aurignacian inhabitants of southwestern Germany to be able to
predict these migrations. An analysis of the tooth eruption patterns of
reindeer remains at Vogelherd indicates that these animals were primar-
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ily hunted during the fall migration. The horse bones, likewise, indicate
that horses were hunted when they migrated in large family groups con-
sisting of mares and maturing foals during late summer and fall. Indeed,
evidence for occupation of Vogelherd at other times of the year is lacking
(Niven, 2007, 377). Niven (2007) infers from these patterns that Vogel-
herd was not occupied all year round, but seasonally during the annual fall
migrations of large herbivores—the density of the archeological material
moreover suggests that it was used multiple times. Given that hunter-
gatherers inhabit extensive ranges (between 314 to 2500 km2 (Mandryk,
1993), probably closer to the high value in the Ice Age Aurignacian), and
taking into account the presence of exotic lithic material (i.e., stone tools
made from cores that originated over one hundred kilometers away), this
seasonal occupation suggests that the inhabitants of Vogelherd could an-
ticipate these migration events. Unlike reindeer, whose migratory behav-
ior is regulated by the secretion of hormones like melatonin as a function
of exposure to daylight hours (Paul et al., 2008), humans do not have
physiological adaptations to time their migrations. A plausible explana-
tion of their accurate, long distance travels to Vogelherd is their access
to calendrical devices.
The African archeological record shows a similar pattern: Later Stone
Age (LSA) sites indicate an increased foraging efficiency compared to
Middle Stone Age (MSA) locales. These improvements are not caused by
changes in climate or prey availability as the South African Last Inter-
glacial and the Present Interglacial are climatologically very similar. Yet
LSA sites from the Present Interglacial show improved foraging efficiency,
such as an increase in bird and fish bones compared to MSA sites (Klein,
2001). The failure of earlier humans to record cyclicity accurately in their
environment could explain this difference. Material culture allowed the
recording of cyclical patterns, enabling hunter-gatherers to time their vis-
its to sites according to patterns in animal migration and plant growth.
The capture of Cape fur seals (Arctocephalus pusillus) in southwestern
African coastal sites presents a pertinent case study (Klein, Cruz-Uribe,
& Skinner, 1999). Fur seals breed on offshore islands, the majority of
births occurring during late November and early December. About nine
months later, adult seals force their young from the rocks into sea. Large
numbers of these young seals wash ashore, exhausted or dead—an ideal
time for mobile hunter-gatherers to visit these sites. Like in the European
archeological record, only humans from Later Stone Age sites appear to
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recognize this cyclical pattern: fossil remains from seals in LSA sites in-
deed mostly represent individuals of about nine months old, implying
that these people timed their visits to the coast to fall within the August-
October peak in juvenile seal availability. In contrast, Middle Stone Age
sites do not show such a fixed pattern. The bones of seals recovered from
these sites are commonly older, ranging from sub-adults to adults, not
showing any cyclicity at all, a pattern remarkably similar to that found
in dens of fossil hyenas.
Recognizing cyclicity not only had an impact on hunting success, but
also resulted in a substantial broadening of the human diet. Fish bones
are notably absent in the MP archeological record—exceptions include
the opportunistic and occasional exploitation of marine shellfish by Ne-
anderthals at Mediterranean coastal sites. In contrast, numerous arche-
ological sites indicate that coastal UP people relied heavily on fish for
their diet. These sites show patterns of seasonal and specialized fish
exploitation. The relative proportion of aquatic resources in the diet
of prehistoric foragers can also be directly inferred through analysis of
the stable isotope values of carbon (δ14C) and nitrogen (δ15N) in their
bone collagen. These data provide direct information about average di-
etary protein intake by prehistoric consumers over a period of ten years
prior to their death. Richards, Pettitt, Stiner, and Trinkaus (2001) found
that fish only became incorporated in European diets by the middle UP
(about 30,000 BP). Prior to this time, the principal sources of animal
protein were large herbivores. The trend of including fish in the diet
coincides with elaborations in material culture, such as lavish burials,
personal ornaments, portable art and notched artifacts. Likewise, at the
African LSA site of Ishango, Congo, along the Upper Semliki River, dense
concentrations of fish remains, together with hundreds of barbed points
used to spear the fish, dated at about 25,000 BP, have been recovered
(Stewart, 1994). More than 30% of these remains belong to the genus
Barbus, a large minnow-like fish. Their size range represents primarily
mature individuals, probably caught on their spawning migration, the
only time of the year when fish are truly fat. This implies that the
fishers at Ishango timed their capture to the rainy season, when large
quantities of Barbus congregate in river mouths on their yearly spawning
migration. The repeated rainy season occupations at Ishango indicate
the predictability of these. Interestingly, two incised bones dating to the
same period have been recovered at Ishango. The spatial distribution
226 Chapter 8. How material culture extends the mind
of their notches (Fig. 8.7) almost certainly indicates that they are arti-
ficial memory systems. One reason why MSA people neglected such a
stable and abundant food source may be that the systematic exploitation
of fish requires recognizing cyclical patterns of spawning and migration.
In historical times, the Northwest Coast Native Americans planned and
prepared for the capture of salmon months in advance (Ames, 1994).
Figure 8.7: Incised bone from Ishango, Congo, dated to 25,000–20,000 BP,
Museum of Natural Sciences, Brussels, Belgium (author’s photograph).
Marshack (1991a) interpreted this object as a lunar calendar, each row
representing 60 days (approximately two observational lunar months).
Recognizing cyclicity has an impact on many aspects of human life.
Traditional human diets in which plants are rare, such as those of the
Inuit, show a strong relationship between physiological stress, group size
and dietary fat. The human body’s ability to metabolize energy from pro-
tein is limited; a critical ratio of protein to fat must be maintained to pre-
vent starvation. As mentioned earlier, the animals that Late Pleistocene
humans hunted—as indicated by bone collagen analysis and archeological
remains—provided mostly lean meat, which contains mainly protein and
little fat. Hunting animals with high fat content requires the detection of
cyclical patterns, as animals only accumulate fat during specific phases
of their life-cycle: fish are only fat while returning upstream to spawn,
terrestrial herbivores only accumulate fat prior to migration, mating or
giving birth. A comparative study of traditional Inuit diets with differ-
ing protein to fat ratios (Cachel, 1997) indicates that groups with high
protein/low fat diets are smaller and have less complex social structures
with little social stratification. Their members suffer more physiological
stress, such as bone fractures.
Applying these observations to Late Pleistocene Europe, it becomes
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apparent that Neanderthals (associated with MP industries) consumed
less fat than anatomically modern humans (associated with UP assem-
blages). Although Neanderthals were highly successful hunters, focus-
ing on prime-age individuals (Steele, 2003), they had relatively low pop-
ulation densities and suffered many traumatic injuries—T. Berger and
Trinkaus (1995) aptly compare them to rodeo veterans. Their burial pat-
terns do not suggest social stratification. In marked contrast, the popula-
tion density of anatomically modern humans as indicated by site density
was higher, and their fossil remains show less traumatic injuries. Their
burial patterns hint at more complex social structures as is indicated
amongst others by grave gifts of exotic origin at the Saint-Germain-la-
Rivie`re burial dated at about 15,600 BP (Vanhaeren & d’Errico, 2005).
Moreover, detailed study of the processing of carcasses of reindeer and
other large mammals by anatomically modern humans (e.g., Niven, 2007)
indicates that modern humans invested considerable time and effort in ex-
ploiting fat-rich parts of those carcasses (such as the extensive processing
of lower hindlimbs). The failure of earlier humans to recognize cyclicity
in their environment could explain these behavioral differences.
8.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has examined anthropological and archeological evidence
for the use of the external environment as an extension of human mental
time travel. The anthropological case studies indicate that humans use
a variety of naturally occurring objects and especially designed artifacts
for this purpose. Because only a tiny fraction of material culture survives
in the archeological record (i.e., only objects that are in a suitable con-
text, and that are made of hard materials, such as stone and bone), the
Late Pleistocene artifacts discussed here are probably only a fraction of
the calendrical systems that were being used. Nevertheless, when such
artifacts begin to consistently appear in the archeological record, one can
see an improvement in foraging success, especially in the exploitation of
cyclical resources. The invention of calendrical systems can be seen in the
broader context of technological and behavioral innovations that occurred
during the MP to UP transition.
The fragmentary nature of the archeological record makes it at present
difficult to model the claims put forward in this chapter. However, re-
cent computational models that have examined the evolution of commu-
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nication (e.g., Di Paolo, 1997) and the role of population dynamics in
the emergence of culturally modern behavior (e.g., Powell et al., 2009)
could be adapted to model the role of external media in human behav-
ior during the Upper Paleolithic. Current analytic models (e.g., Henrich,
2004b) examine relationships between population size and technological
and behavioral innovation. However, to date such models do not take
into account the role of externally stored knowledge in cultural evolution.
As we have seen, the ethnographic and archeological record strongly indi-
cate that storing knowledge outside of the brain increases the reliability of
representations and protects them against various memory biases. There-
fore, future computational and analytic models should incorporate this
reliance on externally stored knowledge as a factor in the transmission of
information and skills.
Some philosophers of mind have raised criticisms against an interpre-
tation of the extended mind where cognition actually takes place outside
the brain. Giere (2004) considers the Hubble telescope, which uses the
star cluster Abell 1689 as a gravitational lens: if Hubble is involved in
cognitive (epistemic) processes, does it follow that cognition extends 2.2
billion light years into space? Does cognition exceed the speed of light?
Adams and Aizawa (2001, 46) compare distributed cognition with non-
cognitive instances of tool use: if a person uses lopping shears to chop
thick branches from a tree, shears and arms can be considered as a sin-
gle system. However, there is little reason to suppose that the muscular
processes inside the arms extend into the lopping shears. If their inter-
pretation is correct, there is little reason to suppose that the cognitive
processes that take place within the brain extend into our epistemic arti-
facts, or that our innate timing capacities are radically altered or replaced
by the use of calendars and other timing devices. We are all familiar with
situations such as holidays or periods of illness in which we are removed
from our time-keeping devices like agendas and calendars, and where we
quickly lose track of the days of the week as a result. Therefore, the
extended mind can only be properly understood in terms of a coupled
system in which the brain holds a privileged position. In the case of
calendrical systems, it seems that mental time travel is a necessary pre-
requisite. Without our ability to mentally travel in time, we could not
foresee future imagined events, and calendars would be useless. Archeo-
logical evidence for episodic future thinking in hominids dates back to at
least 2.6 million years BP. At this time, hominids began to make stone
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tools (Semaw et al., 1997); they regularly cached these for future use
(Potts, 1994), indicating sensitivity to future needs. However, it seems
that mental time travel alone was not sufficient to allow them to accu-
rately predict cyclical events. Evidence for this is only archeologically
attested since the Late Pleistocene.
The co-occurrence of epistemic artifacts with improved foraging tech-
niques and increased dietary breadth suggests that material culture was
necessary to recognize cyclicity in the environment, a capacity that hu-
mans do not naturally possess. The changes in behavior during the Late
Pleistocene can be understood as a result of an increased use of epistemic
artifacts, making humans part of distributed cognitive systems with com-
putational capacities extending their evolved cognitive abilities. Calen-
dars and interpreting humans constitute coupled cognitive systems that
enable humans to predict cyclic events far more accurately than their
evolved cognitive abilities for keeping track of time allow.

Part III
Religious reflection
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Religion in human experience
Since the 18th century, philosophers, social scientists and political theo-
rists, such as Freud, Weber and Marx, have repeatedly spelled the end of
religious belief in the light of modern science and culture (Stark, 1999).
They identified religion with primitive thought and behavior. For exam-
ple, Auguste Comte (1896, 52ie`me lec¸on), when tracing the evolution of
human culture, termed the most primitive stage l’e´tat the´ologique, where
human culture is in the grip of hallucinations and passions. As these au-
thors see it, as individuals acquire a more rational understanding of their
world, informed by science, they would all gradually come to abandon
this view in favor of a purely scientific conception of the world. Despite
these forecasts, nothing of the sort has happened. This is especially the
case when we cast our glance away from western Europe, where religion
is mainly a matter of state churches that typically enjoy low attendance
rates, and focus on more entrepreneurial religious institutions in America,
Asia and Africa. When current sociologists of religion refer to ‘seculariza-
tion’ (e.g., Stark, 1999), they do not mean a process of religious decline,
but rather one of change: religious believers can freely choose their re-
ligious affiliation, or draw religious meaning outside of institutionalized
contexts (adherents to Jediism, for example, get their inspiration from a
fictitious religion from the Star Wars franchise).
Religion is a cultural phenomenon that can be traced back to the
late Pleistocene archeological record. Although religious behavior in itself
does not fossilize, many religious practices leave material traces, including
burials if they contain grave gifts, and representational depictions of su-
pernatural beings. Although burials were already an established practice
by Homo sapiens and Homo neanderthalensis by 120,000 BP, it is a mat-
ter of continuing debate whether or not these burials provide compelling
evidence for belief in an afterlife. Neanderthal burials do not contain
uncontested grave gifts or other signs that warrant inference to such be-
liefs. Moreover, some archeologists (e.g., Gargett, 1989, 1999) argue that
unintentional burial cannot be ruled out for the Middle Paleolithic skele-
tons of anatomically modern humans and neanderthals in the Levant,
120,000–80,000 BP. Starting about 27,000–26,000 BP we see more defi-
nite evidence of intentional burial, including grave gifts in the double child
burial at Sungir, Russia (Kuzmin, Burr, Jull, & Sulerzhitsky, 2004), see
Fig. 8.8. A plausible explanation for grave gifts is that the donors actu-
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ally believed that the deceased could use them, presumably in an afterlife.
Next to this, depictions of supernatural beings provide strong evidence
for religious thought. Therianthropic figures can be found in the shape of
sculptures and cave-paintings since about 32,000 BP. The so-called lion
man from Hohlenstein-Stadl (Fig. 7.5a) is a 28 cm tall mammoth ivory
figurine that can best be described as a half-human half-feline hybrid of
undetermined sex. Recently, a second, smaller lion man has been exca-
vated (Conard, 2003). This figurine was found in Hohle Fels, and is dated
to 33,000–31,000 uncalibrated 14C years, making it part of the same Au-
rignacian Swabian cultural complex as the better-known specimen from
Hohlenstein-Stadl. The two objects combined suggest that these the-
rianthropic figurines were not products of individual fancy, but had a
well-defined cultural, probably religious, meaning. Other therianthropic
figures include more recent cave paintings from the Magdalenian Trois-
Fre`res cave, one a human-animal hybrid, the other a bipedal bull playing
a musical arch. More indirect evidence for ancient religious practice can
be obtained when relying on ethnographic parallels like shamanic art
from the San (Kalahari desert) and the Shoshone (Coso Range, eastern
California). Lewis-Williams and Dowson (1988) have argued that the
imagery in Franco-Cantabrian rock art bears evidence of shamanic rit-
uals. To Clottes and Lewis-Williams (1996), the frequent depictions of
dots and lines indicate that the artists were experiencing altered states of
consciousness (where one sees entoptic images, i.e., geometric patterns,
and eventually hybrid creatures) which led them to conclude that the
Paleolithic artists had a shamanic religion.
Figure 8.8: Sungir double child burial. Note the lavish grave gifts (spears
and clothing studded with beads). From http://www.evolution-of-man
.info/children.jpg.
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It seems safe to assume that religion is a universal human phenomenon.
Is it also uniquely human? Darwin (1871) already observed that the belief
in one or a few gods is a result of cultural evolution and is not univer-
sal, but that animism (the belief that natural objects are imbued with
agency) may be far more phylogenetically ancient, and can be found in
all cultures. Since the late 19th century, in particular since the anthro-
pologist E.B. Tylor (1871 [1920]) included Australian aboriginal beliefs
as religious beliefs in his Primitive cultures, anthropologists have broad-
ened their definition of religion so that it not only includes practices that
involve interaction with one supreme being, but also with ancestors, spir-
its, and other supernatural agents. Darwin used a similar inclusive sense
when he argued that religion is not uniquely human, but that it can be
found in nonhuman animals:
My dog, a full-grown and very sensible animal, was lying on
the lawn during a hot and still day; but at a little distance a
slight breeze occasionally moved an open parasol, which would
have been wholly disregarded by the dog, had any one stood
near it. As it was, every time that the parasol slightly moved,
the dog growled fiercely and barked. He must, I think, have
reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious manner, that
movement without any apparent cause indicated the presence
of some strange living agent, and no stranger had a right to be
on his territory. The belief in spiritual agencies would easily
pass into the belief in the existence of one or more gods. For
savages would naturally attribute to spirits the same passions,
the same love of vengeance or simplest form of justice, and the
same affections which they themselves experienced (Darwin,
1871, 64–65).
The anthropologist Stewart Guthrie (1993) has developed this argument
more fully, arguing that religious beliefs are a byproduct of our ability to
detect agents, in particular conspecifics, an ability we share with many
other animals. According to Guthrie, our specialized agency detection
system sometimes leads us to observe false positives (i.e., observing an
agent where none is present). The evolutionary rationale for this is that
a false positive is less costly than a false negative, as the latter can result
in a failure to detect a dangerous predator, a prey, or a potential mate,
and the former only results in a small waste of time and energy. Using a
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mathematical model, Godfrey-Smith (1991) indeed found that cognitive
systems that generate an excess of false positives can evolve if the costs
or payoffs of false positives (detecting a signal in the environment where
there is none) and false negatives (failing to detect a signal that is present
in the environment) are asymmetric. In those cases, natural selection will
tend to promote beliefs that yield the highest payoffs or incur the least
costs (Stephens, 2001, see also sections 10.4 and 12.4). It is a kind of
wager that is similar to Pascal’s wager, and it can easily be explained in
game theoretical terms, as follows: as long as c1 < c2, and b > 0, we can
expect hyperactive agency detection to occur (table 8.1). Some animals
Table 8.1: Costs and benefits of agency detection
agent present agent absent
detect benefit b false positive c1
do not detect false negative c2 no cost or benefit 0
exploit this proneness to detect agency in other species, for example in
mimicry: most species of hawk moth (Sphingidae) caterpillars have a
final abdominal segment with spots that have an uncanny resemblance
to a snake’s head, thereby deterring predators from eating them (causing
a false positive). According to Darwin and Guthrie religion is a form of
animism, and one can see something that can be interpreted as animistic
behavior in the behavior of other animals. Guthrie talks about horses
that shy away from bags and leaves that move in the wind, as if they
interpret them as agents, and about chimpanzee rain dancing, i.e., the
display of hooting and swaggering that chimpanzees often exhibit at the
start of rain storms. To S. E. Guthrie (1993, 52) “the display is indeed a
threat against the storm and [. . . ] the chimpanzees do perceive the storm
as animate.” If religion can be reduced to a form of hypersensitive agency
detection, it is not uniquely human.
A problem with Guthrie’s model is that it does not provide a detailed
causal account of how the detection of living things can result in sus-
tained, costly religious practices. As the psychologist of religion Joseph
Bulbulia (2004, 659) puts it: “While it is understandable how Darwin’s
dog could have responded to a moving gate [sic] by barking, it is not
obvious why we would respond to vague reality with a Sistine Chapel,
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or a Mecca, or with painful rituals?—‘I detect an agent, therefore, off
with my foreskin.”’ Bulbulia rightly observes that religion has particular
elements, such as ritual, prayer, costly signaling, that are absent in non-
human animals. It is not surprising that Jesse Bering (2001) is therefore
skeptical about the possibility that religion has precursors in nonhuman
animals, and argues that it is uniquely human. Our ability to conceptu-
alize unobservable mental states, such as beliefs and desires, our capacity
to engage in pretend play and other forms of counterfactual reasoning,
and a psychological death concept are, according to Bering (2001), nec-
essary conditions for the development of religious ideas. As we saw in
section 1.2.3, the positing of unobservable mental states and counterfac-
tual reasoning seem to be outside the purview of chimpanzee cognition.
We might agree with Guthrie (1993) and Darwin (1871) that animism
is an important aspect of religion, but in this dissertation I will assume
that religion is a far richer and more complex phenomenon, which has no
clear parallels in nonhuman animal cognition.
Is religious belief a biological adaptation?
The question of whether religious belief is a biological adaptation remains
unresolved. While some authors working in the field of cognitive science
of religion (CSR) think that religion is a byproduct, for example Pascal
Boyer (2002), Justin Barrett (2004), and Paul Bloom (e.g., 2007), there
are others like Richard Sosis (e.g., Sosis & Alcorta, 2003), Jesse Bering
(e.g., Bering, 2006) and Ara Norenzayan (e.g., Norenzayan & Shariff,
2008) who regard it as an adaptation. In the following sections, we will
briefly review a selection of byproduct and adaptationist accounts of re-
ligion. It is important to point out that CSR is not really a research
program25, but rather an umbrella term for philosophers and scientists
from diverse disciplines who examine the cognitive basis of religion. De-
spite its methodological diversity, there are a few features that underlie
most CSR research. CSR investigates beliefs (such as beliefs in gods or
ancestors) and behaviors (such as rituals, prayer and meditation), and it
does so in a fairly specific way. Religious beliefs are examined in terms of
ordinary cognitive biases and constraints, and religiously-motivated be-
haviors are examined in terms of ordinary human behaviors, subject to
cognitive and bodily biases and constraints. In this way, CSR natural-
izes religion: it provides naturalistic explanations for beliefs and behaviors
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that are traditionally associated with the supernatural. Another underly-
ing unifying assumption of CSR is that religious convictions and practices
are not solely the result of culturally contingent processes. This does not
imply that culture would be unimportant—to the contrary, many CSR
researchers explicitly investigate the effects of culturally variable features
on beliefs. For example, Boyer and Ramble (2001) studied the effects
of memory biases in the cultural transmission of religious concepts in
Gabon, France and Nepal, and Knight, Sousa, Barrett, and Atran (2004)
examined how Maya children represent beliefs in the Christian God and
in indigenous spirits. Rather, CSR scholars think that the architecture
of the human brain constrains and guides the development of religious
beliefs within specific cultures.
Religion as byproduct
CSR researchers adhere to a massively modular conception of the mind
(as outlined in section 2.2.3). According to the cognitive anthropologist
Dan Sperber (1994), modules are domain-specific computational devices
that are highly specialized in the processing of particular computational
problems. The evolutionary relevant domain to which a module responds
is its proper domain. The term ‘proper’ is closely related to the way the
term is used in teleosemantics (e.g., Rowlands, 1997): it is the evolution-
ary function the module has acquired, which enhances the fitness of its
owner. However, a module can also respond to input that is not part of its
proper domain, but that resembles it—in Sperber’s (1994) terminology
the actual domain of the module, i.e., the sum of all stimuli that fall in
the proper domain and those that fall outside it, but to which the module
responds. The large array of cultural stimuli to which a module responds
is its cultural domain. An example can illustrate this distinction. The
proper domain of the face recognition module is the human face. This is
because the evolved function of this module is to facilitate the recogni-
tion of conspecifics. However, our face recognition module (anatomically
located mainly in the fusiform face area) also responds, albeit somewhat
less strongly, to faces of monkeys and even to those of other animals such
as cats (Tong et al., 2000). Clearly, our face recognition system does not
have the evolved function of recognizing the face of a cat, but this is part
of its actual domain. The cultural domain of the face recognition module,
as we have seen in section 5.4, is the vast array of cultural stimuli that
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have face-like depictions, including masks, cartoon faces, and portraits.
Byproduct accounts of religious belief similarly see religious concepts
as part of the cultural domain of specific computational modules. As
mentioned earlier, Guthrie (1993) regards religion as a consequence of an
evolved agency-detection system. Guthrie (e.g., 1996) stresses that his
account focuses on our ability to recognize conspecifics, i.e., religion is a
byproduct of anthropomorphism. However, later authors such as Justin
Barrett (e.g., 2004) have argued that the agency-detection system is spe-
cialized in detecting agency in general, not just human agency. According
to this view, the proper domain of the modules that give rise to religious
beliefs are agency detection and intentionality detection. If our reasoning
about everyday (nonreligious) agents has indeed given rise to religious be-
lief, we can expect that when people draw spontaneous inferences about
their gods, they will model these inferences on their expectations about
how everyday agents behave, and not on theologically correct concepts,
which in the case of the Christian god include omniscience and omnipo-
tence. As predicted, Barrett (J. L. Barrett & Keil, 1996; J. L. Barrett,
1998) found that both Christian and Hindu believers tend to reconstruct
stories about their gods in ways that are theologically incorrect, i.e., gods
are bounded in their knowledge and actions: subjects tend to think about
their gods in terms of normal agents. Like normal agents, gods and other
supernatural beings have beliefs, desires and emotions, and they act in
the world in order to fulfill goals and desires.
The developmental psychologist Paul Bloom (2005, 2007) has argued
that religion arises out of an intuitive mind-body dualism. As we have
seen in section 2.3.1, humans make an intuitive distinction between cau-
sation in the physical and psychological domains, a distinction that is
already present in infants. A striking experiment by Kuhlmeier et al.
(2004), for example, reveals that five-month-old infants simply do not
treat humans as if they are physical objects. In this looking time exper-
iment, infants were shown walking humans and inanimate objects that
travelled in continuous paths, disappearing behind one screen, appear-
ing again, and then disappearing behind a second screen. The infants
were surprised when an inanimate object, such as a rolling ball, violated
their expectations about continuity of objects: if a second ball was vis-
ible behind one of the screens after it was lowered, they looked longer
at the display. However, when the same thing happened with an agent
(a human), the infants’ looking time did not increase, which shows that
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they were not surprised, implying that infants initially do not apply their
intuitive physics to humans. Adults and older children also use different
inference mechanisms for bodies and for minds (intuitive physics versus
folk psychology). As a result, the physical death of a person does not
prevent them from thinking that that person’s mind would continue to
exist. Indeed, people often refer to the mental states of deceased persons
and how they would react to a current state of affairs, as in ‘grandpa
would never have approved of that (and therefore, we should not do this)’
(Hodge, 2010). We can imagine disembodied minds and this may lead to
religious concepts like ancestor worship (where one can still perceive the
agency of a deceased forebear). However, Bloom’s hypothesis of psycho-
logical dualism does not seem to be the default position in all religions,
as judged from afterlife beliefs. In many religions (e.g., ancient Egyptian
religion; taoism), humans have not one but several souls (Hodge, 2008).
Moreover, several religions (e.g., Christianity, Islam) hold that people will
have a body in the afterlife. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) states
that God will “judge the living and the dead [. . . ] All of them will rise
with their own bodies, which they now have,”26 reiterating what Chris-
tian theologians have written since the second century. The resurrection
of the body has been a central belief in Christianity for centuries, see e.g.,
Fig. 8.9 for a typical illustration. Many religions practice the giving of
grave gifts, which would be unintelligible if belief in disembodied minds
were universal.
The cognitive anthropologist Pascal Boyer (1994, 2002) has argued
that religion is not a byproduct of one specific intuitive ontology, but
rather, that religious ideas are a product of an interplay between cultural
transmission and evolved propensities of the human mind. His byproduct
account of culture draws on Sperber’s (1985) theory of the epidemiology
of representations. This theory aims to explain the stability in cultural
representations. Acquiring a new cultural concept, like capitalism or
platypus requires that a learner reconstruct this representation in her
own mind. Given this, we can expect that not everyone has identical men-
tal representations. Fortunately, humans do not start out from scratch:
they can build upon pre-existing knowledge, including that supplied by
intuitive ontologies. For example, a toddler who learns that a platypus
is an animal can infer that it is self-propelled, needs food to sustain itself,
and has offspring that resembles it. Cultural transmission presupposes
that a learner supplements already acquired knowledge. Some ideas are
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Figure 8.9: Resurrection of the flesh (fragment) by Luca Sig-
norelli, 1499–1502, from http://casasantapia.com/images/art/
orvietolsignoresurr700.jpg.
easier to learn and recall than others because they rely on knowledge that
is already present. Intuitive ontologies constrain and guide the acquisi-
tion of concepts. We can therefore expect that concepts that have a very
poor fit with intuitive ontologies will be harder to reconstruct, and thus
harder to remember and transmit. On the other hand, concepts that are
more in tune with our intuitive ontologies are easier to remember and
transmit. According to Boyer (1994, 2002), religious ideas strike a cogni-
tive optimum, because they are minimally counterintuitive: they violate
a few of our intuitive ontological expectations, which makes them inter-
esting and attention-grabbing, but they conform to most other intuitive
ontological expectations, which makes them easy to remember and trans-
mit. For example, ghosts violate our basic expectations of how physical
objects behave in their ability to walk through walls, and to appear and
242
disappear at will. But the psychology of ghosts is conform to our basic
ontological expectations about agents: they have beliefs, desires and a
distinct personality. In this case, only the properties that violate our
intuitive ontologies need to be transmitted when we acquire the concept
ghost; the elements that are conform to intuitive ontologies are tacitly
assumed, as they are the default position.
Implicit in Boyer’s theory are two testable predictions: (1) minimally
counterintuitive ideas are easier to transmit than others, and (2) mini-
mally counterintuitive are typically religious. There is considerable empir-
ical support for the first prediction. J. L. Barrett and Nyhof (2001) gave
participants stories to reproduce that contained intuitive, bizarre or coun-
terintuitive elements. After a delay, their participants were much more
accurate in their recall of the minimally counterintuitive elements. Boyer
and Ramble (2001) had comparable results with a study that probed
recall of similar stories in Gabon, Nepal and France.
However, it is less clear whether minimally counterintuitive ideas are
specific for religious concepts. Pyysia¨inen, Lindeman, and Honkela (2003)
presented subjects with imaginary beliefs with varying levels of counterin-
tuitiveness. They showed that counterintuitive representations in general,
and counterintuitive representations involving a conscious agent in par-
ticular, are more likely to be considered religious. Next to this, studies
indicate that minimal counterintuitiveness is also typical of nonreligious
folklore, including fairy tales. Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner, and Schaller
(2006), for instance, found that stories recorded by the Grimm brothers
that had a limited number of counterintuitive elements (e.g., Little red
riding hood) are still beloved fairy tales today compared to those that
have too many counterintuitive elements (e.g., The magic table, the gold
donkey, and the cudgel in the sack) or none at all (e.g., the story of the
trickster The little peasant). Thus, it is not at all clear why counterintu-
itiveness should be a defining feature of religious concepts.
Boyer’s theory as he originally formulated it in 1994 is also vulnerable
to the so-called Mickey Mouse problem27: Mickey Mouse is minimally
counterintuitive, yet we do not feel compelled to worship him. Boyer
(2002) attempted to solve this problem by arguing that not all minimally
counterintuitive concepts are interesting, but that specifically agents that
have special, strategic knowledge of our actions (especially those that are
morally relevant) are compelling. We are thus not much impressed by a
god who only exists on Wednesdays (counterintuitive but uninteresting),
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whereas a god who knows when you are good or bad is more interesting.
More recently, Gervais and Henrich (2010) have proposed the Zeus prob-
lem. Zeus has all the features that we can expect of a successful god:
he is minimally counterintuitive, and he has access to strategic informa-
tion. Yet Zeus is no longer an object of religious devotion28. Gervais
and Henrich (2010) argue that a successful evolutionary account of reli-
gious beliefs should not only take cognitive biases about the content of
religious beliefs into account but also transmission biases, in particular
conformist bias: people usually do not worship religious beings from the
past, or even gods from neighboring groups, because they tend to follow
the religious affiliation of their parents or peers. On the other hand, con-
formist bias can lead people to accepting a different religion when they
perceive that a number of their peers adhere to a different religious move-
ment. This is how the sociologist of religion Rodney Stark (2005) explains
the rapid spread of Mormonism in the USA: it is not so much by active
proselytizing, but by having Mormons as friends, neighbors or colleagues.
Cognitive biases may explain how people mentally represent gods, but
context-based cultural evolutionary models are necessary to explain why
people come to believe in particular gods.
Religion as adaptation
Some theorists propose that religion is an adaptation, evolved in response
to problems faced by humans living in large groups. Humans are a proso-
cial species, but there is always a risk of defection. To counter the risk of
defection, members of a group can impose punishment. Indeed, theoret-
ical models (e.g., Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2002) and psychological experiments
(e.g., Henrich et al., 2006) indicate that cooperation can flourish in groups
where altruistic punishment occurs, i.e., punishment that is costly to the
punishers and that does not always give them a direct material gain.
However, for people living in large-scale societies direct punishment is
not always possible. Policing institutions are a solution, but they are
liable to corruption and even in the best of cases they are not always
able to catch or even to spot freeriders. According to Norenzayan and
Shariff (2008) human societies would therefore benefit from belief in one
or more beings who are omniscient or have special knowledge, next to the
capacity to reward or punish. Most adaptationist approaches to religion
take this point of view, arguing that belief in supernatural punishment
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provides a solution to the free-rider problem. Schloss and Murray (in
press) remark that adaptationist theories of religion rely on two diverg-
ing explanatory strategies. The first group of theories argues that religion
enhances cooperation, amongst others through costly signaling (the coop-
eration enhancement model), whereas the second places more emphasis
on the avoidance of punishment (the punishment avoidance model).
The cooperation enhancement model of the anthropologist Richard
Sosis (e.g., Sosis & Alcorta, 2003) proposes that religion is a form of
costly signaling. It is a well-observed phenomenon in the sociology of re-
ligion that strict churches have more success in terms of membership and
attendance than loose congregations (Iannaccone, 1994). This is intrigu-
ing, given the wide range of seemingly arbitrary behaviors and taboos
these churches impose, such as abstaining from coffee, sigarettes, danc-
ing, and even some types of music. Iannaccone (1994) speculates that
strict churches are more successful, precisely because they require greater
commitment from their members than lax ones. People may be attracted
to strict churches because their members are less likely to cheat. The
costly religious customs (e.g., dress codes, food taboos), which often re-
sult in exclusion from or reduced opportunity of interaction with other
groups provide an honest signal: “if I go through all this trouble to signal
my religiosity, this means I am a sincere believer.” For example, dressing
as an orthodox Jew will provide the benefits of increased altruism from
other orthodox Jews, but may expose one to ridicule and ostracism of
the population at large. Indeed, even wearing a simple skullcap has this
effect, as the use of ‘decoy Jews’ by the Dutch police illustrates29. Thus,
it seems unlikely that someone (other than a trained policeman) would
dress up as an orthodox Jew without having the religious beliefs to match.
The costliness of the signal makes it honest. Empirical support for Sosis’
predictions comes from a literature study on the viability of 19th-century
American communes—given that communes tend to fall apart due to a
high percentage of freeriders, one can take the lifespan of a commune as
an indirect proxy of levels of cooperation within it. Sosis and Bressler
(2003) found that religious communes had on average a lifespan that was
four times longer than that of secular communes. Using games such as the
anonymous dictator game, where donors can choose to anonymously give
as much as they like to an unknown recipient within their community,
Sosis and Ruﬄe (2007) found that members of religious kibbutzim are
more cooperative than those of secular ones. Next to costly dress-codes
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and taboos, moral emotions can also serve as reliable signs of commit-
ment, which are reinforced with costly sacrifices and ritual observances
(Teehan, 2010).
In order for the costly signaling theory of religion to work, the cost for
the honest signaler must be smaller than for the dishonest signaler. For
example, the cost of a fancy tail is easier to bear for a healthy peacock
than for an individual of less quality, thus it is a reliable signal. But it
remains unclear whether this is the case for religion. Perhaps religious
individuals perceive the cost as less high, because they expect greater
benefits (e.g., in an afterlife), which makes it easier for them to abide by
religious dresscodes and taboos. Another problem with the cooperation
enhancement model is that it does not explain why the costly signals
should be religious. As we saw in chapter 6, dialects and art may also
be capable of generating group cohesion. Another potential difficulty is
that cooperation enhancement models rely on freedom of religious choice,
which places severe limits on their explanatory scope. Thus, they cannot
explain why hunter-gatherers or medieval villeins would be religious, since
there is little point in costly signaling one’s membership of a religious
community if there is no freedom of religious choice. After all, a ‘free
market’ of religious groups (Finke & Stark, 1989) is a relatively recent
and not globally widespread phenomenon, mainly restricted to northern
America. Many European countries have state-funded churches with low
levels of expected commitment, which makes competition by smaller high-
commitment religious groups harder. Prior to the 18th century, religious
choice was quasi nonexistent, as the treatment of religious minorities in
Europe exemplifies—one need but think of the massacre of the Cathars
in southern France, or the historical persecution of Protestants. There is
still no freedom of religion for the present-day Iraqi housewife and many
others (De Cruz & De Smedt, in press c).
Several authors have proposed that religion is adaptive not by foster-
ing cooperation, but rather by helping people to withstand the temptation
to cheat, thus aiding them to avoid the costs of being punished. On a
population level, the constant imminent threat of supernatural punish-
ment makes groups with religious beliefs less vulnerable to subversion
from within than non-religious communities. In this way, Norenzayan
and Shariff (2008) explain how belief in supernatural punishment can be
maintained through cultural group selection. There is a considerable body
of empirical research that is in favor of punishment avoidance theories.
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Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) confronted participants with a sentence
that they had to unscramble and remove an extraneous word from, such
as ‘felt she eradicate spirit the,’ which should become ‘she felt the spirit’.
Some of these sentences contained only neutral words, others contained
secular primes (e.g., police, judge) and a third group contained religious
words (e.g., God, spirit). Afterwards, the subjects played a dictator game
with a 10 $ stake, where they could freely choose how much money they
kept and how much they gave away. They found that participants who
got religious primes gave more money than those who received neutral
primes (mean 4.6 $ versus 2.6 $), an effect that actually only held for the-
ists. However, participants who got secular primes did not significantly
differ from those who received religious primes (mean 4.4 $ versus 4.6 $).
Bering, McLeod, and Shackelford (2005) found that students were less
likely to cheat at a computer game where they could win money, if they
had been informed prior to the experiment that the ghost of a deceased
graduate student had been observed in the room that the experiment
took place in. Several problems remain unresolved in the punishment
avoidance account. First, there is a problem of cause and effect: if the
effect Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) observed was entirely due to the
presence of theists in their sample, how can the model explain the be-
lief in supernatural punishing/rewarding agents? Second, why should the
observer be a supernatural and not just a natural observer? After all,
experimental studies show that even a picture of a pair of eyes on a box
increases prosocial behavior: people are more likely to put money in a
donation box in a canteen when two staring eyes are put on it (Bateson,
Netttle, & Roberts, 2006). As Norenzayan and Shariff (2008) themselves
point out, the presence of large, cooperative and not very religious groups
(e.g., agnostic Scandinavian countries) indicates that secular institutions
like the police can be equally successful in instilling cooperation. Thus,
people in at least some societies can withstand the temptation to cheat
when effective punitive mechanisms are present without belief in divine
punishment. In sum, the two adaptationist models for religion (cooper-
ation enhancement and punishment avoidance) each have experimental
evidence in their favor but leave many questions unanswered. At present,
there is no compelling evidence to suggest that religious belief would be
a biological adaptation.
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The role of universal cognitive biases in theological think-
ing
As this brief survey of evolutionary approaches to religion indicates, there
is at present no satisfying overarching explanation for why humans, and
not other animals, have religious beliefs. Despite this lack, CSR has pro-
vided compelling explanations for specific aspects of religiosity, in par-
ticular the widespread occurrence of minimally counterintuitive agents
(Boyer, 2002), the focus on agents, rather than non-agents as objects of
religious worship (S. E. Guthrie, 1993; J. L. Barrett, 2004), and the strong
connection between religion and moral norms in particular cultural set-
tings (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Interestingly, CSR has to date mainly
focused on folk religious beliefs. This makes sense, because theological
reflection is only a tiny part of religious experience, since it is performed
by specialists in specific highly-institutionalized contexts like universities
and monasteries. Through this neglect of theology, CSR has not yet ad-
dressed the question of whether theological reflection is continuous with
everyday cognitive processes—it has naturalized religion, but it has not
yet naturalized theology. In the following two chapters, we shall look at
some arguments from natural theology in the light of CSR. Throughout
I will take the position that Rowe (1979, 340) has described as ‘friendly
atheism’: “The atheist may believe that some theists are rationally jus-
tified in believing that the theistic God exists.” In the context of this
dissertation, I assume a naturalistic (nontheistic) picture of the world, a
view that includes an evolutionary origin of human cognitive capacities as
given. I will defend the view that theists may be justified in holding the
beliefs they do, and that the cognitive basis of theological reflection may
provide a basis for rational disagreement between theists and atheists.

Chapter 9
Paley’s iPod: The
cognitive basis of the
design argument within
natural theology
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Cruz, H., & De
Smedt, J. (2010b). Paley’s iPod: The cognitive basis of the design argu-
ment within natural theology. Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science, 45,
665–684.
For many scientists and philosophers, Hume’s critique (1779) and Dar-
win’s theory of natural selection (1859) have definitely undermined the
idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts to design
in nature. Yet the argument from design stands as one of the most in-
tuitively compelling arguments for the existence of a divine creator. It
enjoys an enduring appeal, going back as early as Plato’s Timaeus, Ci-
cero’s De Natura Deorum and Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. Although it
garnered particular attention around the turn of the 19th century, with
Paley (1802 [2006]) as the best-known example, recent formulations can
be found in the work of Swinburne (1968), Plantinga (1991) and propo-
nents of Intelligent Design. Some (e.g., Wattles, 2006) have argued that
the appeal of the design argument can be explained by Aristotle’s perva-
sive influence on western philosophy and theology in his concept of nature
as inherently purposive. Although cultural factors undeniably played an
important role, this chapter proposes that the popularity of the design
argument runs deeper, and that its argumentative structure can be traced
back to evolved properties of the human mind.
In what follows, we will examine empirical studies from developmen-
tal and experimental psychology to investigate the cognitive basis of the
design argument. The focus will be on two aspects: the tendency of hu-
mans to discern teleology in nature, and the way they intuitively assess
probabilities. A better understanding of these aspects not only elucidates
the lasting popularity of the design argument, but can also help theists
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and atheists to construct a rational basis for disagreement. From this it
becomes clear that humans spontaneously discern purpose in nature, but
that the inference to a designer is not automatically made. When con-
structed theologically and philosophically correctly, the design argument
is not presented as conclusive evidence for God’s existence, but rather as
an abductive, probabilistic argument. This chapter examines the cogni-
tive basis of probabilistic judgments in relationship to natural theology.
Placing emphasis on how people assess improbable events, we clarify the
intuitive appeal of Paley’s watch analogy. We conclude that the reason
why some scientists find the design argument compelling and others do
not lies not in any intrinsic differences in assessing design in nature, but
rather in the prior probability they place on complexity being produced
by chance events or by a creator. The chapter begins by outlining an
analysis of the epistemic properties of the design argument. Next, it ex-
amines the cognitive basis of teleological reasoning and the design stance
in children and adults. We then discuss the probabilistic aspects of the
design argument. Finally, we explore why theists and atheists disagree
on the plausibility of the argument.
9.1 The argument from design
The argument for the existence of a divine creator, based on evidence
of design in nature, has recently enjoyed a revival in theology and phi-
losophy. Biologists (e.g., Dawkins, 1986, 4–5) praise the argument for
its explanatory coherence and intuitive appeal. William Paley’s image
of the watch on the heath was certainly not the earliest formulation of
the design argument, nor even of the watch analogy, but its familiarity
makes it a suitable starting point. The argument Paley presented in Nat-
ural theology can be summarized as follows: if one encounters a watch,
the complexity of this artifact and the interrelations of its parts lead to
the inference that it is the product of purposive design. From this Paley
concluded that complexity in nature is also the product of a Designer, be-
cause proposing that it could have been brought about by chance would
be absurd (Paley, 1802 [2006], 7–15).
This argument has interesting epistemic properties: it is both an anal-
ogy and an inference to the best explanation. Analogies map the structure
of a well-known domain (the source domain) onto a lesser-known prob-
lem (the target domain). In distant analogies the structures of source
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and target domains greatly differ in their basic ontological properties.
The design argument is a distant analogy in that it maps the artifactual
domain (source domain) onto the natural world (target domain). Ar-
tifacts exhibit goal-directedness in their design: they are intentionally
created by designers who have their function in mind. As organisms ex-
hibit goal-directedness in their design, they must also be the product of
a purposeful designer. Although this analogical structure has often been
attacked on the ground that it is inconclusive (e.g., Hume, 1779; P. Frank,
2004), it is worth noting that distant analogies are well-established in sci-
entific practice as a way to gain insight into new problems (De Cruz &
De Smedt, 2010c). When the conceptual structure of the target domain is
relatively unknown, as in the case of scientific discovery, scientists often
resort to analogical reasoning of this sort as an epistemic action. His-
torical examples include Johannes Kepler’s mapping of the properties of
gravity onto the properties of light (i.e., the fact that sunlight dissipates
with increasing distance between the Sun and the planets it is cast upon)
to explain why planets further from the Sun move more slowly, in this
case, caused by a weakening of the gravitational force with increasing
distance from the Sun (D. Gentner et al., 1997), and Charles Darwin’s
analogy of a hundred thousand wedges to examine the force of natural
selection (Millman & Smith, 1997). A more recent example is the Swiss
army knife analogy as a way to conceptualize the evolved structure of the
human brain in evolutionary psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994a, 88).
The analogical structure of the design argument is thus epistemic; it is
performed to gain insight into an unfamiliar domain (God’s creation). In
many early versions, the design argument served a heuristic, rather than
a strictly argumentative purpose, as in the works of 17th-century natu-
ral philosophers like Bernard Nieuwentijt and Antonie van Leeuwenhoek,
who perceived design as a source of wonderment about nature.
Traditionally, design arguments had an inductive argumentative struc-
ture. They began with the empirical observation that all complex, func-
tional objects of known origin were products of intelligent design. Then
came the inductive step, in which one infers that what is true for some
members of a class is true for all members. Hume (1779, part II, 56–
60) dispensed with this way of reasoning by arguing that artifacts and
biological organisms are too dissimilar to be classed together. When we
see a house, we can reasonably infer that it has an architect or builder,
because we know from experience that this particular effect flows from
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that particular cause. But we have no guarantee that the universe bears
such a resemblance to a house as to invoke a Designer; we do not know in
how far our analogy is reliable. Indeed, because an object resembles other
objects in that it has property p does not imply that it also resembles
them in other respects. To suppose that it does is affirming the conse-
quent, which is a logical mistake. Although Paley did not mention Hume
explicitly, the structure of his watchmaker analogy escaped this criticism
by adopting a different strategy. It is an inference to the best explanation
(IBE), which has the following structure:
IBE Given evidence E and a pool of plausible, potential ex-
planations H1, . . . ,Hn of E, if Hi explains E better than any
of the other hypotheses, infer that Hi is closer to the truth
than any of these others (Douven, 2002, 359).
IBE enables us to probabilistically infer that a given hypothesis is closer
to the truth than other hypotheses because it explains the available ev-
idence better than rival explanations. In this probabilistic aspect, the
design argument differs from deductive proofs for the existence of God,
such as Anselm’s ontological proof. IBE escapes Hume’s critique, because
it does not rely on induction, as it simply argues that there is no better
explanation for order and complexity than design (Gliboff, 2000). This
fundamental probabilistic aspect of the design argument has received rela-
tively little attention in the philosophical literature (but see Sober, 2002).
Having established apparent design and probabilistic inference as two key
properties of the design argument, we will now examine the possible cog-
nitive bases for its rational acceptability.
9.2 How we infer design
9.2.1 The design stance
To Paley, the conclusion that a watch is purposefully designed was self-
evident. Our perception of its interrelated parts, formed and adjusted to
each other—the coiled elastic spring, the flexible chains, the cogwheels
—each fashioned out of the material that suits their intended function
best, should lead us to infer that the watch must have had a maker
who formed it for a specific purpose. Yet Paley acknowledged that such
seemingly spontaneous inferences require contextual knowledge about the
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artifact under consideration: “it requires indeed an examination of the
instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to per-
ceive and understand it” (Paley, 1802 [2006], 8). In the case of the watch,
Paley could infer the intent of the designer, as he was familiar with the
class of artifacts to which the watch belongs. But what would happen if
he pitched his foot against an unfamiliar object, such as an iPod? Would
he have inferred design as automatically as in the case of the watch?
Its sleek shape, carefully integrated buttons and intended function would
have presented a puzzle to him. Unfamiliar artifacts can be so outlandish
that people can be led to believe that they are not the work of human
designers. From the 19th-century wave of European colonization onward,
and especially during World War II, the indigenous inhabitants of Papua
New Guinea were confronted with a cornucopia of western goods. They
believed that these were gifts of the ancestors. This led to the emergence
of cargo cults, whose adherents are still trying to ritually lure airplanes
into dropping more cargo, more western goods (Trompf, 1995; P. Frank,
2004). And what to think of people who observe UFOs? Often these
alleged spaceships are no more than military reconnaissance airplanes,
crashing weather balloons, or even bright planets. Nevertheless, people
do infer that the objects are intentionally designed by supernatural agents
and by extraterrestrials respectively. To gain a better understanding of
the design argument, it is therefore useful to examine how humans infer
design, what constitutes necessary and sufficient conditions for something
to be a product of design, and how creator and artifact are causally linked.
Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that design is not
a feature we can objectively infer. Remarkably, neither complexity nor
order are necessary and sufficient conditions to decide whether an ob-
ject is purposefully created. For example, Gelman and Ebeling (1998)
showed two-year-olds a stain vaguely resembling a bear (Fig. 9.1). They
told some subjects that the spot was created accidentally, by kicking
over a bottle of paint, whereas another group learned that the shape was
painted intentionally. Only the children in the latter group called it ‘a
bear’. Thus the perception of the stain as accidental or representational
depends critically on the prior information the children received on how
it was brought about. In a similar experiment (Gelman & Bloom, 2000),
adults saw a variety of artifacts, but were given two diverging accounts
of how the objects came into being. In the unintentional version a strip
of cloth was accidentally caught in a machine, resulting in holes being
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Figure 9.1: Are these pictures a bear (left) and a sun (right) or just some
spots? Our intuitions are influenced by background information about
the genesis of these images. Stimuli from Gelman and Ebeling (1998),
Fig. 1, p. B37.
punched at regular intervals. In the intentional version, a person took
scissors and carefully cut holes at regular intervals. Subjects were more
prone to call the object a ‘belt’ if they believed it was intentionally cre-
ated. Apparently, design is in the eye of the beholder: our judgment that
something is an artifact depends on our foreknowledge that the artifact
was intentionally created. Once we are familiar with specific classes of
artifacts, we can reasonably infer that a particular member of a class was
created with the intention of belonging to this class. When we see a chair
in a pile of rubbish, we conclude that the object was created to fulfill a
specific function (to sit on) and to be of a specific class (chairs). This
stance also provides useful inferences when we have to identify classes of
non-utilitarian objects, such as ships in bottles: although these boats will
never sail, we still call them ships, because the designer intended them to
belong to this class of objects. The intimate relationship between design
and intention was noted by Dennett (1987, 16–17) and Bloom (1996) who
argue that humans take an intuitive design stance: we use the designer’s
intention to infer the class the object belongs to. It was on this infer-
ence that Paley relied in his assertion that the watch was a product of
intentional design (see also section 7.2.1).
Conversely, knowledge of the designer’s intention can help us to infer
9.2. How we infer design 255
an object’s intended function or identity. Take as an example Bloom and
Markson’s (1998) experiments in which three- and four-year-olds were
shown featureless ovals that were purportedly drawn by a child with a
broken arm that because of this could not draw well. The young subjects
were told that these were drawings of chickens (three vertical ovals) and
a pig (one horizontal oval). When prompted, the preschoolers effortlessly
identified the pig, because they reasonably inferred that the artist would
draw objects from the same category in the same way. Young children
intuitively regard the creator of an artifact as having privileged knowledge
about both its name and its intended function. This was illustrated by
an experiment (Jaswal, 2006) in which preschoolers saw objects that were
given an anomalous label, e.g., the experimenter showed the child a key-
shaped object and said ‘you are not going to believe this, but this is
actually a spoon’. Children were only willing to adopt the anomalous
name if the experimenter referred to the object as something he had
created, not as something he had merely found. Recognizing that the
creator of an artifact has the prerogative to name it marks an important
step in the development of the design stance.
The intended function and identity of an object thus inextricably link
the creator with the created object. This aspect of the design stance is
particularly interesting in the case of broken objects: although broken
watches and fragile chairs cannot perform their intended function, we
still name these objects watches and chairs because they were originally
created to fulfill the intended function of their artifact class. When nine-
year-olds and adults are presented with broken artifacts, they still label
them according to their intended function, except if the transformation
has changed the object beyond recognition (Gutheil, Bloom, Valderrama,
& Freedman, 2004). Paley voiced this intuition aptly when he stated:
neither [. . . ] would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch
sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right.
The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer,
might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident,
in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the move-
ment, or whether we could account for it or not. [. . . ] If by
the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the
movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or
disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds
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as to the utility or intention of these parts (Paley, 1802 [2006],
p. 8–9).
The human propensity of inferring design may be due to the distinct
evolutionary history of our species (see also section 4.4.2). Humans rely
to a unique extent on tools for their survival. Whereas other primates
use mostly unmodified objects as tools, archeological evidence for stone-
knapping in hominids goes back as far as 2.6 million years BP (Semaw et
al., 1997). By adopting the design stance, hominid children might have
learned to use and fashion tools more efficiently. Indeed, comparative
studies of social learning in children and chimpanzees reveal stark con-
trasts in the way new tools are used: whereas children take the intention
of the person who demonstrates these tools as guidance, chimpanzees rely
more extensively on the physical properties of the tools to figure out how
they work (Horner & Whiten, 2005). The design stance provides children
with a useful heuristic to learn about their environment. It allows them
to “ignore the actual (possibly messy) details of the physical constitution
of an object, and [relying on] the assumption that it has a certain de-
sign, predict that it will behave as it is designed to behave under various
circumstances” (Dennett, 1987, 16–17). Without the design stance, we
would not possibly learn to use and name hundreds of tools and other
artifacts, but would perhaps be limited to the less than ten tool types a
typical community of wild chimpanzees entertains (Whiten et al., 1999).
The hypothesis that the design stance is a product of natural selection,
rather than the cultural product of Aristotelian teleology, finds support
in the fact that it also occurs in nonwestern cultures, even those where
material culture is relatively sparse, like the Shuar, an Andean Native
American culture (German & Barrett, 2005), and that infants and young
toddlers rely on it to learn the names of novel objects and how to use
them (Casler & Kelemen, 2007).
9.2.2 Intuitive teleology
Whereas the design stance might have evolved in response to the reg-
ular use of artifacts throughout human evolution, with the function of
rapidly categorizing and using artifacts, humans also possess a natural
propensity for teleological reasoning. This propensity is most marked for
biological entities, but it can apply to almost all categories of objects.
Across cultures (e.g., H. C. Barrett, 2004), humans have the intuition
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that animals and plants possess adaptations that are self-beneficial, such
as claws for defense or thorns for protection against being eaten. Young
children, however, not only attribute purpose to artifacts and biological
adaptations, but also to entire organisms (what are lions for? ‘to go in the
zoo’) and nonliving natural kinds like clouds (‘for raining’)—a tendency
termed promiscuous teleology (Kelemen, 2004). Moreover, when given a
choice between teleological and non-teleological explanations, preschool-
ers and elementary school children prefer teleological accounts. For ex-
ample, when asked whether rocks are pointy because of natural processes
(e.g., ‘bits of stuff piled up for a long period of time’) or because of teleo-
logical functions (e.g., ‘so that animals could scratch on them when they
got itchy’), children typically endorse the latter (Kelemen, 2003).
At around ten to twelve years of age, the preference for teleologi-
cal explanations lessens, probably because adolescents acquire elaborate
coherent mechanistic explanations through schooling. Although moun-
tains can be climbed, few adults would claim that mountains are there
to climb on. This is because our learned knowledge that mountains are
formed by tectonic activity or volcanism is incompatible with teleological
explanations, where the function provides a sufficient reason for why the
structure exists. Remarkably, patients with Alzheimer’s disease show a
re-emerging preference for teleological explanations. For example, they
think that rain is there so that plants and animals could have water to
drink and grow, rather than the acquired explanation that rain occurs by
water condensing into clouds and forming droplets (Lombrozo, Kelemen,
& Zaitchik, 2007). An increased tendency for teleology is also observed
in people with little schooling such as Roma adults (Gypsies from central
European descent). Formal education seems to reduce a preference for
teleological explanations, but cannot eradicate it. Indeed, when educated
adults are forced to make speeded judgments, they too, show a heightened
acceptance of teleological explanations: when judging at a glance whether
a statement is correct or not, they tend to endorse teleological, incorrect
explanations, such as ‘the Sun radiates heat because warmth nurtures
life’ (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009). Reasoning strategies observed in children
persist into adulthood, but may be masked by secondary explanatory
strategies. Once these become impaired (in the case of Alzheimer pa-
tients) or are unavailable (in the case of speeded judgments or lack of
education), the intuitive, evolved strategies of childhood re-emerge. Al-
though scientific education tends to lessen teleological reasoning, the ten-
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dency to apply teleology is not absent even among trained scientists. As
will be expounded in section 11.5.1, analysis of the paleoanthropological
literature reveals that early theorists relied on extra-scientific intuitive
explanatory strategies—until the late 1970s, many paleoanthropologists
thought that separate lineages of human races evolved toward an idealized
endpoint (modern humans), a process denoted as orthogenesis, which is
now uniformly rejected (De Cruz & De Smedt, 2007).
Today, teleology is no longer considered a valid scientific principle in
biology. It is hard to refrain from thinking that the eyes’ function is ‘for
seeing,’ whereas it is more in tune with evolutionary theory to say that
the eyes’ function can be described in terms of the effects it had for repro-
duction and survival in past organisms in which this structure evolved.
The philosopher of biology David Papineau (2005), for example, believes
that teleology should be excised from biological discourse, because the
function of a trait is not a result of its purpose, but a consequence of
the fitness advantages it bestowed on ancestral organisms. Nevertheless,
teleology is a useful heuristic to make sense of our everyday artifactual
and biological environment—it enables us to see at a glance what a tool is
for (e.g., a sharp edge for cutting) or to categorize animals as dangerous
or not (e.g., presence of claws or fangs). As Kant (1790 [1987], part II,
§66) had already argued in his Critique of Judgment, we use teleologi-
cal explanations because the concept of purpose makes living things and
artifacts more intelligible to us.
The central place of teleology in human cognition can perhaps explain
why it remains an important philosophical and theological principle, de-
spite its lack of scientific plausibility. Note that the fact that our psycho-
logical propensities are sometimes at odds with scientific knowledge does
not necessarily affect the rationality of our judgments. Not only are they
often indispensable in everyday reasoning (our understanding of artifacts
would be seriously compromised without the design stance), concepts like
‘design’ or ‘purpose’ would be meaningless without them. Whether or not
such concepts are also scientifically meaningful, is a property that is to be
empirically discovered or philosophically elucidated. The biologist cum
philosopher of biology Francisco Ayala (1970), for example, argues in fa-
vor of teleology as a result of blind design—even though natural selection
is blind, biological traits have acquired purposes.
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9.3 Are humans intuitive theists?
Does the tendency to infer design also entail an inference to a Designer, as
Paley and others have suggested? At this point, developmental and exper-
imental psychological data do not present a unified picture. Lombrozo et
al. (2007) found that although Alzheimer patients reasoned more teleolog-
ically, they were not more likely than healthy control subjects to invoke
God as an explanation. In a study that probed Dutch primary school
children’s intuitive theories on the origin of species (Samarapungavan &
Wiers, 1997), the answers clustered together in different categories, in-
cluding spontaneous generation, Lamarckism and pure essentialism (i.e.,
animals and plants have always existed in their present form). Although
many children made teleological inferences, only about 10% made explicit
reference to God or intelligent design. On the other hand, a comparable
experiment by Evans (2001) in the United States, found that the major-
ity of 10-year-olds endorsed creationist accounts of the origin of species,
regardless of their religious background. Kelemen and DiYanni (2005)
obtained comparable results with British elementary school children, al-
though the percentage of creationist accounts was significantly lower than
with American subjects.
Several possible explanations might account for these findings. A
strong position holds that humans are intuitive theists. In this view, cre-
ationism is a natural mode of reasoning which is only altered when chil-
dren acquire explicitly non-religious beliefs from their cultural environ-
ment. Bering (2006) defends this position, arguing that religious beliefs
are biological adaptations that were directly selected to enhance coopera-
tion, altruism and group cohesion. A weaker position (e.g., Bloom, 2007)
holds that religious belief itself is not innate but a byproduct of other
cognitive adaptations such as agency detection and theory of mind. In
this view, children acquire culturally transmitted religious beliefs easily
because these key in on evolved propensities of the human mind. Here
the step from design to Designer is not automatically made, but needs
to be made explicit, as Paley and others in fact did. Support for this
latter view comes from experiments where Hindu (J. L. Barrett, 1998)
and Christian (J. L. Barrett & Keil, 1996) college students had to recall
stories about God. In doing so, they unconsciously distorted the stories
to fit God into intuitive expectations they had about normal people, such
as only attending to one person or one event at the same time. This in-
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dicates that representing an omniscient, omnipresent being is cognitively
demanding and that expectations about normal agents structure reason-
ing about divine agents. Another view, suggested by Taede Smedes as
he read the paper on which this chapter is based, holds that intuitive
theism might be an evolved module, but that it depends on external cul-
tural circumstances for its development, in the same way as the language
faculty requires appropriate linguistic input to develop properly. In this,
he echoed John Calvin’s sensus divinitatis, an innate propensity to form
a belief in God that needs to be triggered by environmental (cultural)
factors (Helm, 1998, see also section 10.5). We think that the experimen-
tal evidence does not support the view that there is an intuitive theism.
What is still required is an assignment of a probability to the existence of
a Designer. The next section will look in more detail at the probabilistic
aspects of the design argument.
9.4 Intuitive probability: Can chance events produce or-
der and complexity?
9.4.1 The Annales and the Boeing
The theologian and philosopher Joseph Butler (1736) already observed
that all human reasoning is probabilistic: Because we are finite beings
with knowledge that is restricted in time and space, we cannot claim
absolute knowledge. From imperfect observations we regularly draw far-
reaching conclusions. Humans are naturally endowed with the ability to
detect statistical frequencies in their environment. This ability is not re-
stricted to humans; it occurs in a wide variety of animal species, including
those with relatively simple nervous systems such as bumblebees (Real,
1991). Human infants use probability inference to learn about their en-
vironment, such as the statistical detection of recurring sound patterns
to chunk streams of continuous speech into words which is crucial for
word learning (Aslin, Saffran, & Newport, 1998). The design argument
draws on our evolved ability to assess posterior probability, the proba-
bility that is assigned after the relevant evidence is taken into account.
From the age of five onward, humans are fairly accurate in making such
assessments (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008). For example, if preschoolers
are shown that more red than green chips are placed in a bag, they will
correctly state that there is a higher chance that the experimenter will
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draw a red chip. However, if the experimenter says ‘I can feel that the
chip in my hand is round’ and proportionally more round chips are green,
children will update their probabilistic judgments in favor of green. How
likely is it that the apparent design in nature was intentionally created
or, alternatively, that it happened by chance? Early proponents of the
design argument have taken their intuition that chance does not produce
order as a starting point:
He who believes this may as well believe that if a great quan-
tity of the one-and-twenty letters [. . . ] were thrown upon the
ground, they would fall into such order as to legibly form the
Annales of Ennius. I doubt whether fortune could make a
single verse of them. How, therefore, can these people as-
sert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse of
atoms? (my translation) (Cicero, 45 B.C.E., book 2, §93)
Cicero discarded the atomists’ idea that chance collisions of elementary
building blocks (atoms) formed the material world on the basis that
chance has a low probability of producing order. Assuming that the
21 letters of the Roman alphabet are equally distributed into his “great
quantity,” the chance of the first letter falling in the correct place is 1/21,
the chance that the first two letters are correct is thus 1/21×1/21 = 1/441
(if the space is also treated as a letter, it would be 1/22× 1/22 = 1/484).
The chance that the letters would produce the approximately 7,000 char-
acters of the 600 lines that survive of Ennius’ Annales (a now fragmentary
epic poem on the history of Rome) is vanishingly small, being 1/217000.
Cicero’s intuition has been reiterated many times, including astronomer
Fred Hoyle’s image of hurling around scrap metal at random and happen-
ing to assemble a Boeing 747 (Anon., 1981)30. Although all arrangements
of the scrap metal are, with hindsight, equally improbable, very few of
them will fly; similarly, although all combinations of 21 letters are equally
unique, very few of them will produce a legible text, let alone the Annales.
William Dembski (1998) has developed this inference as the basis for
his defense of Intelligent Design. Although it is intuitively compelling, re-
jecting chance as an explanation for complexity and design is problematic
because, as Elliott Sober (2002) notes, there is no probabilistic equivalent
of modus tollens. In other words, we cannot state that
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If hypothesis H were true, observation O would be highly im-
probable.
But O.
Therefore, H is not true.
The lottery paradox aptly illustrates this. Assume a fair lottery in which
only 1 of 1000 tickets is the winner. The probability of winning this
lottery is very low. Yet winning the lottery does not cast doubt on its
fairness. The law of likelihood in statistics stipulates that it is not the
absolute value of the probability of data under a single hypothesis that
is to be considered but rather how the probability values compare under
different hypotheses. The intuitive idea that improbability strengthens
the existence of God is problematic in that it tacitly relies on an analogy
between human and divine agency. When deciding whether human design
or chance is responsible, we rely on empirical knowledge of what human
agents in fact do. In an example from Kenneth Himma (2005), adapted
from Dembski (1998), suppose a political candidate’s name appears first
on the lists of voting ballots 40 out of 41 times. The probability of such
an event’s occurring by chance is very small. But when we suspect that
a county clerk rigged the list, we rely on two pieces of tacit knowledge:
that undecided voters are more likely to choose the first on the list, and
that the county clerk wants a particular candidate to win. Being an
intelligent agent, it is not unlikely that he rigged the list. We also know
of cases in which ballots were tampered with to win an election. Hence
the hypothesis that the name was placed first 40 out of 41 times by design
rather than mere chance becomes very plausible indeed.
In the case of divine action, however, we do not have empirical knowl-
edge to draw upon, and thus no assumptions can be made about what
God would or would not do. It is not possible to accord prior probabili-
ties to the existence of God on the basis of empirical evidence. Without
the necessary background data to make the design argument an IBE, this
argument relies on an analogy between human and divine agency. Again,
this version of the design argument becomes an argument from analogy.
As we have seen, this was successfully attacked by Hume (1779), and it
was precisely for this reason that Paley (1802 [2006]) recast the argument
from design into an IBE.
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9.4.2 Probability and inference to the best explanation
The reliability of IBE as an abductive strategy depends on the amount
and quality of the data and the relevance of the data to the conclusion. If
insufficient evidence is available, IBE may well lead us to choose “the best
of a bad lot” (van Fraassen, 1989, 143). In fact, the bad-lot argument
even applies if one has all the possible evidence, because one may simply
have failed to conceive of the true theory with this evidence in hand. If
each letter that falls correctly is selectively retained, we need at most
21 × 7, 000 trials to complete what is now left of the Annales. Cicero,
being unacquainted with the principle of cumulative selective retention,
did not envision this possibility. Richard Dawkins (1986, 46–48) uses a
similar analogy to illustrate this point: whereas one monkey could not
possibly type a sentence from Hamlet, selective retention of keystrokes
by many typing monkeys would solve the problem.
When using an IBE strategy, however, most modern versions of the
design argument do not take natural selection and its principle of cumu-
lative selective retention into account as a viable explanation. Dembski
(1998), for example, holds that regularity, chance, and design exhaust
the possibilities, thereby sidestepping the combination of chance and reg-
ularity that is natural selection. To be sure, in 1802 natural selection
was not in the pool of possible explanations. However, as Sander Gliboff
(2000) demonstrates, Paley did have a range of alternative materialist
explanations, of which we mention three. First, necessity: because ev-
erything has to have some form, it may as well be the present form; for
example, the eye is the actual realization of the possible ways to fill an
eye socket. Second, he considered infinite trial and error: given an infi-
nite time and universe, every possible configuration of matter could be
produced, some of which turned out to be viable life-forms that persisted
and reproduced—an interesting precursor to the concept of natural se-
lection, and an idea first proposed by Lucretius (ca. 50 B.C.E [2007]) in
De rerum natura. Third, he discussed the claim that parts of organisms
could arise before their function was determined, a forerunner of exap-
tation theory (Paley, 1802 [2006], 38–41). These alternatives were being
explored and hotly debated in Paley’s time by early evolutionists such
as (Georges-Louis Leclerc Comte de) Buffon, Denis Diderot, and (Paul-
Henri Thiry Baron) d’Holbach. Paley seems familiar with these authors,
as he mentioned Buffon explicitly and others implicitly. Next to these,
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he briefly discussed the special biological forces or ‘organizing principles’
proposed by the Go¨ttingen school of German biologists, such as Johann
Friedrich Blumenbach, Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer, and Johann Christian
Reil (Paley, 1802 [2006], 218–225). Although now rejected, the latter’s
Newtonian approach to biology in which they stipulated forces acting on
biological entities (analogous to physical forces acting on physical entities)
was conceivable and widely accepted at the time (Larson, 1979). The idea
proposed by atomists such as Lucretius that very improbable things may
happen in an infinite universe has its modern statistical formulation in
Diaconis and Mosteller (1989, 859), who write that “with a large enough
sample, any outrageous thing is likely to happen.”
What led Paley to reject these alternatives? His answer was that the
purported natural propensities required intelligent design:
I am unwilling to give to it the name of an atheistic scheme
[. . . ] because, so far as I am able to understand it, the original
propensities and the numberless varieties of them [. . . ] are, in
the plan itself, attributed to the ordination and appointment
of an intelligent and designing Creator (Paley, 1802 [2006],
224–225).
One could dismiss this as a circular argument in that he rejected nat-
uralistic explanations because they point to a Designer, the proposition
that had to be proven. We want to argue that it can likewise be seen
as arising out of the high probability Paley accorded to the existence of
God. As will be argued in the next section, the likelihood of data can
be meaningfully assessed only in relationship with hypotheses, which are
accorded a prior probability.
9.5 A rational basis for disagreement
If humans are prone to discern design and teleology in nature, why do
some find the design argument more compelling than others? This may
be due not to intrinsic differences in the way design and teleology are
discerned but to differences in the prior probability people place on the
existence of a Designer. An interesting way to approach this problem is
through an examination of how humans regard coincidences. For Griffiths
and Tenenbaum (2007), an event is a coincidence if it is judged to have
a lower probability of occurring under our current theory of how the
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world works than under an alternative hypothesis. Coincidence plays
an important epistemic role in scientific discovery: the meteorologist Al-
fred Wegener (1912) noted that the coastlines of West Africa and South
America fit into each other like puzzle pieces, that their geological strata
matched, and that the distribution of species on both sides of the Atlantic
was highly correlated. He thought that this pattern was not a mere coin-
cidence but that these continents were once joined and had drifted apart.
The nineteenth-century physician John Snow (1855) noted that cholera
outbreaks in London tended to cluster at public water pumps and inferred
that this was not a coincidence but provided evidence for his theory that
cholera was transmitted through polluted water (rather than bad air, the
then favored theory).
These examples suggest an intimate connection between coincidence
and evidence. A coincidence occurs when the likelihood ratio in favor of
an alternative theory is insufficient to overwhelm the prior odds against
it. A coincidence becomes evidence when the likelihood ratio in favor
of an alternative theory overcomes the prior odds against it and leads
us to accept that alternative theory. Because people differ in the prior
probabilities they assign to alternative hypotheses, what is a coincidence
to one person can be considered compelling evidence by another.
In the case of the design argument, the competing hypotheses are
Hmat (purposive and complex structures arose strictly through natural,
material causes) and Hdeo (design as the result of a Designer). In the
framework of Hmat, the occurrence of ordered complexity and apparent
design presents a coincidence. Given that chance events tend to produce
disorder, the probability of this occurrence is extremely low. Darwin’s
theory of natural selection has successfully solved this dilemma, because
it relies on a combination of chance and lawlike processes. Indeed, no
other naturalistic theory can explain why living things are improbably
complex, why the interrelationships between their parts are highly func-
tional, and why they exhibit features that enhance their probability of
surviving and reproducing in their environment. Proponents of Hmat can
find epistemic justification in Darwin’s explanation of design. To justify
why they favor their view rather than Hdeo, they can cite examples of
maladaptedness and appeal to ontological parsimony because their ex-
planation is restricted to observable, causal physical processes. In Hdeo
the occurrence of design is not improbable, because this theory explic-
itly proposes a Designer who made the universe orderly and purposeful.
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Under these epistemic circumstances, but not under Hmat, design in na-
ture becomes corroborative evidence for the existence of a Creator. Next
to this, natural theologians can also appeal to ontological parsimony, be-
cause it reduces many kinds of explanation to one underHdeo (Swinburne,
1968).
This model of prior probabilities explains three puzzling facts. First,
it explains why evolutionary thinkers writing before 1859 did not accept
natural theology’s design argument. Even in Paley’s time, not everyone
was led to accept Hdeo, although the arguments in favor of natural theol-
ogy were widespread. Early evolutionists, including Erasmus Darwin and
biologists of the Go¨ttingen school, sought to describe biological forces
that could assemble complexity in the same way as Isaac Newton had
done for mechanics (see also section 12.6). These authors had a strong
commitment to a physicalist worldview leading them to adopt the view
that Hdeo was unlikely, even though they did not have a compelling causal
explanation for the apparent design. Second, it explains why the design
argument, despite its intuitive appeal, fails to convince nonbelievers. As
long as plausible naturalistic explanations for design in nature are avail-
able, the design argument will fail to overturn their prior beliefs. Third,
it may elucidate why well-established scientific data do not persuade be-
lievers of design of the opposite. This is shown paradigmatically in the
United States, where everyone has access to scientific education, yet cre-
ationism and Intelligent Design are widespread, and many express severe
distrust of evolutionary theory (see J. D. Miller, Scott, & Okamoto, 2006).
The epistemic force of the prior probabilities we accord to competing
hypotheses is an important element in scientific and other formalized
ways of reasoning. It can explain why scientists are unwilling to let go of
a cherished theory even in spite of overwhelming evidence against it, as
already described by Thomas Kuhn (1962). For theists, design in nature
provides compelling circumstantial evidence for the existence of a Creator.
Take as an illustration the Thomistic tradition, which emphasizes the
role of understanding and knowledge (scientia) in belief. In this view,
a successful natural theology would start out from self-evident premises,
proceed by valid arguments, and reach the conclusion that there is a
person such as God (Plantinga, 1991). As we have seen, humans are
prone to discern design and teleology in nature. Within the epistemic
context of Hdeo, the perceived design in nature that is a universal feature
of human cognition can be taken as a self-evident premise from which the
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existence of a Creator can be argued. It is not a stand-alone argument
that can convince those who do not believe in God (see also Himma,
2005), especially since plausible naturalistic explanations have become
available.
9.6 Is there still a place for the design argument?
Undeniably, the power of the design argument as an inference to the best
explanation has been seriously weakened since Charles Darwin and Alfred
Wallace independently came up with natural selection as a naturalistic
explanation for design. Given that the combination of random events and
selective retention can explain most of the apparent design around us, can
theologians still reasonably invoke design? Misrepresenting or altogether
neglecting natural selection is the strategy most commonly adopted by
Intelligent Design proponents (e.g., Dembski, 1998). Intelligent Design is
not a very desirable position for theologians to take, however, because it
makes scientific claims that need to be evaluated by scientific standards.
As a scientific research program, it fails because its hypothesis of a De-
signer is too vague and too general to count as a scientific hypothesis;
it cannot be used as a basis for empirical testing. Even concepts such
as irreducible complexity (Behe, 1996) are too broad and too vacuous to
be investigated by biologists; to date, there are no satisfying models of
complexity that allow for investigation by empirical, quantitative meth-
ods. Moreover, using scientific standards to argue for divine action is a
category mistake, because under the received theistic worldview, God is
not an immanent cause like other natural causes (Smedes, 2008).
The most productive way for theologians and scientists to look at
the argument from design is to treat it as a metaphysical rather than a
scientific principle. Within this perspective, there are at least two cases
in which a design position is still defensible. A first case is presented
by a position that endorses evolutionary biology but argues that God
intervenes occasionally to fashion structures that could not have arisen
through natural selection. In this position, one endorses intelligent design
as a philosophical position but not as a scientific research program that
conceptualizes evolution and design as competing scientific explanations.
Theologically, it follows a distinction that is commonly made between
God’s general actions (which pertain to the universe as a whole and can
be seen in the laws that govern physical, chemical, and biological pro-
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cesses) and special actions (which lie beyond normal physical processes).
Whereas natural selection and other evolutionary processes belong to the
former category, occasional design or intervention in these belongs to the
latter.
Johnson and Potter (2005) propose that human natural language may
be the product of purposive creation. They base their argument on the
fact that adaptationist explanations require a plausible reason for why
the adaptation evolved. Adaptations evolve in response to specific selec-
tive pressures and enhance the survival and reproduction of their bearers.
For language, there are as yet no persuasive adaptationist explanations
(see also section 3.2). We do not know what language is an adaptation
for or how and when it evolved. Despite the proliferation of adaptationist
stories on the origin of language, such as social grooming, technological
intelligence, cooperative hunting, and sexual selection, none of these hy-
potheses has been able to substantiate itself into a theory. This leads
Johnson and Potter (2005) to infer to the best explanation that purpo-
sive design brought language into being. Their position is distinct from
Intelligent Design in that they explicitly endorse evolutionary theory as
the best explanation for complexity in the living world.
A second, perhaps stronger, case (because it does not rely on a God
of the gaps) is found in scientists and theologians who regard design and
evolution as complementary rather than mutually exclusive explanatory
frameworks. Watchmakers do not build watches from scratch but rather
rely on the gradually accumulated innovations in timekeeping technology,
which we can trace back to sundials and waterclocks, to the introduction
of the spring, to the modern digital watch. Upon close scrutiny, very
few inventions appear de novo; most are the result of a gradual and
cumulative retention of favorable variations (Basalla, 1988). For instance,
the streamlined design of Polynesian canoes, which is close to optimum,
can be traced through archeological and historical data as the gradual and
unconscious retention of favorable variations, with the perilous ocean as
the selecting agent (D. S. Rogers & Ehrlich, 2008).
These insights on the origin of artifacts can be extended to divine
design. The nineteenth-century botanist Asa Gray defended the view
that natural selection is an
a-fortiori extension to the supposed case of a watch which
sometimes produces better watches, and contrivances adapted
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to successive conditions, and so at length turns out a chronome-
ter, a town clock, or a series of organisms of the same type
(Gray, 1888, 57).
Cell biologist Kenneth Miller argues that God has initiated natural selec-
tion and other natural evolutionary processes as an indirect way to create
complexity and design. For him, the undetermined nature of evolution
through natural selection and other natural processes enabled the evo-
lution of truly free, truly independent beings (K. R. Miller, 1999 [2007],
213, 238, 253). Theodosius Dobzhansky, one of the founding fathers of
the modern synthesis, wrote, “The organic diversity becomes [. . . ] reason-
able and understandable if the Creator has created the living world not by
caprice but by evolution propelled by natural selection [. . . ] Evolution is
God’s, or Nature’s, method of Creation” (Dobzhansky, 1973, 127). This
position is stronger than Intelligent Design, because proponents of the lat-
ter—who see natural and supernatural causes as competing explanations
for complexity in the living world—in many cases need to acknowledge
that natural selection is the better explanation. This problem is avoided
when one allows for the possibility that evolution and design are not
mutually exclusive.
On the basis of modern evolutionary theory it is not possible to re-
ject either Hmat or Hdeo. Both positions depend on prior probabilities
that are assigned on the basis not of scientific evidence but of meta-
physical principles. It is interesting that both positions, physicalism and
naturalistic theism, already existed in the earliest stages of evolutionary
theory. Whereas Charles Darwin and Thomas Huxley did not provide
room for God in their explanatory frameworks, Alfred Wallace and Asa
Gray were theists who treated divine action as complementary with a
scientific worldview, not as a competitor. Wallace, while continuing to
endorse natural selection as the chief principle guiding the evolution of
plants and animals, invoked intelligent design for the human mind: “The
brain of pre-historic and of savage man seems to me to prove the existence
of some power, distinct from that which has guided the development of
the lower animals through their ever-varying forms of being” (Wallace,
1871, 343). Martin Fichman (2001) aptly argues that Wallace’s theism,
rather than an about-face, was an integral part of his evolutionary think-
ing. Today, both schools of thought continue to exist side by side, with
Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett as examples of strict materialists
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and Kenneth Miller and Simon Conway Morris as proponents of theistic
evolution.
To summarize, the argumentative structure of the design argument
can be traced back to evolved biases of the human brain. It relies on the
design stance, which leads us to treat complex and purposive structures
as the product of design, and on intuitive teleology, the propensity of
humans to discern purpose in nature. These cognitive biases are univer-
sal, although they can be masked by formal education or strengthened
by religious upbringing. The step from design to Designer is perhaps
more explicit, and relies on an inference to the best explanation. The
plausibility of this inference relies on the prior probability one places on
the existence of God. By making these differences in prior probability
more explicit, theists (natural theologians, biologists, and philosophers)
and physicalist scientists and philosophers have a rational basis for dis-
agreement.
Chapter 10
The cognitive appeal of
the cosmological
argument
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Smedt, J., & De
Cruz, H. (in press a). The cognitive appeal of the cosmological argument
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion.
10.1 Introduction
The cosmological argument has enjoyed and still enjoys substantial popu-
larity in various traditions of natural theology. This chapter investigates
the cognitive basis of the cosmological argument. It proposes that its en-
during appeal is due at least in part to its concurrence with human cogni-
tive predispositions, in particular intuitions about causality and agency.
These intuitions seem to be a stable part of human cognition. We will
consider implications for the justification of the cosmological argument
from externalist and internalist perspectives. The cosmological argument
infers the existence of God from the existence of the universe. It has
been developed in various traditions of natural theology (Christianity,
Judaism, Islam) since the Middle Ages (Fig. 10.1). Early examples in-
clude the Kala¯m (Islamic theological) cosmological argument, formulated
by amongst others Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and al-Ghaza¯li, the second and
third of Thomas Aquinas’ five ways, Duns Scotus’ argument from con-
tingency, and cosmological arguments based on the principle of sufficient
reason by Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. Despite an equally dis-
tinguished list of critics (such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Bertrand
Russell, and C.D. Broad), it still enjoys a widespread popularity in con-
temporary philosophy of religion (e.g., Craig, 2003; Koons, 1997; Swin-
burne, 2004). Cosmological arguments can be usefully categorized in
three classes (see e.g., Craig, 2003; Oppy, 2009). The first, exemplified
by Thomas Aquinas’ second and third way, relies on the observation that
causes stand in relation to their effects as chains. As an infinite regress
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Figure 10.1: God the creator of the world was a popular theme in
Medieval imagery, as in this miniature from a French bible (1252–
1270). From http://www.wga.hu/art/zgothic/miniatur/1251-300/
03f 1251.jpg
of causes is deemed impossible, this leads to the inference of an uncaused
cause, i.e., something that has itself as a sufficient cause. The second, ex-
emplified by the Kala¯m cosmological argument, contends that all objects
that have a temporal beginning must have a cause, and that since the
universe has a temporal beginning, it must have a transcendent cause.
The third, Leibnizian cosmological argument says that the totality of the
world is a contingent being, which requires a sufficient explanation for its
existence (Craig, 2003).
This chapter does not provide an analysis of the formal properties of
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the cosmological argument, but rather, focuses on the intuitions that lie
at its basis. We propose that the enduring appeal of the cosmological
argument is due at least in part to its concurrence with human cognitive
predispositions, in particular intuitions about causality and agency. In-
tuitions about causality underlie the inference of an external cause of the
universe (section 10.2), whereas predispositions towards agency make God
a natural candidate for this cause (section 10.3). Even modern versions
of the cosmological argument that are couched in sophisticated modal
terms are based on and ultimately stand or fall with the soundness of
these intuitions. The link between the cosmological argument and the
structure of human reasoning was first proposed by Kant (1781 [2005]),
who claimed that arguments from natural theology are unavoidable given
the structure of human reason. To Kant, the intuitions that underlie
the cosmological argument (such as our propensity to look for explana-
tions or to seek necessary causes) are regulative ideas of human reason,
which bring “systematic unity into our cognition” (Kant, 1781 [2005],
A616/B644). The crucial difference between his and the present account
is that Kant could only rely on introspection when considering causal
intuition, whereas present-day philosophers can also draw on empirical
data from cognitive science that, as we shall see, are very relevant for
the debate. The case of cognitive origins of the cosmological argument is
better informed than it was more than two centuries ago.
We also examine the implications of cognitive science for the cogency
of cosmological arguments. Section 10.4 explores an externalist argument
that is based on evolutionary considerations: our natural capacities for
causal inference have evolved in response to selective problems related to
everyday experience. However, this may cast doubt on their reliability in
the domain of metaphysical inquiry. A second externalist line of reason-
ing (section 10.5) is based on Reformed epistemology: cognitive science
shows that our beliefs about causality and agency are properly basic, and
therefore at least prima facie justified. Section 10.6 examines an inter-
nalist approach where cosmological arguments fulfill an epistemic need.
Answering the question of why there is a universe by positing an agent
may afford an epistemic sense of satisfaction, provided that one already
accords a high prior probability to the existence of God. In this way, the
cosmological argument can contribute to a coherent worldview for theists.
Before proceeding, a caveat is in order. The central issues of this chap-
ter are on the one hand a meta-causal question (what are the causes for
274 Chapter 10. The cosmological argument
our causal reasoning?) and on the other hand a question of justification
(how do causal intuitions figure in the justification of the cosmological ar-
gument?) A familiar philosophical metaphor to distinguish between these
two questions is the Sellarsian dichotomy between the space of reasons
and the space of causation (e.g., Sellars, 1956). The cosmological argu-
ment as formulated by theologians and philosophers of religion is situated
in the space of reasons and justification: it is motivated by propositions
(reasons or candidate reasons) that present themselves to our judgment
and that guide our inferences. These reasons cannot be reduced to the
fact that cosmological arguments are appealing—after all, as Davidson
(1963) observed, there are many things that may hold a certain appeal
but that we would not subscribe to. What can be a compelling reason for
accepting the cosmological argument is that it concurs with basic human
intuitions about causality and agency. The cognitive origins of these in-
tuitions can be located in a space of lawlike processes, such as regularities
in cognitive development. When examining the cognitive origin of intu-
itions that underlie the cosmological argument, we are in effect proposing
a causal factor that impinges upon the space of reasons—such a factor
would not strictly speaking be a move within the space of reasons and
therefore, according to Sellars (1956), would lack justification.
Nonetheless, from a methodologically naturalistic point of view, there
is no unbridgeable gap between causes and reasons, but a fundamental
continuity in the causal natural order: human minds and the thoughts
they form do not stand outside this natural order (Blackburn, 2001). Con-
sequently, naturalists have attempted to bridge the gap between causes
and reasons. As we have seen in section 2.1.4, Susan Hurley (2003) has
argued that animals can make flexible decisions within specific contexts
(e.g., in their social interactions with conspecifics) that are driven by cog-
nitive adaptations. According to Hurley (2003), we can say of these ani-
mals that they have reasons for their actions, even though these reasons
are never made explicit (by the animals themselves), and even though
these reasoning processes only work under quite specific, ecologically rel-
evant conditions. John McDowell (1996) has developed the notion of Bil-
dung (upbringing and education), the process in which we acquire habits
of thought and action through experience, such as an ability to make eth-
ical or normative judgments. To McDowell (1996), these habits would be
sufficient to constitute an individual’s competence in the space of reasons.
However, Bildung naturalism still requires an account of how these
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habits, which together constitute our rational capacity, are acquired. Such
an account has not been outlined yet. Bill Pollard (2005, 76) has sug-
gested that “developmental psychology could assist us in this endeavor.”
As we have seen in section 2.2.4, developmental psychologists (e.g., Spelke
& Kinzler, 2007) have proposed that humans are equipped with a set of
core principles that regulate their knowledge acquisition, amongst oth-
ers in the domains of physics and agency. As we saw in section 2.3,
humans are equipped with intuitive ontologies concerning psychological,
biological, artifactual and physical events. They are phylogenetically old,
emerge early in development, and remain stable throughout adult life;
they are elaborated and enriched through experience and education, but
not fundamentally revised (Carey & Spelke, 1996). As will be argued
further on (sections 10.2 and 10.3), intuitions about causality and agency
that are present in young children are still regulative in the formulation
of the cosmological argument. In other words, the habits that under-
lie our reasoning about causation are partly based on early-developed
intuitions that are enriched but not overturned through experience or ed-
ucation. If developmental psychologists are correct in proposing that core
knowledge still “guides and shapes the mental lives of adults” (Spelke &
Kinzler, 2007, 89), these intuitions can continue to play a role in shaping
the reasoning that guides human inferences, including those in philosoph-
ical and theological reflection. Thus, our examination of origins of the
intuitions that underlie the cosmological argument can be seen within
a methodological naturalistic framework that seeks to relate causes and
reasons.
10.2 Causal cognition and the cosmological argument
Most cosmological arguments proceed in two steps: first, they establish
that the existence of the universe must have a cause, and second, they
identify this cause with God. In this first step, historical versions of
the cosmological argument (e.g., the Kala¯m and Thomistic versions) rely
on the causal principle: every contingent state of affairs has a cause of
its existence31. To illustrate this, here is a contemporary formulation of
the Kala¯m cosmological argument (see Shihadeh, 2008, for an extensive
treatment):
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1. Causal premise: Whatever has a temporal origin (i.e., begins to
exist), has a cause of its existence.
2. The world has a temporal origin (from the ha¯d. ith32).
3. Therefore, the world must have an originator (from 1 and 2).
4. This originator must be eternal, otherwise it too must have an orig-
inator (from 1).
5. Identification of God: The originator is God.
Contemporary versions of the cosmological argument proceed in a sim-
ilar way, although they attempt to replace intuitions with more rigorous
logical argumentation. For example, Joshua Rasmussen (2010) provides
an updated version of Duns Scotus’ argument from contingency: neces-
sarily, for all contingent concrete objects or their duplicates, it is possible
that they have a causal origin, i.e.,
"(Normally, ∀S ((S is a contingent state of existence)♦(S’s
obtaining, or the obtaining of a duplicate of S, is causally
explained))).
Using this causal principle, Rasmussen (2010) derives the existence of a
necessary being wielding S5 modal logic. To justify the causal principle,
however, he draws upon his causal intuitions in everyday experience of
objects:
Consider, for example, your favorite armchair. Surely the
armchair’s existence can be the result of causal factors, such
as a craftsman or factory machine piecing together materials.
(Indeed, it certainly was.) [. . . ] The principle seems to apply
to very small objects, too: neutrinos, for example, can be pro-
duced from proton collisions in a particle accelerator. It’s nat-
ural to generalize: necessarily, any contingent concrete object
can have a cause (Rasmussen, 2010, 185, emphasis added).
Humans habitually generalize from their intuitions about causes in every-
day objects to causes about any contingent concrete object. To propo-
nents of the cosmological argument, the causal principle is a self-evident
principle that hardly requires justification. The philosopher of religion
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William Lane Craig (2003, 117), for example, argues that it “seems ob-
viously true—at least more so than its negation.” However, critics of the
cosmological argument have called this into question. Kant (1781 [2005],
A609/B637) contended that “the principle of causality has no significance
at all and no mark of its use except in the world of sense; here [in the
cosmological argument], however, it is supposed to serve precisely to get
beyond the world of sense.” Although we perceive the world in terms of
causes, we cannot be sure that causes exist in the observer-independent
world. At best, one can justify the causal principle by induction, for ex-
ample, by arguing that it is constantly being confirmed in our experience,
and that it holds a central place in modern scientific practice and in con-
temporary analytic philosophy (Koons, 1997). For Hume (1779, IX, 167),
an explanation of the world in causal terms may be epistemically satisfy-
ing, but such an explanation is only “an arbitrary act of the mind.” By
this, Hume (1748, section 4, part 1) meant that the causal principle is not
metaphysically necessary, but rather, that it results from a psychological
disposition, where cause and effect are joined in the imagination of the
observer through repeated experience. Although Hume’s ideas on causal
cognition are no longer followed in cognitive science33, his assertion that
causal reasoning has a psychological origin, and that such causal reason-
ing lies at the basis of the cosmological argument is still sound. As will
be shown in more detail below, our causal intuitions in everyday domains
closely match those employed by the cosmological argument.
From an early age onward, humans seek causal explanations in ev-
ery sphere of their lives, such as why water expands upon freezing or
why a relationship has failed. We have an intuitive feel for whether or
not an explanation is satisfying. Satisfying explanations are often those
that invoke generative causes (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995).
To put it in a different way: our intuitive understanding of causation is
not only in terms of events that covary or that are contiguous, but is
also in terms of causes that can be plausibly thought to generate their
effects (T. R. Shultz, 1982b). People tend to infer causes spontaneously,
without conscious deliberation and in the absence of instructions to do
so (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002). To explain states of affairs, we fre-
quently invoke unobservable causes such as internal mental states, or in-
visible forces and properties like gravity or metal fatigue. This preference
for unobservable, nonobvious causes is already present in young children.
Preschoolers invoke unobservable mental states to explain the behavior
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of agents: they spontaneously attribute beliefs, desires and intentions to
them, and realize that mental states can differ from the actual state of
the world (Callaghan et al., 2005). Young children posit unobservable
physical forces and properties to account for the motion of inanimate ob-
jects. They have, for instance, the intuition that unsupported objects fall
downward due to gravity, and that one object can set another in motion
when in direct contact (T. R. Shultz, 1982a). From about three years
of age, children posit invisible biological properties to account for the
growth and behavior of biological organisms. Such hidden properties are
invoked to explain why apple seeds, planted in a flower pot, will still grow
out to be apple trees, or why caterpillars turn into butterflies (Gelman &
Wellman, 1991). In sum, humans typically posit unobservable causes in
many domains of reasoning.
Pace Hume, adults as well as young children tend to interpret phys-
ical causation in terms of mechanistic causes rather than simple co-
occurrences, even if both types of clue (mechanism and temporal covari-
ation) are equally available to them (T. R. Shultz, 1982b). That is, they
believe that causes actually generate or produce their effects. Indeed,
adults find causal explanations that invoke a plausible mechanistic causal
link more convincing than those that are only closely associated in space
and time (Ahn et al., 1995).
The ability to figure out causes has also been demonstrated in nonhu-
man animals, such as apes that can use causal cues to find the location
of hidden food (Bra¨uer et al., 2006). Next to this, human children of
four years and older as well as adults are able to infer causes of events
that they never experienced before, involving objects that they are to-
tally unfamiliar with. In a classic series of experiments, the developmen-
tal psychologist Thomas Shultz (1982b) showed Malinese children from
a horticultural society who were unfamiliar with western technology a
variety of causal events involving flashlights and tuning forks. In these
experiments, the participants were more likely to say that a tuning fork
that was struck caused a box to resonate, rather than a tuning fork that
was closer to the box but that was not struck. Similarly, western children
and adults preferred a generative account of causality to explain why the
propeller of a Crookes radiometer (an instrument for measuring electro-
magnetic radiation that none of the subjects had ever seen) began to
spin when a flashlight was turned on. Cosmological arguments postulate
a cause for the existence of the universe, a unique state of affairs that
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cannot be compared with other events. From a psychological point of
view at least, such a view is not problematic or unintelligible, as humans
spontaneously make causal inferences concerning events with which they
had no prior experience. Such causal inferences are, to use a phrase by
McDowell (1996, 84) “habits of thought and action” that constitute a
“second nature.” We have a rudimentary sense of causality that allows
us to infer plausible causes of unique events.
As discussed earlier, humans routinely posit unobservables as under-
lying causes. One set of experiments that compared the behavior of hu-
man children and adult chimpanzees indicates that preschoolers, but not
chimpanzees, attempt to seek a cause for their failure to perform a task
(Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii, 2001). In this study, the participants were
taught to place an oblong L-shaped block in an upright position. When
the block had been visibly tampered with, so as to make the task impos-
sible, both preschoolers and chimpanzees examined it extensively. How-
ever, when the block showed no external signs of manipulation, only the
children explored it from different angles to attempt to find a reason
why the task could have failed. This apparent inability of nonhuman
animals to attribute invisible causes has been demonstrated in other do-
mains as well. Human children, from an early age onward, routinely
represent false beliefs of other agents. Apes, by contrast, fail to attribute
false beliefs (Call & Tomasello, 1999). The primatologists Jennifer Vonk
and Daniel Povinelli (2006) propose that humans may be unique in their
ability to conceptualize unobservables, such as God, ghosts, gravity, and
other minds. The early emergence of this ability suggests that it may
be a stable feature of human cognition. The attribution of an unobserv-
able cause for the universe in the cosmological argument is made possible
by a universal human cognitive disposition to readily infer unobservable
causes.
Most proponents of the cosmological argument also argue for the ne-
cessity of a cause for the existence of the universe. This part of the cos-
mological argument may also be informed by cognitive predispositions.
When we think about causes, we intuitively think about deterministic
rather than stochastic causes. When preschoolers get the choice between
an observable, stochastic cause, or an unobservable, deterministic cause
that both explain a given event, they prefer the deterministic cause—they
are, in the words of Schulz and Sommerville (2006), intuitive determinists.
This bias toward deterministic causal factors persists until adulthood. For
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example, Metz (1998) compared the ability to infer stochastic causes of
physical events in kindergartners, school-age children and adults. She
found that the ability to recognize stochastic causes increased with age,
probably an effect of education. Nevertheless, like the children, the major-
ity of adult participants continued to infer deterministic causes for some
stochastically caused events. It seems that the causal reasoning that lies
at the basis of the cosmological argument is not an arbitrary act of the
mind, but rather a way of reasoning that is both obvious and intuitive
to humans: we readily infer generative causes for events, we routinely
deal with unique states of affairs, we habitually infer unobservable causal
mechanisms, and we have a preference for deterministic causes.
10.3 Intuitions about agency in the identification of God
The second step of most cosmological arguments consists of an identifi-
cation of the necessary, external cause of the universe with God. This
second step is important, because, as Hume (1779, IX, 164–165) already
observed, one could simply argue that the material universe is metaphys-
ically necessary. Moreover, even if we grant that the universe has an
external cause, what reason do we have to identify that cause with the
God of traditional theism, i.e., an infinitely powerful, all-knowing, eternal
and perfectly good being? It seems reasonable to suppose that if there is
an external cause to the universe, it must be a powerful entity. This does
not mean that it is a person, let alone God. To justify the identification
of God, Craig (2003) proposes an argument of the following form:
1. The cause of the universe is timeless and immaterial.
2. The only entities we know of which can be timeless and immaterial
are minds and abstract objects.
3. Abstract objects cannot cause something to come into existence.
4. Therefore, the cause of the universe is a mind, i.e., a person.
As Rowe (2005, 114–115) rightly observes, this argument as it stands is
invalid. In order to be valid, the conclusion should be:
[4a] The only entity we know of which can be the cause of the
universe is a mind.
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Also in this revised form, the argument relies to an important extent
on our finite, human intuitions about causality, where a person is regarded
as the cause for any occurrence—in this case the universe. Craig’s (2003)
characterization of minds as timeless and immaterial entities is akin to
folk psychology. Even young children conceive of minds as immaterial
entities that survive physical death—they believe, for instance, that a
young mouse eaten by an alligator will nonetheless keep on feeling sad
and missing its mommy (Bering et al., 2005).
Richard Swinburne (2004) distinguishes two kinds of causes (physi-
cal and personal), which require two types of explanation, scientific and
personal. To explain the existence of the universe as a whole, we cannot
posit physical causes since there are no physical causes expect for the
universe itself and its parts. Therefore, the universe is either a brute
inexplicable fact, or it is explained in personal terms. Swinburne (2004,
142–145) argues in favor of the personal explanation: he invokes a person,
God, who freely chooses to create and sustain the universe. Given that
the physical universe is extremely complex, whereas God is simple (in
the sense of undivided, not composed of parts, etc.), Swinburne (2004,
147) argues that the theistic explanation is more likely, as it is the more
parsimonious: “The need for further explanation ends when we postulate
one being who is the cause of the existence of all others, and the simplest
conceivable such—I urge—is God.”
The identification of God as the necessary cause of the universe can
be traced back to human intuitions about agents as causes. Swinburne’s
distinction between physical and personal causes has parallels in the
cognitive psychological literature: humans draw an intuitive distinction
between events that are caused by purely physical processes and those
caused by agents (Gelman & Gottfried, 1996). One of these distinctions
that arise already in infancy is that agents, but not inanimate objects,
are able to influence the behavior of objects from a distance (Spelke et
al., 1995). Preverbal infants seem to appreciate that only agents can cre-
ate order: they exhibit surprise (as measured by a longer looking time)
when a rolling ball apparently causes a disorderly heap of blocks to be-
come nicely stacked, but not when an unseen agent (hidden behind a
screen) performs the same thing (Newman, Keil, Kuhlmeier, & Wynn,
2010). This intuitive distinction between objects and agents as two types
of causes is a core principle of human reasoning that persists into adult-
hood. Neuroimaging studies of adult volunteers indicate that the percep-
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tions of mechanical and agent-based motions are subserved by distinct
and largely non-overlapping brain areas (Martin & Weisberg, 2003). In
particular, only motions performed by intentional agents activate areas
reliably involved in the attribution of mental states to others. The uni-
verse exhibits a high degree of order. Our attribution of its origin to an
intentional agent is furthered by these stable intuitions about agents as
causes.
Purposiveness is a decisive cue to favor agency. When adults watch
simple geometric objects moving about on a screen, they interpret those
motions as agent-like and explain them by reference to internal mental
states if the objects appear to move in a goal-directed manner (Scholl
& Tremoulet, 2000). Experimental studies suggest that the ability to
identify an agent as the cause of an event arises early in development.
Twelve-month-olds witnessed a beanbag landing on a stage; subsequently
an object appeared on stage that could be interpreted as the cause of
this event (Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005). The infants looked least
long when a human hand appeared, and significantly longer when a toy
train or toy animal was shown, indicating that they expected the hand,
but not the toys, to be the cause of the event. This implies that infants
assume an agent to be the cause of a contingent event. This preference
for agents was also shown in other studies. Gelman and Gottfried (1996)
showed preschoolers different kinds of objects (animals, wind-up toys,
other artifacts) that, under some conditions, moved without any apparent
external cause. In the case of the animals, the children mostly referred to
internal, biological features. However, for the artifacts, they were much
more likely to attribute the motion to a person. They expressed their
surprise when they saw artifacts moving by themselves, and frequently
appealed to invisible agents, e.g., “I think another invisible person did
that again” (Gelman & Gottfried, 1996, 1980). Children appeal to agents
as causes when they have to explain the origin of artifacts, and even
plants, animals and natural kinds. This led Kelemen (2004) to call young
children intuitive theists, because they discern design and purpose in
nature, regardless of whether or not they were brought up in a religious
environment (see also section 9.3).
Explanations that postulate agents as causes of contingent events are
intuitively appealing and epistemically satisfying. Humans have the in-
tuition that beliefs, desires and intentions directly cause actions. They
regard them as generative causes that bring about actions (e.g., one forms
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the desire to lift a hand, and the hand is lifted) although the actual cogni-
tive processes that underlie human actions are far more complicated. As
social psychologist Daniel Wegner (2003) observes, personal accounts do
not require further causal explanations. By contrast, an infinite regress
of causes does not provide epistemic satisfaction—infinite regress may be
rejected out of hand in many versions of the cosmological argument be-
cause it is unintelligible from the perspective of stable causal intuitions
about persons.
Although the step to an agent is intuitive, the step to a single om-
niscient and omnipotent creator seems somewhat far-fetched from a cog-
nitive psychological point of view. Why might proponents of the cosmo-
logical argument favor God? Are they mainly motivated by background
beliefs that are specific to their culture, i.e., because theologians and
philosophers of religion who have developed cosmological arguments stem
from monotheistic religions? More cognitively interesting is the following
explanation: agents that are all-knowing and very powerful are intuitively
more appealing than normal agents. A large empirical literature on false
belief reasoning (e.g., Callaghan et al., 2005) indicates that an explicit
understanding of mental states as distinct from the state of the world
emerges somewhere between four and five years of age. From this age
onward, humans realize that an agent’s internal mental states may differ
considerably from the actual state of the world or from one’s own mental
states. By contrast, in the case of an omniscient agent, mental states
always correspond to the state of the world. If such an agent believes
that p, then p is simply the case. Consequently, such mental states are
easier to represent than mental states of normal agents, because the latter
require that one keep both the state of the world and their mental states
in mind. In line with this, cross-cultural psychological studies (e.g. J. L.
Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001; Knight et al., 2004) indicate that an
understanding of God’s mental states arises earlier in development than
that of other agents, typically around the age of three. Toddlers start
out attributing omniscience to all agents (e.g., their parents), but later in
cognitive development they restrict this to God. Children come to realize
from their experience that their parents do not know everything, but as
they constantly receive testimony that God is omniscient, they have no
reason to scale down that expectation. From a cognitive point of view,
the inference to an omniscient creator of the universe is not an unlikely
step.
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How do early-developed intuitions about causality and agency pre-
cisely figure as reasons for holding the cosmological argument? There
are two ways in which reasons for developing or endorsing the cosmo-
logical argument can be articulated. The first, which an agent can do
retrospectively, corresponds most to the commonsense notion of reason.
It consists of a reconstruction of an agent’s subconscious states when she
was formulating the argument. Such states could include, for example,
habitual modes of making inferences that cohere with the agent’s world-
view. A second conception is quite different. Not only the agent, but also
others, such as friends, family or other people who know the agent well,
can try to make those reasons explicit. Such persons have what Pollard
(2005, 80) terms “second person authority” about our reasons. Experts
on the human mind (such as developmental psychologists and cognitive
neuroscientists), if they are worth their salt, also have second person au-
thority about our reasons: they can formulate informed ideas about how
the mind draws certain conclusions and what cognitive stable intuitions
may underlie these.
As outlined earlier (section 2.2.4), many developmental psychologists
(e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1996) subscribe to the view that early-developing
principles of human reasoning do not get fundamentally revised over time.
Rather, they get enriched and sophisticated through experience and ed-
ucation. Obviously, the causal inferences that scholars trained in philos-
ophy and theology formulate are far beyond the rudimentary causal un-
derstanding of young children. Yet, if developmental psychologists who
articulated the notion of core knowledge turn out to be correct, there are
good reasons to assume that philosophers and theologians are still guided
by these early developed, cognitively stable intuitions about causality
and agency. These intuitions can be explicitly articulated, addressed and
challenged in philosophical and theological discourse as, for example, in
the discussion between Gru¨nbaum (2000) and Craig (2001) on intuitions
that underlie the cosmological argument. The fact that philosophers can
do this is compatible with our claim that these intuitions have their origin
in normal cognitive processes. As the philosopher Timothy Williamson
(2007, 3) remarks: “Neither their content [of intuitions in philosophy] nor
the cognitive basis on which they are made need be distinctively philo-
sophical.” Instead, one should not be surprised that reasoning skills that
are used in philosophy and theology are what Williamson terms
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cases of general cognitive capacities used in ordinary life, per-
haps trained, developed, and systematically applied in various
special ways, just as the cognitive capacities that we use in
mathematics and natural science are rooted in more primitive
cognitive capacities to perceive, imagine, correlate, reason,
discuss (Williamson, 2007, 136).
In the case of causal cognition, we have indicated continuities between
commonsense causal reasoning and causal inferences that underlie the
cosmological argument, such as the inference of causes to unique events,
the preference for a necessary cause, and the favored postulation of an
agent as cause.
10.4 Evolutionary debunking arguments
Given that intuitions about causality and agency play an important role
in the formulation and acceptance of the cosmological argument, what
are the implications for its cogency? In what follows, we consider impli-
cations for the justification of the cosmological argument from externalist
and internalist perspectives. According to one externalist view, cognitive
accounts of religion cast doubt on religious beliefs (e.g., Dennett, 2006).
This can be placed within the broader context of evolutionary debunking
arguments (a term coined by Kahane, in press): since evolution is not a
truth tracking, but a fitness-enhancing process, beliefs that have an origin
in the evolved structure of our minds are unreliable. This casts doubt on
their epistemic justification. Evolution can lead our cognitive faculties
to produce false beliefs or suboptimal decisions. In some cases, cognitive
processes might deviate from the truth due to a fitness trade-off between
accuracy and efficiency: given that animals have limited time and re-
sources, they will sometimes be better off with fast heuristics than with
faculties that are slow and always truth-preserving, for example, there is
little point in deliberating the most optimal escape route when faced with
a hungry predator. In this view, the propensity to attribute causes may be
a useful heuristic rather than an accurate reflection of the structure of the
world. Sometimes natural selection will promote cognitive faculties that
err on the side of safety, especially when one has little information, and
when the costs of false positives and false negatives are asymmetric. This
asymmetry can lead to the evolution of cognitive predispositions that are
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triggered easily and give rise to many false positives (S. E. Guthrie, 1993;
Stephens, 2001). Arguably this is the case for causality and agency de-
tection. Suppose one hears a noise in the night: assuming that the sound
is uncaused when in fact it is caused by an intruder, a false negative is
potentially a lot more costly (being murdered in one’s bed) than the cost
of a false positive, where one investigates in vain and goes back to sleep.
Other authors (e.g., Stewart-Williams, 2005) maintain that our cog-
nitive faculties work reliably under normal circumstances, but not in
situations that are remote from the conditions in which they evolved.
Accordingly, the evolutionary origin of causal intuitions provides prima
facie evidence against the soundness of the cosmological argument, as
it applies causal intuitions to a domain that is not ecologically relevant,
namely the universe as a whole rather than states of affairs in our ev-
eryday life. Steve Stewart-Williams (2005, 801) presents the following
evolutionary debunking argument:
We should be extremely cautious about accepting that there
must be a causal answer to the question of why there is some-
thing rather than nothing. One popular answer to this ques-
tion is to posit God as First Cause. However, we cannot rely
on the intuition that there must be an ultimate cause for the
universe as a whole. [. . . ] [This] weakens the First Cause
argument for the existence of God.
A problem with this line of reasoning is that we simply do not know
whether the attribution of a cause for the existence of the universe is
off-track. Our causal intuitions are often correct (e.g., the sound at night
was caused by the cat), and there is no a priori reason to assume that
they are off the mark when we apply them to the universe as a whole.
Arguing that causal cognition does not work in the case of theism begs
the question, i.e., it already assumes that there is no God. Should we
doubt either the causal principle itself or its applications outside of the
domain of commonsense reasoning, we would be faced with the unwel-
come consequence that causal cognition is unreliable in the domain of
science. After all, science has only developed in the last few hundred
years, and therefore does not constitute an ecologically relevant domain
for our cognitive faculties. Moreover, holding erroneous scientific beliefs
(such as that the Earth is some 6,000 years old) does not seem to have
a negative impact on human fitness (fundamentalist families tend to be
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large). Yet causality is an important metatheoretical assumption of sci-
ence that cannot be proven. It therefore seems that rejecting the causal
principle outside of the domain of commonsense reasoning comes at a
high price. The soundness of our intuitions in the cosmological argument
remains an open question.
10.5 Properly basic causal intuitions?
A second externalist line of reasoning could go like this: perhaps our
causal intuitions are warranted, because they are properly basic. They
are basic because one does not need to ground them in arguments or
in evidence from other propositions, and they are properly so in virtue
of their truth (or probable truth) being obvious and transparent to the
subject. Examples of basic beliefs include belief in an external world and
in the existence of other minds. According to Reformed epistemologists
like Alvin Plantinga (2000) some religious beliefs are properly basic; they
derive their warrant from the view that God designed the human mind in
such a way that it spontaneously forms these beliefs under a wide variety
of circumstances. According to this model, the human mind has a sensus
divinitatis, an innate cognitive disposition that produces belief in God
under a diverse range of conditions.
The cognitive science of religion has remarkably converged on this
basicality of religious beliefs, by indicating that they arise naturally and
spontaneously without deliberation or instruction (K. J. Clark & Barrett,
2010). In the case of causal intuitions, humans are cognitively predisposed
to think that every contingent object or event must have a cause, so the
assumption that God is the cause of the universe seems plausible. God is
perceived as a good explanation for the universe, because human intuitive
notions of causality favor personal over impersonal causes. In this view,
our causal intuitions do not figure as premises in an argument, but rather,
they are spontaneously elicited when we consider the universe and its ori-
gin. Although strictly speaking in this case, there is a brief inference, the
inference would be very quick, obvious and elementary—Reformed episte-
mologists (e.g., Plantinga, 2000, 170) include such beliefs in the category
of basic beliefs. It may seem surprising to include causal theistic intu-
itions in the category of basic beliefs. After all, traditionally, Reformed
epistemologists have drawn a sharp distinction between belief in God as
properly basic and belief in God as a consequence of argumentation, i.e.,
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natural theology. Some (e.g., Plantinga, 1983, 63–73) have argued that
the idea of properly basic theistic belief motivates opposition to natural
theology. However, such a sharp dichotomy may be overstated. Michael
Sudduth’s (2009) historical examination indicates that natural theology
was widely endorsed within the Reformed tradition up until the latter
19th century. In some cases, basic belief and natural theology are more
part of a continuum than direct opposites. For example, considerations
about the complexity or fine-tuning of the universe might start out as an
unreflective sense of wonderment, but it can form the starting point of
explicit arguments from design. Similarly, a sense of fascination about
the world’s existence can form the beginning of a more formalized cos-
mological argument.
The warrant of our causal intuitions depends on the externalist po-
sition one adopts, namely a Reformed epistemological account of causal
intuitions or an evolutionary explanation. In both cases, a belief is only
warranted if it is produced by cognitive processes that successfully aim
at the truth. As Plantinga (2000, 187) argues, a false belief can have
warrant, provided that the cognitive processes that produce it are typi-
cally truth-preserving. This can happen, for example, when the cognitive
faculty that produces the belief is working at the limit of its capacity.
Applying this to an evolutionary point of view, this would mean that in
the case of cosmology human causal intuitions would be working at the
limit of their capacity, since natural selection has honed these intuitions
in such a way that we can successfully interact with our everyday envi-
ronment. Now suppose that theism is false, then a theist who forms the
spontaneous belief that the universe requires a causal origin, and that this
origin is God, would be warranted, even though in this case he would be
wrong. By contrast, according to the Reformed epistemological model,
if theistic belief is false, then there is no sensus divinitatis and there-
fore, the externalist justification of theistic belief (by virtue of a creator
who has instilled belief in God) disappears. A surprising consequence of
Plantinga’s position is that an evolutionary perspective allows for belief
in God that is both false and warranted, whereas Reformed epistemology
does not. If one does not take theism as a given, the basicality of causal
intuitions does not help one decide whether the cosmological argument is
true, or whether these intuitions are perhaps false but warranted.
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10.6 Epistemic satisfaction
The cognitive science literature on causal cognition can also be incorpo-
rated in an internalist position where cosmological arguments fulfill an
epistemic need. Religious arguments rarely persuade: people seldom ac-
cept or reject religious beliefs on the basis of arguments. This is true
for both theist and nontheist religious arguments, for example, the claim
that natural evil (such as earthquakes or diseases) is incompatible with
a benevolent and omnipotent God, typically does not convince theists
to abandon their belief in such a being. Jennifer Faust (2008) argues
that religious arguments do not persuade because they beg the doxastic
question: the probability one assigns to at least one of the premises de-
pends on whether or not one accepts the argument’s conclusion. Such
arguments are not strictly speaking circular, since they do not state their
conclusion in the premises, but the fact that they require belief in the
conclusion to be persuasive makes them question-begging in a doxastic
sense.
Take the key premises of the Kala¯m cosmological argument (what-
ever begins to exist has a cause of its existence; the world began to exist).
It is no coincidence that theists find them more likely than nontheists.
Proponents (e.g., Craig, 2001) often appeal to the Big Bang theory as
scientific support for these premises. However, the Big Bang theory de-
scribes only the expansion and cooling of the universe, but says nothing
of its origin. Within the standard interpretation of this theory, the uni-
verse inflated from a tiny speck to the size it is today, and will continue
to do so. Given that matter cannot be infinitely packed, we cannot trace
the universe back to an infinitely packed state (Faber, 2001). This seems
to warrant the following inference: the universe is only finitely old, and
started out as a singularity (a very densely packed state). According to
this picture, it does not make sense to talk about time and space prior
to 14–15 billion years ago, since time and space began when the universe
began to inflate. This corresponds to the second premise of the Kala¯m
cosmological argument.
Nevertheless, other interpretations could be given. For example, one
could argue that in the case of a singularity, every moment of the Big Bang
model (t > 0) is preceded by earlier moments, so that there is no moment
at which the universe began to exist (t = 0) (Pitts, 2008). Such interpre-
tations of the Big Bang theory assume a B-theory of time, according to
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which events are ordered by tenseless relations, and all events are on an
ontological par. In this B-theoretical interpretation, it is possible to say
that the universe, while it is finitely old, never came into existence. Un-
surprisingly, proponents of the cosmological argument (e.g., Craig, 1998)
favor an A-theory of time, where the only temporal items that exist are
those that exist presently . This indicates that scientific evidence itself is
not decisive for the cosmological argument, but rather the way in which it
is interpreted, and these interpretations depend on the prior probability
one accords to the existence of God. Nontheistic critics do not accept
cosmological arguments because they accord an initially low probability
to theism. As John Mackie (1982, 100) wrote: “the hypothesis of di-
vine creation is very unlikely.” Materialists may find the existence of the
universe as a necessary fact appealing, since their worldview favors the
metaphysical primacy of the material world. To them, indeed, there is
no reason why the universe, as Hume (1779, IX, 164–165), put it, could
not be the necessary self-existent being. Theists, on the other hand, ac-
cord a high prior probability to the existence of God, and find God an
epistemically satisfying explanation. To quote Swinburne (2004, 147):
[T]he choice is between the universe as stopping point and
God as stopping point. In the latter case, God’s existence and
intention over all the universe’s history will provide not merely
a full explanation but a complete and ultimate explanation of
the existence of the universe.
If the cosmological argument does not persuade nontheists, what does it
accomplish? By presenting a justification for beliefs that one already
holds on the basis of faith or perhaps weak evidence, religious argu-
ments are primarily aimed at those who already believe (Faust, 2008).
Cosmological arguments may fulfill distinct cognitive needs by providing
a sense of epistemic satisfaction. Starting from premises that humans
find intuitively appealing, such as the causal principle and ideas about
agency, such arguments can show that theism is a satisfying explanation
for questions like ‘why is there something, rather than nothing?’ The
sense of epistemic satisfaction that arguments from natural theology can
provide is perhaps more important than their value as proofs. In other
words, while such arguments do not afford a formal proof for the ex-
istence of God, they are nevertheless rationally compelling to creatures
like us, given our natural cognitive faculties. Kant (1781 [2005]) made
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a similar claim about natural theology and its link with the structure of
the human mind: these intuitions may be misleading because they are
subject to the limitations of the human cognitive apparatus, but they
are also unavoidable and irresistibly convincing (A624/B652) given the
structure of human reasoning (see Byrne, 2007, chapters 2 and 3, for a
critical analysis). As discussed earlier (chapter 9), the persuasive force
of the argument from design might likewise be a consequence of its con-
currence with human cognitive predispositions, in particular a pervasive
tendency to see purpose and design in nature which emerges universally in
young children and remains stable throughout adult life. However, while
Kant assumed that such causal and teleological intuitions are inherently
misleading, this remains an open question, as we have pointed out in
section 10.4. From an internalist perspective, it is therefore possible to
treat the intuitions that underlie the cosmological argument as starting
points in explanatory strategies that make theism a more coherent po-
sition. The ability to move within the space of reasons, to formulate
cogent arguments (including religious arguments) critically depends on
such core intuitions that are a stable part of human cognition. These in-
tuitions (in particular, those about causality and agency) make it possible
to develop and evaluate cosmological arguments. If humans were unable
to posit unobservable causes (as our closest nonhuman relatives seem to
be), cosmological arguments would simply be unintelligible.
Experimental evidence from cognitive psychology (Koslowski, Mara-
sia, Chelenza, & Dublin, 2008) reveals an intricate interplay between ex-
planation and evidence: subjects treat information as evidence if they can
incorporate it in a causal framework. They are more likely to treat back-
ground information as relevant to an explanation for an event when the
explanation can incorporate both the event and the background informa-
tion into a single causal account, which makes the overarching explanation
increasingly convincing. Merely saying that God created the universe is
not as epistemically satisfying as providing a coherent, explanatory ac-
count of why we should believe that He did. The cosmological argument
can make theism more plausible by its ability to incorporate background
information (e.g., the Big Bang theory) and universal human intuitions
about causality and agency into a convincing overarching explanatory
account (God as the best explanation for the beginning of the universe).
By its ability to unify scientific knowledge, intuitions about causality and
agency, and theism, the cosmological argument contributes to a more co-
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herent worldview in theists, for whom the existence of the universe is a
fact in need of explanation. As Craig (2001, 379) put it: “Even if the
uncaused origin of the universe were natural relative to the Standard Big
Bang model, that would not imply that the origin of the universe does
not cry out for explanation.”
Part IV
Scientific study
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The cognitive science of science
Like artistic abilities and religious reflection, science is considered as one
of the hallmarks of human-specific cognition and behavior. The world
would look radically different without science and its products, such as
technology, medicine and the institutions we all work in. Indeed, it is be-
cause of our worldwide reliance on science that Homo sapiens could have
this enormous impact on the planet’s climate, ecology, and resources.
If we are to obtain a better understanding of human nature, studying
the cognitive processes involved in scientific reasoning and practice seems
crucial. Since the second half of the 20th century, some philosophers of
science like W.V.O. Quine (1969a) have taken a naturalistic turn. Rather
than regarding philosophy as an a priori discipline, they have begun to
accept that human modes of knowledge acquisition and reasoning are
natural—i.e., they unfold in accordance with natural laws, and are fully
part of the natural order. In this philosophical naturalistic framework,
it also became self-evident to see science as a natural phenomenon. As
a consequence, philosophers of science have started to look at cognitive
science in their quest for an understanding of scientific activity (see for
example, the essays contained in Carruthers, Stich, & Siegal, 2002). In-
deed, as Kerte´sz (2004, 29) observes, the naturalized philosophy of science
and cognitive science share a common background assumption: by using
the methods of empirical disciplines, both strive to investigate the way in
which we gain knowledge of the world.
However, the cognitive science of science remains relatively under-
explored terrain. This is in sharp contrast with, for example, artistic
behavior, which, as we have seen in section 5.1, has been a subject of
inquiry since the formation of psychology as a scientific discipline in the
19th century. Scientific practice is a relatively recent subject of inquiry
in cognitive science. Like the cognitive science of religion, the cognitive
science of science has only really started in the 1980s and 1990s, with
authors like the philosopher and cognitive scientist Marc De Mey (1992),
who applied theories of perception and computer science to philosophy
and sociology of science. The complexity of scientific reasoning, and the
many processes that seem to be involved in it may be the main reasons
why it has not been as actively researched as some other domains of cog-
nition. The cognitive science of science not only investigates the mental
processes that come into play when people reason about the content of
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science, but also specific ways of reasoning that are used in science (e.g.,
induction, causal reasoning, inference to the best explanation), the cre-
ative processes involved in scientific discovery (e.g., the use of metaphors
or analogies), the interactions between scientists (e.g., joint lab work, in-
fluence from one scientist on another researcher’s work), and the nature of
scientific understanding. Given the wide range of cognitive processes that
are involved in scientific practice, the cognitive science of science is only
different from general cognitive science in that it investigates reasoning
that has scientific content (K. Dunbar & Fugelsang, 2005).
However, this potential wide scope may also turn out to be one of the
strengths of the cognitive science of science. Most of cognitive science is
done using an in vitro approach: cognitive scientists typically investigate a
well-defined phenomenon (e.g., concept formation, memory retrieval) and
use especially-designed tasks that are quite remote from everyday cogni-
tion (e.g., presenting participants with averaged faces to probe judgments
of facial attractiveness). By contrast, cognitive scientists who investigate
scientific practice have often adopted an in vivo approach (e.g., K. Dunbar
& Blanchette, 2001). They have shifted from fairly high-level, idealized
approaches to scientific discovery and creativity, to practice within specific
settings, attempting to answer questions like ‘what enables scientists to
make significant contributions to their field?’, or ‘what explains individual
differences between scientists?’ To give but one example, the psychologist
Dean Keith Simonton (1999b) has shown a clear correlation between the
quantity of scientific output by individual scientists and their long-term
impact on their respective fields. The most powerful single predictor of
reputation (eminence) is a person’s sum total of contributions. It is thus
primarily the quantity, rather than the quality of individual contributions
that influences the reputation of the researcher (or the artist for that mat-
ter). In this, Simonton, drawing on Campbell (1960), sees creativity as a
blind non-directed process of variation, selection and retention: ideas are
similar to organisms, in that there is a strong correlation between number
of offspring and lifetime fitness. Animals that have much offspring have a
potentially higher long-term fitness compared to those that have very few
offspring—the same goes for scientific (or artistic) output: “those who
are the most prolific will have the most successful works, but they will
also have the most unsuccessful works” (Simonton, 1999a, 316).
Scientists rely to an important extent on cognitive scaffolding. Ronald
Giere (2004) and Steven Mithen (2002) have argued that scientists draw
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extensively on material culture, which records, stores and helps transmit
information. Next to this, material culture also extends perceptual ca-
pacities, as in the use of a telescope or a microscope, and computational
abilities, as in the use of calculators and computers, or even simply pen
and paper to work out a difficult equation or a complicated experimen-
tal setup (e.g., by drawing diagrams). As we have seen in chapter 8,
by the Upper Paleolithic, material culture had begun to extend human
cognitive abilities. The earliest art and artificial memory systems such
as calendars thus provide the earliest unambiguous evidence that mate-
rial culture was used as a means for recording, storing and transmitting
information. Language also plays an important role in extending human
cognitive capacities (Jackendoff, 1996). For example, the use of analogies
and metaphors is crucial for successful scientific discovery and creativity.
Scientists use both near analogies, where target and source come from
the same or a closely related domain, and distant analogies, where target
and source come from widely diverging domains. The psychologist Kevin
Dunbar (1997) studies creative scientific thought in action in molecular
biological labs. He found that near analogies form the most important
source of creative insight, such as an analogy from a well-understood virus
to a lesser-understood virus in order to predict how the latter would be-
have in specific circumstances. In this particular scientific setting, distant
analogies were less common and served explanatory rather than epistemic
purposes. Dunbar (1997, 488) therefore concludes that “creative ideas
and novel concepts arise through a series of small changes produced by
a variety of cognitive mechanisms [. . . ] Conceptual change, like evolu-
tionary change, is the result of tinkering.” However, in a recent paper
(De Cruz & De Smedt, 2010c) my co-author and I have argued that this
is only the case when scientists study well-understood phenomena. In
periods of intense conceptual change or in the invention of radically new
technological devices, when scientists cannot rely on established examples
to draw near analogies from, distant analogies can play a role in scientific
discovery. For example, the use of mechanical analogies in early modern
physiology was an effective way to understand the functions of bodily
organs. Until well into the 18th century, most of medicine concentrated
on the fluids within the body and their equilibrium, the so-called hu-
mors, such as blood, gall and slime (Greenblatt, 1995). Organs and their
workings were poorly understood. The Renaissance revival of ancient
texts on mechanics, such as Vitruvius’ De architectura (ca. 25 B.C.E.),
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which contained accounts of hydraulics and water pumping engines, next
to Archimedes’ seminal works on mechanics, made that knowledge of hy-
draulics expanded rapidly during the early modern period, enabling, for
instance, the draining of the Low Countries. This permitted physiologists
of that time to draw from this well-understood domain to unravel blood
circulation, an at that time poorly understood phenomenon. For exam-
ple, the Paduan anatomist Benedetti published a paper in 1502 on the
action of the heart valves, which he likened to unidirectional sluice gates
in a canal: “three valves are purposefully placed by nature like movable
gates which by turns when the heart is contracted in emitting blood do
not completely shut off its passage, for these valves close inward” (cited
in Novell, 1990, 397). Another Paduan anatomist, Aquapendente, com-
pared the action of the venous valves to a dam or a mill sluice. One of
his pupils, William Harvey, used a variety of analogies to reason about
circulation. Although his idea that the heart was like a pair of water
bellows (not a pump, as is popularly assumed) was not novel, his colorful
use of analogies, often from the domains of mechanics or physics, enabled
him to make a more precise formulation of how human blood circulated.
Next to this, in his lectures to the College of Physicians, he likened the
mechanism of an erection to the inflation of a glove, and the working
of lungs and thorax to a bladder within a pair of bellows (De Cruz &
De Smedt, 2010c, 36–37).
Continuity or discontinuity?
An important question in the cognitive science of science concerns the
continuity or discontinuity between science and other forms of reasoning.
As we saw in parts II and III, art and religion both date back to at least
32,000 BP. By comparison, scientific practice is a recent phenomenon
in our species, even if it is as broadly construed to also include Greek
natural philosophy. Moreover, although science has an enormous impact
on human lives, the vast majority of humans do not actively engage in
science. Indeed, the process of becoming a scientist involves years of
dedicated practice and study within the highly institutionalized environ-
ment of research-oriented universities. The philosopher Robert McCauley
(2000) argues that there is a wide cognitive divide between scientific and
everyday reasoning: science is ‘unnatural’, whereas religion is ‘natural’.
McCauley uses these terms in the fairly restrictive sense of Boyer (1994).
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Accordingly, thoughts can be said to be natural if they emerge without ex-
tensive cultural support, or even without any particular cultural support.
For example, grammatical rules in natural language arise spontaneously
even in newly-invented languages such as home sign languages (e.g., San-
dler et al., 2005). By contrast, unnatural abilities are those that need
extensive cultural support for their development. If McCauley (2000) is
correct, then studying the cognitive basis of science is of academic in-
terest at best, since the cognitive processes that would be uncovered are
restricted to the select few who have applied themselves to this unnatural
form of reasoning, and is mostly constrained to those living in indus-
trialized nations of the past few centuries (a handful of ancient Greeks
notwithstanding).
Although scientific methods are indeed the result of deliberate study
and practice, McCauley (2000) may be overstating his case. Without
causal reasoning, creativity, and induction, for example, it would be hard
to imagine scientific practice. These abilities are crucial to science, yet
they are not explicitly taught. This suggests some continuity between sci-
entific and everyday reasoning. Carruthers (2002b) has argued that our
ability for hypothesis testing predates the evolution of scientific knowl-
edge, and that this ability has been honed by natural selection through
hunting and tracking. Humans have been active hunters for at least one
million years (Rabinovich et al., 2008). Whereas predators often hunt by
stealth or endurance, human hunters typically proceed by wounding an
animal and subsequently tracking it down using cues in the environment
before killing the weakened prey. This tracking is a lengthy process that
requires the explicit testing, evaluating and confirming or abandoning of
hypotheses, often in consultation with fellow hunters, as can be seen on
Fig. 10.2.
Although science does require a specific suite of social and economic
circumstances for its development, whether one takes the short chronol-
ogy (Renaissance) or the long chronology (ancient Greeks) of science,
scientific practice can only be fully understood if one takes into account
both the abilities and constraints of the evolved human mind. As we have
seen in section 1.2.3, according to Mithen (1996), the ability for scientific
reasoning was already fully in place by the Upper Paleolithic, where we
see evidence of cognitive fluidity, a propensity of the human brain that
lies at the basis of art, religion and science. Richard Rudgley (1999) has
convincingly argued that people from the Late Pleistocene onward show
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Figure 10.2: Three Kalahari hunter-gatherers use environmental cues to
track down a wounded prey, testing and deliberating hypotheses. From
Wannenburgh et al. (1999), p. 33.
evidence of sophisticated technology and modes of reasoning, including
surgery (e.g., trepanation) and astronomical observations, which are pre-
cursors of more recent systematic scientific endeavors.
Some authors (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997) go as far as to say
that scientific reasoning has its roots in normal cognitive processes that
emerge early in child development. They adhere to the ‘theory theory
view’ of cognitive development, according to which human cognition can
be characterized in terms of theories that the mind constructs about the
world. Children move through a successive number of stages in which
they have different understandings of phenomena around them, including
belief-desire psychology, biology or physics. Children are ‘scientists in
the crib’ (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2001): they learn about the world
by constructing hypotheses and testing these against their growing ex-
perience of the world. However, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) may be
over-emphasizing the role of theory formation in cognition, especially in
view of the substantial evidence that a considerable body of our folk in-
tuitions is already present in infants. As we have seen in section 2.3.1,
infants already posit unobservables, such as gravity and internal mental
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states, with very little exposure to the world. Three-month-olds seem to
have some understanding of gravity: they expect that unsupported ob-
jects will fall downward (Spelke et al., 1995). Seven-month-olds already
infer internal mental states (Kova´cs et al., 2010): they form expectations
about the presence or absence of an object not only on the basis of their
own mental states, but also on the inferred beliefs of others. It seems
very hard to believe that preverbal infants would be able to construct
unobservables like gravity or mental states on the basis of external cues
alone, and would be able to do this after less than a year of interaction
with the world, especially given the fact that they spend a considerable
part of this period sleeping.
The educational psychologist David Geary (2007) draws a useful dis-
tinction between primary and secondary forms of cognition, both of which
play a role in science and other forms of formal reasoning. Primary abili-
ties are evolved capacities, dealing with evolutionary relevant properties of
the world. They include what we have termed intuitive ontologies, namely
domains of folk knowledge such as intuitive physics, intuitive psychology,
and intuitive biology, and abilities such as the capacity to learn language
or to understand the spatial properties of the environment. Secondary
abilities are learned skills. An interaction of both types of cognition allows
for the creation and maintenance of suites of culture-specific domains, like
mathematics, writing or specific scientific disciplines. Mathematics, for
instance, is a culture-specific domain that relies on an unlearned number
sense and spatial abilities, but that extends these into culture-specific
mathematical concepts like negative numbers and Euclidean spaces, of-
ten relying on symbolic notation (De Cruz & De Smedt, in press b). Thus,
it makes sense to say that scientific practice consists of both unlearned,
innate capacities and learned, culturally transmitted skills. Induction,
the detection of causality, the ability to make inferences to the best ex-
planation, and intuitive ontological knowledge belong to the former kind,
whereas the ability to synthesize DNA or to solve algebraic equations are
examples of the latter. In the next two chapters, we will examine the role
of intuitive ontologies in scientific understanding (chapter 11) and the
role of biased cultural transmission in overcoming these biases (chapter
12). Intuitive ontologies play a prominent role in scientific understanding,
and may hamper scientific progress, but interactions between scientists
can mitigate their effects, and may provide a solution to the discrepancy
between our everyday, commonsense understanding of the world, and the
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often counterintuitive worldviews that scientists construct.
Chapter 11
The role of intuitive
ontologies in scientific
understanding—The case
of human evolution
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Cruz, H., & De
Smedt, J. (2007). The role of intuitive ontologies in scientific understand-
ing—The case of human evolution. Biology and Philosophy, 22, 351–368.
11.1 Introduction
Since the advent of modern biology, biologists have strived to give hu-
mans a place in their theories. Both Thomas Huxley (1863) and Charles
Darwin (1871) stressed that humans are subject to the same evolutionary
pressures as other species. However, more than a century later, paleoan-
thropology is still struggling to give man a place in nature. Paleoanthro-
pology as a science has set out to solve two important questions: are
differences between humans and other animals ones in degree or ones in
kind, and are humans unique—not just in the sense that any species is
—but also uniquely different in the way they have acquired their charac-
teristics? The wide disagreement among paleoanthropologists on answers
to these questions may seem puzzling given the sound theoretical back-
ground of evolutionary biology and the ever expanding archeological and
fossil record. This chapter proposes that much of these disagreements
originate from clashing intuitions provided by our intuitive ontologies.
We argue that intuitive ontologies structure our understanding of the
world and that they continue to play a role in scientific understanding of
human evolution.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the role of intuitive on-
tologies in the development of folk theories. We further argue that intu-
itive ontologies, despite their value in everyday understanding, have clear
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epistemological limitations. Next, we examine the relationship between
intuitive ontologies and science. We show that the influence of intuitive
ontologies on scientific thinking but not on everyday thought has declined
steadily since the rise of modern science in the 17th century. Taking mod-
els of human evolution as a case-study, we then examine whether scientists
are still prone to fall back on intuitive ontologies in their understanding
of their field. We demonstrate that theories on human evolution are in-
fluenced by tacit intuitive ontological notions. The persistence of these
notions in spite of their incompatibility with science provides evidence
that intuitive ontologies are an integral and stable part of human cogni-
tion.
11.2 Intuitive ontologies and folk theories
Cross-cultural evidence suggests that intuitive ontologies may play a cru-
cial role in the development of everyday knowledge and folk theories (see
section 2.3). Many culturally transmitted ideas could be understood as
cultural elaborations on preexisting intuitive ontologies. For example, in-
tuitive biological knowledge in children develops similarly across cultures
(Atran, 1998). It leads to similar folk taxonomies across the world, which
enable people to reason about animals and plants in their environment
based on their underlying species-typical essence. Between three and six
years of age, children adopt an essentialist stance when reasoning about
animals and plants, and even social categories. Intriguingly, children are
often more essentialist than adults. Five-year-olds believe that French
babies brought up by English-speaking parents will grow up to speak
French; Indian children believe that a Brahmin child remains Brahmin,
even when raised by untouchables (Gelman, 2004).
A possible role for intuitive ontologies in the development of folk
knowledge is that they are framework theories—they provide a skeletal
structure to explain the world in terms of unobservable causal mecha-
nisms. Hume (1739 [2001], part III, §2) already noted that causality
cannot be directly observed, but must be inferred. There seems to be
no compelling reason to infer that a billiard ball sets another in mo-
tion by colliding with it. Yet even three-year-olds make such inferences
based on an assumed generative transmission of energy (T. R. Shultz,
1982a). Children, laypeople and pre-scientific philosophers rely on frame-
work theories, rather than on perceptual cues to explain a wide range
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of phenomena. Such theories are preferred over perceptually based ac-
counts, because they offer coherent and plausible explanations for a wide
range of phenomena. Thus, it seems that science, with its criteria for
coherence and scope, may derive some of its cognitive strategies from in-
tuitive ontologies. First-graders, for example, initially adopt a geocentric
(pre-Copernican) view to explain changes between day and night, even
though this view is never taught (Vosniadou, 1994). The youngest chil-
dren (preschoolers) formulate coherent but scientifically incorrect models
of the Earth, such as a disc-shaped Earth, similar to folk conceptions
in many cultures (e.g., Indian cosmology), see Fig. 11.1. After all, their
intuitive physics informs them that the Earth is flat, and that things fall
downward. Cultural influence also plays a role: whereas both Indian and
American young children make disc-shaped models of the Earth, only the
former will state that this disc is surrounded by water, in accordance with
Indian folk cosmology (Samarapungavan, Vosniadou, & Brewer, 1996)—
this is not unlike the popular image of the Earth in the Middle Ages,
when seafarers feared they would sail off this ocean into unknown deeps.
Cultural influence can also have a mitigating effect on intuitive ontolo-
gies: Australian children are very much aware that they live ‘on the other
side’ of the globe compared to children in the United Kingdom. Because
of this, they have a much earlier understanding of the shape of our planet
compared to British children (Siegal, Butterworth, & Newcombe, 2004).
Older children attempt to incorporate scientific knowledge while main-
taining a consistent worldview. For example, the hollow sphere takes
into account spherical images of the Earth, but still maintains a flat sur-
face for people to live on. It is only in later primary school that children
accept a scientifically correct spherical model of the earth (Vosniadou &
Brewer, 1992).
11.3 Epistemological limitations to intuitive ontologies
If humans view the world in terms of intuitive ontologies, it seems likely
that there will be differences between intuitive and scientific understand-
ing. Science typically requires rigorous, formalized explanations and
sound empirical support, whereas intuitive ontologies are more implicit
and less consistent. There is no overarching intuitive science that enables
us to look at the world through a coherent intuitive scientific lens. How
reliable could intuitive ontologies be as a source of knowledge? It is evo-
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Figure 11.1: Left: mental models of the Earth by children aged 6 to 11.
Note that not all children go through every stage, but basically the lower
drawings represent models by younger children, and the upper figures
represent ideas on the Earth by older ones. From Vosniadou and Brewer
(1992), Fig. 1, p. 549. Right: an example of a dual Earth model, sponta-
neously drawn when the author asked his then four-year-old daughter to
depict the Earth. Here the Earth is round and has people on opposing
sides, but our planet is then integrated into a flat plane with the usual
fauna. It is also a geocentric model, with a small Moon and Sun orbiting
the Earth.
lutionarily quite implausible that they would be entirely off the mark.
However, between usefulness and epistemological soundness lies an abyss
of possible imperfect designs. Take a falling ball: intuitive physics as-
sumes that a ball, carried by a running person falls in a straight line to
the ground from its initial point of release since it is no longer directly
supported. Newtonian physics predicts a parabolic deviation in the course
of the falling object. Yet, an overwhelming majority of people who had
a high school course in physics predicts that the ball will fall in a path
perpendicular to its point of release, an intuition which systematically
distorts their empirical observations, as shown on Fig. 11.2. Even among
physics undergraduates over 20% hold this wrong intuition (McCloskey,
1983).
Although intuitive ontologies could be termed theories in the sense
that they provide explanations, they are often surprisingly shallow. In-
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Figure 11.2: Top: What will happen when a running man releases a
ball? The correct prediction is (a): the ball will continue at the same
speed as the runner; combined with the gravitational force this results
in a parabolic curve. From McCloskey (1983), p. 123. Bottom: pre-
dictions of the trajectory of the ball. A minority of subjects who had
a high school training in Newtonian physics correctly predicted (a). In
the physics undergraduates, this number has increased, but a minority of
them incorrectly maintained the intuitive model (b).
tuitive psychology leads us to believe that our mental states cause our
actions. If an intention is immediately followed by the appropriate ac-
tion, we experience a sense of authorship over this. Yet experiments
show that people can claim authorship over something they have not
done: when subjects click on the image of a swan, after being primed
the word ‘swan’, they will deny that their cursor had in fact been guided
by an experimenter (Wegner, 2003). Thus, our ideas on how the mind
works are surprisingly shallow, an illusion created by the brain that seems
to have developed the evolutionary function of making quick inferences
about other agents’ behavior rather than self-reflection. There may be
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sound computational reasons why intuitive ontologies have these episte-
mological limitations. All too often, there are an almost infinite number
of alternative solutions to any given problem. Examining each of them
would place too much demands on our computational abilities. Evolu-
tion might have favored fast, shallow inference mechanisms (Gigerenzer
& Goldstein, 1996) over epistemologically sound, but slow profound the-
ories.
11.4 Intuitive ontologies and scientific understanding
One way to look at early philosophical theories is that they made explicit
the implicit modes of understanding that intuitive ontologies provide.
Hellenistic and medieval theories on physics echo the object-centred naive
physics of modern college students (McCloskey, 1983). Aristotle’s biol-
ogy, while introducing novel concepts such as an over-arching taxonomy,
was still heavily imbued with intuitive notions of teleology and essential-
ism (Atran, 1998). In some cases, specific cultural conditions can give rise
to elaborations on intuitive ontologies, which nevertheless continue to be
central to the theories. First, let us consider the historical example of
physics. Initially, Aristotle’s theory of motion stated that inanimate ob-
jects, in order to set each other in motion, need to make direct contact, a
principle that is also held by three-month-olds (Spelke et al., 1995). From
the Late Middle Ages on, however, this theory was felt to be inadequate.
The increasing use of projectile weaponry in medieval warfare (such as
longbows, crossbows and primitive cannons) made it necessary to formu-
late a new theory of physics, as is exemplified in the late medieval impetus
theory. After all, once a projectile leaves its launcher, it becomes hard to
pinpoint any external force operating through direct contact; therefore,
the 14th century philosopher Jean Buridan stated
Thus we can and ought to say that in the stone or other
projectile there is impressed something which is the motive
force [virtus motiva] of that projectile. [. . . ] [T]he motor in
moving a moving body impresses [imprimit] in it a certain
impetus [impetus] or a certain motive force [vis motiva] of the
moving body, [which impetus acts] in the direction toward
which the mover was moving the moving body, either up or
down, or laterally, or circularly. [. . . ] It is by that impetus
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that the stone is moved after the projector ceases to move
(Buridan, 14th c. [2009], 88).
However, this impetus theory was but an elaboration of a pre-existing in-
tuitive physics—as is evident in subjects without any training in physics
restating it quite explicitly (McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980, 1140).
Another example of the role of intuitive ontologies in scientific un-
derstanding is essentialism in biology. The view of a species essence as
underlying causal mechanism for development and behavior has dom-
inated most, if not all pre-Darwinian biological thought. Eighteenth-
and early 19th-century European taxonomies became increasingly elab-
orate as a result of the introduction of a dazzling array of new species
of plants and animals by European explorers (Atran, 1998). However,
this proliferation of taxonomic hierarchic levels (family, order, phylum)
did not result in a refutation of essentialist beliefs. Indeed, biologists
could not forsake the intuitive belief that species have essences, which
prevents them from evolving into different species (Stamos, 2005, 84–
88). Hull (1964) observed that essentialism in taxonomy (and biology
in general) resulted in two thousand years of stasis: before Darwin and
other evolutionary theorists, biologists like Linnaeus did not make any
significant theoretical contribution to taxonomic theory since Aristotle
laid its foundations in the fourth century B.C.E. The view of a species
essence as underlying causal mechanism for development and behavior
has dominated most pre-Darwinian biological thought until well into the
18th century (Stamos, 2005). In questionnaire-based studies (e.g., Sama-
rapungavan & Wiers, 1997), a large percentage of children spontaneously
voice essentialist ideas about the origin of species. Their ideas show re-
markable similarities to historical theories, including Greek essentialism
or accounts of small, micro-evolutionary changes within species’ bound-
aries, as fleshed out by the 18th-century French natural historian Buffon.
Perhaps the intuitive appeal of essentialism can partly explain the slow
acceptance of evolutionary theory. It took this theory almost a century
to take root among professional biologists; even today it is not widely ac-
cepted among non-scientists. Shtulman and Schulz (2008) indeed found
that adults who hold on to an essentialist conception of species under-
stand the mechanism of evolution through natural selection less well than
those who hold less essentialist views.
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With the adoption of the experimental method in early modern Eu-
rope, and the gradual emergence of a scientific community, science began
to part ways with intuitive ontologies, to the point that both became
incompatible. Newtonian physics rejected the impetus; Darwinian evolu-
tionary theory denied the notion of essences. Nowadays, scientists demon-
strably abandon pre-scientific intuitions in their domain of expertise. In
one study (Poling & Evans, 2004), children, lay adults, medical students
and evolutionary biologists were asked if extinction is inevitable for all
species. Despite the ease with which they accept death as an inevitabil-
ity for all living beings, all subjects, with the tell-tale exception of the
evolutionary biologists, refused to accept that extinction is inevitable for
every species; furthermore they were especially reluctant to foresee the
extinction of Homo sapiens. Presumably death is not extrapolated on the
species-level because essentialism in intuitive biology holds that species
are unchanging and eternal. Professional evolutionary biologists, in con-
trast, endorsed extinction as inevitable, extending this belief to humans.
Scientists exhibit the same cognitive biases and limitations as other
human beings. The influence of cognitive biases not only applies to the
content of their scientific beliefs, but also to their most fundamental
metatheoretical assumptions. Take, for example, the intuition that all
contingent states of affairs have a cause for their existence. Scientists
rely on this principle, though they cannot demonstrate its reliability. The
propensity to infer causes probably has a long evolutionary history, as it
has been demonstrated in apes as well (Bra¨uer et al., 2006). The search
for (non-obvious) causes of events arises in very young children, leading
some psychologists (e.g., Brewer, Chinn, & Samarapungavan, 2000) to
liken children to scientists, engaged in theory formation and hypothesis
testing. Others have reversed this analogy, arguing that in fact scientists
are like children: Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997), for instance, see science as
a byproduct of our universal search for causal explanations, emerging in
early childhood. As we have seen in section 10.3, looking time experiments
(Saxe et al., 2005) indicate that this search for causes is already present
in 12-month-olds, who expect a human hand, rather than a toy animal,
to be the cause of an object falling on a stage. Preschoolers readily infer
unobservable causes in diverse domains: they invoke unobservable mental
states to explain the behavior of agents (Callaghan et al., 2005), unob-
servable physical forces to account for the motions of inanimate objects
(T. R. Shultz, 1982a), and invisible essences to predict and account for
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the growth of biological organisms (Gelman &Wellman, 1991). This intu-
ition of causality illustrates the continuity between everyday and scientific
reasoning.
Some scientific notions fit poorly with intuitive ontologies. Without
intuitive notions to guide them, scientists often fail to agree on even
the most basic foundations of their field. This may explain why there
still is no single canonical version of evolutionary theory. Biologists and
philosophers of biology disagree on the basic unit(s) of selection (Okasha,
2006), on what a species may be (Stamos, 2003), and on whether evolution
takes place in a gradual or a punctuated tempo (Gould, 2002). If intuitive
ontologies continue to guide our everyday understanding, there remains
the possibility that intuitive ontological ideas may slip unnoticed into
scientific discourse.
11.5 Theories on human evolution
Over the past few decades, theories on human evolution have witnessed
profound paradigmatic shifts, such as the crumbling of the model of multi-
regional continuity, or the archeological evidence for the occurrence of ho-
minids outside of Africa at 1.8 million years BP. These shifts were almost
exclusively caused by finds of fossil evidence (e.g., Gabunia et al., 2000)
and by new insights offered by other disciplines, especially molecular bi-
ology and geochronology (e.g., Swisher III et al., 1994). Paleoantropolo-
gists have always been consumers rather than producers of evolutionary
theory; theirs is a discovery-driven rather than a theory-driven science
(Tattersall, 2000). For the most part, paleoanthropology has been de-
scriptive rather than explicitly theoretical. In other words, it describes
the hominid fossil record, rather than providing novel theories on how
these fossils connect in an evolutionary framework (Foley, 2001).
Therefore, studies of human evolution lack an explicit ontological
framework, making them particularly susceptible to intrusion by tacit
intuitive ontological notions. A possible way to distinguish cases where
intuitive ontologies bias research and where they do not is to examine
whether the basic assumptions of paleoanthropologists depart from those
of standard evolutionary theory. If these basic assumptions are more
compatible with intuitive ontologies than with evolutionary theory (as
will be argued, for example, for the single species model of human evo-
lution), there is reason to suspect that intuitive ontologies are at work.
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How could intuitive ontologies influence scientific understanding of hu-
man evolution? In what follows, we explore some possible relationships
between intuitive ontologies and scientific perspectives on human evolu-
tion. The case-studies below derive from two distinct intuitive ontological
assumptions: the human-nonhuman distinction and psychological essen-
tialism, both of which have differing adaptive functions and therefore
lead to distinct tacit assumptions. The human-nonhuman distinction is a
psychological mechanism that enables us to distinguish conspecifics from
nonconspecifics. This adaptation, which among other things helps us to
recognize potential mates, is important in many species. As psycholog-
ical evidence indicates that conspecifics (humans) constitute a distinct
ontological category (Bonatti, Frot, Zangl, & Mehler, 2002), it is not im-
plausible that studies of human evolution are influenced by the ontological
division between humans and other animals. This might strengthen the
belief that human evolution is exceptional. Psychological essentialism, on
the other hand, makes it possible to override perceptual differences. Its
adaptive function is to facilitate inductive inferences about food, preda-
tors and other ecologically salient features. It enables us, for example,
to realize that a tree currently without fruit will bear fruit in the right
season, or that all predators of the same species are equally dangerous.
Essentialism can come into play when a great genetic similarity between
humans and apes is tacitly taken as evidence that they share the same
essence. This can lead to the idea that apes have psychological abilities
similar to those of humans.
11.5.1 Pruning and straightening the bushy tree of human evolution
Before Aristotle introduced humans as a genus alongside animals and
plants, perhaps no culture ever included humans in their folk taxonomies.
This may owe to the fact that humans belong to a distinct intuitive onto-
logical domain. In effect, western culture may be exceptional in its inclu-
sion of humans in the category ‘animals’ due to this Aristotelian legacy.
In many languages, the term which translates most closely as ‘animal’
excludes humans (Waxman, 2005, 56). When Anggoro, Waxman, and
Medin (2005) asked Indonesian 5- to 10-year-olds whether humans can
be categorized as animals, almost all children explicitly denied this. In
contrast, more than half of their American subjects accepted this. Experi-
mental evidence also suggests that 10-month-olds can distinguish humans
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from other animals (Bonatti et al., 2002), but fail to distinguish dissim-
ilar looking artifacts (Xu & Carey, 1996), indicating that they make a
fundamental human-nonhuman distinction. Modern evolutionary theory
firmly rejects this ontological distinction between humans and other ani-
mals. From its earliest beginnings, evolutionary biology has taken pains
to fit the human species into models of evolutionary theory, as is evident
in Huxley’s three essays on Man’s place in nature (1863) and Darwin’s
Descent of man (1871).
Even so, intuitive ontologies seem to influence scientific understand-
ing of human evolution by compelling scientists to treat humans and their
evolutionary history as exceptional. Hominid fossils are afforded an inor-
dinate amount of scrutiny and speculation, yet the relatively scarce ho-
minid fossil record pales in comparison to that of many other species, that
are often far less studied. As the paleontologist Tim White (1995, 369)
sighs “No suid [or other nonhominid] skulls grace the covers of Nature or
garner headlines like ‘new pig skull completely overturns all previous the-
ories of pig evolution.’” Moreover, once we accept humans as a taxonomic
group, next to plants and animals, it becomes possible to adopt an essen-
tialist stance on humans as well. As late as the 1920s, for example, the
paleoanthropologist Raymond Dart (1925, 195) could appeal to the “har-
monious proportions” of the Taung skull as evidence for its proto-human
status. The assignment of type specimens, i.e., representative fossils for
given species of hominids, reflects a pre-Darwinian essentialist notion in
that it builds on the assumption that for any given species an ideal type
exists, and that variation occurs around this fixed point. If species are
viewed as dynamic entities, subject to variations in space and time, there
is no cogent reason to take a particular specimen as typical for the whole
species. Nevertheless, assigning type specimens is still common practice
among paleoanthropologists, although it has declined in other branches
of post-Darwinian taxonomy.
Tacit ontological notions that humans are unique may have resulted
in the long-standing view that there is something special about humans
that prevents them from speciating and evolving according to the laws
of natural selection. Ever since Darwin, evolution has been conceived
as a branching tree, in which one ancestral species can have several de-
scendant species. However, for the greatest part of paleoanthropology’s
history as a discipline, this was not the prevailing conceptual framework
in which fossil hominid evidence was evaluated. The single species model,
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proposed by Franz Weidenreich, and endorsed by Theodosius Dobzhan-
sky and Ernst Mayr, had hardened into a unilineal and essentialist view
on human evolution. In the first half of the 20th century, the gradual
accumulation of fossil hominids had resulted in a plethora of taxonomic
names. Dobzhansky (1944, 261–262), reviewing the hominid fossil record,
concluded that “no more than a single hominid species existed at any one
time level.” Mayr (1950, 115–116) argued that all hominids could be
grouped in a single lineage leading from the australopithecines, to Homo
erectus, to Homo sapiens. To his credit, Mayr realized that this model of
hominid evolution did not follow the usual branching pattern of evolution.
His explanation for this exception was that hominids could not speciate
because they occupied more ecological niches than any other known an-
imal as they had developed culture. Because they occupy the cultural
niche, humans were conceived of as a unique species, subject to unique
evolutionary pressures. Left to themselves, ordinary (that is, nonhuman)
species get on with speciating, but once the magic ingredient of culture
is added, this process stops. As Mayr (1950, 116–117) put it:
There is one striking difference between man and most of the
animals [. . . ] Man, who has reached such a high degree of
independence from the environment is less dependent on local
adaptation, and a subspecies of man can quickly spread into
many geographically distant areas [. . . ] The authors who have
claimed that man is unique in his evolutionary pattern are
undoubtedly right.
In all probability, Mayr’s reasoning was influenced by the importance of
cultural anthropology—instead of biology, as is the case today—in the
study of human evolution in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s.
This resulted in a systematic overestimation of the role of culture on hu-
man evolution. It remains striking that Dobzhansky and Mayr, both key
figures in the modern synthesis, proposed that speciation did not happen
in human evolution. As Foley (2001, 7) points out, their main argu-
ment for proposing unilineal models of human evolution was informed by
the tacit assumption that humans are unique, rather than by evolution-
ary theory. They reasoned in hindsight, not using culture as a primary
causal mechanism, but as a justification for the alleged anomalies in hu-
man evolution. In contrast, their contemporary, the paleontologist George
Gaylord Simpson (1950) held the more informed view based on general
11.5. Theories on human evolution 315
principles of evolutionary theory, rejecting Weidenreich’s application of
orthogenesis on human evolution on theoretical grounds. Interestingly,
Simpson (1950, 63) hinted at the possible role of psychological essential-
ism (“inherent tendency”) in the popularity of orthogenesis during this
period. Unfortunately, paleoanthropologists chose to follow Dobzhansky
and Mayr, rather than Simpson. The role of culture in human evolution
can be easily overstated, as is illustrated by the recent find of Homo flore-
siensis, a small hominid with the brain size of an early australopithecine,
dated between 90,000 and 18,000 BP (P. Brown et al., 2004). Despite their
cultural niche, hominids were apparently subject to island dwarfism, just
like other larger mammals that happen to strand upon remote islands
(e.g., now-extinct pig-sized hippopotami on Cyprus and Madagascar, Di-
amond, 1992). Indeed, a recent case of extreme island dwarfism in Homo
sapiens on the Micronesian island Palau around 3000–1000 BP (L. R.
Berger, Churchill, De Klerk, & Quinn, 2008) underscores this. Morpho-
logical analysis of stone tools also calls the exaggerated role of culture
in human evolution into question. It indicates that human culture prior
to the Upper Paleolithic evolved very slowly, with long periods of stasis.
For instance, the earliest Oldowan stone tools, dated at around 2.6 mil-
lion year ago, are morphologically indistinguishable from the youngest
African specimens, which are one million years younger (Semaw et al.,
1997). Culture undeniably played an important part in human evolution,
but over-emphasizing its role may be less informed by sound archeolog-
ical and fossil evidence than by the intuition that humans are unique
compared to other animals.
As a result, the paleoanthropological community attempted to cram
the entire hominid fossil record (then already quite diverse) into this sin-
gle linear model (Tattersall, 2000). The single species hypothesis finally
collapsed with discoveries in the 1970s of fossils at the East-African Lake
Turkana Basin, which unequivocally proved that at least two hominid
species coexisted: the robust small-brained Paranthropus boisei and the
large-brained gracile Homo ergaster, shown on Fig. 11.3 (R. E. F. Leakey
& Walker, 1976). Since this time, paleoantropologists have cautiously
started to acknowledge that humans may be like other species after all,
subject to the same evolutionary processes, as exemplified in Robert Fo-
ley’s (1987) Another unique species, arguably the first paleoanthropologi-
cal book to make explicit use of evolutionary theory to interpret details of
the human fossil record. A modern offshoot of the single species hypoth-
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Figure 11.3: Frontal, lateral and superior aspects from (a) KNM-ER 406
(Paranthropus boisei) and (b) KNM-ER 3733 (Homo ergaster), the first
unequivocal proof that two hominid species lived at the same time as both
were found in situ in the same archeological layer (the upper member of
the Koobi Fora Formation, east of Lake Turkana, Kenya). This effectively
ended the single species model, as even a layperson could see that both
skulls belong to two different species. From R. E. F. Leakey and Walker
(1976), Fig. 2, p. 573, Fig. 1, p. 573 and Fig. 3, p. 574.
esis is the model of multiregional continuity (see e.g., Wolpoff, Hawks,
& Caspari, 2000, for an overview). According to this model, all extant
human populations descend directly from a single, highly variable species
which arose about 1.5 million years BP, and which was divided into dis-
tinct ancestral African, Asian and European subpopulations. As they
assume a rather unusual speciation pattern for humans, the multiregion-
alists too may be under the delusion of the human-nonhuman distinction.
Pleistocene hominids lived in disparate ecological settings, and were there-
fore likely to be subject to different selective pressures. Yet they managed
to avoid allopatric speciation, progressing steadily and in parallel toward
the Homo sapiens that we are today! Gould (2002, 911–916) muses that
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multiregionalism only exists because it describes human evolution; no
biologist would draw a similar scenario for another widespread species.
Unsurprisingly, molecular biological studies (e.g., Ingman, Kaessmann,
Pa¨a¨bo, & Gyllensten, 2000) have cast serious doubt on the multiregional
hypothesis, since they indicate a very recent common ancestor for all
current human populations34.
The intuitive human-nonhuman distinction may have contributed to
the idea that human evolution is somehow exceptional. Paleoantropol-
ogists chose to infer as few hominid species as possible from the fossil
record, preferring a straightforward single evolutionary path to a bushy
tree with many branches and dead ends. This is still apparent in main-
stream paleoanthropology: since 1994 important discoveries of late Mio-
cene hominid fossils have given rise to four new genera within the ho-
minid lineage: Ardipithecus (T. D. White, Suwa, & Asfaw, 1995), Or-
rorin (Senut et al., 2001), Kenyanthropus (M. G. Leakey et al., 2001) and
Sahelanthropus (Brunet et al., 2002)—next to the three widely accepted
genera Australopithecus, Paranthropus and Homo. Nonetheless, paleoan-
thropologists (e.g., Haile-Selassie, Suwa, & White, 2004) and geneticists
alike (e.g., Cela-Conde & Ayala, 2003) argue that such a large number
of genera is unacceptable, and that we should somehow prune the tree of
hominid evolution.
11.5.2 Essentialism and humanized apes
One of the most crucial intuitions of psychological essentialism is that
surface features of living kinds are caused and constrained by deeper
properties: animals and plants have an underlying reality or true nature
that one cannot observe directly, but that gives each living thing its iden-
tity and guides its development, as in the transformation from caterpillar
to butterfly. As such, psychological essentialism assumes that a cate-
gory has two distinct, although interrelated levels: the level of observable
reality and the level of an underlying explanation and cause (Medin &
Ortony, 1989). This enables children and lay adults to override percep-
tual features when making judgments on category-membership. When
three-year-olds are shown a leaf, an insect and a leaf-insect, they believe
that the leaf-insect will behave more like an insect than like a leaf, even
though it looks more like the latter (Gelman, 2004). Children from such
dissimilar cultures as Mesoamerican Maya (Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2004)
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and West-African Yoruba (Ahn et al., 2001) hold the belief that super-
ficial changes do not alter a living thing’s core identity. Lay adults too
draw inferences based on taxonomic affiliation, rather than on superficial
characteristics, for example, most adults in the west believe that whales
are mammals rather than fish (Dupre´, 1999), even though whales resem-
ble fish in their morphological features.
In the face of contrary evidence, psychological essentialism seems to
guide inferences, that is, even if surface properties lead us to believe other-
wise, we perceive underlying essences as fundamental causal mechanisms.
Take Chris Darwin, Charles Darwin’s great great grandson, who was as-
signed a tutor to help him pass his biology A-level: “And he introduced
himself and I introduced myself and he said, ‘you’re Darwin [. . . ] I can’t
teach you anything about biology,’ which I thought was really sweet. And
then I went off and failed”35. Despite Chris Darwin’s weak performance
in biology, his tutor’s essentialism compelled him to believe he had to be
good in biology.
The implications of adopting essentialism on theories on human cog-
nitive evolution may turn out to be far-reaching. During the second half
of the 20th century, findings in paleoanthropology and molecular biology
have dramatically altered our conceptual framework on the relatedness
between humans and other apes (see also section 1.2). It was generally
believed that the split between hominids (Hominidae) and the other apes
(the paraphyletic clade Pongidae) occurred at least 15 million years BP.
As we have seen, Sarich and Wilson’s (1967) seminal molecular biological
study demonstrated that humans and chimpanzees diverged only 5 mil-
lion years BP. Thus, humans are no longer separated from other apes by a
deep evolutionary chasm, but are part of the hominoid clade. Since King
and Wilson (1975), molecular biological sequencing has shown that the
human and chimpanzee genomes are highly similar, with estimates rang-
ing between 97 and 99.9%. The close phylogenetic relationship between
Homo and Pan, and the great similarities between their genomes can lead
to the intuitively appealing but misleading conclusion that humans and
chimpanzees are essentially the same. This intuition is strengthened by
popular metaphors in which genes are often portrayed as the essence of
an individual organism. Media coverage supports this essentialist image
with headlines on genes for obesity, violence or alcoholism36.
At first it may seem unlikely that genes would trigger essentialist ten-
dencies—although the causal role of essences has been proposed at least
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since Aristotle’s writings on biology, the molecular structure of DNA has
only been discovered in the second half of the 20th century. Genes, how-
ever, may be an ideal candidate for the indefinable essence to which chil-
dren and adults intuitively appeal. Medin and Ortony (1989, 184–185)
suggest that psychological essentialism is a placeholder notion: one can
believe that a category possesses an essence without knowing what that
essence is. For example, the tiger essence causes tiger offspring to develop
into big, striped, roaring tiger adults, although circumstances might con-
spire to produce stripeless, dwarfed, mute individuals, which will nonethe-
less be categorized as tigers (Gelman & Wellman, 1991, 216). Since its
discovery, DNA appears to fulfill the role of the essence-placeholder in
popular and perhaps also scientific discourse, because it is invisible, and
presents a deeper level that is causally linked with appearance and de-
velopment. This may explain the considerable media coverage of studies
that link variations in DNA with health, behavior and appearance.
Jared Diamond (1992) rhetorically invokes an extraterrestrial observer,
who would objectively classify humans as ‘third chimpanzee,’ overlook-
ing the blatant fact that only one of these species writes about the other
two in fluent grammatical language. The blueprint or essence metaphor
for genes is misleading. Genes do not have a one-to-one correspondence
with the traits they build (Marcus, 2004), hence the difficulties in finding
‘genes for’ homosexuality or mathematical talent. Instead, genes are con-
cerned with the question in what sequence, and to what degree, proteins
are built. One amino-acid substitution can dramatically alter a cascade
of developmental events. Thus, the small genetic differences between hu-
mans and chimpanzees have huge effects. Conversely, since there are only
four nucleotide types, it can be argued that we share at least 25% of
our genes with any given species. Taking a conservative estimate that
a human and a lily would share 35% of their genes, no-one would sup-
pose that these species are 35% similar (Marks, 2003). As mentioned
earlier (section 1.2.2), King and Wilson (1975) have proposed that the
differences between human and chimpanzee anatomy and behavior may
owe to differences in how genes are regulated, rather than in the proteins
they code for. Given the short evolutionary time and relatively few genes
involved, this may be the only possible way for natural selection to result
in such considerable differences. Several recent micro-array studies that
compared patterns of gene-expression in human, chimpanzee and other
primate brains (e.g., Gu & Gu, 2003) have indeed shown that genes have
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been upregulated in the human brain compared to that of the chimpanzee.
It may therefore be unnecessary to posit close psychological similarities
between the two species.
Nevertheless, much of current research in comparative psychology is
directed at finding similarities between our closest living relatives and
us. One such research program focuses on theory of mind in nonhuman
primates. Controlled laboratory experiments have systematically failed
to show genuine mentalizing in apes. Chimpanzees seem incapable to
understand the connection between seeing and knowing: even after many
trials they make obvious mistakes such as begging food from an experi-
menter who wears a bag over her head (see Povinelli, 2000b, for a review).
After many years, however, breakthrough experiments (Hare et al., 2001)
seemed to provide evidence that chimpanzees do know what others can
and cannot see if they are placed in a competitive situation. Subdominant
chimpanzees consistently chose a piece of food only visible to themselves
over a piece of food that was visible to a dominant conspecific as well,
indicating a mentalistic understanding of visual access. These and sim-
ilar competitive experiments were heralded as conclusive evidence that
chimpanzees do have a theory of mind after all. Interestingly, once it
was shown that rhesus monkeys (Flombaum & Santos, 2005) succeeded
in the same test, researchers of animal cognition began to doubt this rich
interpretation. Burkart and Heschl (2005) demonstrated that marmosets,
a small New World monkey about the size of a rat (and so perhaps also
chimpanzees) could succeed in the test by applying the simple behavioral
rule ‘don’t take the food the dominant one is looking at,’ rather than
through a genuine understanding of the relationship between seeing and
knowing. The fact that chimpanzee minds seem ‘suspiciously human’
(Povinelli & Vonk, 2003) may be a reflection of our own mental state
attribution. Indeed, as pointed out in chapter 4, the divergent ecological
and social circumstances under which humans and chimpanzees evolved
make it likely that their psychology is very different from ours.
The notion that chimpanzees are fundamentally like us has lead re-
searchers to investigate chimpanzee cognition from an anthropocentric
perspective, rather than as an end in itself. Psychological essentialism
may compel researchers to believe that chimpanzees do share our cogni-
tive abilities, even if evidence is equivocal (see Call & Tomasello, 2008, for
a balanced review). Thus, it is conceivable that research programs inves-
tigating this type of primate cognition will remain unabated by negative
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evidence as long as the intuitive notion (fed by the genetic similarity of
an imposing 98%) that humans and chimpanzees are essentially the same
persists.
11.6 Concluding remarks
Experimental evidence from developmental psychology and neuroscience
supports the claim that young children and lay adults view the world
in terms of intuitive ontologies. While these provide a shallow but fast
framework to explain and understand salient features of the environment,
they are epistemically limited. In this chapter, we have examined possible
relationships between intuitive ontologies and science. Science and intu-
itive ontologies have gradually parted ways in their ontological and episte-
mological principles. However, because scientists are subject to the same
cognitive limitations as other people, it is possible that intuitive ontolo-
gies still influence their understanding. Since each results from specific
evolutionary pressures, intuitive ontologies can yield mutually inconsis-
tent pictures of reality; they do not provide an overarching framework to
understand the world.
In our discussion of models of human evolution, we have proposed that
these models can be influenced by intuitive tacit assumptions, especially
when they depart from standard evolutionary theory. The assumption
that humans are very different from other species may be based on an
intuitive human-nonhuman distinction. This has resulted in the single
species model, in which a single human species prevailed in disparate
ecological settings over a long period of time. Psychological essentialism
enables us to override perceptual features in specific conditions, where
prior knowledge (of genes and phylogenetic proximity) can lead to the
allegation that chimpanzees have cognitive abilities very similar to those
of humans, an attitude that has influenced the direction and interests of
research programs in comparative psychology. Intuitive ontologies espe-
cially play a role in scientific understanding when it is not underpinned
by an explicit ontological framework.
Scientists can therefore remain unaware of the fact that the questions
they pose are more consistent with intuitive ontologies than with scien-
tific theories. For example, Frans de Waal’s (1999, 635) remark that the
cultural diversity observed in chimpanzees shows them to be “inching
closer to humanity” borders on the essentialist, as it presupposes culture
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as a human domain, rather than recognizing chimpanzee cultural behav-
ior within its own ecological and evolutionary contexts (see chapter 4 for
an elaboration on this point). However, scientists can become aware of
intuitive ontological notions when they pit their ideas against existing
scientific theories. More theoretical and empirical work needs to be done
in order to further clarify the role of intuitive ontologies in scientific and
everyday understanding. However, it can be argued from the recent his-
tory of science that intuitive ontologies are not eradicated by scientific
knowledge, even if they are in apparent contradiction to it. As such, the
lingering role of intuitive ontologies in scientific understanding may help
to elucidate how the human mind acquires knowledge. This research sug-
gests that intuitive ontologies are an integral and stable part of human
cognition.
Chapter 12
Evolved cognitive biases
and the epistemic status
of scientific beliefs
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of De Cruz, H., & De
Smedt, J. (in press a). Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic status
of scientific beliefs. Philosophical Studies.
12.1 Introduction
What is the relationship between the evolved structure of the human
brain and scientific knowledge? A growing body of empirical evidence
from developmental psychology, neuroscience and cognitive psychology
indicates that the way humans perceive and conceptualize the world is
shaped by evolved cognitive inference mechanisms. These findings can be
incorporated in naturalistic theories of mental content that propose that
the proper function of our cognitive processes is to promote survival and
reproduction (e.g., Millikan, 1984; Rowlands, 1997). The implications of
this evolutionary picture for the epistemic status of scientific and other
forms of beliefs remains a matter of debate. Does the fact that our cogni-
tive apparatus has an evolutionary origin provide us with a justification
for scientifically informed beliefs, or are we to treat them with suspi-
cion? To address these questions, we look at two types of arguments that
connect evolution and beliefs: evolutionary arguments (EAs) and evolu-
tionary debunking arguments (EDAs). Both types of argument agree that
evolutionary considerations have implications for the epistemic standing
of beliefs. Both are also committed to evolutionary psychology in the
broad sense, i.e., they hold that evolutionary pressures, in particular nat-
ural selection, are important forces in shaping cognition37. They reach
contradictory conclusions about the implications of evolutionary psychol-
ogy for the epistemic justification of beliefs. EAs state that evolution will
tend to select for belief-formation mechanisms that are reliable, whereas
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EDAs imply that evolution is not a truth-tracking, but a fitness-enhancing
process.
This chapter examines the implications of the evolutionary origins
of our cognitive faculties for the epistemic standing of science. First, it
briefly outlines the role of cognitive biases in human cognition (section
12.2)—as was argued in the previous chapter, these biases also play a role
in scientific practice. Next, we discuss evolutionary arguments and evo-
lutionary debunking arguments in relationship to scientific practice (sec-
tions 12.3 and 12.4). We show that for any belief that can be plausibly
thought to be influenced by evolved cognitive predispositions it is possible
to construct both an EA and an EDA. This indicates that evolutionary bi-
ological considerations may not be decisive for the epistemic justification
of scientific beliefs. We therefore shift our focus to the cultural dynam-
ics of scientific practice, by presenting an analytical model (sections 12.5
and 12.6) that suggests that cultural transmission of scientific knowledge
can lead toward representations that are more truth-approximating un-
der a broad range of circumstances, even if human cognitive faculties were
further off the mark than they actually are.
Before proceeding, we make explicit two basic assumptions that un-
derlie this chapter. First, evolutionary considerations are only relevant
for the justification of beliefs from an externalist perspective. For exter-
nalists who favor a causal account, beliefs are only justified if there is a
proper causal relationship between a belief and the external world. As
we shall see, both EAs and EDAs rely on an externalist, causal account
of knowledge acquisition. Second, we assume a form of basic or ontologi-
cal realism; in other words, we will assume that there is an external and
observer-independent reality.
12.2 Cognitive biases and the perception of reality
Is there a limit to what humans can know? Some authors (e.g., Dennett,
1991) are convinced that our cognitive faculties are in principle able to
tackle all aspects of nature, whereas others (e.g., Sullivan, 2009) argue
that some parts of reality will always remain outside the reach of our
cognitive faculties. This skepticism is often motivated by an appeal to
the evolved nature of the human brain. Plantinga (1993), for example,
argues that
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if our cognitive faculties have originated as Dawkins thinks
[i.e., through natural selection], then their ultimate purpose
or function [. . . ] will be something like survival (of individual,
species, gene or genotype); but then it seems initially doubtful
that among their functions—ultimate, proximate or otherwise
—would be the production of true beliefs (Plantinga, 1993,
218).
Several philosophers of mind (e.g., Millikan, 1984; Akins, 1996; Rowlands,
1997) propose that mental content can be understood as a product of nat-
ural selection: the proper function of some mechanism, trait, or process
in evolved organisms is ultimately relative to fitness, and the brain has
as proper function the production of beliefs that are fitness-enhancing.
Faced with a rich environment, and with limitations in time and cog-
nitive resources, animal brains need to be highly selective about the in-
formation they process. Information that has potentially large conse-
quences for an animal’s fitness needs to be prioritized, whereas cues that
are irrelevant for fitness are often ignored. For example, animal visual
systems typically pick up only a small part of the electromagnetic spec-
trum. In contrast to humans and other mammals, pollinating insects
can see ultraviolet light. In the co-evolution of flowers and pollinators,
many flowers have developed ultraviolet cues that help insects find nec-
tar, such as concentrations of ultraviolet streaks that guide bees into the
centre of a flower, thereby promoting pollination (R. Miller, Owens, &
Rørslett, 2011), as shown in Fig. 12.1. The human visual system ignores
ultraviolet light because it did not play a role in our evolutionary his-
tory (e.g., in terms of food or sexual selection). There is little reason
to assume that the limited part of reality we perceive represents an ob-
jective translation of that reality—animals, including humans, produce
simplified approximations of reality that tend to be adaptively useful
within their ordinary world. Philip Sullivan (2009) considers deerflies:
they conceptualize sources of food like deer, cattle or humans of which
they suck the blood as middle-sized objects that are in motion. A deerfly
has no cognitive resources that enable it to differentiate between a truck
and a large mammal. Human cognitive faculties, too, are not aimed at
the disinterested representation of facts, but at representations that are
relevant for the organism’s fitness. Our sensation of temperature, for in-
stance, is closely related to the skin’s starting temperature; rather than
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detachedly reporting a change in temperature, an already hot skin will
register a warm impulse as hotter and more discomforting than a cooler
skin (Akins, 1996).
Figure 12.1: A common yellow woodsorrel (Oxalis stricta) under normal
lighting conditions (left) and photographed using an ultraviolet-sensitive
camera (right). Note that the honey guides are only visible under UV
light. From R. Miller et al. (2011), Fig. 11, p. 288.
The impact of evolutionary pressures on human mental content can
be weak or strong, depending on the model one develops. A weak ver-
sion (e.g., Rowlands, 1997) restricts the impact to fairly basic represen-
tational mechanisms, mainly perception, such as the spectral-frequency
band in which the human ear can receive acoustic signals. A stronger
version would extend the impact to our conceptual knowledge as well.
One reason to adopt this latter version is that it is difficult to make a
clear distinction between purely perceptual and conceptual mental con-
tent. Higher-order cognitive capacities are almost always involved in sim-
ple cases of perception. Even the belief that one has hands is informed
by higher-order processes, such as an internally generated body schema.
When damaged, this leads to finger agnosia, the inability to recognize
one’s own hands or fingers in spite of intact visual and tactile percep-
tual input (Osawa & Maeshima, 2009). Moreover, a burgeoning field of
experimental evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neu-
roscience indicates that the human mind imposes a variety of conceptual
structures onto the sensations it receives. Human cognition is character-
ized by a host of higher-level specialized inference mechanisms, which we
12.3. Evolutionary arguments 327
termed intuitive ontologies (De Cruz & De Smedt, 2007, 2010c). In or-
der to interpret the world around us, we make inductive inferences about
objects, and categorize them into a relatively small set of classes that are
meaningful from an evolutionary point of view, such as ‘artifact’, ‘animal’
and ‘person’. Categorization is vital for survival and reproduction, be-
cause it enables animals to make fast decisions based on limited sensory
information—it is therefore unsurprising that even organisms with very
small brains, such as insects, perceive the world in terms of high-level
concepts and categories (Chittka & Niven, 2009).
From an evolutionary perspective, science is a recent development in
our species. Thus, scientists have to draw on the same cognitive resources
as other people, and they are subject to the same cognitive limitations.
If humans conceptualize and reason about the world in terms of a limited
number of intuitive ontologies, one could expect that intuitive ontolo-
gies play a role in scientific understanding, as was argued in chapter 11.
Also, as we have seen in section 11.4, the influence of cognitive biases
not only applies to the content of our scientific beliefs, but also to our
metatheoretical assumptions, like, for instance, causality detection.
12.3 Evolutionary arguments
The evolutionary argument (EA) contends that natural selection will form
animal brains that tend to produce true beliefs, because true beliefs are
essential for adaptive decision making. Cognitive faculties that are widely
off the mark would seriously compromise a creature’s ability to survive
and reproduce. As Quine (1969b, 126) put it “Creatures inveterately
wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to
die before reproducing their kind.” This position goes back at least to
the 18th-century commonsense philosopher Thomas Reid, who considered
the consequences of rejecting those beliefs that our cognitive faculties
naturally produce:
I resolve not to believe my senses. I break my nose against
a post that comes in my way; I step into a dirty kennel; and
after twenty such wise and rational actions, I am taken up
and clapt into a mad-house [. . . ] I gave implicit belief to
the informations of Nature by my senses [. . . ] I find, that
without it I must have perished by a thousand accidents [. . . ]
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I consider this instinctive belief as one of the best gifts of
Nature (Reid, 1764, 413–415).
A detailed defense of EAs comes from the philosopher Stephen Boulter
(2007), who argues for an updated form of commonsense philosophy.
Commonsense beliefs are non-inferential, basic beliefs that do not have
to be justified by reasoning or by reference to other beliefs, like our belief
in the past, in the existence of other minds, or our reliance on memory.
As we have seen in section 2.3, intuitive ontologies furnish us with a wide
variety of commonsense beliefs, such as the belief that an unsupported
object will fall downward (intuitive physics), that other agents act on
the basis of their internal mental states (intuitive psychology), and that
tadpoles grow into frogs even though they do not look alike (intuitive
biology). To Boulter (2007), these basic beliefs derive their epistemic
justification from their adaptive value. His EA can be summarized as
follows:
1. Animals that can successfully interact with the world have a higher
chance of passing on their genes than animals that do not success-
fully interact with the world.
2. Beliefs about the world that accurately track those states of affairs
in the world are, on the whole, better guides to action than are false
beliefs.
3. Therefore, natural selection will favor those animals with reliable
sensory and belief formation systems insofar as those sensory sys-
tems and beliefs have a bearing on the animals’ fitness.
4. Commonsense beliefs have direct bearing on human fitness.
5. Therefore, human commonsense beliefs will tend to be correct.
Similar EAs can be found in Fodor (1981) and Stewart-Williams
(2005). This chapter will neither evaluate nor defend the merits of the
EA for commonsense beliefs, but only consider whether this argument
can be used to justify scientific beliefs. As can be seen in premise 3, the
EA has the important qualification that the beliefs will only be reliable
to the extent that they have a bearing on an organism’s fitness. Defend-
ers of EAs argue that they only hold under conditions that resemble the
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ones in which our cognitive faculties evolved. The philosopher and evolu-
tionary psychologist Steve Stewart-Williams (2005), for example, argues
that causal cognition only yields reliable intuitions in our everyday un-
derstanding of the world, but that it may be unreliable in circumstances
outside this narrow range, such as when it produces philosophical or scien-
tific beliefs (see also section 10.4)—for instance, we cannot rely on causal
intuitions to explain events at the quantum level where the commonsense
belief that every event must have a cause has proven unreliable. Most
scientific knowledge falls outside of ecologically relevant conditions. In-
tuitive ontologies may be effective for everyday understanding, but they
can go awry in such domains as probability theory, cognitive neuroscience
or evolutionary theory. Scientific practice itself cannot have exerted any
selective influence on our cognitive systems. The fact that scientific prac-
tice as we know it is only a few hundred years old makes it very unlikely
that such selective pressures, if any, would have perceptible effects. If the
reproductive success of fundamentalists who reject evolutionary theory
in favor of creationism is any guide, holding wrong scientific beliefs does
not seem to have any negative effects on one’s fitness.
12.4 Evolutionary debunking arguments
Does natural selection promote the formation of true beliefs? Evolution-
ary theorists and philosophers have offered at least four types of situations
where it does not. First, many false beliefs, including systematic falla-
cies, do not compromise fitness, and thus cannot be honed by natural
selection. As Steven Pinker (2005) puts it:
Members of our species commonly believe, among other things,
that objects are naturally at rest unless pushed, that a sev-
ered tetherball will fly off in a spiral trajectory, that a bright
young activist is more likely to be a feminist bankteller than
a bankteller, that they themselves are above average in every
desirable trait [. . . ] The idea that our minds are designed for
truth does not sit well with such facts (Pinker, 2005, 18).
More generally, we can expect that beliefs that have no bearing on
an animal’s fitness are not subject to natural selection. Second, natu-
ral selection can favor cognitive faculties that are more often incorrect
than correct under specific circumstances. This scenario is explored by
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the ‘better safe than sorry argument’ (a term coined by Stephens, 2001),
which states that cognitive processes may sometimes err on the side of
safety. If the costs or payoffs of false positives and false negatives are
asymmetric (see table 8.1 on p. 236), natural selection will tend to pro-
mote beliefs that yield the highest payoffs or incur the least costs. Take
agency detection: it is less costly to discern an agent when none is present
(a false positive) than it is to fail to detect an agent that is present (a false
negative)—the first results in a small waste of time and energy, whereas
the second may lead one to miss out on a meal or to become one. For
the same reason, creatures are expected to be excessively cautious when
deciding whether a potential mate is member of the same or of a different
species. In this case, the cost of a false positive (mistaking a member of
another species for a member of one’s own) can be disproportionately high
for females, as it might result in investing time and resources in inviable
or sterile offspring (Godfrey-Smith, 1991). Third, cognitive processes can
deviate from the truth due to a fitness trade-off between accuracy and
efficiency: given that animals have limited time and resources, they will
sometimes be better off with fast heuristics that may occasionally or even
often misfire. There is little point in carefully and elaborately choosing
the best escape route when faced with a hungry predator. As the world
is too complex to be understood in its entirety by organisms limited in
space, time and cognitive resources, animals must resort to heuristics to
make the world more tractable. This usually enables them to act adap-
tively under uncertainty, but it sometimes leads to characteristic biases.
Such heuristics and biases have been experimentally observed in humans
as well as nonhuman animals (see e.g., Real, 1991, for characteristic biases
in foraging bumble bees). Fourthly, and more tentatively, some misbeliefs
might confer an adaptive advantage because of their misalignment with
reality. McKay and Dennett (2009) cite the ‘above average’ effect as a
case in which it is adaptive to be wrong. This is a well-established ten-
dency in neurologically normal people to overestimate their own positive
qualities, to underestimate their negative qualities compared to others,
and to value their own children as smarter, kinder and more beautiful.
From an evolutionary perspective, one can easily see how this bias can be
adaptive, as it leads to increased fitness by compelling one to pay more
attention to one’s own needs and the needs of one’s offspring.
Given that natural selection does not reliably preserve or promote
true beliefs, the evolutionary origins of our cognitive faculties can cast
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doubt on their epistemic justification. The philosopher Guy Kahane (in
press) offers a general schema for such evolutionary debunking arguments
(EDAs):
1. We believe that p, because we have an intuition that p, and there
is an evolutionary explanation of our intuition that p.
2. Evolution is not a truth-tracking process.
3. Therefore, we are not justified in believing that p.
To take a simple example: Thelma believes her children are more beautiful
and smarter than average, and there is a good evolutionary explanation
for this belief. Her belief is not properly causally connected to facts in the
world, namely the objective qualities of her children. Therefore, Thelma’s
belief is unjustified.
Is science vulnerable to EDAs? As Kahane (in press) has observed,
once one allows EDAs, it is difficult to see where they would not apply.
In the case of moral beliefs, for instance, EDAs call into question not
just a subset of moral judgments (e.g., prioritizing the well-being of one’s
own children over that of strangers in the developing world) but all moral
judgments (e.g., caring about the well-being of other people). If we were
solitary animals like tigers, we wouldn’t care about our conspecifics at
all. Humans have altruistic feelings because such feelings confer an adap-
tive advantage to animals that live in complex, structured social groups.
EDAs that are leveled against religious belief may similarly overshoot
their purpose. Studies on the cognitive science of religion indicate that
religious beliefs are byproducts of everyday cognitive capacities, such as
agency detection or attribution of design (see the introduction to part III
for an overview). To some authors the fact that religion is a byproduct of
evolved cognitive faculties undermines its epistemic standing. To quote
Dawkins (2006, 184): “The irrationality of religion is a byproduct of a
particular built-in irrationality mechanism in the brain.” But if being
a byproduct undermines religious beliefs, one could argue that science,
which is also a byproduct of the evolved structure of human cognition, is
likewise undermined:
1. We can hold scientific beliefs due to our evolved capacities for un-
derstanding the physical, biological, and mental world.
2. Natural selection is not a truth-tracking process.
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3. Therefore, scientific beliefs are unjustified.
Note that it does not help much to say that one does not endorse adapta-
tionism, since scientific beliefs formed through cognitive skills that have
arisen through drift or other non-adaptive processes would presumably
be even less reliable than those formed through natural selection.
Interestingly, it seems that for any belief that is plausibly influenced
by human cognitive predispositions, one can construct both an EA and an
EDA, suggesting that we cannot draw straightforward conclusions from
evolutionary origins to epistemic justification. Take theistic beliefs. The
philosopher of religion Michael Murray (2008) speculates that God has
instilled cognitive predispositions in humans through natural selection
which elicit religious beliefs in a broad variety of circumstances. By con-
trast, Dawkins (2006) claims that the evolutionary origin of religious be-
liefs provides prima facie evidence against the existence of God. Or take
scientific knowledge. The philosopher of science David Papineau (2000)
asserts that evolution promotes truth-approximating beliefs in scientific
practice because of selective pressures that have enhanced human capac-
ities for rational reasoning in the domains of folk psychology and means-
end reasoning. On the other hand, the philosopher of science Kathleen
Akins (1996) argues that our cognitive faculties are not aimed at a dis-
interested and objective representation of reality, but rather at forming
beliefs that benefit the organism. It seems that evolutionary biological
considerations will remain indecisive for the epistemic justification or de-
bunking of scientific beliefs. A single brain cannot test its own reliability
without being subject to either circularity (justifying its own working) or
debunking (undermining its own reliability). However, if the dynamics of
knowledge acquisition in institutionalized environments are very different
from those in individual agents, it may be possible for interacting brains
to do so. In what follows, we consider a pessimistic scenario in which cog-
nitive biases are very influential in science. We will present an analytical
model of cultural transmission that shows that interacting scientists are
able to overcome these cognitive biases in a broad range of circumstances.
Note that, since this is an externalist justification of scientific beliefs, we
need not worry about the radically skeptical possibility that our model,
like other types of beliefs, might in its turn be subject to cognitive biases.
The only thing that is required, from an externalist point of view, is that
there are mechanisms in the external world that promote the growth of
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scientific knowledge; scientists need not be aware of these mechanisms.
12.5 The cultural transmission of scientific knowledge:
A model
To examine the cultural transmission of scientific knowledge, we develop
an analytical model, based on Henrich and Boyd’s (2002) work on biased
cultural transmission. Cultural transmission takes place in human minds.
It is biased by prior beliefs and expectations. In particular, our model
focuses on the role of intuitive ontologies in scientific practice. It does
not require high-fidelity copying of cultural traits, nor that these traits
are discrete. It does rely on the assumption that scientific models can
be more or less truth-approximating. There are well-known objections to
this assumption, and a discussion of this falls beyond the scope of this
chapter. However, given that most defenses of scientific realism seem to
require some form of truth-approximation, the assumption seems quite
reasonable. As we shall see, the dynamics of cultural transmission are
such that science can evolve progressively even when starting out with
very low levels of empirical accuracy; even if initial theories are mostly
wrong, they can converge toward more accurate representations over time
given a large enough population of scientists and a sufficient level of di-
versity of inferences.
We start out with a range of scientific ideas that attempt to represent
some aspect of reality or that attempt to solve a particular science-related
problem. It does not matter whether we talk about the evolution of crus-
taceans, the structure of the atom, or reasons for the fall of the Roman
empire. Assuming ontological realism, not all scientific solutions will cap-
ture observer-independent reality equally well. Each scientific model has
a z value, a positive real number. Higher z values denote better scientific
models, i.e., they are more truth-approximating or more efficient at solv-
ing a science-related problem. ∆z is the average change in z across the
community of scientists, denoted by N , that is concerned with a particu-
lar problem. For example, suppose that z stands for the representational
adequacy of models of the structure of the atom that were in the running
in the early 20th century. N would then be the pool of scientists who
investigated the structure of the atom in that period. Of the models of
the atom that were circulating then, Dalton’s early 19th-century model
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of atoms as hard billiard balls had a lower z value than Thomson’s plum
pudding model of electrons floating in a soup of positive charge which in
turn had a lower z value than Rutherford’s model of the atom as a minia-
ture solar system. Even though Rutherford’s analogy is no longer used
in contemporary physics, it still had the highest z value of the aforemen-
tioned models, since it made a distinction between the positive nucleus
and the negative electrons. ∆z is the shift in representational accuracy
from the early 19th to the early 20th century. Since the average repre-
sentational accuracy of models of the atom improved, ∆z was positive. If
there had been scientific stasis (no improvement in these models), ∆z = 0;
if there had been a decline in scientific accuracy (for instance, if scientists
during this period had reverted to a form of ancient Greek atomism), ∆z
would have been negative.
To model the transmission of scientific practice, we use the Price equa-
tion (Price, 1972), which describes changes in the frequency of traits that
are transmitted. This equation is widely used in disparate scientific do-
mains, including biology, economics, and anthropology. It models the
extent to which transmittable characteristics covary with the effects of
selection (first term of equation 12.1), and the rate at which these char-
acteristics change over time (second term). Henrich and Boyd (2002)
and Henrich (2004b) have adapted it to study the transmission of cultur-
ally acquired skills; here it will be used to examine the transmission of
scientific knowledge. In a general form the Price equation states:
∆z = Cov(f, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selective transmission
+ E(f∆z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
noisy inference
(12.1)
Equation (12.1) describes how the average value of any transmittable trait
z changes in a population from one generation to the next. To predict
the value of ∆z, we need to take into account on the one hand its selec-
tive transmission—in this case, the adoption of a specific scientific model
based on its perceived empirical adequacy and instrumental effectiveness
by scientific peers—and on the other hand distorting influences of cog-
nitive biases. The former is modeled as Cov(f, z) (covariation of z with
its cultural success) and the latter as E(f∆z) (expected cultural success
of z as it changes over time). f gives the relative likelihood that a given
scientific model z will be chosen. We will here assume that scientists are
able to assess the merits of scientific models. This model is agnostic as
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to how people assess competing scientific theories; this can be through
epistemic values, intuition, experiment, evaluation of empirical adequacy
or a combination of these factors. We also suppose for simplicity’s sake
that members of the scientific community want to adopt the best sci-
entific model, denoted by zh. Assuming that members of the scientific
community attempt to incorporate the most successful representations of
reality zh, we can see that fh = 1 and fnot h = 0. This reduces equation
(12.1) to
∆z = zh − z +∆zh (12.2)
Due to errors inherent in cultural transmission and the effects of cognitive
biases, most scientists of N will end up with lower z values than zh.
Henrich and Boyd (2002) model the newly obtained z value as randomly
drawn from a Gumbel distribution38. This provides us with a rather
pessimistic assumption: there is a greater probability that a scientist
who adopts a model will get it wrong, and will end up with a lower z
value, typically by an amount α, which represents the systematic biases
of our evolved cognitive faculties. However, as in other forms of cultural
learning, there are stochastic processes involved, so that some individuals
might end up with a higher z value, due to individual learning or even
lucky errors. If the new most successful model zh′ is accepted by the
scientific community, the average z value can exceed the previous mean
(∆z is positive). One could also imagine that members of the scientific
community will not end up with a higher z value, or alternatively, that
they do not adopt a new model with a high z value. Recall that ∆z can
be 0 (scientific stasis), or can even become negative (decline of scientific
knowledge). Under what conditions can we expect these scenarios to
occur?
Henrich (2004b) derived the following equation (see his Appendix A
for technical details on the derivation), which will here be applied to
calculate ∆z, i.e., the change in z value across time in the population of
scientists working on the same problem:
∆z = −α+ β(γ + Ln(N))︸ ︷︷ ︸
always positive
(12.3)
To assess whether scientific progress will be positive, 0 or negative, one
needs to take the following variables into account: α, the difference
between average z value (z) and zh; β, the variability of the Gumbel
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distribution which represents the degree to which scientists will make
different inferences; N , the size of the scientific community. γ is the
Euler-Mascheroni constant (≈ 0.577). One can see that the first term
of equation (12.3) acts against cultural transmission: α represents the
effects of low-fidelity transmission due to cognitive biases. Therefore, it
is negative and lowers the value of ∆z, except in cases where scientists
take over a model without modifying it, in which case α = 0. The sec-
ond term promotes scientific progress. Ln(N) is the natural logarithm
of N . We presupposed interaction among the scientific community, so N
is the population of interacting scientists. β is a mathematical measure
of the tendency of people to make different inferences, in this case, di-
verging scientific models of the same aspect of reality. For instance, in
the early 20th century, there were several competing models of the struc-
ture of the atom, yielding a high β value. Interestingly, the larger β, the
higher the chance that models will be invented that exceed the mean of
previous z values. In other words, the more scientists make different in-
ferences, the more likely scientific progress becomes. In contrast to what
some Bayesian philosophers of science contend (see Shaffer, 2008, for an
overview), this model suggests that disagreement among scientists is not
undesirable—quite on the contrary, it is essential for scientific progress.
To obtain a positive ∆z value, one needs a large number of scientists
N when cognitive biases α are substantial, or when the tendency to make
different inferences β is small. In other words, even if α is disproportion-
ately large, i.e., if human cognitive biases were even further off the mark
than they actually are, it is still possible to have scientific progress if sci-
entists make many different inferences and if the scientific community is
sufficiently large. The critical value for N , i.e., the minimal number of
interacting scientists within a community that is necessary to maintain
a given level of scientific knowledge is shown for different values of α/β
in the supplementary movie S1, which can be consulted online39. Larger
values of α make scientific progress more difficult. As can be seen, larger
values of α/β require larger critical values for N . Also, the model predicts
that, since the natural logarithm of N plays a role in the value of ∆z,
disproportionate increases of N are required to maintain the same levels
of scientific growth once N gets substantially large. Quantitative stud-
ies that link the size of the scientific community and scientific discovery
in diverse disciplines are in line with this prediction, including genetics
(Glass, 1979) and physics (Wagner-Do¨bler & Berg, 1999). In this latter
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study, one can see, for example, a concurrence between a steep increase in
the number of authors working on electricity and magnetism in the mid
19th century with important discoveries in that field, such as Maxwell’s
unification of electricity, magnetism and light into a single theory of the
electromagnetic field in the 1860s (Wagner-Do¨bler & Berg, 1999, 256).
It should be noted that this model is highly idealized to enhance its
conceptual clarity. One of the factors that it does not take into account
is luck, i.e., single individuals working in relatively small research com-
munities (e.g., Newton or van Helmont) can produce large improvements
by happening to make the right guess. Translated into this model, this
would correspond to an initial high zh value within a small N . The model
is not designed to predict the future history of science, but rather to ex-
plain factors that mediate scientific progress, including in actual historical
case studies. In the future, it could be combined with other approaches,
such as work that conceptualizes science as an epistemic landscape (e.g.,
Weisberg & Muldoon, 2009).
12.6 An illustration: 18th- and 19th-century transmu-
tation theories
There is no prescribed methodology to assign concrete values to α/β in
the growth of scientific knowledge, although it is often possible to get
estimations of N . In order to get a qualitative feeling for the predictions
of the model, we will apply it to the development of theories on the trans-
mutation40 of species in biology in the period from 1760 to 1860. Since
Antiquity, most naturalistic theories on the origin of species tended to be
overwhelmingly (though not exclusively) essentialist. As argued in sec-
tion 11.4, this may be due to the fact that human reasoning about species
is biased toward essentialism. Next to this, psychological evidence (e.g.,
Kelemen, 2004) indicates that humans also possess a natural propensity
for teleological reasoning. Across cultures (H. C. Barrett, 2004), humans
have the intuition that animals and plants possess adaptations that are
self-beneficial and well-adapted to their environment, such as claws for
defense or thorns for protection against being eaten. As we saw in section
9.2.2, children and adults with little schooling also have an overwhelm-
ing preference for teleological rather than mechanistic or evolutionary
explanations. Teleological explanations are at odds with a correct under-
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standing of the evolution of species, because in such accounts the function
of a trait provides a necessary and sufficient explanation for its existence
(e.g., a giraffe has a long neck in order to reach high foliage) which does
not leave room for mechanistic, evolutionary accounts. Additionally, bi-
ological evolutionary changes cannot be directly observed, but must be
indirectly inferred. In the case of transmutation theories, there is thus
a substantial cognitive bias α. To offset the effects of α, natural histo-
rians and natural philosophers (terms that denote what are now called
biologists) needed a large β and a sizable population of interacting bi-
ologists N . The extent to which biological theories on speciation are
truth-approximating will be taken as an indicator of their z-value.
Although transmutation theories go back at least to Antiquity, with
authors like Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritos and Lucretius, it was
only from the middle of the 18th century onward that such theories were
systematically considered and explored. Contrary to common opinion,
Lamarck’s and Darwin’s were only two among many such ideas (Mayr,
1982; Bowler, 2003). As we have seen in section 9.4.2, in Germany at
the end of the 18th century, members of the so-called Go¨ttingen school,
such as Blumenbach, Kielmeyer and Reil, stipulated forces that acted on
biological entities, in analogy to physical forces acting on physical en-
tities. French naturalists were the first to propose detailed theories of
how species can transmute (change) into other species. An early example
is de Maillet’s Telliamed, Ou entretiens d’un philosophe indien avec un
missionnaire franc¸ois (1748), which proposed that life-forms had sponta-
neously emerged on Earth, and that their adaptation to diverse circum-
stances gave rise to distinct species. In his Histoire naturelle ge´ne´rale
et particulie`re (1766) Buffon argued that closely related species, such as
horses and donkeys might have a shared common ancestor; evolutionary
changes occurred mainly through degeneration. Lamarck delineated a
tree-like structure of the origin of species; he thought that transmutation
of species occurred through the transmission of acquired characteristics,
an idea developed in detail in his Philosophie zoologique (1809). These
ideas enjoyed wide currency across Europe, being translated within a few
years of publication in several European languages, and were further de-
veloped by authors in Italy, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (Corsi,
2005). Examples include the Belgian geologist d’Omalius d’Halloy’s Note
sur la succession des eˆtres vivants (1846) and Chambers’ progressive no-
tion of transmutation (originally anonymously published) in Vestiges of
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the natural history of creation (1844). Thus, from the mid 18th century
onward, there is a burgeoning β value for transmutation theories.
None of these theories would be endorsed by biologists today. Even
though they have elements that are correct, they have a lot of assumptions
that are now considered to be mistaken. For example, the notion of an
inbuilt capacity for striving toward perfection, as marshaled by Lamarck
and Chambers, is now uniformly rejected, as are other forms of teleologi-
cal reasoning in biology (see section 9.2.2). From the perspective of biased
cultural transmission, the initial correctness of theories is not important,
rather, it is the diversity of the inferences and the size of the scientific
community that increase the probability that some of these theories will
become more truth-approximating than earlier ones. When more truth-
approximating models are adopted by other members of the community,
the quality of transmutational theories ratchets upward. This is in accor-
dance with quantitative data on the size of the scientific community at
the time. Shelishch (1982) has made estimates of the community size of
active biologists (natural historians and natural philosophers) from 1760
to 1860. His numbers are an underestimation of the true size of the sci-
entific community that was involved, as he only included prolific authors,
and did not incorporate authors from related disciplines, like the geologist
Charles Lyell, who were important for the development of transmutation
theories. First, there is a slow linear growth in the community of bi-
ologists from 1760 to 1790, followed by a steeper growth in almost all
biological fields from 1790 to 1860: in 1760, the number of active biolo-
gists was about 60, by 1820, it had increased to 160, and in 1860, it had
reached 240.
The effects of N on the ability of a scientific community to maintain
complex theories is shown in Fig. 12.2. Here, the Y -axis represents ∆z;
the X-axis shows the number of interacting biologists N . The logarithmic
curves indicate the scientific progress or decline with different values of
α/β. The dashed line represents a simpler level of biological theorizing,
α/β ≈ 4.5; the full line shows a more advanced level, α/β ≈ 6. The
intersections of these curves with the X-axis indicate the critical value of
N to maintain particular levels of biological theorizing. As can be seen, a
group of 240 interacting naturalists can maintain a more advanced level
of scientific knowledge than one of 60.
The model predicts that, given a larger N and a large β, scientific
knowledge is likely to be more truth-approximating over time. Is this the
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Figure 12.2: Relationship between values of N and complexity of bio-
logical theory that can be maintained. A community size of 240 active
biologists can maintain more complex theories (α/β ≈ 6), compared to a
population of 60 biologists (α/β ≈ 4.5).
case for theories on the transmutation of species? The z value of concepts
of the transmutation of species increased during the late 18th to the mid
19th century, as more and more naturalists accepted transmutation and
common descent, and started to elaborate on these theories. Even schol-
ars originally opposed to the idea came to make active contributions to
them. Richard Owen, for example, initially denied transmutation, but in
his On the nature of limbs (1849) he argued that humans evolved from
fish. In the course of the 19th century, these theories also became more
accurate than their predecessors. For example, at the turn of the 19th
century, the issue of extinction was still hotly debated. Some authors, like
Lamarck (1809), thought that species do not go extinct but merely evolve
into different species. By the 1830s, due to the work of paleontologists
like, for instance, Georges Cuvier and Louis Agassiz, the factuality of
extinction was no more in question (Herbert, 2005). Similarly, the persis-
tence of some types of animals over several geological periods, such as the
brachiopod Lingula, casted doubt on saltationist and catastrophist mod-
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els of species origination that were common in the 18th century (Mayr,
1982).
Historical studies (e.g., Herbert, 2005) indicate that Darwin relied ex-
tensively on earlier transmutationist theories when conceiving his theory
of natural selection. These sources included his own grandfather Eras-
mus Darwin, Lamarck (likely through the Lamarckian anatomist Robert
Grant, who taught him at Edinburgh), Chambers (whose Vestiges was
immensely popular at the time), and Karl Ernst von Baer’s embryology,
while he also extensively studied critiques of earlier transmutationist mod-
els. The increasing recognition of the influence of earlier transmutationist
theories in Darwin’s work supports the importance of scientific commu-
nity size in scientific practice and discovery. More speculatively, Peter
Bowler (2008) has argued that even if Darwin had never written On the
origin of species, we would likely still have ended up with something like
evolutionary theory today. Indeed, transmutation was widely accepted
by the mid 19th century, and several authors, also building on contempo-
rary literature, came up with elements of natural selection independently
from Darwin. The physician William Wells proposed a mechanism akin
to natural selection operating across human populations to account for
variation in skin color and disease resistance in his posthumously pub-
lished An account of a female of the white race of mankind, part of whose
skin resembles that of a negro; with some observations on the causes of the
differences in colour and form between the white and negro races of men
(1818). Patrick Matthew (1831), a timber-merchant who saw the role
of random variation in evolutionary change, published this idea almost
as an afterthought in Note B (364–365) and in the final appendix (383–
385) of his On naval timber and arboriculture. In a series of papers, the
zoologist and animal trader Edward Blyth (e.g., An attempt to classify
the “varieties” of animals, with observations on the marked seasonal and
other changes which naturally take place in various British species, and
which do not constitute varieties, 1835) discerned variation as a causal
mechanism to explain why domesticates could revert to their wild types.
And, as is well known, Wallace developed his own transmutation theory
based on natural selection in two related papers (On the law which has
regulated the introduction of new species, 1855, and On the tendency of
varieties to depart indefinitely from the original type, 1858).
The case of the transmutation of species indicates that a large inter-
acting scientific community, combined with an ability to draw many dif-
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ferent kinds of inferences, can lead to more truth-approximating theories,
even when constrained by cognitive biases, and starting with an initial
low accuracy. The analytic model does not guarantee that our current
scientific models would be correct. It also allows for the possibility that
scientific knowledge declines, for example in the case of a strict orthodoxy
that would prevent the generation of many different inferences, or if there
were a severe decline in the community size of interacting scientists.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this dissertation has been to create a naturalistic picture in
order to obtain a better understanding of creative capacities that are
specific to our species, focusing on artistic ability, religious reflection,
and scientific study. By integrating data from diverse domains within
a philosophical anthropological framework, I have presented a cognitive
and evolutionary approach to the question of why humans engage in such
activities.
Art, religion and science have traditionally been regarded as hallmarks
of our species, as behaviors that set humans apart from other animals.
Traditionally, their study lay exclusively within the domain of special
sciences, such as aesthetics, sociology or history. However, the past 30
years have seen an increasing recognition of the importance of cognitive
science in the philosophical and scientific understanding of these phenom-
ena. This has resulted in a cognitive turn in fields of philosophy that have
been concerned with these subject matters. This is not a concerted effort,
but rather an independent evolution in diverse branches of philosophy in
dialogue with the cognitive and evolutionary sciences.
How can we explain this growing philosophical interest for lower-level
approaches? Perhaps it is a consequence of the increasing prominence
of naturalism in philosophy. Since the second half of the 20th century,
philosophers (e.g., Quine, 1969a) have begun to acknowledge that episte-
mology and other branches of philosophy should take into account that
human reasoning processes are fully part of the natural, causal order.
Thus, to understand the emergence and transmission of particular cul-
tural phenomena, we need to understand the evolved cognitive under-
pinnings that constrain or facilitate this emergence or transmission of
information (Sperber, 1985). Cognitive science, combined with an evo-
lutionary understanding of the human mind, could provide a unified on-
tological framework for philosophical anthropology and the related field
of philosophy of mind. At present, these philosophical disciplines lack a
clear ontological framework. Philosophical anthropology is simply the
study of human specificity or uniqueness, but it is difficult to gauge
343
344 Concluding remarks
human uniqueness without a unifying explanatory framework in which
the diversity of observations that fit in its study (such as art, religion
or scientific practice) could be placed. Sperber (1996) remarked that
(classical, non-cognitive) anthropology does not have an ontology either.
Clearly, anthropology has concepts like kinship or marriage, but these
technical terms are defined mainly in terms of similarities or differences
with other cultures. For example, institutions are termed marriages in-
sofar as they have some resemblance to the modern western institution
of marriage. Cultural deviations from this western concept (e.g., plu-
ral marriages, child marriages) require an extension of the concept, and
such continued extensions of concepts have led to an illusion of infinite
cultural variability. However, because anthropology lacks unifying onto-
logical assumptions, there is no measure by which cultural diversity can
be assessed. Undoubtedly, a spider would think that the variation in
spider webs is very large, and would conclude on the basis of this that
there are no universal norms or constraints that govern the diversity in
arachnid constructions. By introducing cognitive and evolutionary per-
spectives, I have sought to provide a more solid footing for philosophical
anthropological discussions of uniquely human behavior. In particular,
I have argued that art, religion and science which are usually seen as
achievements that are quite remote from ordinary modes of reasoning are
subserved by evolved cognitive processes that serve functions in everyday
cognitive tasks, that arise early and spontaneously in cognitive develop-
ment, that are shared cross-culturally, and that have evolved in response
to selective pressures in our ancestral past. These mundane cognitive
processes provide a measuring rod with which we can assess a diversity
of cultural phenomena; they form a unified explanatory framework to
approach human culture. I have argued that we can explain uncommon
thoughts (exceptional human achievements such as art, religion and sci-
ence) in terms of interactions between common minds, ordinary human
minds who share their knowledge through cultural transmission.
The introductory chapter 1 provided a brief review of extant philo-
sophical, archeological and psychological theories on human uniqueness.
As we saw there, a fundamental debate on the continuity between human
and nonhuman cognition has been going on since Aristotle categorized
us as rational animals. This debate has often been conducted in terms
of stark opposition. Some (e.g., Darwin, 1871) have argued that human
cognition is entirely continuous with that of other animals, only differing
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in degree and not in kind, whereas other authors have attempted to find
a single defining feature that sets human cognition apart, such as cog-
nitive fluidity (Mithen, 1996), or the use of symbols (Tattersall, 1998).
However, as we saw in chapter 2, evidence from experimental and devel-
opmental psychology, paleoanthropology and archeology hints at a more
complex picture. The human mental toolbox has properties that are con-
tinuous with reasoning in other animals, such as the ability to formulate
intentional mental states or stimulus-independent thought, but has also
properties that are discontinuous with it, such as counterfactual reason-
ing, or the ability to posit unobservables (like internal mental states or
physical forces). Chapter 3 explored how it may be more productive to re-
gard aspects of uniquely human cognition, such as language, in a modular,
mosaic fashion, that keeps in mind that the human brain is composed of
both phylogenetically old and novel, derived modules, rather than seeing
human uniqueness in diametrical opposition to nonhuman animal cogni-
tion. Chapter 4 presented an evolutionary scenario to gauge how some
aspects of human culture, such as our ability to engage in triadic interac-
tions, can be plausibly explained as the outcome of ecological and social
factors during hominid evolution.
In parts II, III and IV we saw how exceptional human cultural achieve-
ments are continuous with everyday, mundane actions and modes of think-
ing. According to the picture outlined here, there is a fundamental con-
tinuity between the scribbling of a two-year-old and the works of ac-
complished visual artists like Henri Matisse: both are governed by an
intuitive design stance, are guided by the propensities of their perceptual
systems (aesthetic sensitivity) and encode symbolic meaning in what they
do (chapter 7). The propensities of a stable human cognitive architecture
also constrain and guide the cultural evolution of art, such as in the selec-
tion for face-like stimuli in portraits, masks and busts all over the world,
or in the increasing importance of bold lines and bright colors in abstract
art (chapter 5). In the domain of religion, we have seen that sophis-
ticated theological and philosophical arguments, such as the argument
from design or the cosmological argument, are subserved by intuitions
that spontaneously emerge in the preschool years. Appeal to a Designer
is due to an early-developed intuition of design and teleology in nature
(chapter 9); the inference to a First Cause stems from our ability to infer
causes for contingent events and from our propensity to prefer agents as
causes (chapter 10). We have also seen how intuitive ontologies, which
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govern our expectations about the physical, biological and psychological
world, play a role in the development of scientific theories (chapter 11).
This is not only the case for historical theories (e.g., medieval impetus
theory in physics), but also for recent theories (e.g., paleoanthropology
and its struggle with intuitions about human uniqueness).
As we have seen throughout this thesis, these cognitive capacities
do not operate in a vacuum—rather, humans rely extensively on social
networks to transmit information, and on their material environment to
delegate and share cognitive tasks. Thus, in chapter 6, we saw that par-
ticular artistic traditions can be explained as a product of cultural group
selection, where art objects are used as ethnic markers to signal coop-
erative intentions. Chapter 8 demonstrated that humans since the Late
Pleistocene have extensively relied on material culture to store and trans-
mit information that is hard to keep in memory. Chapter 12 explored how
scientists can rely on biased cultural transmission to improve the accuracy
of the models they develop: within an interacting scientific community, a
diversity of inferences can lead to improvements in scientific knowledge.
Does this cognitive and evolutionary approach mean that the special
sciences have become redundant in the study of uniquely human behav-
ior? As is already clear from my extensive use of archeological, historical
and cross-cultural data, these data are essential if we are to have a clear
picture of stable aspects of human cognition. Archeology, for example,
is crucial for testing hypotheses on human cognitive evolution, since it is
the only science that studies the material marks of human behavior in
the remote past. If cognitive and evolutionary theories provide a mea-
suring rod to approach the diversity of human culture, manifestations of
this diversity provide testcases against which cognitive and evolutionary
hypotheses can be properly evaluated. Thagard (1989, 655) has emphat-
ically stated that cognitive science should not come to replace the special
sciences in our understanding of scientific practice. Indeed, as we have
seen in section 5.5, a reasonable reductionism does not obviate the need
for other approaches to cultural phenomena. It is not because we can un-
derstand some aspects of artistic ability and appreciation in terms of cog-
nitive science that history or sociology of art become redundant. Rather,
the emphasis on cognitive processes in this dissertation should be seen as
complementary to other approaches. Ideally, in the future, these cogni-
tive and evolutionary perspectives should be more fully integrated with
results from the special sciences in order to get a better understanding
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of aspects of art, religion and science. Indeed, it could be argued that
present-day cognitive scientists working in the fields surveyed here have
a rather limited knowledge of special sciences like sociology, history, and
anthropology. For instance, Hyman (2010) has criticized the neuroscien-
tific work by Zeki (1999), Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) and others
on the grounds that they do not properly distinguish between our appre-
ciation of the works of art and what they represent:
The point I want to underline is that Ramachandran’s theory
of art (we can call it the Baywatch Theory of Art) doesn’t
distinguish between a work of art and the kind of object that it
represents. For example, if (sic) it doesn’t distinguish between
a sculpture that represents a woman with big breasts and a
woman with big breasts. And it follows that the theory cannot
be telling us what “the key to understanding what art really
is” (Hyman, 2010, 255).
Hyman may be conflating two things here: the usefulness of the theory
and its scope. Indeed, it is true that what he terms “the Baywatch Theory
of Art” does not distinguish between our aesthetic appreciation of an
object and what it depicts (see also section 5.2), but this does not mean
that said theory does not critically contribute to our understanding of
aesthetic appreciation. Classical theories of art have not fully appreciated
the cognitive limitations and possibilities that constrain and enable our
appreciation and production of artworks. As we have seen in section 5.4, a
better understanding of cognitive biases can help us to explain particular
developments in the history of art. Cognitive neuroscientists find these
cognitive underpinnings very interesting, because successful art provides
a window onto invariant properties of human perception. The subject
matter of art (such as faces, landscapes, children) also provides a novel
insight into our evolved interests and tastes.
Theories and observations from the special sciences can help to fur-
ther advance the cognitive study of art, religion and science. They can
provide material to test ideas that have only been examined in the in vitro
environment of laboratory studies, mostly with undergraduates from rich,
industrialized nations or with infants and young children from the middle
class of these same countries, using highly constrained and artificial ex-
perimental procedures. Indeed, as Henrich et al. (2005) have pointed out,
the use of these in vitro studies does not capture the full diversity of hu-
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man cognition and behavior. Moreover, an exclusive reliance on western
subjects has the same distorting effect (Henrich et al., 2010). To give but
one example, Bloom (2007) has argued that humans are intuitive psycho-
logical dualists mainly on the basis of experiments with five-month-olds
that showed that infants initially do not extend their intuitive physics to
human beings. However, as Hodge (2008) has shown on the basis of a sur-
vey of afterlife beliefs in diverse cultures, this picture may be too simple
(see the introduction to part III). Indeed, in a large-scale corpus analysis
of ancient Chinese texts, Slingerland and Chudek (in press) have demon-
strated that Chinese make a distinction between material and immaterial
parts of a person, but again, this is not simply the strong psychological
dualism that Paul Bloom proposes: Chinese sources talk about the mind
(xin, literally, the heart), the life force (chi) and the material body. Thus,
while cross-cultural evidence supports Bloom’s (2007) assertion that hu-
mans make an intuitive distinction between body and immaterial person-
hood, this rarely takes the shape of a straightforward Cartesian dualism.
Hence the need to incorporate cross-cultural, archeological and historical
examples in cognitive and evolutionary pictures of human behavior.
Throughout this thesis, there was a consistent focus on human behav-
ior and the cognitive propensities that underlie it—not on the aesthetic
qualities of the art objects, the validity of the theological arguments, or
the veracity of the scientific theories. Indirectly, though, implications
about these subject matters can be drawn, for example, the model out-
lined in chapter 12 provides a naturalistic mechanism for why theories
tend to get better (and presumably more truth-approximating) over time.
As we have seen, the cognitive and evolutionary approach to art, religion
and science outlined here does not require positing overarching silver bul-
let theories that pinpoint a single cause of why we engage in these cultural
activities. Rather, instead of searching for a grand theory that can ex-
plain all of human uniqueness, it seems more fruitful to formulate specific
hypotheses about particular manifestations of human culture using an
evolutionary and cognitive framework enriched with data from the special
sciences—consilience of inductions is an important part of this research
program.
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Notes
1BP stands for ‘Before Present’; it is a standard way in archeology to specify dates
in the past. To avoid the problem of an ever-shifting present, by convention the term
‘Present’ refers to 1950, roughly the beginning of radiocarbon dating.
2An in-depth discussion of cultural evolution falls outside the scope of this disser-
tation. For a more detailed exposition, I refer to De Cruz and De Smedt (2004).
3In this respect, Mithen diverges quite sharply from the position he defended in
1996.
4The use of ethnological and anthropological parallels to examine archeological case-
studies.
5As is common practice in philosophy and cognitive anthropology, small caps are
used to denote concepts.
6Because this thesis is concerned with naturalistic views of concepts, I will here not
discuss the vast philosophical literature that sees concepts as abstract objects (i.e., the
Fregean tradition).
7inherited from a common ancestor.
8specialized, derived.
9The original study I cited to back this up was on cottontop tamarins (Hauser, New-
port, & Aslin, 2001). In 2009, when I wrote the paper on which this chapter is based,
Marc Hauser’s scientific misconduct had not come to light yet. Given the retraction of
a related paper in Cognition (Hauser, Weiss, & Marcus, 2002), which allegedly showed
that cottontop tamarins are not only able to learn statistical regularities, but also more
complex grammatical rules, I decided to replace this reference by another one. There
is little evidence that nonhuman primates are able to learn complex grammatical rules.
10In a refitting process, archeologists try reconstruct the original stone by putting
the flakes they find on an archeological site around the core that has been abandoned
on the same site.
11Retrieved on November 15, 2008, from http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933
,312446,00.html.
12‘Nonwestern art’ is the term routinely used for artistic traditions from outside of
the West, specifically art made by the indigenous populations of Africa, Asia, Oceania,
and the Americas.
13To give my own example—and one that actually happened to me: during a con-
ference last year, I saw a philosopher I had met on an earlier occasion. This gave rise
to the justified belief ‘x is also attending the conference’. However, it later turned
out that the person I saw was not x, but his twin brother. Both were attending the
conference—actually, they were presenting a joint paper, which was a rare occasion for
them, since they normally worked in quite different fields (physics and philosophy, re-
spectively). Thus, my earlier-formed belief was true and justified, yet one could argue
that that belief was not knowledge.
14The term ‘aesthetic experience’ refers to sensory and qualitative appreciation that
involve a subjective sense of pleasure—it is not restricted to art, but can also be elicited
by other stimuli, like a beautiful landscape.
15The golden ratio is the relationship between two quantities, for example, the length
and width of a rectangle, where the ratio of the sum of the quantities to the larger quan-
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tity is equal to the ratio of the larger quantity to the smaller one; it is approximately
1.618.
16Contrapposto is a term for a dynamical position of a human figure, where its weight
is shifted onto one foot (a well-known example is Michelangelo’s David).
17‘Academic art’ denotes paintings and sculptures in a style that was taught at
European academies of the arts, mainly during the 18th and 19th centuries.
18In this chapter, we will make use of one particular derivation of the Price equation.
In chapter 12, we will use a different derivation of the Price equation.
19There was a second refugium (a region where isolated populations of once more
widespread species persist) in the Italic peninsula and the southern Balkan and the
eastern European plains which we disregard here, since these people did not give rise
to the Magdalenian cultural complex. The Epigravettian, the culture in these latter
refugia, was distinct from the Magdalenian and its predecessor the Solutrean. It also
persisted until the Holocene, but its spread after the Last Glacial Maximum was less
successful and less uniform than that of the Magdalenian.
20BBC, 22 January 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1753326
.stm.
21Dating Australian rock art is notably difficult. Many of the pigments are impossible
to date directly. Some paintings from the Kimberley region (northwestern Australia) no
longer have original pigment, making direct dating impossible. In these sites, the paint
has been replaced by a biofilm of living, pigmented micro-organisms whose natural
replenishment may account for the longevity of these paintings (Pettigrew et al., 2010).
The oldest absolute dating of Australian rock art is a luminescence dating of 17,500 BP
(Kimberley region), which actually dates an ancient mud wasp nest that was positioned
over the painting (R. Roberts et al., 1997). However, a compelling case can be made
for an earlier date for figurative art in Australia, based on indirect evidence. As we
shall see in section 8.4, many of these paintings show accurate, naturalistic depictions
of extinct animals such as marsupial carnivores (Fig. 8.1) and giant kangaroos, species
that died out between 46,000 and 40,000 BP (R. G. Roberts et al., 2001). This means
that either the paintings are ancient, or that they are part of an ancient visual tradition
that goes back to at least 40,000 BP, since it would otherwise be very hard to explain
how the painters could have made these pictures so accurately. (There is some evidence
that the demise of the Australian megafauna happened much later in New South Wales.
For example, Field, Fullagar, and Lord (2001) claimed that it persisted up to about
30,000 BP, but New South Wales and the Kimberley region lie thousands of kilometers
apart, so it is not very likely that the Kimberley artists were familiar with the ecology
of New South Wales.)
22These hand stencils have not been dated directly; rather, what has been dated is
a thin layer of calcite overlaying these paintings. This was done using Th/U, which is
a dating method with a wide error margin, hence this wide window.
23E.g., http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8544332.stm.
24Commonly but erroneously referred to as the Dreamtime. The Dreamtime is the
period when the world was created by ancestral beings; the Dreaming is a story that
explains the creation of the world within a particular cultural group setting.
25In a Lakatosian sense, CSR is a successful research program with at its core the
assumption that religion is a product of natural, ordinary cognitive processes, but
aside from this it is more a ‘movement’ among cognitive scientists, anthropologists and
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philosophers than a unified research effort.
26In canon 1, see http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/lateran4.html.
27Unfortunately, it seems impossible to find out who first coined this term as there
are contradictory accounts of it in circulation.
28A few thousand Greek Neopagans notwithstanding.
29see, for example, http://www.hudson-ny.org/1384/europe-decoy-jews.
30I spent several years (intermittently) trying to find the original mention of this
powerful image. In the end, I stumbled upon a 1981 edition of Nature where an
anonymous author had written a piece on Hoyle on evolution, which to my knowledge
is the first mention of this metaphor.
31In the discussion of the causal principle, this chapter will leave aside inductive
versions of the cosmological argument, such as Swinburne’s (2004), which is based on
considerations of simplicity.
32The ha¯d. ith are attested narratives of the sayings, actions and tacit approvals and
accounts of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. In the Islamic world, these play an
important role in jurisprudence and theology (Abdel Haleem, 2008).
33Hume believed that our causal intuitions are purely based on the perceived covari-
ation of events. As will be argued in more detail further on, contemporary cognitive
science indicates that people are also able to infer causal relationships for unique events
if they can identify a plausible mechanism that connects them.
34The most recent genetic studies based on comparisons of complete hominid genomes
hint at a more complicated picture. Apparently, Homo sapiens arose relatively late
in Africa, around 200,000 BP according to genetic material (Tang, Siegmund, Shen,
Oefner, & Feldman, 2002), and around 195,000 BP according to archeological evidence
(McDougall, Brown, & Fleagle, 2005). Once our species left Africa in diverse waves
between 125,000 and 40,000 BP (e.g., Armitage et al., 2011), it experienced limited
gene-flow due to some amount of interbreeding with remnant ancient hominid popula-
tions, in particular Homo neanderthalensis (Green et al., 2010) and an as yet unnamed
Siberian hominid species based on the finds of a tooth and a finger bone at Denisova
Cave (Reich et al., 2010).
35BBC, 16 June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4082078.stm.
36E.g., BBC, 20 October 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-11572894.
37This broad position is not to be confused with evolutionary psychology in the
narrow sense as developed by the ‘Santa Barbara school’, in particular by John Tooby
and Leda Cosmides, see sections 2.2.3 and 5.3 for brief discussions of this research
program.
38This is a type of extreme probability distribution that models long (finite) se-
quences of random variables.
39as supplementary material with the online first version of the paper on the Springer
website http://www.springerlink.com/content/t2443r31h7057093/.
40Transmutation is a historical term for what is now denoted by biological evolu-
tion which avoids the anachronism of ‘pre-Darwinian evolutionary theory’. The term
‘evolution’ was not routinely used to denote the natural development of life on Earth
until Herbert Spencer popularized this sense of the term in the second half of the
19th century. Darwin, for example, in his Origin of species (1859), only once used the
derivative ‘evolved’ (it is actually the last word of the book).
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